
A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

Edited by SIR J. A. HAMMERTON

Complete in six volumes with
about 1000 maps & illustrations

Volume III

THE ALLIES AT BAY: 1916

London

THE FLEETWAY HOUSE

PREFACE TO THIRD VOLUME

AT the opening of the year 1916, the operations, in which provide the subject matter for this third volume of *A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR*, a condition of stalemate had been reached, and throughout the twelve months the Allies were at bay outside the ring that had been formed around the Central Powers. More than once they tried to break through the lines of men and material that were opposed to them, but the year closed with that vital task still unaccomplished and with no definite idea of how, when or where it was to be achieved.

Of the efforts made to break the line during the year the most ambitious was the combined British and French offensive on the Somme that opened on July 1. In spite of the most elaborate preparations, the attack failed with frightful loss, and when, towards the end of the year, the fighting died down, the Allies in the west were still at bay outside defences that more than ever appeared to be impregnable. On the other side of Europe the Russians, led by General Brusiloff, made their last great offensive with equally unsatisfactory results. Two other operations of the year stand out: the epic defence of Verdun by the French, and the battle of Jutland, the one major naval encounter of the whole war. The former was a feat of arms worthy of the best traditions of a great military nation. The latter, although in some ways disappointing to the British people who had been brought up to expect victories of the kind associated with the name of Nelson, was in the real sense decisive, for never again, save by underwater craft, was Great Britain's command of the sea challenged.

Important as were these four events, they by no means exhaust the war story of these eventful twelve months. The British failure to retain Kut was further evidence that during the year the Allies were at bay. A deadlock was reached on the Italian front. The entry of Rumania into the war on the side of the Allies made the circle around the Central Powers more complete,

but it was soon to be proved that this was the weakest part of the ring, as here the Germans and Austrians smashed their way through and speedily had Rumania at their mercy. Before the end of the year Russia was visibly failing, while on the other side the Turks, freed from the necessity of defending Gallipoli, were able to make themselves unpleasantly active in more quarters than one. On the other hand, Great Britain scored successes in East Africa; and in the Balkans the Allies, from the base which had been established at Salonica, advanced against the Bulgarians and recaptured Monastir.

Other subjects dealt with in this volume include the revolt of the Arabs in the Hejaz against the rule of the Turks, the campaign against the Serussi who had invaded Egypt from the west, and the campaign that, on the other side of that country, cleared the Sinai peninsula of the Turks. Further episodes are the war in the air, that was increasing almost daily in size and importance, and the continuous activities of the guarding fleet which, by its steady blockade, was bringing Germany and Austria nearer to surrender. The rebellion in Dublin in Easter week has a bearing on the war, and is, therefore, chronicled as are the transport and other activities behind the lines.

There could be no greater proof of the seriousness of the situation in the main theatres of war than the willingness of the British people to accept a system of compulsory military service, an event which falls within the year under review. This made military service compulsory on all fit males between the ages of 18 and 41, and so supplied material for the armies of 1917. The adoption of the scheme was largely due to the Celtic energy of Mr. Lloyd George, who, having been for a short time secretary of state for war, before the end of the year succeeded Mr. Asquith as prime minister, formed a Cabinet recruited partly from men outside the political circle, and made other innovations in constitutional practice designed to meet the conditions of warfare on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world.

LITERARY CONTENTS

OF VOLUME III

CHAPTER	PAGE
1 Russia's Victories Over Turkey	9
2 The Epic Story of Verdun—(I)	20
3 The Epic Story of Verdun—(II)	31
4 Fall of Kut and After	57
5 Campaign Against the Senussi	73
6 Coming of Conscription	90
7 The Irish Rebellion	107
8 Battle of Jutland	120
9 Russia's Last Great Effort	156
10 Revolt in the Hejaz	173
11 Blockading the Central Powers	183
12 Opening of the Somme Battles	195
13 French Fighting on the Somme	216
14 Autumn Attacks on the Somme	237
15 The Italian Front	259
16 Rumania Enters the War	288
17 Smuts' Campaign in East Africa—(I)	308
18 Smuts' Campaign in East Africa—(II)	329
19 The Salonica Expedition	347
20 Behind the Lines	376
21 Verdun Unconquered	392
22 Clearing the Turks from Egypt	410
23 The Rumanians Retreat	430
24 Battle of the Ancre	452
25 Russia on the Verge of Collapse	475
26 Minor Naval Operations	492
27 Aerial Activity	503
28 The Home Front	527
29 V.C. Heroes of the War—(III)	541
PERSONALIA OF THE WAR—(III)	567
A DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916	605

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

IN VOLUME III

Maps and Plans

	PAGE		PAGE
Armenia	16	Hejaz	177
Verdun.	29	The Somme Area	204
Battle of Kut	67	The Austro-Italian Front..	271
Jutland. Battle Cruiser		Rumania	293
Engagement	123	Salonica Expedition	355
Jutland: Battle Fleet En-		Verdun: Douaumont Front	405
gagement	139	Battle of the Argesul ..	446
Jutland; Scheer's Escape	151	Battle of the Ancre	463

List of Plates

PLATE			PLATE
King George and Some Allied	Headquarters of the Irish		
Leaders	Rebels	12	
Scenes of Austrian Triumphs	British Soldiers in Action in		
The Russian Campaign in Asia	Dublin	13	
Minor	Ruins of a Rebel Stronghold	14	
Honor of the Guns at the	Earl Beatty, Admiral of the		
Battle of Verdun	Fleet	15	
Fort St. Michel at Verdun ..	The End of the Queen Mary		
French Troops Taking Re-	at Jutland	16	
freshment Near Verdun ..	Jellicoe's Dash to Jutland ..	17	
French Soldiers Being De-	Ramming the Spitfire.. ..	18	
corated for Bravery... ..	British Commanders at Jut-		
General Sir A. Murray; Mar-	land; H.M.S. Minotaur ..	19	
shal H. P. Pétain	Three British Ships Sunk at		
King George at Aldershot ..	the Battle of Jutland ..	20	
The Coming of Conscription	Types of Britain's Naval		
Siwa a Stronghold of the	Might	21	
Senussi	Reinhold von Scheer, German		
Mahomet's Burial Place ..	Commander at Jutland ..	22	

LIST OF PLATES—(Continued)

	PLATE		PLATE
German Battleship Seydlitz on Fire	23	The Prince of Wales at Calais	42
The Assault on Mametz	24	Italians in Action at Asiago	43
Troops for the 1st Battle of the Somme	25	Advancing Through Alpine Snows	44
General Sir H. Rawlinson; General Sir H. Horne	26	Italian Gunners in the Mountains	45
British Advance on Beaumont-Hamel	27	Italian Soldiers Crossing the Isonzo	46
Creeping Barrage on the Somme	28	Italian Method of Camouflage Positions in the Carso Campaign	47
A New Element in Warfare	29	Austria at War on Two Fronts	48
British Howitzers on the Somme	30	Fort Vaux Two Years After the War	49
Desolation Around Martinpuich	31	Memorial to French Heroism on Mort Homme Ridge	50
The Coming of the Tanks	32	Rumania at War	51
Attack Near Ginchy	33	Ill-fated Rumanian Town and Bridge	52
British Trench at Ovillers	34	Mackensen Entering Bukarest in Triumph	53
British Wiring Party on the Somme	35	A Serbian Ammunition Dump at Salonica	54
London Scottish Marching to the Trenches on the Somme	36	Allied Fleet off Salamis	55
King George and the Prince of Wales at Fricourt	37	British Triumph on the Ancre	56
Cheering the King at the Front	38	German Submarine at Work	57
King George Inspects a Captured Trench	39	Inglorious End of a Zeppelin	58
King George at Reninghelst	40	Thiepval and Beaumont-Hamel Stormed by British	59
King George Talks With Wounded Officers	41	Mechanical Aids to Victory	60
		Women on the Home Front	61

A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

Volume III

CHAPTER 1

Russia's Victories Over Turkey

WHEN the Grand Duke Nicholas was relieved of the command of the Russian armies in Poland and made viceroy of the Caucasus and commander-in-chief of the armies there, General Nicholas Yudenitch was appointed his chief-of-staff, and was for all practical purposes the actual commander-in-chief. There had been no activity on the Caucasian front during the greater part of 1915, but events elsewhere had by the end of the year greatly increased its importance. Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, a British force had been sent to Mesopotamia and was locked up at Kut-el-Amara, the failure of the Gallipoli expedition had released large forces of Turkish troops, and a Turkish advance through the Caucasus became a contingency which had to be guarded against. In these circumstances a blow at Turkey on this front might have valuable results, and Yudenitch decided that Erzerum, the great Turkish fortress in Armenia, which lay in an important strategic position 50 miles inside the Turkish frontier, should be his objective.

He decided on an advance in mid-winter, despite the fact that the weather prevailing in that stretch of country in January would greatly increase his difficulties. But the Russian plans were laid with careful attention to that fact. Troops were sent for from Siberia who had learned their soldiering under climatic

RUSSIA'S VICTORIES OVER TURKEY

conditions even more severe than those to be expected in the Caucasus in mid-winter. They were inured to hardships. They lived largely in the open, and worked for many months of the year in a climate so cold that the conditions they were now called upon to face had no terrors for them. Yudenitch was able to back these soldiers with an ample supply of mobile artillery, including powerful siege mortars with abundance of shells.

His original plan of campaign, prepared with the greatest secrecy, was to advance along the whole front, from the Black Sea to Lake Van, and to send out simultaneously three columns spread over a wide area, all converging on Erzerum. It is difficult for those unacquainted with the country to realize what such an advance implied. The admirable roads and splendid railways constructed by the Russians in days of peace made it comparatively easy to bring forces to Kars, to Batum and to the Caucasian border. But here the real difficulties began. The shortest road from Erzerum to Kars was about 130 miles long, with inadequate paths buried in deep snow, maintaining a general level of from 4,000 to 5,000 feet above the sea. The whole district was subject to fierce blizzards. Time after time the troops would be compelled to haul their guns and munition trains many thousands of feet up ice-covered mountain sides. In January the normal temperature was 20 to 25 degrees below zero, and at times the cold increased to 40 degrees below zero.

Even hardened troops, accustomed to Siberian weather, might well shrink before such conditions. Nor was the road undefended. The Turks had along this route an army originally estimated at 250,000 men. There is reason to believe, however, that this force had been considerably weakened in order to meet the attempted British advance towards Bagdad. The Russians from the north and the British from the south were each very materially helping one another by causing a division of the enemy forces.

Erzerum had been in its day a great fortress, and its natural defences were extremely good. Standing 6,000 feet above sea level it is protected on the south, north and north-east by mountains which rise to heights of from 10,000 to 12,000 feet. To the south-west flows the Euphrates, while there are also ranges of hills to the east. Its great weakness was that the nearest railway was at Angora, over 400 miles distant, and from there munitions and supplies had to be transported over indifferent roads. The other source of supply was from Trebizond, the Black

THE FORTRESS OF ERZERUM

Sea port only about 100 miles distant; but the Turks had by no means full command of it, and during the latter part of 1915 a force of Russian light cruisers and destroyers had destroyed a large number of Turkish ships.

The Turks had long recognized that in the fight with Russia Erzerum would be a vital point. In 1900 German military engineers began modernizing the old forts, and in 1916 there were at least 18 strong fortresses built on the granite hills, three of them new works, fortresses which should have made Erzerum impregnable. The Deve Boyun mountains, which guarded the north-east route from the Caucasus, were supposed to be specially strongly fortified, and it was claimed that this mountain position was defended by nearly 300 Krupp guns of heavy calibre and 100 mortars, besides 400 pieces of older type. Here again, however, most of the armament existed only on paper. Fronting Erzerum, along the main route where the attack must be made, was another group of forts, also supposed to be splendidly armed.

Over-confidence helped to the undoing of the Turks. Many of the guns which were supposed to defend the position had been removed. Others were none too modern and in none too good condition. The Turks were doubtless suffering, in common with the rest of the Turkish army at that time, from inadequate food. They did not believe that the Russian armies could cross the mountains in any strength, and so did not prepare against such a move. But the factors which really overthrew them were the rapidity and force of the Russian blows. The Russian commander-in-chief first succeeded in producing a feeling among the Turks that there was no special reason to fear him. Then by a series of brilliant moves he caused such confusion among the Turkish staff that it was unable to fathom his plans.

The Russian army was far more favourably situated for attack than the Turkish army was for defence, having a railway base at Sarikamish, only 80 miles distant from Erzerum. The Turkish forces covering the fortress were not large, amounting to something under 150,000 men. They held a line stretching from a point close to the shores of the Black Sea, running through Olti to the shores of Lake Van, a distance of about 200 miles, the last 50 of which were held chiefly by Kurdish irregulars. The 3rd army, which held the position nearest the Black Sea, was commanded by Kiamil Pasha. At the beginning of January, 1916, the Turks did not foresee any danger of an immediate attack at

RUSSIA'S VICTORIES OVER TURKEY

this point. Kiamil Pasha might receive reinforcements from the troops released by the close of the Gallipoli campaign, but he could not expect them until the spring. No doubt this consideration weighed with Yudenitch in deciding upon a winter attack.

A surprise was in store for the Turks, not only in the time of the Russian advance, but in its direction. Yudenitch meant to advance in three columns, the outer ones being separated by a distance of over 60 miles. The Russian army on the right was to advance from Olti, the central army was to march on Hassan Kale, while the third attacked the Kurdish irregulars in the neighbourhood of Lake Van. When the flanks of the defending Turkish army had been pushed back the central Russian army drove forward.

The Russians, who had been greatly hampered by heavy snow, attacked a strong Turkish position, the village of Azankai, 17 miles from Kara Urgan, and stormed an important mountain ridge some 9,000 feet high. This fortified position of Azankai was typical of others. Here on the heights overhanging the roads was a labyrinth formed of several tiers of trenches for infantry and artillery positions. All these works were carefully masked and joined up by sheltered galleries. The Turks held up the Russians for three days there, but at the end of the third day the position was in Russian hands. From here the Russians aimed straight at the Turkish centre, and their artillery overwhelmed the Turkish fire.

The Russian infantry then went forward, and all opposition broke down before it. Cavalry completed the work of the infantry and cut down the retiring Turks by the hundred. Blizzards, bitter cold, heavy snows failed to stop the Russians. The high mountain roads were in such a condition that it was impossible for horses or oxen to drag the great guns, so the Russian soldiers themselves pulled them along. Time after time they were confronted by strong, carefully prepared Turkish positions. These they swept through one after another.

On January 16 there came a big fight at Keupri Keui, where three Turkish divisions tried finally to hold back the Russians from crossing the river Araks, but they forced the position, and two days later had reached Hassan Kale, a little over 20 miles from Erzerum. The Cossacks swept the Turks out of the place and pursued them into the fire zone of the Erzerum forts, slaying large numbers before they could get away. Observers there at

AN ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH

the time described the place as covered with the enemy's dead, and with the bodies of the horses and mules used in their transport service by the Turks. Three days later the Russian howitzers had come up and opened a deadly fire on the supposedly impregnable defences of the Deve Boyun mountains.

While one Russian army under Generals Lastouchkin and Vorobeioff was directed against Deve Boyun, a second army under General Shevasky swept down on Erzerum from the north. It found itself opposed by the Turks, who held a number of fortified heights situated in lofty mountain positions. The Russians themselves paid warm tribute to the courage of the defence at this point. It needed some days' fighting before the Turks were driven out, mainly by a series of night bayonet attacks. The Turkish 10th corps, which had been brought up from the left, confronted the Russians here. The Russians cut the corps in two, and forced themselves between part of this corps and Erzerum, thus preventing it from sharing in the defence.

While these movements were going on to the north and north-east, a still more unexpected Russian advance was taking place to the south. The Turkish staff was convinced that danger was least of all to be feared from this quarter, for in the whole district to the south were mountains rising to a height of 10,000 feet, and without any roads. So confident were the Turks that they had left the defence of this region to Kurds. The Russians determined to attempt the "impossible," and accomplished it. Despite almost incredible hardships, a considerable Russian force struck through, and by February 12 was outflanking the main southern defence of Erzerum, Fort Palandeuken.

To the north-east, Russian troops began to ascend the great mountain Karga Bazar on the night of January 26. There was a blinding snowstorm, and it was bitterly cold. "By a kind of miracle," wrote one Russian correspondent, "they even dragged up not machine guns, but field guns. Camels transported shells for the guns, together with cartridges and food. On these 'inaccessible' heights also arrived the flying Red Cross detachments and the tea-vans of the municipal unions."

By the night of February 11 the Russians were holding a number of important positions about twelve miles from the city of Erzerum itself. But the Turks still held the town and the great fortress immediately protecting it. For the Russians to subdue the fortress by the ordinary method of siege attack would

RUSSIA'S VICTORIES OVER TURKEY

have been, in a climate like that of Erzerum, almost impossible. Storms and snows must in the end have wiped out the Russian armies as they waited in their unprotected positions around the Turkish front. The Russian commanders had resolved on another course. They were to take the city by storm. On the night of February 11 an advance was made from Karga Bazar. The Russians, advancing in three columns and dragging their guns and machine guns with them, reached the edge of the mountainous plateau, descended the snowy slopes, and attacked a series of trenches. Thence the Russians pushed on with the utmost resolution. The Russian batteries planted on the heights of Karga Bazar covered the Russian assaults with sustained artillery fire. At various points the Russians, by successfully manœuvring, so isolated important Turkish positions that it was impossible to hold them. Fort after fort was assaulted and taken. Fort Tafta was stormed in the darkness. The Russian force moved through the deep snow in silence. Its approach was unseen, and the men fell upon a Turkish garrison and bayoneted it without firing a shot.

The main fight for the surrounding forts lasted for five days, from February 11 to 15. Day after day, assault after assault was made. The resistance was desperate and sustained. Several Turkish regiments were annihilated. Other regiments were made prisoners en bloc. Some Turkish army corps of three divisions (40,000 men) were reduced to between 3,000 and 5,000 men. All the remainder had been slain in the fighting, fallen into Russian hands, or perished from exposure. The Russians were the first to admit the resolution and the courage of the enemy. "During the five days' assault the fortress was defended by the Turks with a stubbornness to which the enormous quantity of killed and frozen corpses give testimony." The fortifications were full of Turkish dead, the Russian official account declared.

The assault on the main fortress was made on February 16. Here the fighting was of a severity even beyond that already known. Whole regiments were wiped out. The works were blocked with the dead. The wounded were quickly frozen to death if not promptly attended to. The Turks had prepared their positions carefully. The Russians had to fight at many points through barbed-wire entanglements and over tremendous obstacles. The headquarters staff of Erzerum was mainly German, and while the assault on the fortress was in progress

THE CAPTURE OF ERZERUM

the Germans were the first to abandon the position, causing panic and disorder among the already demoralized Turkish troops.

The road to the west was open to the Turks, and those who could escape fled along it, quickly pursued by the Russian cavalry. According to the official statement, the Russians captured 235 officers and 12,753 uninjured men, besides sick and wounded; 323 guns, nine standards, a vast supply of stores, and a very considerable quantity of ammunition.

The capture of Erzerum came as a surprise not only to the world at large, but even to most Russians. It had seemed impossible that such a thing could be done, and those most familiar with the tremendous difficulties of the undertaking had been most doubtful of its possible success. The "impossible" had been accomplished. The Russian general staff was careful that the Germans should be fully informed of what had taken place. Circulars printed in German, giving a full account of the capture and its significance were scattered by aeroplanes over the German lines. In many cases the Russians stuck up big notice-boards opposite the trenches, "Erzerum kaput" (Erzerum finished). The usual response of the Germans was to open a tremendous burst of fire on the notice-boards.

The Turks hastening away from Erzerum suffered heavily. The pursuit of them by the Russians was to some extent checked by very severe weather: deep snow, which made roads almost impassable, and heavy frosts. But if this rendered it difficult for the Russians to advance, it made it equally difficult for the Turks to carry on their retreat. Large numbers of Turkish troops, caught in the storms and heavy frosts, were frozen to death. The Turks abandoned guns, ammunition and anything that kept them from escaping more quickly. Nine out of ten in many a battalion were lost, and the remnants that finally escaped the frosts and the Cossacks were little more than a broken band.

The capture of Erzerum was of enormous strategical significance, largely because it opened up a very considerable area of country to the Russians. This one point protected Western Armenia and Anatolia from invasion. It commanded all the best roads of Trans-caucasia and of the interior of Asia Minor. With Erzerum in their possession the Russians were now in a position to move forward quickly, and they did so.

The capture of Erzerum was unquestionably one of the most spectacular achievements of the war. The campaign was daringly

THE ADVANCE ON TREBIZOND

conceived, and the consequences of failure would have been dire. Its success was to a great extent due to the unexpectedness of the Russian attack, and though Yudenitch had accomplished great things and had before him possibilities even greater, his next movements would lack the element of surprise.

His first objective was Trebizond. The importance of Trebizond lay in the fact that it had an excellent harbour and good roads communicating with the interior of Asia Minor, so that it would form a base for future operations, besides making the Russian flank completely secure. In winter the road from Erzerum to Trebizond was extremely difficult, and only a small part of the attacking force approached by this route. But as the Russians had command of the Black Sea it was possible to bring a considerable force of troops in transports, and these were landed under the cover of fire from warships on March 4.

The landing was made at Adina, 60 miles east of Trebizond, and the force moved along the coast. By March 8 it had covered 25 miles, and on that day overthrew a Turkish force which opposed its passage of the Kalopotamos river. After that progress became more difficult, and it was not until April 8 that the Russians reached the main line of the Turkish defences. In front of it ran a small river, the Kara Dere, on the Trebizond side of which was a ridge of high ground rising in places to a height of 2,000 feet. The Turks had strongly fortified this position, and it was impossible to outflank it. It could only be taken by a frontal attack, and the Russians did not reach the summit until April 15. Then the Turkish army retired into the city, and three days later another Russian force was landed to the west of Trebizond. The Russians were now only 12 miles from the fortress, and on April 18 the remnants of the Turkish garrison deserted the city and fled south.

To assist in the isolation and capture of Trebizond Yudenitch was attacking in other directions. From Erzerum one Russian army corps was striking directly to Sivas. Another advancing in Persia captured Kermanshah, and from there moved forward in an attempt to take Bagdad in the rear. Another great force pushed down from Erzerum southwards in the direction of Mosul and the Euphrates valley. On February 18 this force captured Mush, 70 miles from Erzerum. By the beginning of March it reached and captured the very important position of Bitlis, 120 miles away. Bitlis was a well planned and strongly defended

RUSSIA'S VICTORIES OVER TURKEY

mountain position, armed with heavy modern guns and occupied by a considerable garrison. The Russian army moved forward at night time during a fierce storm. Following the plan it had previously adopted, it came on in silence, without firing a shot, stormed the place, and took it with the bayonet. Bitlis gave the Russians an entry into the main road down the river valley to the plains of Mesopotamia, and it gave them the whole Van region, cutting in two the Turkish forces operating in the Mush region and in the region of Lake Urumiah.

The Russians in Armenia and Persia, in pushing forward as they were doing, were showing in the best way possible their cooperation with their ally Great Britain, for every mile they advanced brought them nearer to Kut-el-Amara, where General Townshend's force, which had sought to reach Bagdad from the south, was surrounded and unable to advance or retreat.

By the latter part of March, 1916, the position of the Russians in Asiatic Turkey and in Persia was extremely favourable. The enemy had brought up strong forces, but despite repeated endeavours had been unable to stay the Russian advance. In Persia, Russian forces occupied Ispahan, the southern capital, thus finally defeating efforts that had been made by Germany to make the shah their tool, and to use Persia in their campaign to win over the Mahomedan world. The army that had moved westwards from Erzerum towards Sivas was progressing in a way that would eventually threaten Constantinople, and the Turks were busy building strong defensive works from Sivas to Shabin-Karahissar to check it. The army moving southwards that had seized Bitlis had now reached Khizan, thirty miles farther south.

Thence it was aiming at Sert, when the rich Euphrates valley would be open to it. But these Russian successes had convinced Enver Pasha that a great effort must be made to retrieve the situation. During April the Turkish armies were heavily reinforced, and in May were strong enough to take the offensive against Yudenitch. Throughout most of June the Russians stood on the defensive, retiring in some cases from positions they had conquered, and the Turks pressed on towards Erzerum. It was not till July that Yudenitch was in a position to renew the attack. The first intimation of the progress he was making was given on the 12th of that month, when it was announced from Petrograd that he had recaptured Mamakhatun, taken nearly 2,000 prisoners, and was marching on to Erzincan, while the

GAINS AND LOSSES

Turks were repulsed in the mountainous region of the Chorokh. A further success took place on June 15 in the capture of Baiburt, midway on the Erzerum-Trebizond road, and 10 days later all Russia rejoiced over a more important and striking triumph in the fall of Erzingan itself, a considerable military station and otherwise of strategic value. With the taking of this centre the conquest of Armenia was practically complete.

But the Turkish offensive was not thoroughly overcome, for on other parts of Russia's long Asiatic front it was continuing and even making headway. The Turks, in their general plan of campaign, which had been brilliantly worked out for them by a young German officer, struck along the whole of the Russian line. After some success they failed, as was seen, on the grand duke's front from the Black Sea to Erzerum, but in the south-east, in the district of Lake Van, they took from him the towns of Bitlis and Mush in the second week in August, and for some time the aspect of affairs in this region was unpromising for the Russians, who also had been forced to retreat from Mesopotamia into Persia. In May it had been thought among the Allies that Yudenitch, through Baratoff, was in a position to attack Mosul, and perhaps cut off the Turks at Bagdad.

Events utterly belied these anticipations. On June 8 the Russians were defeated at Khanikin, less than 100 miles from Bagdad, on the Teheran-Hamadan-Bagdad road, and driven across the mountains into Persia. In July they lost Kermanshah, and about August 12 had to evacuate Hamadan. Farther north, on the Teheran-Lake Urumiah-Mosul road, they had to abandon Rowanduz, only 80 miles from Mosul, retire across the passes, which were infested with hostile tribesmen, and withdraw to the south of Lake Urumiah. These successes of the Turks were considerable, but as August went on the situation was once more got in hand by Yudenitch, who had been reinforced. Mush and Bitlis were captured again, and the Turks checked and caused to turn westward on both of the Persian caravan roads mentioned above. No movement of any importance took place on this front during the rest of 1916. The Russians held the territory they had taken, and the Turks attempted no further counter-attack.

CHAPTER 2

The Epic Story of Verdun—(I)

TOWARDS the end of 1915 there were indications that even the docile German nation was growing restive under the huge sacrifices it was making to achieve victories which did not seem to bring the end within sight. At Christmas, 1915, General von Falkenhayn, chief of the German general staff, presented to the kaiser a report on the military situation which has since been published in his book, "General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical Decisions." One by one he examined the possibilities of achieving final victory by an offensive against Great Britain, Russia or Italy, and dismissed them all. His report began by saying that France had been weakened almost to the limits of endurance, both in a military and an economic sense, and he concluded with these words:

As I have already insisted, the strain on France has almost reached the breaking point—though it is certainly borne with the most remarkable devotion. If we succeed in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached, and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purpose with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the western front there are objectives, for the retention of which the French general staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death—as there can be no question of a voluntary withdrawal—whether we reach our goal or not. If they do not do so, and we reach our objectives the moral effect on France will be enormous. For an operation limited to a narrow front Germany will not be compelled to spend herself so completely that all other fronts are practically drained. She can face with confidence the relief attacks to be expected on those fronts, and, indeed, hope to have sufficient troops in hand to reply to them with counter-attacks. For she is perfectly free to accelerate or draw out her offensive, to intensify it or break it off from time to time, as suits her purpose.

THE GERMAN FORCES

The objectives of which I am speaking now are Belfort and Verdun.

The considerations urged above apply to both, yet the preference must be given to Verdun. The French lines at that point are barely 12 miles distant from the German railway communications. Verdun is, therefore, the most powerful *point d'appui* for an attempt, with a relatively small expenditure of effort, to make the whole German front in France and Belgium untenable. The removal of the danger, as a secondary aim, would be so valuable on military grounds that, compared with it, the so-to-speak "incidental" political victory of the "purification" of Alsace by an attack on Belfort is a small matter.

Falkenhayn's belief that France would bleed herself white in defence of Verdun was based on an appreciation of its political or even sentimental significance in the eyes of the French. It was an historic city, which was regarded by every Frenchman with pride, and it was the key-for'ess to the eastern defences of France. Falkenhayn was right in his belief that its surrender would be unthinkable to the French; he was wrong in his estimate of the courage and tenacity with which they would cling to it. Before the end of December, 1915, Falkenhayn's plan was accepted, and preparations for the attack were begun. The first step was to mass a surprising force both of men and artillery on the western front. It was usually reckoned that the Germans maintained on all fronts a field army of about 74½ army corps, which at full strength numbered 3,000,000 men.

Yet, while holding the Russians from Riga to the south of the Pripet marshes, and maintaining a good show of force in the Balkans, Germany succeeded in bringing up nearly 2,500,000 men for her grand spring offensive in the west. At one time her forces in France and Flanders were only 90 divisions. But troops and guns were withdrawn in increasing numbers from Russia and Serbia in December, 1915, until, it is estimated, there were 118 divisions on the Franco-British-Belgian front. A large number of 6 in. and 12 in. Austrian howitzers were added to the enormous Krupp batteries. Then a large proportion of new recruits of the 1916 class were moved into Rhineland depôts to serve as drafts for the 59 army corps, and nearly all the huge shell output that had accumulated during the winter was transported westward. These gigantic preparations could not be entirely hidden from the French staff, but Falkenhayn made his dispositions in a very skilful manner, Out of his available total of 118 divisions he

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(I)

massed his principal striking force against the British army. Verdun was apparently only a secondary objective against which first 19 and later 30 divisions were concentrated.

One effect of this massing of German troops against the new and longer British line was that the French commander at Verdun, General Herr, scarcely expected the overwhelming attack made upon him on February 21, 1916. General Herr's staff knew—though he himself declined to believe it—that the enemy was preparing a formidable assault in the woods north of the old French frontier fort. But though the German airmen were very active throughout January and February, a good deal could be seen by the French aerial observers of the vast secret work going on amid the misty tracts of woodland. Germany sent the pick of her airmen to the Verdun front, and it was not until the middle of March—nearly four weeks after the opening drum-fire bombardment—that the French recovered fully at Verdun the power of reconnoitring the enemy's positions and bombing his distant lines of communication.

The French staff reckoned that Verdun would be attacked when the ground had dried somewhat in the March winds. It was thought that the first enemy movement would take place against the British front in some of the sectors of which there were chalk undulations through which the rains of winter quickly drained. The Germans encouraged this idea by making an apparent preliminary attack at Lihons on a five-mile front, with gas-clouds and successive waves of infantry. During this feint the veritable offensive movement against Verdun began on Saturday, February 19, 1916, when the enormous masses of hostile artillery west, east and north of the Verdun salient started registering on the French positions.

Falkenhayn's plan was to achieve victory, not by a preliminary bombardment of the French lines followed by an infantry advance which would have involved heavy losses, but by bringing to bear upon the enemy such a terrific fire that the attacking forces would only have to occupy the ground which the artillery had rendered untenable. So confident was he that his guns would overwhelm the French that he dared to return to old-fashioned methods. He did not dig gun pits for his lighter artillery: he placed hundreds of pieces of ordnance side by side on open ground, confident that his hurricane shell fire would overwhelm the enemy before they could make an adequate reply. The

AN AGED GENERAL

German lines had the advantage of being densely wooded, and the ever-green fir woods formed a splendid cover for the vast artillery preparations. A French airman sent to count the batteries in the small wood of Granilly, gave up his task in despair, saying there were more guns than trees.

The method of handling these great parks of artillery was as terrible as the force employed. It was a development of the phalanx tactics used by Mackensen in breaking the Russian lines at Gorlice ; and according to a rumour Mackensen was at Verdun, with his chief, General von Falkenhayn, superintending the disposition of guns and men. The commander nominally in charge, Field Marshal von Haeseler, was a man of 80, of the type of von der Goltz—excellent at drawing up schemes on paper, and accounted the best military leader in Germany. He had, therefore, been given a position similar to that which Blumenthal occupied in the Franco-Prussian conflict, and was placed in command of the crown prince's army, so that by his genius he might win personal glory for the Hohenzollern dynasty. General Herr, who had succeeded General Sarraill as army commander on the Verdun sector, did not anticipate the character or the tremendous violence of the assault that opened at dawn on February 21, 1916.

For two days the German heavy howitzers had been battering at the 25 miles of defensive earthworks round Verdun. This was the orthodox manner of preparing for a storming infantry advance on a wide front, in order to make so large a gap that the hostile long-range guns of defence behind the third line could not close the rent by means of curtain fire. A break 10 miles in width was thought to be necessary. General Herr had only two army corps to hold back the seven army corps that the Germans first brought forward, but the high, broken, difficult ground about Verdun favoured the defending forces. Moreover, the French engineers had worked in an astonishing fashion to increase the natural difficulties of the terrain. In the low ground, such as that round the two Ornes heights held by the Germans, the French had tunnels at a depth to which no shell could penetrate.

In the three important woodlands lying between Ornes and the Meuse—Haumont Wood, Caures Wood and Herbebois Wood—there were tunnels for protection against flame-projector attacks, deep, winding communication saps hidden in the trees, with shrapnel cover for escaping from intense gun fire, and land mines,

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(I)

entanglements and spiked barriers with high-explosive attachments and trip-mines; in short, all the intensive system of protection that had been developed in the Argonne fighting. General Sarrail had only extended his lines to the woodlands in the plain between the Meuse and Ornes in the spring of 1915, snatching the ground from the enemy bit by bit when the German forces at Verdun were weakened through sending reinforcements to the Champagne and Lille battlefields. General Sarrail, however, extended his lines into the low-lying northern woodlands with considerable reluctance. He liked hill positions himself, and there was a dispute between him and the high command regarding his manner of fortifying the newly-won ground. As a result he was sent to Salonica, and the defence of Verdun in the new style was given to General Herr.

But the phalanx tactics of the Mackensen school were calculated to overwhelm any system of defensive works, new or old, in forests or on hillsides. The German attack was irresistible, and it was only the large space of country available for retreat between the Meuse and Ornes line and the Douaumont plateau that saved Verdun from immediate capture.

The enemy maintained a bombardment all round General Herr's lines on February 21, but this general battering was done with a thousand pieces of field artillery. The grand masses of heavy howitzers were used in a different way. At a quarter past seven in the morning they concentrated on the small sector of advanced entrenchments near Brabant on the Meuse and Haumont; 12 in. shells fell with terrible precision every few yards, with the result that the trenches were obliterated. In each small sector of the six-mile northward bulge of the Verdun salient the work of destruction was done with surprising quickness. After the line from Brabant to Haumont was smashed the main fire power was directed against the other end of the bow at Herbebois, Ornes and Maucourt. Then, when both ends of the bow were severely hammered, the central point of the Verdun salient, Caures Wood, was smothered in shells of all sizes, poured in from east, north and west. In this manner almost the whole enormous force of heavy artillery was centred upon mile after mile of the French front. When the great guns lifted over the lines of craters the lighter field artillery, placed row after row in front of the wreckage, maintained an unending fire curtain over the communicating saps and support entrenchments.

HURRICANE FIRE

Then came the second surprising feature in the new German system of attack. No waves of storming infantry swept into the shattered works. Only strong patrols at first moved cautiously forward to discover if it were safe for the main body of troops to advance and reorganize the French line so as to allow the artillery to move onward. But in planning an advance to be achieved by such methods the Germans had overlooked the fact that the French had learned much from their previous experience of trench warfare. Their high command had continually improved their system of trench defence in accordance with the experiences of hurricane bombardments in Champagne and the Carençy sector. General Castelnau, the acting commander-in-chief on the French front, was indeed the inventor of hurricane fire tactics, which he had used for the first time in February, 1915, in Champagne. When General Joffre took over the conduct of all French operations, leaving to General Castelnau the immediate control of the front in France, the victor of the battle of Nancy weakened his advance lines and then his support lines until his troops actually engaged in fighting were very little more than a thin covering body, such as is thrown out towards the frontier while the main forces are well behind.

The effect of this tactical device was to leave very few French troops exposed to the hurricane fire, and to minimise the losses which the Germans had been sure they could inflict upon the enemy. In every case the fire-trench line before Verdun was almost empty, and in many cases the real defenders of the French line were men with machine guns hidden in dug-outs at some distance from the photographed positions at which the German gunners aimed. The batteries of light guns, which the French handled with the flexibility and continuity of fire of machine guns, were also concealed in widely scattered positions. The main damage caused by the first intense bombardment was the destruction of all the telephone wires along the French front. In one hour the German guns ploughed up every yard of ground behind the observation posts and behind the fire-trench. Communication could only be slowly re-established by messengers, so that many parties of men had to fight on their own initiative with little or no cooperation from their comrades.

Yet, desperate as were their circumstances, they broke down the German plan for capturing trenches without an infantry attack. They caught the patrols and annihilated them, and then

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(I)

swept back the main bodies of German troops. First the bombing parties were felled, then the sappers as they came forward to repair the line for their infantry, and at last the infantry itself. The small French garrisons in every centre of resistance fought with cool courage, and often to the death.

Artillery fire was practically useless against them, for though their tunnel shelters were sometimes blown in by the 12 in. shells, which they regarded as their special terror by reason of their penetrative power and wide blast, even the Germans had not sufficient shells to search out all the underground chambers, every one of which had two or three exits. The new organization of the French machine gun corps was a great factor in the defence. One gun fired 10,000 rounds daily for a week, most of the positions selected being spots from which each German infantry advance would be enfiladed and shattered. Then the French "75's," which had been masked during the overwhelming fire of the enemy's howitzers, came unexpectedly into action when the German infantry attacks increased in strength. Near Haumont, for example, eight successive furious assaults were repulsed by three batteries of "75's." One battery was then spotted by the Austrian 12 in. guns, but it remained in action until all its ammunition was exhausted. The gunners then blew up their guns and retired.

Some of the Haumont guns got through the German fire curtain and helped in the defence of the Caures Wood. Here there occurred some memorable exploits. First of all the wood was taken, despite its magnificent system of defences, by the smashing effect of the German heavy shell fire. The position was almost as strong as the famous German labyrinth near Arras, and, knowing this, the enemy used his 16.8 in. Berthas in addition to the 12 in. Skoda guns. The thick roofs were driven down upon the men sheltering beneath, and the wood had to be abandoned. But the survivors of the garrison held the enemy back while a lieutenant of engineers with his men laid a large number of mines with electrical firing wires. The German general, after his skirmishers and bombing parties had been beaten off, went back to the old Prussian method of a mass attack, and launched a division against the wood. By arrangement the French covering troops fled in apparent panic, and were hotly chased down the trenches and communication saps to the southern outskirts. As the last man left the wood the lieutenant

SOME HARD FIGHTING

of engineers, who was near Beaumont waiting the signal, pressed a button. Many of the trees rose in the air, and extraordinarily heavy losses were inflicted on the advancing troops.

In spite of the vast forces employed so lavishly, the Germans achieved but little on the first day of battle. They won a footing in the first line trenches and in some of the supporting trenches—a thing any army could have done with a large expenditure of shell. The French still held Brabant and Haumont; and the garrisons of Herbebois Wood and Ornes were making a superb defence. But on the morning of Tuesday, February 22, the Germans worked up a ravine between Brabant and Haumont by means of flame-projectors. At the same time the German artillery renewed its smashing, intensive fire, wrecking and flattening out Haumont village and breaking up the French works for a depth of three or four miles. Fortified farms were bombarded south of Haumont Wood and transformed into volcanoes by the huge German shells, and when night fell trench warfare had come to an end so far as the northern part of the Verdun garrison was concerned.

All their earthworks had been swept out of existence, and the troops fought and worked in the open in a tragic darkness lighted by the enemy's wonderful star-shells. They had been hammered out of Brabant, on the banks of the Meuse, and their centre had been driven in. On the right, however, the garrison of Herbebois Wood still clung on to part of their original position under an intermittent hurricane of heavy shell, the intervals of which were filled by infantry attacks. Under the enemy's fire the French troops linked their Herbebois line with Hill 351, digging all night in a rain of shell to connect the two positions for a fresh defence against an enfilading attack on Beaumont. When morning broke the Germans began the attack on this new French line. After a desperate struggle lasting 12 hours, in which the German commander continually brought up fresh regiments, the French retired from Herbebois and another wood below it, but still held on to the hill.

All along this side of the salient hand-to-hand fighting went on, from Ornes to Bezonvaux and the advanced position of the Hill of Vaux. Small French garrisons held advanced positions in the plain stretching towards the enemy's basin of Etain. There was terrible fighting at Maucourt, where the French had some quick-firing guns, posted only five yards apart and


THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(I)

unmasked, against German columns charging 20 men deep in close ranks. The French soldiers themselves sickened at the slaughter they wrought. They were so near to the enemy at Maucourt that odds and ends of human remains almost fell on top of them as their melinite shells exploded in the German masses. The French gunners suffered more in proportion than their infantry, especially in the centre and the left wing, where the guns had to fight a continual rearguard action in the open. Though they often caught German columns at short range, they were in turn smitten by the heavy German guns, enemy airmen circling over them and directing the fire. Ornes held out until the afternoon of February 24, when the garrison, attacked from three sides, retreated to Bezonvaux, from which a ravine ran up to Douaumont. Covering the country north of Douaumont was a force composed of Zouaves and African sharpshooters. They recaptured part of the wood between Herbebois and Hill 351, and then withstood a prolonged bombardment of terrific intensity; but eventually they were pushed out of Beaumont and out of the wood they had recaptured, and they lost Fosse Wood, a little way below the Douaumont plateau, towards which they retired.

At the same time the centre and left of the French salient were being hammered back with increasing rapidity. The division close to the Meuse, which had withdrawn from Brabant and Haymont, tried in vain to counter-attack from their second line at Samogneux, Hill 344, and a fortified farm near by. The enemy massed his guns against them across the Meuse, northward, and north-westward. They could not move out to attack, and by the evening of February 23 their position was untenable. In the night they withdrew from Samogneux towards Côte du Poivre, which was practically their last dominating position. Côte du Poivre was, indeed, the critical position of the entire defence of Verdun. Had the enemy won it he would have been able to advance along the Meuse and cut off a large part of the French forces in the salient.

General Herr and his staff, however, devised a deadly system of defence. In an attempt to take Verdun at any cost, the enemy was pushing ahead in continual rush attacks, following the line of least resistance rather than making sure of his footing. Across the river at this point the French held several lines of dominating heights, from which they poured a flanking fire into every

A GHASTLY SIGHT



VERDUN. Map of the environs, showing the successive lines taken up by the defence under the pressure of German attacks between February and June, 1916.

hostile force advancing from Brabant and Haumont. The nearer the Germans came to Verdun, on the Côte du Poivre sector, the more terribly they suffered from the fire across the Meuse. They came within range of rifles, machine guns and light field pieces, as well as heavy howitzers, and while their flanks were thus shattered, their front was hammered from the Côte du Poivre position. At Vacherauville, a village just below Côte du Poivre, the enemy's advance was definitely checked on February 25. In one ravine near the village, as day was breaking, some French gunners on Côte du Poivre espied a grey mass of hostile forces, and shelled it furiously.

The Germans did not move. When the light was clear, it was seen that the figures were dead, though many still stood upright. They had been caught by the heavy guns across the river and slain wholesale, more by shell-blast, apparently, than by shell fragments. Haeseler had made a costly mistake in driving up the Meuse towards Côte du Poivre before he cleared the French from Côte l'Oie, Mort Homme and Charny ridge across the river. He afterwards tried to remedy his error by bringing his main artillery forces against Côte l'Oie and Mort Homme. But before thus widening the scope of his attack, he tried to preserve

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(I)

the intensive, narrow method of assault in the Mackensen style by thrusting into the centre of the flattened Verdun salient. That is to say, he shifted the point of the phalanx from Côte du Poivre to the middle of the Douaumont plateau. This was the right course, for it removed the attacking masses and their immediate artillery supports from the French flanking fire across the Meuse, and brought them nearly within reach of victory.

The great thrust into the French centre also cleared the French out of the eastern edges of the heights of the Meuse overlooking the Woivre plain, for the Zouaves and Moroccans and the former garrisons of Herbebois and Ornes were farthest from Verdun, and most in danger of being cut off. The Zouaves and Moroccans fell back on Douaumont, while the troops from Bezonvaux entrenched themselves.

At this critical time, a great snowstorm swept over the hilly battlefield and the lowland marshes of the Woivre. The storm was a disaster to the Germans. It robbed them in the crisis of the struggle of their tremendous power of artillery. Gunners and aerial observers were blinded, and from their point of view matters were not much improved by the mist that followed the snow. Snowdrifts in the valley paths delayed the forward movement of the guns and the bringing up of ammunition and supplies to the firing line. This was when the original German plan for economy in men failed. The high command could not wait for its guns to resume full action. The infantry, which had been promised so easy a task, had to undertake, with diminished artillery support, the terrible work of breaking the French front by hand-to-hand fighting. Verdun, after all, was to be purchased with German blood and not with German shells.

The great arc of artillery was, of course, still able to work by the map and by observers in the firing line. It could pound villages, farms and old forts in which French troops might be sheltering, but it could not aim at the manœuvring columns and discern all the paths of communication. On the plateau of Douaumont, some four hundred feet above the Meuse, the garrison of Verdun had the old entrenchments prepared at the outbreak of the war and improved by long labour. Then there were many improvised new defences—masked batteries of quick-firers, to be unmasked only against mass infantry attacks, and hundreds of machine guns.

CHAPTER 3

The Epic Story of Verdun—(II)

GENERAL JOFFRE, General Castelnau and their staffs were now convinced that Verdun was the enemy's first objective. The British army took over all the line where the second grand German offensive was expected, thus liberating important French reinforcements for the battle on the heights of the Meuse. All lines and roads leading roundabout or direct towards Verdun were crowded with men and material. The main French force—the mass of manœuvre—was driving towards the enemy. The only matter of doubt was whether it would arrive in time to hold Verdun, or whether the supreme contest between French and German would take place on the western side of the Meuse.

This depended upon the staying power of the small, original garrison of Verdun. At heroic sacrifice they had to cover the massing of the great new forces. The situation had become very critical on the afternoon of February 24, when large enemy forces debouched between Louvemont village and the hill in front of the Douaumont plateau. General Herr flung all his remaining reserves into the fight, with the order that the line between Douaumont and Haudromont was to be held at any cost. Haeseler in turn, using the snowstorm as cover, brought up all his available infantry and employed them in mass attacks of great persistence. His aim was to wear down the physical power of endurance of the thin line of the French. On February 25 the Germans, after a long hand-to-hand wrestle, took all the village of Louvemont at the slope of the plateau, and climbed up the ridge, but were thrown back.

About this time General Castelnau went to Verdun to examine the position. He was not satisfied with what he saw. The Germans had won a magnificent artillery position on the high land at Beaumont, towards which they were dragging the main group of their heavy guns. The command of the air had been almost lost, and there were not enough pontoon bridges across the flooded Meuse to bring up quickly the needed reinforcements.


THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

As a result of Castelnau's visit General Herr was relieved of his command and General Pétain was entrusted with the reorganization of the Verdun defences. But before General Pétain could get to work there was the immediate task of checking the massed infantry attacks, which the enemy was employing. General Castelnau could not arrange to bring up a large force—time and means were lacking. A picked body of fighters was needed, and, with pardonable favouritism, the general wired for the Bretons who had won the battle of Nancy for him—the Bretons of the 20th army corps, under General Balfourier.


The two key positions to Verdun were Côte du Poivre and the Douaumont plateau. If the Germans could take these Verdun would be in their hands. So confident were they of success that the kaiser had arrived at the crown prince's headquarters to witness the final triumph.

Saturday, February 26, was a supremely momentous day, for on it the Germans made their grand attack all round the horse-shoe front from Côte du Poivre to Douaumont. Time after time they swept forward only to be mowed down by the murderous fire on front and flank upon Côte du Poivre, "the German's grave." Time after time fresh masses took the place of those who had been mowed down, only to meet with the same fate. Five times they came on; five times they were shattered. But on the east, the Douaumont side, they were covered from the flanking fire; yet it was only with the seventh onslaught that they won at last a footing on the plateau, and the alarming news was proclaimed that they had captured the fort of Douaumont. Its fall was announced in a German official communiqué as an important success "achieved in the presence of his majesty the emperor and king."

As a matter of fact, the achievement at Douaumont, though serious, was very far from being so important as it seemed. The so-called fort was one of what had been a ring of outlying forts round Verdun, all of which had been dismantled a year before, when the uselessness of forts under the new conditions had been made clear. The Germans had a footing on the plateau, and that an extremely precarious one; the dismantled fort, occupied by a Brandenburg regiment, made a dip in the French line. The French, before the storm of artillery fire which had preceded the last attack, fell back a short distance, but as twilight was falling, Balfourier, with the 20th army corps, came into action.



The Royal Palace at Cetinje capital of Montenegro. Montenegro joined Serbia on the outbreak of war, and Cetinje was occupied by the Austrians January 1916.



The unpretentious Montenegrin Parliament House at Cetinje. At one time it was used as a theatre.



View of Durazzo, Albania, from the sea. The town was taken by the Austrians in January, 1916, after they had overrun the country.

SCENES OF AUSTRIAN TRIUMPHS IN JANUARY, 1916



View of Erzerum, mountain city of Armenia once a frontier fortress of the Byzantine empire. Its capture by the Russians under General Yudenitch from the Turks on February 16, 1916 was one of the outstanding military operations of the war. The Russians took 13,000 prisoners, more than 300 guns and immense quantities of munitions and supplies.



The defences of Trebizond after their capture by the Russians in April, 1916, in the course of their Caucasus campaign against the Turks. The town is noted as the place where Xenophon and the Ten Thousand reached the sea after their historic retreat. Trebizond, which is situated on the Black Sea, 570 miles east of Istanbul, was retaken by the Turks in February, 1918.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS IN ASIA MINOR



View of Avocourt, France, showing the village cross, all that remained of the place at the close of the Great War. It was prominent in the battle of Verdun, when, in March, 1916, the Germans attacked with flaming liquid in the Avocourt-Malancourt sector and seized Avocourt Wood on March 10.



The fortress of Douaumont near Verdun seen from the air before the German bombardments and, right, the same fortress afterwards. It was a noted centre in the battle of Verdun, the Germans capturing it on February 25, 1916, when its fall caused great alarm. It was not till October 24 of that year that the French recaptured it.

HAVOC OF THE GUNS AT BATTLE OF VERDUN



"FALL 'MIDST THE RUINS RATHER THAN SURRENDER." This motto was engraved on the arch of Fort St. Michel was characteristic of the dauntless spirit that animated the French troops in the battle of Verdun which commenced on February 21, 1916. St. Michel was one of the five forts in the Verdun sector.

DOUAUMONT

The vehemence of attack of this new French force was terrific. The men went forward with such speed that the enemy was surprised; but, after falling back some hundred yards, the Prussians proved worthy of their reputation as a crack corps, and resisted with great vigour. They bent without breaking, under sudden and very severe pressure. The Bretons dashed onwards for more than a mile, joining on to the Zouaves at Douaumont village, and enclosing part of a Brandenburg regiment in the fort. The Germans on the slope of the ravine, however, managed to hold on to a sap running through a coppice and connecting with the fort. They thus retained a valuable observation station on the plateau from which they could direct their main batteries at Beaumont.

After breaking against the Douaumont ridge on February 26 the German attack weakened. Fierce infantry fighting continued at Douaumont village till the end of the month. Then came an ominous period of calm, lasting three days. The enemy was moving his enormous parks of guns closer to Verdun. But the time thus spent by the Germans in the thick slush of valleys and ravines, into which the thawing snow drained, was extremely valuable to General Pétain. He threw bridges over the Meuse; he augmented his gun power on the western heights at Mort Homme and Charny ridge, making his flanking fire from this direction more deadly and far-reaching; he strengthened the Douaumont plateau defences, and poured in guns, ammunition, and fresh troops by means of a special service of motor-lorries.

General Pétain did not, however, pack his infantry into the restricted Verdun area. Under fire his men were scattered but fresh, the main force being well out of range of the German artillery, and used in short shifts at the front, a division at a time. On the other hand, no German within five miles of the French guns was safe. As the new French commander's shell supply became greater owing to the constant improvement of his lines of communication, and as newly-rifled guns arrived regularly to replace those worn by firing, he gradually dominated the German artillery. It is quite likely that the guns in use on both sides throughout the operations amounted to 6,000; for the rifling of the heavy ordnance wore out rapidly.

In continual drum-fire bombardments, in which massed artillery acted like one gigantic machine gun, it was not only

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

shell stores, carefully accumulated for months, that were spent, but the life of the heavy ordnance. The wasting of shell accumulation and the wearing out of the guns crippled the immediate offensive power of an army in a manner that no reserve of man-power could compensate for. General Pétain therefore had to provoke the hostile artillery into constant action, as well as induce the German infantry to fling itself against his quick firers and machine guns. Thus, even if he could have done so at once, it might not have been sound policy to overwhelm the enemy with a large part of the French accumulation of shell.

In the first days of March the Germans resumed their bombardment and infantry attacks upon the Douaumont plateau, losing heavily, yet not shifting General Balfourier's corps. But Douaumont, despite the enemy's activity round it, had then become a place of secondary importance. General Pétain had not waited for bridging material to transport his big guns across the Meuse. Instead of concentrating round the spot at which the enemy was striking, he ran his new heavy ordnance more quickly up the Argonne Forest to the hills above Verdun, on the opposite side of the stream. There, with a range of five miles, he could sweep all the reserve, support and firing lines of the enemy's forces engaged on the front of three and a half miles between Côte du Poivre and Douaumont.

This abruptly changed the situation, as the Germans viewed it. They had to take the hills across the Meuse—Mort Homme and Charney ridge especially—in order to recover fully the power of making mass attacks on the Douaumont plateau. So the tide of battle shifted and the great batteries at Beaumont swung round to westward to make a flanking bombardment on the French positions across the Meuse; and east of these positions another mass of heavy German artillery near Montfaucon opened a hurricane fire. Then on March 6 infantry assaults began. Forges, a weak salient in the French line, was taken at great cost, but the enemy could not debouch from the hamlet on to the northern slopes of Côte l'Oie. The force that attempted to do so was shattered. But the next day a fresh German division reached part of the crest, and worked down the railway to Regnéville, lying over against Samogneux, with the river between. The conquerors had, however, advanced against terrible machine gun and artillery fire and were badly weakened, though the total French garrisons of Forges and Regnéville had

FORT VAUX ASSAILED

been very small. Again new forces were deployed on March 7, and by another day of hard and good fighting the German commander made a brilliant stroke. He captured Corbeaux Wood and Cumières Wood, from which a decisive advance could be made on Mort Homme. If Mort Homme fell, General Pétain's power over the enemy's ground across the Meuse would be seriously reduced, and his more southerly position in Charny Wood would be menaced.

He at once threw reinforcements towards Mort Homme, and by an attack quite as fine as that of Balfourier's corps at Douaumont the division recovered the greater part of the two woods. All the next day it withstood frontal and flank attacks, with the enemy's guns pounding it from the north, east and south, the reverse fire coming from German batteries across the river near Côte du Poivre. On March 10 another fresh, large enemy force of some 20,000 infantry worked again through part of Corbeaux Wood and Cumières Wood, suffering frightful losses and achieving no great result. All that General Pétain had fought for was time: he had gained more than 48 hours in which to organize the works on and round Mort Homme in the way he wanted. This important advanced position had now become safe—for the crucial time at least.

The German commander also needed time to bring up his guns to cover the ground he had won in the woodlands and by the river. So there was a lull round Mort Homme. But, on the distant eastern side of the Verdun salient the German offensive was resumed with extreme violence. The new objective was the fort of Vaux, south-east of Douaumont Fort and connecting with it in the old system of defence before the structures of armoured concrete were emptied of guns. The fort on the plateau was approached by a ravine in which lay the village of Vaux. Supported by their heavy artillery in the Woivre plain, the Germans attacked round the mouth of the ravine on March 9, and at night some 6,000 Poles got into the village, but were scattered by a bayonet charge.

Fort Vaux was not captured, though the struggle for it went on for weeks with increasing fury. Even by the middle of March the ground below the fort was heaped with greyish forms, where the dead and dying had rolled down the slopes. In the ravine below, the Germans, by the end of March, won the eastern houses of the village, but could not for long advance farther. It cost

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

them the larger part of a division to get this small footing, and when, at increasingly heavy sacrifices, they occupied all the houses and began to climb the ravine, a terrific French bombardment, followed by a bayonet charge and bomb attack, cleared them out again. They had no time to dig cover enough to protect them from Pétain's heavy guns. Vaux Fort remained untaken, and Caillette Wood was recovered by the French early in April, thus strengthening both the Douaumont and Vaux positions.

At the beginning of April the crown prince's army had been increased from 14 divisions to 25 divisions with a view to a fresh attack. A vast mass of men, with some thousands of guns, was concentrated among the forested heights on the left bank of the Meuse, from Cumières Wood to Béthincourt Wood. The French lines were drawn around Mort Homme, rising 100 feet above the woods occupied by the Germans, and around Hill 304, the summit of which was only 60 feet above the highest part of the wooded ground held by the enemy.

Between the two principal heights round which the French positions were established there ran a valley road southward to the hamlet of Esnes. This valley dipped about 100 feet between Mort Homme and Hill 304. The German siege guns bombarded the nine-mile front with unparalleled fury, the tempest of shell being more terrible than that which swept away the first French defences at Verdun in February. Then, on the morning of Sunday, April 9, 1916, some 40,000 Germans came out of the woods of Béthincourt and Malancourt, and stormed up the long western slopes towards Hill 304. The grey figures advanced in dense and very deep formation, by columns of companies, the intention being to choke the French guns by sheer numbers.

But the wonderful French "75," which was used like a machine gun by General Pétain's soldiers, broke every German column within 100 yards of the French trenches. Then as the grey flood ebbed from the western slopes of Hill 304, a stronger German attack was launched against Mort Homme on the eastern side of the nine-mile front. Here the Germans had only 700 yards of ground to take in order to reach the high northern boss which the French used as an observation post. Another huge body of German troops charged from the woods in dense columns, but General Pétain turned hundreds of guns upon the grey masses, smashed them up completely, following them into Corbeaux Wood and Cumières Wood until the

PETAIN'S TACTICS

entire force went to pieces. The German commander then brought up a fresh force that crept over the water meadows between the Meuse and the slopes of Côte de l'Oie and tried to rush the ruins of Cumières village. Advancing along the open field of fire by the grass flats, the Germans were caught in a terrible way by shrapnel, machine gun bullets and musketry fire, and driven back with very heavy loss.

In the afternoon two more masses of men were launched westward against Hill 304 and eastward against Mort Homme. Towards the end of the day a German brigade managed to take some trenches near Avocourt, but the position was recovered in the twilight by a French counter-attack. On the eastern side the enemy won 500 yards of advanced trench at the base of Mort Homme, and succeeded in retaining this unimportant bit of low ground for some days. It had cost Falkenhayn probably the best part of 50,000 men to take 500 yards of advanced trench. His losses were almost as heavy as those the British army had incurred during its operations at Loos, yet the Germans had not made the least impression upon the French defences. It was a grave set-back to German hopes, and in a special order of the day General Pétain informed the soldiers of Verdun that they could now be confident that victory was achieved.

The elements of General Pétain's new system of resistance had been tested almost to breaking point, but it was the Germans who were broken. General von Falkenhayn could not, for some time, maintain an ordinary amount of pressure against Pétain's lines, for the German reserves before Verdun were exhausted. But instead of letting the battle die down, General Pétain began to force the pace of it. He pressed the Germans back at Douaumont, and in answer to his pressure two fresh German divisions were brought from another part of the front and launched in a general attack between Douaumont and the river. The French guns and machine guns broke the attack, and all that the Germans won was a small French advanced position in Chauffeur Wood. The Germans also made a strong local attack on Mort Homme, where they were again defeated. At the beginning of May, General Pétain became chief of the French general staff, and was succeeded in the command at Verdun by General Nivelle.

One of the first things General Pétain had done when he arrived at Verdun was to recover the mastery of the air from the enemy, so that the Germans usually had to go by direct observation from

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

heights and from captive balloons far in their rear in order to trace the position of French batteries. Hill fortifications had lost nearly all their old military importance. Neither side entrenched a large force of infantry along the crest of a hill in order to shoot down an attacking host. Hill tops were occupied only by artillery observers, sitting in a deep hole at the end of a periscope and a telephone wire. French observers on Mort Homme, and the line of Charny ridge some miles south of Mort Homme, watched every movement of Germans near the Meuse, and brought howitzers by the score or by the hundred to bear upon the moving target.

Mort Homme, an eminence rising 968 feet above sea level, was the dominating French observation point. Eastward it overlooked all the German positions facing the Douaumont front, and northward it dominated all the woods occupied by the Germans from Forges to Cuisy. But it was the eastward outlook, on the German attacking positions immediately north of Verdun, which made Mort Homme an objective of the highest importance to the German commander. He could not make a frontal attack on Verdun with any chance of success until he had captured Mort Homme and had thrown back the French batteries that enfiladed from across the Meuse every German advance on the Côte du Poivre-Thiaumont-Douaumont line.

So all through May and the greater part of June, 1916, Falkenhayn, through his subordinate commanders, directed a series of terrific attacks at the Mort Homme. Some assaults were made directly against the long, undulating plateau rising northward in the round boss above Béthincourt. Other attacks were planned to turn the Mort Homme positions by flanking movements westward. For three days and three nights all the ridges and slopes for miles around Mort Homme were swept by heavy shell fire, and on Sunday morning, May 7, a mass attack was delivered on a two-mile front between Mort Homme and Hill 304. Some five brigades tried to storm the heights, but they were broken one after the other before the cross-fire of the French batteries and machine guns, and when evening fell only one communication trench on the west side of the valley had been won by the Germans. This trench was dominated by higher French positions both east and west, so that, costly as it had been to win, it was still more costly to hold. In the night the French recaptured it, and then held or crushed up every

FIGHTING FOR THE HILLS

counter-attack. When dawn broke the French still held their recovered trench, and the Germans had only tens of thousands of dead and wounded to show as the result of the fourth great attack on Verdun.

On the east of the Meuse a Prussian division tried to break through the Thiaumont Farm on the Douaumont ridge, while the French enfilading forces around Mort Homme were held up by the direct assault made upon them. The Prussian division advanced with admirable steadiness, and though battalion after battalion was shattered, a few hundred survivors succeeded towards the evening in taking 500 yards of the French line. The victorious remnant of the division was pounded all Sunday evening by hundreds of French guns, and then a small fresh French force was brought through the curtain of fire the Germans maintained around Thiaumont, and in a swift counter-attack retook nearly all the lost ground. The Germans had spent nearly a month in the preparation of this new offensive movement, yet after expending millions of shells, wearing out guns by the hundred, and losing an immense number of men, they won nothing. As a French officer sardonically remarked: "The cost of ground around Verdun is rising."

Under the explosions of innumerable shells the north and north-western slopes of Hill 304 were churned into a chaos. All the northerly slopes of Mort Homme ridge were likewise ploughed up. The French infantry sheltered on the southern slopes, the summits being defended only by crossing fires from French batteries. Thereupon the tide of battle was turned by Falkenhayn still farther westward. He had begun by attacking Mort Homme in order to turn Cumières Wood; then he had attacked Hill 304 in order to turn Mort Homme, and on May 10 he attacked the height west of Hill 304 in order to turn Hill 304. The attacked height, known on the map as Hill 287, and called by the Germans White Ant Hill, was an elevation with gentle slopes lying midway between the main French position and the westerly woods occupied by the Germans. It was enfiladed by French batteries in Avocourt Wood in the same way as Avocourt Wood could be enfiladed by French batteries in the next westerly sector. All the French positions interlocked, so that any German frontal attack upon one or more of them came under a cross-fire. Yet two German divisions endeavoured to storm Hill 287. One advanced from the western

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

woods and another from the northern valleys. The western division was caught on two sides by gun fire, and broken before it arrived at the French trenches. Sections of the northern division reached one of the slopes held by the French, only to be driven out by a counter-attack.

This waste of the forces of an army corps was followed by another pause. The Germans replaced their worn-out guns, and filled out with young drafts their wasted infantry forces. Then on May 17, after another long, terrific bombardment, a general attack was delivered against the French line on the left bank of the Meuse from Avocourt to Cumières. Avocourt Woods, from which the French guns had enfiladed the assault on Hill 287, were first attacked by strong German forces at six o'clock in the evening. The struggle raged with extreme fury all night, the successive waves of German infantry being thrown back with terrible losses. Towards dawn on May 18 the French commander felt the enemy weakening, and suddenly launched two attacks, one against a German position north of Hill 287 and the other against a fortified post on the north-east slope of Hill 304 held by Pomeranian troops. Both of these German positions were captured.

The enemy commander, therefore, moved his attack towards Mort Homme, and, under a hurricane of shell, sent two fresh divisions forward. These, however, were broken by gun fire, their only gain being a small position near the road leading from Haucourt to Esnes. Thereupon Falkenhayn resolved to overwhelm the French with shell fire. For two days and two nights the boss and the plateau of Mort Homme smoked and flamed under the concentrated fire of hundreds of heavy German and Austrian howitzers. When the north-western and north-eastern slopes of the Mort Homme had been made untenable two swarms of German infantry attacked on either side in an endeavour to envelop the salient height.

The eastern division, that coming from Corbeaux Wood, swept over the remnant of French machine gun sections who valiantly tried to hold the fire-trench, and in large numbers climbed up to the French second line. But on the height they were met by flanking counter-attacks from the French lines at Cumières. Though the German commander flung another division into the battle, he could not make any headway. The French forces by the Meuse continued to take the Germans in the flank with gusts

RAMPARTS OF DEAD BODIES

of artillery fire, machine gun fire and bayonet and bomb attacks. All the spearheads of the German thrust were destroyed.

On the western slopes of Mort Homme, however, the enemy succeeded in winning a position round the dominating boss of the hill. The boss itself was swept by the fire of French and German guns and transformed into a No Man's Land, the French garrison being driven down into the shallow depression on the plateau. The French trenches were wiped out, and all the ground on the height for a depth of nearly two miles was covered by a curtain of fire from the German batteries. Yet French reinforcements, coming up in motor-lorries, pushed through the tempest of death, and leaping forward from shell-hole to shell-hole, arrived at the ruins of the first-line trenches. There the reinforcing troops, sadly diminished in numbers, drove back two waves of enemy sharpshooters, and then held up the advancing massed columns of double companies, by means of which the German commander tried to conquer the lower southern ridge of Mort Homme. As the German columns were held by rifles and machine guns, the flanking French batteries caught the checked grey masses and mowed them down.

Soon the Germans had ramparts of their own dead to serve as cover in their rushing mass attacks. On both Mort Homme and Hill 304 the grey piles of dead, wounded and stunned men formed barriers some yards in height. Still, there was something sublime in the absolute disregard for death displayed by the German soldiers. Their cohesion and drive under appalling losses exceeded all old Prussian records of tenacity in attack. At the end of the battle the French still held the southern slopes of Mort Homme, where they were solidly entrenched, and their positions ran in a curve round the eastern and western slopes.

The Germans had won a salient on the northern face of the height, but could not get farther. Communication trenches, running across the Esnes valley, connected the French organizations on Mort Homme with their system of trenches on the western slopes of Hill 304. On this height the French positions now formed a salient in the large horseshoe curve which the Germans had won round the base of the hill. The crest of Hill 304 was still held on May 23 by the French in spite of the fact that the Germans in their official communiqués claimed to have conquered it. As a matter of fact, the enfilading fire of the eastern French batteries at Cumières had become a greater

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

obstacle to the German advance on Mort Homme than the batteries south of Hill 304. Cumières and the woods around it formed the extreme northern point of the defending armies around Verdun. As the guns in the wood were linked by telephone to the central exchange in Verdun, as well as to the army exchange on the left bank of the Meuse, their fire could be directed against the Bras-Douaumont front as well as against all German movements on the eastern slopes of Mort Homme. Cumières, therefore, became the main objective of Falkenhayn's next general attack.

On May 23 the French line was again buried in shell and cloaked in smoke. French airmen, sent out to reconnoitre the movements of German infantry, flew perilously near the ground but could see nothing. A great cloud of smoke, 600 feet thick, blanketed the scene. The smoke was so dense that the flame of the high explosives could hardly pierce it, and under this cover waves of German infantry went forward. The main attack was delivered on the centre at Hill 304 and Mort Homme and on the right wing at Cumières.

But the smoke was not all German smoke. Every French gun and howitzer that could be brought to bear maintained a barrage of fire over the German positions and the No Man's Land between the trenches. It was not until the evening that the German infantry could get through the curtain of high explosive and shrapnel and reach the French trenches between Mort Homme and Hill 304. Having at last got within striking distance, the Germans brought up a detachment of flame-throwers, and with torrents of liquid fire burned the French out of their lines as twilight was falling. Just before nightfall the French returned, and in a charge of terrible fury bayoneted and bombed the flame-throwers with their supporting troops out of the lines, and recovered all the position.

In half an hour's nocturnal fighting the Germans lost all the ground they had won at the cost of thousands of men, and only a small remnant of them escaped back to the trenches from which they had advanced. But on the wing at Cumières the German effort was more prolonged and more successful. The ruins, lying in the great loop of the Meuse, were bombarded for some hours and then attacked by waves of infantry. The small French garrison armed with machine guns held out in cellars and shell-holes until May 24, but then some Thuringian regiments, by

CAURETTES WOOD

means of a long, violent alternation of gun fire and assault, broke through the village and stormed along the water meadows of the Meuse towards the railway station at Chattancourt.

This was a very important advance for the Germans. It brought them a mile behind Caurettes Wood, in which the French batteries were sited, and south-east of Mort Homme. But the French commander had the situation well in hand. All the low land by the river which the Germans had won was under the fire of French guns on either side of the river. A tempest of shell was poured upon the Thuringians, and French reinforcements, brought up in the night, were launched in a counter-attack. By the river the Germans were pushed back a mile to Cumières village, and then from Caurettes Wood they were assailed by another French force. When day broke on May 25 one point of the French pincers was thrust into the cellars and rubble of the village eastward, and another point of the pincers closed westward on the Germans above Caurettes Wood. The enemy commander had then to free his trapped and half-scattered force, and by hammering for the greater part of a week against the left point of the pincers he compelled the French force in Caurettes Wood to ~~loosen~~ its hold on Cumières.

But, from the night of May 24 to the morning of May 31, the French commander controlled the situation. All this time he held the survivors of the Thuringian regiment in a vice, and compelled the enemy to launch from the northern wood mass after mass of infantry against the terrific fire of the French guns. The original French garrison of Cumières was very small, and though the counter-attack was made by a larger force, its first victory was won at no great loss, and the enemy was then forced to sacrifice his men during a week of tremendous gun-fire defence.

By this time the French had brought out a new missile of attack against the line of German observation balloons that dominated the hills on either side of the Meuse and directed the fire of thousands of German guns. A new kind of French bomb destroyed the hovering "sausages," and left the German gunners in a condition of great disadvantage. The French airmen were masters of the air, and were able to trace the direction of the flow of German ammunition and German reinforcements, spot for their own guns, and protect their own observation balloons. Thus General Nivelle was in a position to make his preparations in secret, and, when Falkenhayn was bringing all his available

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

forces to bear against Mort Homme and Cumières, an answering move was delivered by the French commander on the other side of the Meuse.

Here the main French positions had scarcely altered since the 20th army corps flung the Brandenburgers back on Douaumont Fort. The fort was a ruin hemmed in by new French trenches and dominated by French howitzers. But as the German emperor had staked the military prestige of his empire on the possession of the fort, General Nivelle selected this point for attack, with a view to lightening the enemy pressure against the French positions across the Meuse. His direct object was to relieve the pressure against Mort Homme by compelling the Germans to bring large reinforcements across the Meuse. To a single French division was assigned the task of making a diversion ; but it was a famous division—the 5th—under a famous commander, General Mangin, who with his men had broken all the attacks made by the enemy the previous April on the Douaumont-Vaux sector. In their first Verdun battle the troops of the 5th division had killed or captured every German who reached their trenches, and had stormed every position they were set to attack. "You march under the wings of victory," said General Mangin in April, when he gave his men a furlough for a month, while the division was being strengthened with new drafts in preparation for further fighting.

In the third week in May the troops came back from their homes, with their ranks brought up to full strength, and at dawn on May 22 Douaumont Fort looked like a volcano in eruption. The French artillery was completing its methodical bombardment, and as soon as daylight came a squadron of pilots flew over the lines and exploded six of the German observation balloons. Having thus "bandaged the eyes of the Boche," as the French soldiers put it, the 5th division began to advance from shell-hole to shell-hole at 10 minutes to 12 in the morning. One regiment skirmished forward through the Caillette Wood towards the right side of the fort. Another regiment made a frontal attack in the centre, while the third regiment converged on the left near Thiaumont Farm. The Germans, divining their danger, drenched the ground with shrapnel, but the French infantry went through the fire and over three lines of German trenches.

Just at noon a French aerial pilot reported by wireless that a Bengal fire was burning on Douaumont Fort. It had taken the

THE GERMANS COUNTER-ATTACK

129th regiment a little under 11 minutes to break into the fort. Bengal fires also appeared on the western side among the shattered masses of concrete, indicating that the 36th regiment was succeeding in its flanking attack on the west. When the north-western and northern angles were reached machine gun sections and sappers began to move about the ruined masonry, constructing redoubts against the coming counter-attacks. But the French thrust from the Caillette Wood, in which the 74th regiment was engaged, was shattered by a flanking fire from some German communication trenches. This check prevented the swift enveloping movement from being completed, with the result that the north-eastern angle of the fort remained in the hands of the Germans. Nevertheless, the two victorious regiments bombed their way into nearly three-quarters of the entire position, and captured over 100 prisoners.

In the night the Germans delivered a furious counter-attack. An enormous number of infantry was collected east of Haudromont Wood, and by sharp bombardments alternating with mass attacks the French line in front of Thiaumont and east of the fort was slightly pressed back. But in the fort itself the 129th regiment resisted in a marvellous manner. Instead of giving ground, its men somewhat increased their gains. At dawn on May 23 the German fire on the fort became appalling. The trenches had for months been battered by heavy French shells, and now the Germans again turned their parks of artillery upon the ruins, tearing the concrete into splinters and excavating the ground to an extraordinary depth. It seemed that nothing could remain alive amidst the choking fumes.

But the men of the 129th regiment, though falling in hundreds, continued to break up every charge. The miracle was how the regiment managed to save any machine guns and bombs in their front lines during the terrific bombardments, seeing they had had only a few hours in which to prepare their position against the very heaviest shell fire. When the regiment was relieved in the early morning of May 24 it had not lost a yard of the ground it had captured; but afterwards two fresh Bavarian divisions were launched through the broken remains of the first great counter-attacking force, and by the evening the ruins of Douaumont were recovered by the enemy.

Nevertheless, the operation was a considerable success for General Mangin and his chief, General Nivelle. By employing

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

only 12,000 bayonets in an abrupt, unforeseen attack upon the most ticklish point in the enemy lines, the French commander had compelled Falkenhayn to bring at least four times the number of bayonets for a counter-attack. Falkenhayn had been collecting a large general reserve, which he intended to use in a grand, decisive frontal attack on Verdun as soon as he had won the positions round Mort Homme from which General Pétain had enfiladed all his previous frontal attacks. He thought that he had at last reduced the French army to a condition of passive resistance; but General Mangin's alarming thrust into Douaumont Fort taught him that the offensive spirit of the French infantryman was still as strong as ever.

Nevertheless, Falkenhayn decided to make his general attack upon Verdun. The fact that General Pétain had now been given the command of all the armies of the centre created a belief in the German staff that the next attack was now to be expected in the Champagne sector. Therefore, during the last days of May, Falkenhayn mustered all his available forces in an endeavour to draw to the defence of Verdun forces which he supposed General Pétain intended to employ in Champagne, and to obtain a decision there before a new French offensive became effective. From various parts of the German front he obtained five divisions to reinforce his troops.

Heavy guns by the hundred were also shifted towards the left bank of the Meuse, and after a bombardment the first of the new divisions advanced from Corbeaux Wood on Mort Homme in the evening of May 28. Broken by the French curtain fire, the division fell back, re-formed, and attempted another advance at midnight, which was again shattered. Finding that the preliminary bombardment had not weakened the French defence, the German commander marked the hundredth day of the battle of Verdun by an unparalleled storm of heavy shell fire.

For 12 hours the whole of the French front from Avocourt to Cumières were subjected to a bombardment far exceeding in violence that which had first broken the French north of Verdun. Then by terrific blows of massed brigades the French positions from Mort Homme to Cumières were hammered in with fearful waste of life. The French trenches were erased along the high road running from Béthincourt past Mort Homme to Cumières, but the advanced French forces retired to the high road and there resisted every hammer-blow. The German infantry could not

FALKENHAYN'S PLANS

get through the French artillery fire. The position was indeed an extraordinary one. Practically the whole of Mort Homme had been conquered by the German gunners, who kept 250 heavy howitzers playing on this small stretch of high ground. Very small French forces of infantry were holding out in shell-holes and broken trenches on some of the east, west and southern slopes. It seemed to require only one charging German regiment to take and occupy the position. But though the enemy commander sent out divisions instead of regiments, his troops could not sweep up the ruins of the French position. The French guns dominated the field of struggle. Hill 304, against which a fierce assault was also delivered, remained impregnable, and on the left bank of the Meuse the French were still holding out in their old lines, when the Franco-British offensive on the Somme opened on July 1.

As General von Falkenhayn failed to push back the French positions on the left bank of the Meuse, which from across the river enfiladed all his frontal drives against Verdun, he had to abandon the short road to the fortress town. He turned away eastward, towards the right wing of the French defences at Vaux. Here there was a natural line of attack which had allured Field Marshal von Haeseler during the first phase of the Verdun operations. From Vaux a great ravine ran from east to west as far as the village of Fleury, providing cover for a large attacking force directed against the last fortified heights around Verdun.

On the north of the ravine was Caillette Wood, which the French had captured on March 31 and lost on April 2. South of the ravine was the broken mass of Fort Vaux, empty of its guns and defended only by a small force of infantry with machine guns and grenades. It was only four miles from Vaux Fort to Verdun, and owing to the long ravine a considerable part of the distance was sheltered from direct fire and ordinary observation. The French heavy guns on the left bank of the Meuse could give practically no assistance against an attack along the Vaux ravine, and the wonder is that Falkenhayn did not concentrate continually against Vaux, instead of wasting men by the ten thousand on the enfiladed Douaumont front and on the impregnable and secondary western heights of the Meuse.

East of Douaumont Fort the Germans had possessed for months, in Hardaumont Wood, an excellent means of approaching to the ravine, for a number of smaller ravines ran from the

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

wood down into the long, deep gorge. But the French were so firmly established from the south-east of Douaumont to the Vaux gorge that the area of attack was practically reduced to the mouth of the ravine. On May 31 a grand bombardment began on ground already churned and pitted by months of fierce artillery fire. Strong German detachments which had been working round the flanks of Harcourt Wood made raids to test the defences of Vaux village, and piled the French barricades with their dead. The woods up the slopes on the left became alive with crawling foes, while the German artillery continued to shell the village. Then, when the strain upon the defenders had become intense, two fresh German divisions made a terrific rush attack. Each mass took a side of the ravine.

One division on the left won a footing on the slopes of the promontory occupied by Vaux Fort, while another division on the right drove through the French barricades in the valley, carried the church and the group of houses round it, and stormed the larger part of the long street. This result was due largely to the skill of the German artillery observing officers watching the struggle from the northern slopes. They brought their gun fire down in hammer-strokes with terrible precision on the houses and gardens where the French tried to make a stand.

But there were French observing officers on the southern side of the gorge, and when their infantry were driven from the village to the millpond the heavy guns smashed up what remained of the village. The French infantry, who were fighting with machine guns behind an old mill, then charged back, recapturing the village street and pushing the Germans back to the ruined church at the eastern end. All day and all night the small band of Frenchmen, after their wonderful recoil against the blow of an entire army corps, fought like men possessed and broke every charge made by the enemy.

For three days and three nights the awful struggles at the mouth of the gorge went on, and as the German commander threw fresh divisions into the shambles, the savage fight swayed up and down the village street till the little brook in the ravine ran red and the living fought behind mounds of dead. On the south-east of Douaumont Fort the French Alpine troops broke every German attempt to get at Vaux village from the rear. On the glacis of Vaux Fort a Saxon division, which had made the first mass attack on the left, came upon a sunken line of barbed-

A GALLANT STAND

wire entanglements which had been missed by the German shells, and were there held and slaughtered by the thousand. The steep slopes of the promontory were covered with a mass of writhing figures unable to advance and unable to escape. The French had a long field of fire down the incline, and with bombs, musketry fire, machine gun fire and a curtain of shrapnel they caught the Germans, front and rear, and annihilated them.

Half-way between the fort and the village there was one small trench held by the 101st French infantry regiment, and only 40 yards away were the German entrenchments. The French trench was smashed up by salvos of 11 in. shells, and by maintaining a continual fire with packets of 10 of these shells the Germans prevented the position being repaired. But the weakened regiment held out and stopped an enemy advance through a neighbouring wood, and then, cut off from food and water, fought on all night and all the next day and broke an enemy charge in the evening. An order was then given to send up a rocket, asking the French gunners to put a curtain fire over the retreating Germans. Unhappily, the rocket burst before it rose, and set fire to the whole stock of rockets. The trench filled with fire and smoke, and French artillery observers on the height above thought that the enemy had conquered the position by a liquid-fire attack. At the end of two hours the flames were got under and the stock of grenades prevented from exploding. Sixteen pints of water were then got through the German curtain fire to the survivors of the regiment, enabling each man to have one mouthful.

In the darkness of the early morning of June 3 the Germans made another attack in force, but it was driven back by hand grenades and rifle fire. Soon afterwards it began to rain, much to the relief of the defenders. Spreading out canvas, tins and other receptacles, they at last obtained a good drink of water. As the torture of thirst had troubled them much more than the shell fire and the infantry charges of the enemy, they became more confident. A rain of smaller shells, 4 in. and 5 in., fell upon them. Some Germans, hanging on to the slopes of Vaux Fort, enfiladed them with a machine gun on the right, and another party of Germans who had got into Fumin Wood brought a machine gun against them on the left. Then, after being sprinkled with shells of all sizes for six hours, they were attacked

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

by wave after wave of German infantry. Yet once more they threw back every attack. All night they were again bombarded with extreme violence, and just before dawn the German troops again attempted to rush the shell-holes in which the battered regiment was sheltering. But when the relieving party managed to get through the German fire on June 5 the enemy was still held off the north-west slope of Vaux promontory.

The torn and battered fort had been pounded with heavy shells since March, an average of 8,000 shells falling on the ruins every day for nearly three months. The entrance was blocked up, and only one wicket in the north-western corner remained for bringing in supplies and keeping up communications. The trench held by the 101st infantry regiment had protected the movement through the north-western wicket gate; hence the extraordinary resistance which the men there maintained for five days. Within the fort was a tiny garrison of 150 men under Major Raynal, who had been twice badly wounded, and came out of hospital unfit for service in the field. He applied for the command of Vaux Fort in May, pointing out that his injuries would not impede him in directing the defence of the ruined mass of concrete. Sleeping in a cavern and hobbling among the broken masonry, the gallant major so arranged his machine guns and stock of grenades that the fort, which was absolutely useless as an artillery position, became a magnificent machine gun post.

It rose in the north-eastern angle of a little tableland, stretching 1,840 yards above the great gorge. On the eastern side the plateau was cut by another ravine that ran towards the south-east. On both these steep sides the little garrison, with its machine guns and hand grenades, had a tremendous advantage over the attacking forces; and though outnumbered often by 100 to one, they rolled the Saxon division down the crest, 200 yards from the wall of the fort, and broke another division that climbed up the south-eastern ravine. As the Germans had proved at Douaumont, a modern fortress of armoured concrete when hammered into absolute ruin makes a superb machine gun position. It needs only a small garrison, who have deep caverns in which to shelter; and long periscopes help to make the work of observation safe against anything except a direct hit by a heavy howitzer shell.

Vaux Fort, however, was more than a machine gun redoubt defending two of the principal ravines of the Verdun district.

A LACK OF WATER

Owing to its position on the edge of the plain stretching to Metz, it was the principal observation post of the French 11th army. It overlooked the lowland eastward and north-eastward of Verdun, and afforded such information of the enemy's movements as no balloon observer or aerial scout could obtain. Major Raynal had only 150 men with him as a garrison on May 31, but the next day some 400 wounded troops, caught in the terrific rain of German shells, retired into the fort for shelter.

This was the chief reason why the fort fell, for there was not enough water for 550 men. Practically nothing could be got through after June 2, even dispatch bearers being brought down. The shower of rain that saved the 101st regiment, holding the trench between the fort and the ravine, was of little use to the garrison. They were too busy fighting to make arrangements to get water for half a battalion. They had to contend against liquid flame, poison gas shells, and innumerable assaults. There were eight or nine attacks in force every day, with only one pause, on June 3, after four divisions had been broken in the ravine and round the promontory.

On June 4, however, the German commander made a new concentration of his guns. He drove an advanced French force back from its dangerous position on the edge of the plain at Damloup, south of Vaux, and then with an enormous crescent of guns firing north, north-west and east of the promontory he smashed up all the outer defences and ringed the entire fort with an incessant fire.

Then it was that the handful of heroic Frenchmen began to weaken from thirst. A few daring men succeeded in getting in with a tiny supply of water, but all outside attempts made to get a large supply into the fort failed. By an encircling movement the German infantry won the wall of the fort and tried to rush across the courtyard, but were shot down. They climbed on the shattered roofs and, with a rope, lowered baskets of high explosives through the windows, dropped in time fuses, and swung the charges against the French sharpshooters in the rooms. Still the garrison fought on. Owing to lack of water, the situation became hopeless on the morning of June 6, and Major Raynal then surrendered with his handful of exhausted men.

After vainly battering along the ravine from Vaux to Fleury, which the French soldiers had named the Ravine of Death, the German commander made a thrust northward at Thiaumont. The Thiaumont works lay on a ridge connecting the Douaumont

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

plateau to the height of Froide Terre, rising by the Meuse immediately north of Verdun. On the right of the Thiaumont ridge was another height, Hill 320, that dominated the eastern end of the Ravine of Death, the gorge being also commanded by two wooded promontories known as Vaux Chapitre Wood and Fumin Wood. On June 12 the Germans drove in on Thiaumont on a front of three miles, with three divisions, and after dreadful losses they got a footing on the slope west of Thiaumont. There followed a long pause of 11 days while the German commander was bringing up the enormous forces he was concentrating at Thiaumont. On June 23 he made his supreme attempt with six divisions of infantry, launched in dense columns like incessant battering-rams, against the Thiaumont ridge. The ridge was carried with its earthworks, after a Rhenish division had been thrown back from the western slopes of the ridge, for a Prussian reserve corps simultaneously pushed down eastward from Douaumont and, after hours of fighting, reached the Thiaumont earthworks and pierced the French line.

To avoid being cut off by the forces closing on it eastward and westward, the small French garrison fell back rapidly on Fleury village by the end of the ravine coming from Vaux. The victorious Germans stormed into Fleury village, but again there was seen the surprising and magnificent power of recoil of apparently beaten French troops. Fugitive and seemingly routed, the defeated garrison of Thiaumont turned in the village, drove the Prussians out of the houses they had won, and then chased them northward up the road to Bras.

Thereupon the German commander threw in his last reserves, making in all 100,000 men launched on a sector only three miles wide. In a fierce hand-to-hand struggle with bomb and bayonet the French were again pushed out of the northern end of Fleury village. French forces, however, still occupied the southern promontories of the Ravine of Death running from Fleury to Vaux, and a small wood south-east of the fort was also held by the French against all attacks. Every line of approach from Verdun was crossed by converging fires from powerful hidden French artillery positions. All the German attacks coming from Fleury, for example, were taken in flank by tempests of shell directed from the observation post at Fort St. Michel, while attacks coming from Vaux were taken in flank by a tempest of fire coming from Fort Tavannes. Then directly facing the enemy

NIVELLE'S ORDER

was Souville Fort on the right of the line, a dominating position overlooking the plateau of the tableland of Vaux and about equal in height to Douaumont. None of these French forts was an artillery position. The old 6 in. guns had been removed, and far more powerful howitzers with quick-firing action were concealed around the southern slopes of the heights. As in the case of Vaux, the old battered forts were merely observation posts and machine gun redoubts manned by a couple of hundred men. The main French forces sheltered in large caverns and moved into action by way of tunnels and deep communication trenches.

The design of the German commander was to press a converging attack upon Souville Fort, eastward from Vaux and northward from Thiaumont. In four months he had captured a mile and a quarter of ground at the price of over 250,000 men. He was now faced with the problem of capturing nearly four miles of ground, across which ran two strong defensive lines, for each of which the French asked the same price. He began by attempting to drive in towards the river against the Côte du Poivre and Froide Terre defences. But this seems to have been only a demonstration, for the French army across the Meuse still clung to the slopes of Mort Homme and enfiladed any direct assault on the northern sector of Verdun.

On June 23 General Nivelle issued the following order:

The hour is decisive. The Germans, feeling themselves hemmed in on all sides, are delivering furious and desperate attacks in the hope of reaching the doors of Verdun before they are themselves attacked by the united forces of the Allied armies. Comrades, you will not let them pass! Your country calls for yet this supreme effort from you. The army of Verdun will not allow itself to be overawed by shells or by that German infantry whose efforts it has smashed in the past four months. The army of Verdun will know how to maintain its glory intact.

On the day on which General Nivelle's order was issued the British guns opened their bombardment from Ypres to the Somme, and warned Falkenhayn of what was about to happen. The German chief of staff thereupon asked the commander who was in active control of the crown prince's army to make one more attempt to snatch a decision at Verdun. It will be remembered that General Nivelle had recovered, on June 23, the northern key position of Thiaumont work between Douaumont and the ridge of Froide Terre. The recovery of this fortified

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

height left the enemy powerless to close upon the old inner Fort of Souville. Souville Fort had been constructed, with the neighbouring north-eastern fort of Tavannes, after the war of 1870, and before the invention of the high explosive shell in 1886. The two old forts were therefore of little direct practical value against the enemy's gigantic array of heavy siege ordnance, ranging from 16.8 in. Berthas to the 8 in. howitzer which was the principal German weapon against Verdun. The 8 in. howitzer had a range of about six miles, and was employed in parks, and not in batteries, to produce an overwhelming hurricane of trench-smashing shell.

Towards the end of June the Germans turned hundreds of these 8 in. guns upon the Thiaumont work and Souville and Tavannes Forts and Froide Terre. Then after days of bombardment, which the French guns answered with telling vigour, a terrific infantry battle raged in and around Thiaumont. The French lost the work, but stormed back on the morning of June 30 through a series of hostile curtain fires, and recovered the position. In the afternoon the Germans returned in dense columns, and were mowed down by gun fire and machine gun fire. By persistent pressure of packed waves of attack the Germans at last re-entered the work at three o'clock in the afternoon, but at half-past four they were again thrown out by strong storming columns of French infantry.

The next day the German commander made another succession of grand attacks on Thiaumont, and apparently, in his report to the general staff, claimed to have entered it after a struggle of 48 hours. He attacked on a wide front from the Damloup Hill eastward to the height of Froide Terre northward, and while pressing the French on both these flanks drove in at the centre, which was Thiaumont. But the French 2nd army stood firm all along the line on the day when the Allies were attacking the German defences on the Somme.

The German eastern wing stormed up and into Damloup, rising south of Vaux Fort. The French surged back and recovered Damloup, were again driven out on July 3, and once more went back and re-established themselves on Damloup. Meanwhile, the struggle on the Thiaumont hill went on with increasing fury, each side concentrating the fire of all available heavy guns over a wide arc upon the few furlongs of the coveted key position.

THE GERMANS TAKE DAMLOUP

At an inordinate waste of life the German 5th army, under the crown prince, at last managed to take Thiaumont by burying the hills in explosions of heavy shell and launching column after column of storming infantry, who regained the work for the fourth time. The French troops remained in immediate contact with the position, and at Damloup Hill, in spite of violent bombardments and infantry attacks, they continued in possession.

The enemy's recovery of Thiaumont was an affair of importance. It again opened the way for an advance upon the old inner defences of Verdun, and enabled Falkenhayn to proceed with his plan of obtaining a success on the Meuse that would divert French forces and munitions from the Somme. The village of Fleury, lying at the mouth of the long Vaux ravine and giving access to the slopes of Souville Fort, became the objective of the enemy's operations.

After a long and intense bombardment the German infantry was launched on July 7 against the French positions between Thiaumont and Fleury. The Germans took the front French line, but were thrown out of it by a French counter-attack, and when night fell the defending front was unbroken. Another prolonged artillery preparation went on for four days. Then on July 11 the German infantry made an assault on a large scale, closing upon Damloup Hill, Fumin and Le Chenois Woods, Vaux-Chapitre Wood, Fleury village and the ground south of Thiaumont.

General Nivelle and General Mangin had no reason to expose their men to great wastage. They gave ground at last at Damloup, as this position was exposed to flanking fires from Vaux Fort, Vaux and the eastern plain. It had been held while the shattered wood behind it, Laufée Wood, was strongly entrenched and linked more firmly with the three wooded heights running north-westward and known as Le Chenois Wood, Fumin Wood and Chapitre Wood. These four woods, scamed with trenches, dotted with redoubts and lined with deep communicating ways, formed the real defences of the two old forts, Souville and Tavennes, rising immediately behind them. The enemy was badly defeated in all the woodland battles, and though he got a footing in Chenois and Fumin Woods, the French returned in the night and recovered most of the ground, so that the capture of Damloup cost the German commander the best part of two divisions.

THE EPIC STORY OF VERDUN—(II)

After the vain grand attack of July 11 the chief of staff to the crown prince concentrated two fresh divisions for a different kind of attack. He tried a knife-like drive along a very narrow front, at the village of Fleury, directly against Souville Fort. The columns of infantry massed in the old formation into the valley where the ruins of the Chapel of Sainte Fine scarcely showed in the chaos of shell-holes below Souville Fort. As brigade after brigade was shattered by shell fire and raked by machine gun fire, the German brigadiers employed an extraordinary method in order to maintain the strength of their attacking front. The method was known as infiltration, and appears to have been first worked out by General von Mudra in the Verdun operations.

Each reeling and heavily punished mass, at a signal, re-formed in such a way as to leave lanes running almost straight from the front to the rear. Through these lanes a fresh brigade then advanced in sections, and, smartly opening fan-wise at the head of the fighting-line, furiously continued the action. All this was done on a closely engaged front, with both the outworn force and the fresh force maintaining the attack during the manoeuvre of infiltration. This new way of driving home an assault at any cost had been prepared by several months of practice. As the British and French did on the Somme, so the Germans did before them at Verdun. They reproduced the hostile positions in great detail on a large practice ground behind their own lines, and also constructed a copy of their own attacking parallel.

But on July 12 the French light field guns and the hidden machine guns sadly interfered with the funnels of fresh troops that came through the broken brigades up the slopes to the fort. The inclines were held impregably, and at the close of the day all that the Germans gained was a little ground at the cross-roads between Vaux and Fleury and round the ruins of Sainte Fine Chapel.

This great but fruitless effort exhausted the forces under the crown prince. Before his chief of staff could arrange another operation the British army broke the second German line on the Bazentin ridge and compelled Falkenhayn to collect men and guns from Verdun and pour all available shell towards the Somme. The pressure on Verdun was relieved, and the famous French boast, "Ils ne passeront pas," had been vindicated.

CHAPTER 4

Fall of Kut and After

WHILE Townshend and his little army were holding out gallantly in Kut the problem before the British relieving force was extremely difficult. The Turkish commander Nur-Ed-din had settled down to a steady investment of the town. A semicircular line of trenches pinned the defenders into the loop of the Tigris in which Kut stands. To check any relieving force, strong lines had been constructed on the north of the river and resting on the marshes which extended north and south of the river.

The first line at Sheikh Saad, about 25 miles due east of Kut, was on both sides of the Tigris: five miles above Sheikh Saad a second line of defence was made at the point where the Wadi cuts into the Tigris at Orah. Above Orah the great Suwaicha marsh runs alongside the left bank at a distance varying from one to three miles with the Umm-el-Brahm marsh on the other bank at about the same distance. Here three formidable lines of defence were dug astride the river, each flank resting on a marsh. These were the Umm-el-Henna, the Falahiyeh and the Sanna-iyat. These passed, there remained the most complete line of all, the Es Sinn line, about seven miles east of Kut, astride the river with its right flank drawn back till it reached the Shatt-el-Hai, and its left flank running up to and extending beyond the Suwadd marsh.

At this time Sir John Nixon retired owing to ill-health, his place being taken by Lieutenant General Sir Percy Lake, with General Aylmer, V.C., in command of the relieving force, consisting of the Lahore division from the western front, the main part of the Meerut division and some English Territorial battalions from India. The two divisions from France were arriving in piecemeal style, units and equipment often in different ships, and there was a lamentable failure to provide adequate transport or supplies for the relieving force, with the result that on two critical occasions there were at Basra 10,000 men who might have turned the scale, yet were immobile for want of transport.

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

Everything pointed to the necessity of waiting until the new force had been properly organized and its deficiencies in equipment made good. But to the men on the spot the necessity of moving to the relief of Kut seemed immediate. Early in December General Townshend had wired that he had rations for only one month; later, that he could last till February. There was anxiety, too, about the stories of Turkish reinforcements on the way, and of the dwindling ammunition. All these factors seemed to point to the vital necessity of haste, and contributed to the hurried advance on January 4, 1916.

The van left Ali Gharbi under command of General Young-husband, and approached the Sheikh Saad lines. On January 6, Major General Kember's troops came in touch on the right bank, and an infantry brigade working round the Turkish right rolled up a battalion, taking 500 prisoners. On January 7, General Aylmer's main force attacked on the left bank. Here outflanking was impossible, and a costly frontal attack was launched against heavy and well directed Turkish fire. For two days the action continued, till the Turks, fearing that their flank might be turned by the British success on the right bank, retreated in good order to Orah, where the Wadi stream from the Pushtikuh hills protected their left front.

The rains had begun: the Tigris rose four feet; and in a hurricane of wind the drenched British troops doggedly followed up. After a night march in extremely foul conditions General Aylmer attacked on the north (left) bank, while the river craft bombarded the enemy's right. Next day the position was won and the enemy retired to the Umm-el-Henna lines in the marsh region. Here the exhausted troops failed in their attempt to dislodge the Turks, and on January 21 General Aylmer had to dig himself in 1,300 yards from the Turkish lines. It had been a costly operation for the small force, and the British casualties amounted to over 8,000 officers and men.

Thereafter for a month no operations were undertaken. The rains had ceased and a chill, dry wind blew daily. Operations would have been possible had General Aylmer been in possession of the men and munitions, but he wisely decided to wait for reinforcements. After skirmishing, a British force was detached to work round the right of the Turkish line, and on February 23 it arrived at El Aruk, where it could enfilade the Turkish line at Umm-el-Henna.

A NEW COMMANDER

It was not until March 7 that the true advance began to develop. It was a boldly conceived plan to avoid the three lines of defence, to strike straight across the desert by night and attack the Es Sinn lines by surprise. The dangers of the enterprise were great and apparent. If the surprise failed to secure a quick success the lack of water would compel the troops to retire, and communications might be threatened by the Umm-el-Henna troops.

On the evening of March 7 the British column set out for the rendezvous at the Pools of Siloam. The night was black and the ground was unexplored. Yet the move was brilliantly executed, and just before dawn the Turkish camp fires were seen and, what was more cheering still, the flash of Townshend's guns at Kut. Yet the Turks were on the alert; no surprise was possible, and though the tired troops flung themselves repeatedly against the breastworks, the odds were too great, and the British force sullenly withdrew. The garrison of Kut, which had waited eagerly through the day, heard the guns die down and knew that they were once more shut in, while the relieving force returned to their old position east of Umm-el-Henna.

A further pause ensued, during which Sir F. J. Aylmer was relieved by General Sir G. P. Goringe, a soldier of great experience, who had commanded the expedition to Nasiriyeh in the summer campaign of the preceding year. With him was the 13th division, which had won distinction at Gallipoli, and when a frontal attack on the lines of Umm-el-Henna was decided on this division was chosen for the work.

Trenches had been pushed forward by means of saps to within 100 yards of the enemy's position at Umm-el-Henna, where he was strongly entrenched in places as deeply as nine feet. At 5 a.m. on April 5 the leading battalions of the 13th division rushed the first and second trenches in quick succession under the support of concentrated artillery and machine gun fire. Another hour saw them in possession of the third line, and by 7 a.m., after two hours' furious fighting, during which they drove everything before them, they occupied the fourth and fifth lines. Information was then received from scouting aeroplanes that the enemy was strongly reinforcing his positions both at Felahiyeh and Sanna-i-yat, three and a half and seven miles away up the river. As the approach lay over very open ground further advance was deferred until nightfall. At 8 p.m., after a well-earned rest, the forward movement was continued on the

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

left (north) bank, and the Felahiyeh position was successfully carried in the darkness.

In the meanwhile the Lahore division of the Indian army, which was under General Keary, had pushed on upon the other bank and had met with equal success in capturing the enemy's trenches opposite Felahiyeh, and consolidated the position, despite a strong counter-attack. In front of the relieving force only remained the main positions of Sanna-i-yat and Es Sinn. The troops were in good heart, and there seemed a chance that they might yet win through in time. But nature was on the side of the Turks: the great flood season was beginning, and the Tigris rose at a leap as the snow water from the Armenian hills came down. The Suwaicha marsh grew to a great lake and flooded Turkish and British trenches impartially. Men lived in mud-holes and waded sometimes waist deep in water. Defence was difficult, but attack was a Herculean feat.

On April 9 in a lull of the storms the 13th division was flung across the river and sent into action on the right bank, across half a mile of flooded ground, and though it forced back the enemy's right wing there was no break through. On April 17 the fort at Ben Issa, four miles from Es Sinn, was carried. Here the advance stayed, and after a heavy bombardment the Turks launched fierce counter-attacks. No fewer than six massed attacks were launched before 2 o'clock in the morning, each delivered with great fury and at tremendous cost. Searched by shrapnel and withered by infantry fire, each one broke. A few Turks reached the trenches and even got through a gap between two battalions in the dark; but at dawn, when they endeavoured to regain their lines, they were all shot down or captured. In front of one brigade alone 2,000 Turkish dead were counted. One whole Turkish division of 10,000 men was in action, and the total losses were 3,000 killed and 400 captured. German officers led the attacks and died beside their men.

On the north bank remained the Sanna-i-yat lines, and upon these the British advanced. Following a bombardment the first and second lines of trenches were taken; but Turkish reinforcements rushed up from the rear brought the British attack to a standstill, with the result that the ground won had to be abandoned.

So in storm and rain and flood, with ever-decreasing forces opposed to ever-increasing numbers, the relief force found itself

FOOD SUPPLIES RUNNING SHORT

within 11 miles of Kut, whence the beleaguered British, now in the last extremity of hunger, could see the flashes of its guns.

The condition of affairs at Kut was meantime approaching a climax. On April 8 there was no further possibility of running the mill, which had to stop working owing to lack of fuel, though fortunately there was a stock of flour in hand to last another week, when the rations had to be cut down to a quarter of a pound per man per day, British and Indian alike.

Many, and amongst them several successful, attempts at escape were made by Arab inhabitants after food became scarce. One man, a particularly strong swimmer, aided by inflated bladders, made the journey down stream to the British camp at Kurna. Another—sole survivor of a party of 18—arrived on a raft. These were able to give first-hand news of the condition of the besieged, all of whom, they said, were in cheerful spirits, fully confident that relief would yet reach them. Their respect for General Townshend, who seems to have been endowed with the same capacity for arousing and maintaining enthusiasm in his men as the hero of Khartum, amounted to veneration.

On April 24 a final attempt was made to get supplies through, and the *Julnar*, laden with stores of every sort and kind, left Basra, bent on running the blockade. Her mission, however, had been an open secret for three weeks before she started, and the Turks, through Arab sources, knew as much about her every movement as the British authorities. She consequently fell an easy prey to the enemy, actually within sight of Kut.

Attempts to replenish the failing supplies of the garrison by aeroplane had been frequently made, but, except in a few cases, had proved unsuccessful. The Turks boldly claimed that the superiority of their battle-planes enabled them "to shoot down the old British machines one after the other."

How exhausted were the garrison may be gathered from the following extract from the report of Colonel Hehir, principal medical officer to the garrison:

During the last month of the siege men at fatigues, such as trench digging, after ten minutes' work had to rest awhile and go at it again; men on sentry-go would drop down, those carrying loads would rest every 100 yards. There were instances of Indians returning in the evening from trench duty who lay down and were found dead in the morning—death due to starvation asthenia . . . At the end of the siege I doubt whether there was a single person capable of a five-mile march.

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

In fact, for a fortnight before the surrender, the troops occupying the front lines had been too weak to march back with their kits, and so had remained in position the whole time. The behaviour of the British soldier was beyond praise. The defaulters' sheet was blank, and there was no grumbling. As long as their strength lasted they played their games on the piece of ground by the liquorice factory, and fished diligently in the river to supplement their stores.

On April 29 the limit of endurance was reached, and the doom of Kut sealed. An ominous message from General Townshend, received by wireless at half-past eleven on the morning of that day at the British headquarters, stated that he had surrendered.

I have destroyed my guns and most of my ammunition is being destroyed. Officers have gone to Khalil Pasha, the Turkish commander-in-chief, who is at Madug, to say that I am ready to surrender. I must have some food here and cannot hold out any longer. Khalil has been told to-day, and a deputation of officers has gone in a launch to bring food from the Julnar, the ship sent by the relief force on the night of April 24 to carry supplies to the garrison of Kut.

Shortly afterwards came another message:

I have hoisted the white flag over Kut Fort and town, and the guards will be taken over by a Turkish regiment which is approaching. I shall shortly destroy wireless. The troops go at 2 p.m. to camp at Shumran.

The news, to a great extent discounted by the tenor of the messages from General Townshend intimating that the end was in sight, was received throughout the Empire with profound sorrow. In Great Britain regret was tempered with indignation, for a strong and justifiable feeling existed that the reverse need never have been sustained. Allied and neutral countries were unstinted in their sympathy and admiration. In hostile camps the announcement was hailed with expressions of extravagant delight. Berlin, in delirium of joy, claimed the credit for General von der Goltz and the scientific training which the Turkish army had received at his hands.

Khalil Pasha received the envoys of General Townshend, for whom he expressed unbounded admiration, with the proverbial courtesy of his race. He was specially desirous that the garrison, after all the privations it had undergone, should be generously provisioned, and regretted that his own stores were not sufficiently plentiful to enable him to furnish what was

BRITISH PRESTIGE DIMMED

requisite. As soon, however, as the iron pressure of the blockade had been removed, supplies poured into Kut from British sources.

General Townshend, who was permitted to retain his sword, was shortly afterwards sent to Constantinople, where quarters were assigned him at Prinkipo, the principal amongst a group of islands in the Gulf of Ismidt. He carried with him into his enforced retirement the sympathy, respect and admiration of his countrymen. For nearly five months he and the troops he so ably commanded had acquitted themselves nobly under conditions of the utmost difficulty and of a nature to test character, whether in bravery or endurance, to the core.

Kut had resisted for 143 days—a long time when the conditions are considered. Though a misfortune, its fall was not of itself a disaster. Indeed, it may be argued to a limited extent that the campaign had been of service to the Russians in the Caucasus in keeping Turkish troops on the Mesopotamian front which otherwise might have been diverted to Erzerum and Trebizond.

Inevitably in both Asia and Africa the prestige of British power declined. In Egypt the success with which Senussi and Ottoman attacks were repelled helped to mitigate the effects of the double disasters in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian campaigns. Yet the victories achieved against the armies of the British empire by the strongest of Mahomedan Powers had political results surpassing their direct military value.

Some of the men round the young emperor of Abyssinia were so extravagantly impressed by the Turkish successes that they tried to enter into league with the Ottomans and Teutons, with the aim of making a flank attack upon the Sudan. In Persia there was a force of rebels and native and European mercenaries who became more active and mischievous, thinking that the power of the British had been irremediably broken, and that the Germans, with a large Turkish army, would sweep through Persia, crush the Russian and British troops there, and invade India. There were signs of unrest in various directions, and the faith of many native leaders in the permanent might of the British empire was severely tested by all manner of political and religious intrigues.

Happily the main structure of British influence in Asia and north-eastern Africa resisted temporary defeat and incessant plotting. The British race profited by the traditions of tenacity

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

it had established in the Sudan, in South Africa and in Flanders. In Abyssinia, in Persia, in Afghanistan and in Arabia loyal rulers and princes felt that the nation which had avenged Gordon would avenge General Townshend.

The Turks, though inflated by victory, had no faith in their own power of making an offensive movement. Instead of advancing against the baffled Indo-British army of relief, they abandoned part of the ground they had held and resumed a purely defensive attitude. On May 19, 1916, the Turks retired from their advanced positions by Es Sinn, on the right bank of the Tigris. This withdrawal was followed up, and by the evening of the next day most of the right bank of the Tigris was clear of the enemy as far as the Shatt-el-Hai, which connects the Tigris and the Euphrates, between Kut-el-Amara and Nasiriyeh. Turkish rearguards only remained to cover the bridges over the Hai, which was in flood and unfordable.

The immediate effect of this unusual retreat, which followed upon a brilliant success, was to throw upon the British forces the burden of the offensive. Naturally, no offensive was attempted. The troops were too exhausted, too poorly supplied, and the flooded marshland in the angle of the Tigris and Hai was so dangerous as to render it difficult or impossible to hold any ground gained. The large angle of water and marsh was a trap. Any British force that entered it without firmly securing its position and communication was liable to be cut off by two sudden Turkish thrusts from the Tigris and the Hai.

It was stalemate in Mesopotamia. Neither side was in a position to make any further movement; the Turks because they dared not, and the British because they could not. The enemy, however, was far from idle. As soon as all British action was checked in the direction of Bagdad, and when the Turkish defences had been greatly improved from Sanna-i-yat to Kut-el-Amara, a considerable number of Ottoman troops marched against the Russian army under General Baratoff, which had driven down to Karind.

Karind was only 150 miles from Bagdad, lying in the heart of the tangle of mountains through which ran the immemorial route of trade and conquest from Bagdad to Teheran. In the early plan of the Allies it had been arranged that General Baratoff should move towards Bagdad from the north, while General Townshend advanced from the east. With the failure of the



REFRESHMENT FOR HEROES. This striking photograph shows French troops enjoying pannikins of steaming broth after their terrible ordeal in the trenches. From its duration and the fierce nature of the battles the fighting round Verdun it is perhaps the most terrible of the whole war.



HONOUR FOR PÉTAÏN'S BRAVES. The photograph shows French soldiers being decorated for bravery in the environs of Verdun after their return from the battle front. To Marshal Pétain, who was placed in command of the Verdun defences in February, 1916, the main credit for stemming the German attack is due.



Russell

ALLIED LEADERS EAST AND WEST. Left and chief of the imperial general staff, 1915-19. In January, 1916, he took over command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and from Egypt led the British troops into Palestine. Right, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain was one of the most successful generals in the war. He led a brigade in 1914, an army in Champagne and in 1916 brilliantly commanded the defences of Verdun. He succeeded General Nivelle as commander-in-chief in 1917.



Henri Manuel

General Sir Archibald Murray was chief of staff in 1914 and chief of the imperial general staff, 1915-19. In January, 1916, he took over command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and from Egypt led the British troops into Palestine. Right, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain was one of the most successful generals in the war. He led a brigade in 1914, an army in Champagne and in 1916 brilliantly commanded the defences of Verdun. He succeeded General Nivelle as commander-in-chief in 1917.



Spot a General

THE KING'S RETURN TO HEALTH. This photograph was taken early in 1916 when King George had completely recovered from the effects of his accident in France on October 28, 1915, when the horse he was riding at an inspection of troops lost its balance on slippery ground and went over backwards, pinning the king underneath. He is seen with Princess Mary and the Earl of Derby, then director-general of recruiting, at a military fête at Aldershot.

SIR PERCY SYKES

British movement the Russian column at Karind became too weak to withstand the increasing forces brought against it. The Russians fell back from Karind to Kirmanshah. There they were again assailed by part of the Turkish army from Kut-el-Amara, with reinforcements from other corps. They were compelled to abandon Kirmanshah, and in a prolonged retreat that ended 250 miles beyond the Persian frontier they at last checked the great Ottoman advance and saved northern Persia from being overrun.

Meanwhile, southern Persia was also saved from anarchy and utter spoliation by an unexpected British movement. This developed into one of the most romantic episodes in the general history of the war. Sir Percy Sykes landed at Bandar Abbas, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, some months before the fall of Kut. As originally designed, his work was only to have extended the British successes in Mesopotamia by restoring order in the disturbed regions in southern Persia. When, however, the British successes in Mesopotamia ended in utter failure, and Turks, Teutons, Persian rebels and neutral mercenaries endeavoured to transform Persia into a base of operations against India, the task of Sir Percy Sykes became one of great importance.

The man was equal to his work. Sir Percy had begun life as a subaltern of cavalry, and had found more scope as an explorer. After serving five years in the army he settled in an obscure but congenial post in the Persian city of Kerman, near the desert route to Afghanistan. After exploring the surrounding waste and highlands he obtained a position as consul general in the still wilder and more remote Persian town of Meshed, in the mountainous angle where the deserts of Persia, Russia and Afghanistan meet. For more than 20 years Sir Percy Sykes travelled and explored, becoming the supreme British authority on all Persian problems and the leading historian of the country.

Early in 1916 he returned to Persia at the head of a small British column, but armed with such knowledge and such power of personality as made him worth an army corps in himself. His design was to enlist, train and arm the tribes of Persia, and transform Persia herself into a wall of defence against Turks, Teutons, brigands and the treacherous Swedish officers of the old military police. By a marvellous march of more than 1,000 miles through hostile regions where the tribes had been armed by the Germans, Sir Percy Sykes saved the situation that had been imperilled by the surrender at Kut and the failure at the Dardanelles.

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

The gallant explorer first moved up to his old post at Kerman and connected the trade of this highland town with the sea-borne traffic at Bandar Abbas. Then in a great march between the central mountains he pushed on to Yezd and reached Ispahan. Thence he turned south to Shiraz and Bushire. Tribe after tribe was adroitly and tactfully drawn to the British side, until some 11,000 young and warlike Persians were enlisted in his military police. A vast tract of fresh country was added to the British sphere of influence and connected with the valuable British petroleum fields north-east of Basra.

When the great march of Sir Percy Sykes was completed the direct influence of the British empire extended from the Baluchistan frontier of India, entirely across southern Persia to a point near Kut-el-Amara on the Tigris. At the outbreak of war British influence in Persia had reached only to Bandar Abbas at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Only a small corner of Persian territory was still occupied by the Turks, and from this corner they were soon expelled under the combined pressure of Russian and British forces. Great Britain entertained no designs on the independence of Persia. That country had indeed been left as a sort of buffer state between Russian and British fields of influence. Only the over-reaching intrigues of Teuton and Turk had transformed the Shiraz regions into a scene of conflict, and the Turkish success at Kut had finally made the occupation of southern Persia obligatory upon the menaced British forces.


In Abyssinia there was less trouble in putting down the movement against British dominion. The men around the young emperor were so madly excited by the news of the Turkish victory on the Tigris that they went too far for their own people. They proposed suddenly and violently to turn Abyssinia from a Christian state into a Mahomedan state. This extraordinary design was suggested to them by agents of that German empire which, before the war, had intrigued against its own Mahomedans in East Africa, and sought to use pig-breeding as a weapon of conversion, as the pig is regarded as an unclean animal by Moslems. Now Germans of the same intriguing school endeavoured, by the gospel of Ottoman victories and British defeats, to transform the Abyssinians into a Moslem race and league them with the mullah of Somaliland, the sultan of Darfur, and some discontented remnant in the Sudan for a combined attack upon the British forces holding the Nile.

ABYSSINIA AND AFGHANISTAN

The plot, however, was almost as fantastic as Herr Zimmermann's later attempt to unite the bandit chiefs of Mexico with the splendid armies of Japan against the United States.

In Abyssinia the most powerful chiefs of the Christian clans turned upon the miscreant court party, defeated the forces of the emperor, drove him from the throne, and placed a Christian upon it. In Afghanistan the a mir loyally continued his policy of amity with both Russia and Great Britain. Neither the retirement from the Dardanelles nor the fall of Kut inclined him to become the tool of the Ottoman intriguers who plied him and his chiefs with mischievous advice.

With Afghanistan standing firm, and with Persia in course of conversion from a condition of hostility and anarchy to one of friendship and order, while the Sherif of Mecca, the Prince of Nedj, and other Arabian rulers were showing antagonism to Ottoman power, the situation of the Indo-British forces in Mesopotamia improved. The immense resources in man-power in India, though still greatly restricted in operation by



FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

the poverty of cadres, were gradually employed in the neighbouring field of war. The military classes and races of India were especially suited to the climatic conditions of warfare on the Tigris and Euphrates. Less resistant to the heat of the desert than the native Arabs, they were at least as well able to bear the tropical temperature, the sandstorms and plague of insects as the Ottomans of the Anatolian highlands.

Mesopotamia thus became the great testing place for the soul of the young new India that had grown up under the fostering rule of the British race. Brilliant British generals, who had watched the work of the old Indian army in the days of tragic stress around Ypres, came to the Orient to train and lead the new generation to battle. Sir Charles Monro, the former army commander at Ypres and director of the withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula, was appointed commander-in-chief. He succeeded Sir Beauchamp Duff, and from India organized victory on the Tigris. His work was closely linked with the activities of all the British armies and allied forces, and it was controlled from London by the chief of staff, Sir William Robertson.

The result of this rearrangement was that the practical conduct of affairs was removed from the lax and fumbling hands of Indo-British administration and entrusted to men whose high ability had been proved in continual warfare of the most violent kind. Sir Stanley Maude, who succeeded Sir Percy Lake and Sir John Nixon as commander of the army of Mesopotamia, had been a colonel at the outbreak of hostilities. Then as brigadier he had distinguished himself, and had been promoted major general in 1915. After being wounded on the western front and mentioned five times in dispatches he went to Mesopotamia with the 13th division. Of all the generals in the baffled army of relief, Sir Stanley Maude was the one who had shown most skill, and came, in circumstances of hopeless difficulty, nearest to decisive success.

Such was the commander chosen to avenge General Townshend and restore through Asia and North Africa the prestige of the British empire. He enjoyed many material advantages over his predecessors. Under the severe pressure of British opinion, inflamed by disclosure of scandalous neglect and lack of foresight on the part of the Indo-British bureaucracy, the measures that should have been taken in 1914 and 1915 were at last energetically carried out in 1916.

FLOOD WORKS

A considerable fleet of river steamers was collected. Munitions were provided of the quality and quantity required. Hospital accommodation was enlarged from 4,700 beds in January, 1916, to 18,000 beds in August, 1916. Medical men, practised in preventive treatment and bacteriological measures, were encouraged and greatly increased in numbers. Drugs and vaccines were obtained, and by these and other measures an outbreak of cholera checked.

The antiquated aeroplanes, outpaced and outclimbed by the German machines employed by the Turks, were replaced by more modern and powerful fighting, bombing and scouting machines. The large guns brought by the Turks from Adrianople were outranged by new British heavy artillery, and the wonderful Stokes gun travelled to the Tigris front with fleets of motor-lorries and other aids to rapid transport. Ice plants were erected, green food was grown in abundance and insect pests were combated.

Finally, and crowning all the works of reorganization, the railway, long refused by the Indo-British administration, was begun. The line and the improved river transport system enabled concentrations of men and material to be made against the enemy, with a rapidity to which he could not reply by means of the incomplete Bagdad railway line. As Lord Kitchener had avenged Gordon by driving a railway towards Khartum, so the engineers of Sir Stanley Maude avenged Townshend by driving a railway towards Bagdad. The speed with which the river line was constructed was unparalleled in overseas warfare.

Before, however, the railway was built, it was necessary to roll back the great river floods, of which the ancient tradition comes down to us in the early chapters of the Bible. At Basra, through which a constant stream of troops and stores poured, ground space was won for camps, huts, magazines and hospitals. A great embankment was raised from Magil to Shaiba. From the main embankment another rampart against the waters branched off to Basra. This was followed by further works on a total front of 20 miles. Wharves were constructed at which ocean-going steamers could stop and unload. Large waterworks were made at the port and the towns on the upper reaches. Wireless communication was established with London, and Basra was transformed into one of the great seaports of the world.

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

For thousands of years before the reign of Haroun-al-Raschid the great desert between the rivers had been a fertile plain. Vague swells of buried mud-bricks, veiled in blown sand, dimly remained to show where lived the first dynasties of the world, men who were masters of both the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Some of their ancient seaports ultimately stood hundreds of miles from the sea, owing to the enormous masses of earth brought down by the rivers in the course of ages. The last inheritor of the region—the Arab—had seen the land laid waste by tribe after tribe of Mongols, and had himself been thrown back to primitive savagery by his fellow Mahomedan—the Turk.

The Arab had finally watched the Turk defeat the Briton. For a generation he had been inclined to trust in British power, and half to believe the extraordinary promise of a renaissance of Mesopotamia through British agency. But when General Townshend's column turned back from the great arch at Ctesiphon, many Arab tribesmen lost their faith in the British, and, going over to the apparent victor, helped the Turk to pursue and surround the Indo-British force. The gigantic transformation of Basra, carried out with a speed like that of the miracles performed by a magician of "The Arabian Nights," served once more to impress the imagination of the tribesmen.

As the great effort of organization proceeded with equal intensity of achievement at Amara and other distant river towns, the tale of wonders spread across Arabia through Nejd to Mecca. No doubt the news was also carried northward to Bagdad, Mosul, Aleppo and thence to Constantinople. The Turk and the Teuton, however, appear to have been somewhat incredulous of the reports conveyed to them by their many spies. They did not believe that the great works were being achieved in time to have any decisive effect upon the course of the war.

The Turkish military authorities neglected to strengthen their Tigris front, and spent men by tens of thousands in helping the Austrians in Galicia. They made also another vain adventure in the direction of the Suez Canal, and assisted the Bulgarians around Salonica, while maintaining a strong line of battle against the Russians in Armenia and pursuing their wild plan of invading India through Persia. According to a German allegation, made in a belated manner after the disaster, the Turkish staff conducted the later Mesopotamian campaign according to its own

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

views, and did not submit its problems in strategy to the successor of von der Goltz. Seeing, however, that both Falkenhayn and Hindenburg took large Turkish forces away from Turkey and exhausted them against the Russian army under General Brusiloff, it would appear that the Germans misled the Turks.

It was the general staff of Germany that misappreciated the situation on the Tigris. The enemy's military authorities either overlooked the older lessons in British tenacity, or concluded that time would not allow the disaster at Kut to be retrieved. A very strong Ottoman force was left on the banks of the Tigris; but considerable as was its power, its strength was not properly adjusted to meet the very violent and prolonged effort which the British might have been expected to make.

Seven months and a half were spent by the Mesopotamian army in organizing the territory it occupied, speeding up methods of transport, collecting reinforcements and devising improved means of warfare. The ground abandoned by the enemy between the Tigris and the Hai was gradually consolidated and strongly occupied in a manner permitting swift concentration against the long stretch of Turkish fortifications.

The Turks then occupied some 30 miles of lines along the loops and bends of the Tigris. At Sanna-i-yat their deep and intricate trench system formed a narrow, deep front between the flooded Suwaicha marsh and the swollen Tigris. On the opposite bank was a large patch of water-logged ground extending close to a second zone of strong defences at Es Sinn. At Es Sinn was another swamp, the Suwada marsh, on which the second zone of Turkish fortifications rested. The low land was badly water-logged by winter floods, hindering operations in the cool season when battles could best be fought.

Sir Stanley Maude, however, crept upon the enemy in the night of December 13, 1916. From Imam Ali Mansur a force of cavalry and infantry marched in the darkness across the seven miles of desert to the fords of the river Hai, then an almost stagnant hidden river edged with scrub. The infantry rushed the Turkish outposts and threw a pontoon bridge across the stream near Atab. Then the cavalry also crossed as dawn was breaking, and swept along the western bank of the river to a point two miles from Kut. Thereupon the infantry in turn again advanced and entrenched in a large bridge-head on the ground they had won, while the cavalry made a sudden raid towards the Shumran

FALL OF KUT AND AFTER

bridge on the Upper Tigris, nine miles beyond Kut. All these surprise operations perturbed and confused the enemy.

It was against the distant Shumran bridge, well behind Kut and far in the rear of the principal zones of the Turkish defences, that Sir Stanley Maude intended to make his main attack. Apparently he considered that the Turkish commander would regard the operations across the Hai as a feint, designed to distract him and induce him to weaken his forces at Sanna-i-yat. This was exactly how the Turkish general looked at the matter. On the night of December 14 his pontoons at Kut were bombed by the British Flying Corps, and so wrecked and scattered that the Turks had to ferry their troops across the river.

When the enemy was thus temporarily lamed, the Indo-British forces on the Hai pressed onward and won all the ground within a quarter of a mile of Kut. From their new camp the attacking troops were able to see the townspeople gazing from their roofs. The line of white houses, thrown out against the dark palm-groves, could have been reduced in a day to a heap of mud bricks had the British gunners been ordered to bombard. But though easily within range, the town was not attacked. All the hail of shell was poured upon the eastern Turkish front of Sanna-i-yat, where the bombardment began on December 14. This was done in order to lead the enemy to think that the movement across the Hai was only a preliminary diversion. The cavalry that had crossed the Hai extended its raiding operations 20 miles inside the enemy's territory, breaking up bands of hostile Arabs and capturing the important position of Gassab Fort, where cattle and grain had been stored. The enemy's river communications were also raided 10 miles behind Kut, and some of his bridges destroyed. The Flying Corps cooperated admirably with the horsemen and, using a ton of bombs on a single journey, sank enemy steamers and exploded ammunition dumps.

CHAPTER 5

Campaign Against the Senussi

A REMARKABLE illustration of the thoroughness with which Germany exploited every force that she could influence to embarrass the Allies was provided by the Senussi campaign. From 1914 until 1917 the activity of the Arab tribes on the western frontier of Egypt caused the British authorities in Egypt considerable uneasiness. The Senussi were not a people apart, but a Mahomedan order founded in 1835 by an Algerian, Sidi Mahomed ben Ali es Senussi. The headquarters of the sect were originally at Alexandria, but Sidi Mahomed's son and successor, Senussi el Mahdi, established himself at Jof, in the Kufra oasis of the Libyan desert. On his death in 1902 his son, Sidi Idris, was too young to succeed, and his nephew, Sidi Ahmed, known as the Grand Senussi, became the chief.

During the war with Italy in 1911 he had assumed the temporal as well as the religious leadership of his people, and he had ambitions to establish himself as the ruler of a great Libyan state. He had always maintained good relations with Egypt, but when Turkey joined the Central Powers an effort was made to induce Sidi Ahmed to proclaim a jihad against the Allies, the idea being that it might result in inflaming religious fanaticism in Egypt and embarrass those countries which had Mahomedan subjects.

To this end a Turk, Nuri Bey, was sent early in 1915 as an emissary to Sidi Ahmed with instructions to endeavour to embroil him with Great Britain. The Grand Senussi, however, was not at that time inclined to attack Egypt. At the British frontier fort in Sollum Gulf there were two gunboats, and though their guns were obsolete the Senussi had no artillery to pit against them. The British had built a motor road westward of Dabaa towards Matruh, Barrani and Sollum. At some distance inland from these three last-named seaports rose the waterless, unexplored ridge of the Taref mountains, which formed a great semicircle with its horns near Matruh and Sollum. Beyond the mountain line was the waterless sand of the Libyan desert,

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

which stretches south to the remote oasis of Siva. The British position was therefore one of considerable strength, and the Senussi encamped near Sollum realized that as long as the British maintained the command of the sea it was useless for them to attack the posts along the coast.

But on November 5, 1915, an Austrian submarine torpedoed off the Libyan coast a British armed merchantman, the *Tara*, which had once been employed on the service between Holyhead and Dublin. She was commanded by Captain Gwatkin Williams, and carried a crew mainly of Welshmen. The *Tara* carried ten boats, but only three succeeded in getting away, and the Austrian submarine took these in tow and handed over the prisoners to the Senussi. They were marched for nearly 150 miles into the Libyan desert, and received, as afterwards transpired, extremely bad treatment. After sinking the *Tara* the Austrian submarine attacked Sollum, and managed to convoy to the shore a steamer on which were two or three hundred Turkish soldiers, some Turkish and German officers and a considerable supply of machine guns and ammunition. They reached the camp of the Senussi, and in the second week in November an attack was made upon the little British force at Sollum. The first assault was repulsed, and thereupon the Grand Senussi disclaimed all responsibility for it. The situation therefore remained uncertain, but as the troops at Sollum were at a great distance from the nearest railhead, in a rough country with communications that could be easily cut by the enemy, it was decided for strategic and political reasons to withdraw them to Matruh.

Matruh was 180 miles distant from Alexandria. There was a single line of railway running from Alexandria to Dabaa, and for the remaining 42 miles there was a fairly good motor road. The country around Matruh was valuable. The light, sandy soil produced on the edge of the vast desert a bountiful supply of barley, which formed the main food supply of the bedouins in the Libyan desert. It was therefore certain that if the Senussi meant to undertake any operations against Egypt they would first of all endeavour to recover the barley fields. To provide against this contingency a strong column was assembled near the railhead ready to reinforce the frontier guard at Matruh. Aerial reconnaissance showed that the Senussi were gathering in force from the south and moving eastward. On December 11

FIGHTING ON CHRISTMAS DAY

British patrols under Lieutenant Colonel J. L. R. Gordon met a body of 300 Arabs, defeated them and drove them westward. Two days later a stronger Arab column of 1,200 men with machine guns attacked Colonel Gordon's troops at a spot some 24 miles west of Matruh. The British force, though outnumbered, held its own. But a Senussi army was gradually assembling at Jebel Medwa, near Matruh.

To meet the new threat the West Frontier force was formed under the command of Major General A. Wallace. Partly by the road and railway connecting Matruh with Alexandria, and partly by sea transport, a force was collected which consisted of a composite infantry brigade, a composite cavalry brigade and the 15th Sikhs, the last-named being the only fully trained troops. The water by the shore was brackish, and, as there were no wells available, drinking water had to be brought from Alexandria to the camp close to the beach. Here the force was safe from any attack, for in addition to its own artillery it was covered by guns mounted on the trawlers which had been used as transports, and which were of such light draught that they were immune from submarine attack. After spending some days in trenching the hill above the port, erecting wire entanglements and preparing generally a strong resistance, the British commander decided to attack on Christmas day. The Senussi force at Jebel Medwa numbered about 5,000 men, and their encampment was about six miles along the motor road running south-west from Matruh. An infantry column composed of Sikhs and New Zealanders broke camp at four o'clock in the morning and marched along a rough road towards the hills where the enemy were massed among the rocks and caves. The cavalry, consisting of the Australian Light Horse and some Yeomanry, rode out in a sweeping movement round the enemy's right flank.

The column of New Zealanders and Sikhs which was divided into two parties first encountered a small advance party of Senussi, who retired after a skirmish, and the British mountain battery then opened fire on the height occupied by the enemy. The Senussi had only two pieces with which to reply, and the British forces had great help from the sea, for H.M.S. Clematis had come as close inshore as possible, and with the help of an aeroplane spotter dropped 6 in. shells into the Senussi position. The Sikhs who formed the centre of the attacking line, with New

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

Zealanders supporting them on both flanks, had now come under the fire of the Senussi, who were occupying the first of a series of ridges. The Sikhs fought with great dash and courage, and the New Zealand troops also distinguished themselves. Three lines of infantry stormed the enemy position, supported by armoured cars from which machine guns swept the bedouins. By two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy, commanded by a Turkish officer, Jafar Pasha, had been driven from the ridges west of Jebel Medwa into a rocky valley called Wadi Majid.

The long nullah in which the Senussi made their great stand was pitted with caves which offered excellent natural defences, and the work of clearing the valley went on somewhat slowly. But an unfortunate hitch prevented the completion of the encircling movement. The cavalry had been delayed by hostile mounted troops, Jafar Pasha having foreseen this part of General Wallace's plan. By the time the cavalry reached their objective the Senussi were in full flight, and as the early nightfall made pursuit impossible most of them escaped westward. The British force, however, captured all the enemy's stores as well as flocks of sheep, herds of cattle and a number of camels. Even this small victory was of great value in helping to convince the revolted tribes that Sidi Ahmed was not an unconquerable mahdi.

The failure of General Wallace to gain an early success was largely due to the fact that many of the troops under his command were untrained, and only the Sikhs were seasoned soldiers who had before taken part in warfare similar to that in which they were now engaged. But the close of the Gallipoli campaign had set free troops from among whom it was possible to give General Wallace fully trained and seasoned reinforcements. His chief need was cavalry, and the South Midland Mounted Brigade and the Composite Yeomany Brigade were added to his forces. In addition the 2nd South African Infantry were sent to him from Alexandria. Towards the end of January it was discovered that the chief Senussi force was concentrated at Halazin, 22 miles south of Matruh. But General Wallace's forces were still inferior to those of Sidi Ahmed. The enemy had won over the large Ulad Ali tribes, he had collected a force of Tripolitan bedouins, and some more Turkish troops as well as gunners and engineers. Sidi Ahmed was only the nominal leader, and the actual commander of the Senussi forces was the Turk Nuri Bey with Jafar Pasha

THE ADVANCE FROM MATRUH

as his second in command. There were 2,000 Senussi regulars in uniform, with some 4,000 bedouins, occupying a well-designed series of entrenchments planned by the Germans and Turks, with numerous machine guns, under German and Turkish officers, backed by two pieces of artillery.

Having received all his reinforcements, Major General Wallace began his advance from Matruh on January 22. His first march was one of 12 miles to Bir Shola. It was made under extremely unfavourable weather conditions. The winter rains had reduced the ground to a sea of mud; it was difficult to move artillery forward; the armoured car division soon found progress impossible, and eventually had to be sent back to Matruh. Motor ambulances became bogged and had to be dragged back to firm ground by teams of soldiers. General Wallace's plan was on much the same lines as those of his previous attacks upon the Senussi positions—a direct advance upon Sidi Ahmed's main position with his infantry, while the cavalry carried out an encircling movement on his left.

The advance began on January 28 against a position which extended for nearly two miles. The main attack was made by the Sikhs, but towards noon they were attacked on their right flank and two companies of the 2nd South African Infantry were sent up in support. A little later an attempt was made to turn the Sikhs' left flank, and it was strengthened by a company of the 1st New Zealand Rifles. But the pressure became stronger on the left flank, and further reinforcements of Royal Scots were sent up, to be followed later by more New Zealanders. The Sikhs were all the time advancing in the centre, while their flanks were being pressed back, and by three o'clock in the afternoon they reached the enemy's main entrenchments and drove them out. Thereupon the pressure on the flanks relaxed.

Once more, however, the Indian and British troops were robbed of the full fruits of victory. The horses of the mounted troops were too exhausted for a pursuit of the enemy, and the mud made it impossible for the armoured cars to do the work of cavalry. The Senussi had been driven back, but they had not suffered a decisive defeat. General Wallace's army bivouacked two miles to the east of the position vacated by the enemy. The men had neither greatcoats nor blankets. They were soaked through by the pouring rain and chilled to the bone by the bitter wind that swept in from the sea. No sleep was possible as it was

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

feared that the enemy would attempt a counter-attack. Ramparts were built and machine guns and artillery were got into position. But at daylight airmen reported that the enemy had retreated over 20 miles, and the troops were able to move back to the position where their wagons were bogged in the mud.

The continued resistance of the Senussi caused Sir John Maxwell anxiety, and in consequence considerable changes were made in the British force. General Wallace, who had for some time been in ill-health, relinquished his command and was succeeded on February 10 by Major General W. E. Peyton. The Sikhs, who had played a great part in the fighting, were withdrawn. The heavy armoured cars which had too often been rendered useless by the mud were replaced by a lighter type, and a camel corps 2,000 strong gave the British general a force well fitted for desert fighting.

The Senussi army had continued its retreat to a point nearly 80 miles from Matruh. Nuri Bey and Jafar Pasha knew that the port of Barrani, between Matruh and Sollum, would be the British objective. Their aeroplane scouts found that the enemy had obtained substantial reinforcements, and were entrenched on a ridge some 15 miles south of the little seaport. General Peyton's first step was to establish an advance base, and he chose for this purpose Unjeila, which was half way to Barrani, and had the advantage of a good water supply. It was occupied without opposition on February 15 by a body of troops and a large convoy of camels carrying supplies. The rest of the troops were gradually brought on, and on February 20 General Lukin took command.

• On February 23 he moved out from Unjeila, and after two days' marching arrived within eight miles of the Senussi camp at Agagia. The troops were given a day's rest, and on February 26 an infantry column advanced against the enemy's position, while a force of Yeomanry moved round the left flank to cut off retreat. The Yeomanry pressed on towards the ridge to which the enemy's sharpshooters had retired, and about this time the infantry, who had been advancing for two hours without meeting much resistance came sharply into action. The British front was about five miles long, and the advance was made over undulating ground affording no cover to the attacking troops, so that they lost heavily. But supported by the artillery they plodded on, took the crest of the ridge and drove the enemy into the valley below.

THE ENEMY'S RETREAT

As soon as they were clear of their trenches Lieutenant Colonel H. M. W. Souter, in command of the Dorset and Bucks Yeomanry, to whom was assigned the task of cutting off the retreat, gave the order to charge. General Lukin, with his experience of desert warfare, knew that the charge was likely to succeed, for the sun was very hot and the heat shimmer over the sand made visibility bad. None of the enemy machine gunners could get the range quickly enough, and fired either too short or over the heads of the Yeomanry as they swept on towards the crest of the position. They were first met by Senussi regulars, who inflicted upon them most of their casualties. Five officers were shot down, and Colonel Souter's horse was shot under him right in front of Jafar Pasha, who was himself wounded and made a prisoner. Nuri Bey was for a time believed to be killed, but he had already fled from the field.

The victorious army with the enemy fleeing before them pushed on to Barrani, which they made their base while preparing for the final stroke along the coast. Supplies were sent by sea transport and land convoy. The port was put into a state of defence, and a reserve force was brought up from Matruh, and on March 9 General Lukin moved out to retake Sollum, lying 50 miles west on the Tripoli frontier. The bay was encircled by the Taref mountains, which come down to the coast, leaving only a narrow way of approach along the seashore.

The mountain passes had to be occupied in order to prevent the enemy from using the escarpment as a screen for an attack on the rear of the column. The troops marched along the rough track to the wells of Bag-boag, but at this small bedouin settlement the chief difficulty of desert warfare became acute: though the force was not a large one there was not enough water for the horses and the men. General Lukin was, in fact, trying to accomplish with foot soldiers and horsemen a task requiring a camel corps. The enemy, who was amply provided with camels, was retreating with the utmost speed. The Senussi and the bedouins had had on the ridge of Agagia all the fighting they wanted, and they aimed to get into the heart of the desert. It was a race in dead calm weather under a burning sun, first across a rough and stony plain and then up the mountain passes.

The troops rested only for a few hours at night, and reached Bir-el-Augerin at noon on March 12 after a trying march across

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

the plain and mountain slopes. Then, after only a few minutes' rest, two battalions of infantry were sent forward to carry the first pass, the Madian, and advance eastward along the heights. The South African Scottish battalion, with the 1st South African battalion in support, went upward to win the heights. The armoured-car battery, which came up from the south-east along the ridge, assisted in the operation. Meanwhile, the South Africans, worn down by the heavy marching and suffering from lack of water and the tropical heat, struggled up the Taref mountains, and reached the summit in the afternoon, fortunately without meeting any resistance.

The sufferings of the men when they had won the key to Sollum after a gruelling task were not at an end. There was an ancient Roman cistern at the top of the Madian pass, and it was expected that this reservoir would provide water for the whole column. But the enemy had emptied the cistern, and also pumped dry the wells at Siqiat, farther eastward, intending thus to prevent any advance along the mountains. This he did to some extent. General Lukin had intended to water his troops at the cistern and the wells, and then move his whole force along the mountain ridge towards Sollum Bay. But in the absence of water his plan had to be modified. The main force bivouacked on the plain on the night of March 12 while the motor-car battery held the Madian pass. Then, on the morning of March 13, General Lukin rearranged his forces.

The larger body of troops, with all the animals, moved along the plain and the coast to another pass midway between Sollum and the height where the empty Roman cistern had been found. General Lukin, in person, with the two South African infantry battalions, the armoured cars and a mountain battery, moved eastward along the top of the Taref mountains. With him also went the Australian Camel Corps and camels carrying the water supply. There was only enough water for eight pints a man until the water supply at Sollum could be captured. It might have been 48 hours before water was reached, and it might have been longer. So there was not much drink for the 2,000 infantrymen and their comrades. The detached column on the ridge marched until nine o'clock at night, and then bivouacked four miles distant from the Halfaia pass, where it was to meet the column in the plain. Every man who was not on sentry duty snatched a few hours' rest after a feed of biscuit and a

THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER

mouthful of water. Then, early next morning, the armoured cars went out to reconnoitre and found the pass abandoned by the enemy, and also learnt that the Senussi had evacuated Sollum the evening before and retreated to the south-west.

Aerial scouts reported that the Senussi camp at Bir Waer, on the heights west of Sollum, was empty, and the duke of Westminster, who was in command of the armoured cars, was ordered to pursue the retreating foe with "reasonable boldness." Heading his armoured-car battery, which consisted of nine armoured cars and one open car on which a machine gun was mounted, with some 32 men, the duke went forward with a degree of boldness that can hardly be described as reasonable: it was comparably daring. Ignoring the small parties of fleeing Arabs, the squadron quickly passed through the enemy's camp at Bir Waer and then turned down the old road which starts in the desert and runs to the Tripoli coast town of Tobruk, 90 miles west of the Egyptian frontier.

The road surface had worn rocky in the course of ages, but the motor-car men regarded it, after their experiences in rain-soaked desert sands, as a magnificent track. On it they speeded up their motors to 35 miles an hour, which was remarkably fast in the Libyan wilderness. It took them only half an hour to overtake the Senussi army, which was watering at the Asisa wells, some 20 miles from Bir Waer. Detachments acting as rearguards sniped the cars but missed, owing to the speed at which they were going. Then, as the leading car whipped round a bend in the road, an extraordinary battle between 32 British soldiers and nearly 6,000 Senussi regulars, bedouins and Turks abruptly opened.

The enemy was caught just as he was preparing to break camp. His camel supply train was standing loaded, and masses of his infantry were already on the move. Two guns had been removed from their position, but a third gun and two machine guns still protected the rear of the retreating army. Some Turks manned the 10-pounder and the two Maxims, and opened fire with these as the leading car swung into sight. The duke of Westminster ordered his battery to form in line and charge. The ten cars formed up along the road, with the enemy facing them over some 300 yards of rough ground formed of boulders, stiff scrub and sandy patches. As the cars wheeled, the machine gunners in them swept the hostile positions, and then, while two

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

of the cars remained on the road and kept up a covering fire, the other eight cars attacked in infantry fashion. That is to say, each car made a short rush forward, supported by the covering fire of the cars that were standing still at the moment. Rapid and exact judgement with regard to range was needed from the machine gun officers, while from the drivers there was required a nice appreciation of the intentions of the Turkish officer who was directing the mountain gun. But this officer could not get the range of any of the charging cars. Not a single direct hit did the Turkish gunners register, but the British machine guns were doing deadly work. They shot down, almost to a man, the Turkish officers and gun-crews, and then swept forward against the absolutely demoralised Senussi army, which was scattering in every direction. The cars dashed about the battlefield, breaking up every knot of men that still showed fight, and searching chiefly for Turkish officers, whose capture was most important.

Most of the bedouins threw away their rifles and fled, utterly regardless of the direction in which they were going. The charge was continued for seven miles, but the pursuit of the enemy had to be abandoned for fear of a shortage of petrol. Three cars were left on the field to guard the booty and the prisoners, while the rest of the battery went back to Sollum for more petrol. Three mountain guns, nine machine guns, a large quantity of shell, 300,000 cartridges, 24 spare machine gun barrels, military stores, food supplies, camels and mules were among the material captured. The armoured cars had only one casualty, an officer being slightly wounded in the head. Important among the enemy losses were 30 Turkish officers killed or wounded. What with the smashing up of the Turkish high command at Agagia, the destruction of guns round Matruh, and the final capture of the rest of the artillery possessed by the Senussi and most of his ammunition and supplies, the campaign on the north-west frontier of Egypt seemed practically concluded.

A letter was picked up near the ruins of Bir Waer, written by Captain Williams, of the auxiliary boarding ship Tara, to Nuri Bey. The British captain complained that the Tara prisoners were starving and ill, and begged that medicine should be procured for them at Sollum. The letter mentioned Bir Hakim as the place where the prisoners were being kept. All the bedouin captives and refugees were questioned about the position of Bir

ARMoured CARS IN ACTION

Hakim, yet none of them had heard of it. But in the first dash through Bir Waer the duke of Westminster had captured a bedouin straggler, and the man afterwards admitted that he had acted as guard to the Tara prisoners, and showed himself eager to guide the armoured squadron to the well. Then another Arab said that he had fed a flock at Bir Hakim in his boyhood thirty years before. Thereupon the duke of Westminster resolved to make a raid into the desert. Every man in the battery was up all night and all the next day tuning up the engines and getting the cars in order. The armoured cars were reinforced by squadrons of light cars carrying machine guns, and all the motor ambulances within travelling range of Sollum were added to the expedition in order to provide transport for the men of the Tara and the crew of the Egyptian patrol boat Abbas.

By midnight on March 16, 1916, there gathered at the old Turkish fort on the ridge above Sollum the nine armoured Rolls-Royce cars, five open touring motor-cars with machine guns, light cars and motor ambulances, forming together a fleet of 45 vehicles. At three o'clock on the morning of St. Patrick's day the duke of Westminster led his squadrons across the desert for a few miles, and, picking up the Tobruk road, reached Asisa, the scene of the motor-car battle on March 15, and there halted in the darkness until day broke and lighted the ancient Tobruk road. Thence the cars went along the old Roman way through wide stretches of bare desert, with an occasional halt to repair some burst tyre. When 65 miles had been covered a small party of bedouins was overtaken and disarmed, but, as there was no room to spare for prisoners, the men were set free.

About this time the cars, under the direction of the two bedouin guides, turned south into the desert, and after travelling for 15 miles over appallingly rough ground the expedition came to a standstill. The man who had fed his flock at Bir Hakim 30 years before maintained with much eloquence that the column was going on a wrong track. The bedouin who had guarded the prisoners was not inclined to argue the point, for he was doubtful himself, and yet held that his direction had been the right one. He was sincerely concerned about the matter, and desirous of making the expedition a success. The duke resolved to trust this man, though the desert was now becoming very stony. The 100 mile point was passed, and then the 105 mile point, which had been thought to be the extreme limit of the expedition. The

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI

cars went on for another 16 miles, and nobody in them spoke. The sense of failure weighed upon all. Then one of the Arabs espied in a mirage a small height. On the hill there was a line of men running about with rifles in their hands. The armed men quickly disappeared, and the duke of Westminster formed his armoured cars into line at two o'clock in the afternoon and then launched them on an attack. Meanwhile, other figures had appeared against the sky-line, and one raised a British cheer.

The cars raced up to within 200 yards of the mound, and as they opened fire the Senussi's soldiers bolted as fast as they could, which was not, however, very fast, as they had their women and children with them. Some of the armoured cars advanced in pursuit, while the tourer cars and the ambulances approached the prisoners, many of whom were now dancing and shouting with joy. Some of them, indeed, could not be persuaded to leave the fighting cars, and in their happiness at meeting their countrymen again they slightly hindered the battle with the guards. But while these were being hunted down the remainder of the fleet was making a tremendous race to the rescued men.

The condition of the prisoners was very bad. The Arabs themselves were short of food, and their prisoners were starving. Despite their sufferings, however, they had managed to get food for the dog of the shipwrecked Tara, who was accepted as a mascot by the armoured car battery. One of the Tara men said that he went almost mad when he saw the soldiers unloading packing-cases from the car, as he knew they contained food. Many of the prisoners ate three days' rations with such speed that their starved stomachs could not digest the unusual quantity.

• After bringing the rescued men, numbering nearly 100, back to Sollum through a sand blizzard, the armoured car battery returned to the workaday labour of patrolling. For some months the patrols continued to hunt out and destroy hidden stores of ammunition, of which another 250,000 rounds were discovered after the occupation of Sollum. Then south of the port two German wireless sets were found in the desert and brought in. A cordon of troops was flung out in a semicircle toward the Libyan and Sahara wastes. In the south the British and Egyptian troops at Kharga made reconnaissances in all directions, while airmen flew over the oasis of Dakhla, and there broke up the bedouins by machine gun fire and aerial bombardments. More to the north, round the Beharia oasis, a small body of the

WANT AND STARVATION

Senussi's followers continued until May, 1916, to terrorise the native population and rob them of their food.

Along the northern coast the victorious frontier force came down to the edge of the plateau at Moghara, and, after closing all routes of supply to the western deserts, opened markets along the line they were holding. This brought the bedouins in from the western wastes, and they came in tribe after tribe. Along the coast the Ulad Ali tribe sent in their headmen to make submission, and the sheikh who had first assailed the British near Matruh returned with the remnant of his people to make peace.

The condition of the country was terrible. Not a grain of the barley of rare quality, grown by the coast, had been raised during the brief war. The hostile Arabs, once so well fed from their own land, had been living, like the Tara prisoners, on anything they could find. Many cairns in the desert told the price the natives had paid for listening to the false tales of Jafar Pasha and Nuri Bey. When the tribesmen came in—parties of starving men, women and children—the usual thing happened. The British soldier went hungry and the Arab children shared his rations. At the beginning of May, 1916, the larger part of the bedouin army was living on the biscuits and dried dates brought by British transports and motor trucks to the coast towns.

By October light cars were patrolling hundreds of miles of desert. On October 4, 1916, Major General W. A. Watson took over the command of the western force, which in a little over a fortnight from that date captured both the Beharia and Dakhla oases, nearly 500 men and a number of camels. General Watson visited the Beharia oasis on November 16, and under the Union Jack which had been hoisted by the troops held a durbar attended by the principal inhabitants. He also held a durbar at Dakhla on the 19th. In both districts the civil administration was re-instituted, to the gratification of the natives.

After the defeat of his army Sidi Ahmed had reached the Siwa oasis, and Sir Archibald Murray, having heard in January, 1917, that he was making preparations to retire to Jaghbub, gave orders on the 21st that operations were to be undertaken against the Siwa and Girba oases by a column entirely composed of armoured motor-cars, and supplied by motor transport from Mersa Matruh. This place was 200 miles from Siwa, and the road, such as it was, lay across a waterless desert. Brigadier General H. W. Hodgson was placed in command. He planned

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI.

to attack the Senussi camp at Girba, which was west of Siwa, with the larger part of his force, and to detach two motor batteries to block the solitary pass at Garet el Manâsib that was practicable for camels between Siwa and Jaghbub.

On the evening of January 29 the fighting force, consisting of three light armoured batteries and three light-car patrols, was concentrated at Mersa Matruh, but progress was delayed by a severe sandstorm, which prevented some of the lorries of the heavy supply column that was coming from Dabaa from arriving till the 31st. But on February 1 all was ready for the swift rush across the waste, and next day all units reached the point of concentration, 168 miles south of Matruh. Early on the 3rd the force successfully descended the pass north-east of Girba, and moved on to the attack. The enemy was completely taken by surprise on seeing the motor column, and at once withdrew from his camps to the cliffs and hills in rear—where he showed that he did not intend to retreat farther without a fight.

At Girba the Senussi were 650 strong, with both guns and machine guns, and they were led by Mohammed Saleh, the general of the Grand Senussi, who himself was at Siwa with four or five hundred men, and was already making ready to fly. Owing to the rough nature of the country the cars could get no nearer to the Girba position than 800 yards, but after an action lasting all day and on into the night they compelled the Senussi to withdraw. On the 4th Girba was in their possession, and they took Siwa next day. The Senussi's base thus fell into the hands of the British with astonishing rapidity—thanks to the motor-cars, an ideal arm for the western desert. A parade at which the local sheikhs were present was held before the court-house at Siwa, and the inhabitants of the oasis gave the troops a friendly reception.

The detachment of armoured cars and a light-car patrol which had been dispatched in the direction of the pass at Manâsib, with the object of intercepting Sidi Ahmed—or, at least, of cutting off a considerable number of his followers as they retreated from Girba and Siwa—had reached a position some 18 miles north of the pass, but there most of this column was forced to remain; as it was found impossible to get the armoured cars down the steep escarpment. The light-car patrol and one car, however, managed to get down to Manâsib and take up a position from which this force was able to cut up some of the

THE SULTAN OF DARFUR

leading parties coming from Girba. But the enemy established a post in the sand-dunes beyond the reach of the cars, and diverted to it his retreating men. There thus being no chance of further success, the detachment was ordered to withdraw.

The whole column returned to Matruh on February 8, having sustained no loss except three officers slightly wounded. On the other hand, the Senussi lost 40 killed and 200 wounded, including five Turkish officers, besides rifles and ammunition. Sidi Ahmed and his chief fighting man, Mohammed Saleh, made good their escape. Yet this expedition into the southern desert dealt, in the words of Sir Archibald Murray, "a rude blow to the moral of the Senussi, left the Grand Senussi himself painfully making his way to Jaghbub through the rugged and waterless dunes, and freed the western front from the menace of his forces."

At first one promising path of retreat had been open to him. In February, 1916, just before General Lukin broke the Senussi's power on the ridge of Agagia, the Sultan of Darfur, 1,000 miles away from the scene of action, began openly to side with the Senussi. Darfur is the westernmost state of the Anglo-Egyptian territories of the Sudan. It extends along the northern edge of the Sahara, some 400 miles south of the Kufra oasis—the Senussi's headquarters—with which it connects by means of caravan routes running through Borku in French territory. Darfur had been incorporated in the dominions of the false mahdi in 1883, but the negroes and Arabs composing the population chafed under the rule of the dervishes and fought desperately for freedom until the British victory at Omdurman in 1898 liberated the country. The hereditary Arab leader of the then friendly Darfur people, Ali Dinar, was set free from the mahdist prison and recognized as sultan, under the suzerainty of the Anglo-Egyptian government.

It was largely through the influence of the older Senussi that the Darfur chiefs had fought for 15 years against the mahdi and khalifa and their dervishes of the Sudan. Owing to the strong influence of this missionary sect the younger Senussi had been able to induce the sultan, in January, 1916, to attempt a movement of invasion towards Khartum. El Fasher, the capital of Darfur, lies some 500 miles west of Khartum in a mountainous country watered in the rainy season by tributaries of the Nile and streams flowing towards Lake Chad. A farming nation of some 4,000,000 brown-faced negroes and bedouin

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENUSSI.

settlers, who live in huts of clay and reeds in a burning climate, scantily people a country larger than the United Kingdom. As, however, the high plateau is seamed by dry river-courses and broken by innumerable mountains, between 6,000 and 7,000 feet high, Darfur is a land of great natural strength.

Ali Dinar was not content to remain upon the defensive. Early in February, 1916, he gathered a force at Hilla, a great mountain 100 miles east of his capital and close to the frontier of Kordofan. His clear intention was to invade Kordofan, one of the centres of the former mahdist revolt and peopled by half a million Arabs and Nubians. But in answer to this dangerous threat the British sirdar made a concentration of a mixed Egyptian force of all arms under Colonel Kelly. The concentration took place at Nahud, a point 300 miles south-west of Khartum, and well to the south of Ali Dinar's centre of operations. Colonel Kelly marched in a north-easterly direction towards the enemy's capital, thus menacing the line of communications of the rebel sultan and compelling him to postpone his invasion of Kordofan and look to his own safety. While the sultan was rearranging the disposition of his force, Colonel Kelly's column marched from Nahud, in Kordofan, to the Darfur town of Um Shanga, which was reached, after arduous skirmishing and marching, towards the end of March. At the same time another part of the column closed round the great mountain of Hilla, where Ali Dinar had made his first concentration. From Hilla the column moved along the lower edge of the Sahara to the town of Abiat, the seat of Ali Dinar's power.

Colonel Kelly's lines of communication were strengthened and broadened, enabling supplies and reinforcements to come from Khartum and Kordofan. Six weeks were spent in strengthening the little column and preparing for the decisive advance. Then, on May 15, 1916, Colonel Kelly moved out from Abiat on a long fighting march towards El Fasher. The sultan's outposts were driven in, and his larger advanced forces were shaken out of their positions by a series of sharp movements which brought the column on the evening of May 21 to the village of Beringia, 12 miles north of the Darfur capital.

The enemy, some 3,000 strong, was entrenched on the heights by the village, and Colonel Kelly was not inclined in the circumstances to make a frontal attack. On the morning of May 22, 1916, he sent out his camel corps on an outflanking movement,

AN ARAB RUSH

and this compelled Ali Dinar to abandon his entrenched position. But the Arab leader, instead of retiring when he had been out-flanked, ordered a general attack against the British lines. The drive, tenacity and absolute disregard of death of the mountain negroes and Arabs of Darfur were heroic. They would have broken the Egyptian lines had the troops been armed only with Martinj rifles. But the new magazine rifle, machine guns and modern quick-firers stayed the terrific charge within 10 yards of the Egyptian front. Despite their rapidity of movement, half their forces were brought down in the vain rush.

When the enemy was trying to make a stand against a counter-attack, a strange event struck fear into his heart. He had in reserve a large body of mounted men and some 2,000 foot soldiers. But over them swooped an officer of the Royal Flying Corps. He bombed the Arab horsemen and scattered them, threw his remaining bombs at the Darfur infantry, and then planed down and raked them with his machine gun. They broke in disorder under his fire.* And while the British airman was flying back, wounded in the thigh, to Abiat, Colonel Kelly and his column marched on to El Fasher. The capital was occupied early in the morning of May 23, 1916, and Sultan Ali Dinar, with only a small following, fled westward.

On May 29, 1916, three envoys appeared in El Fasher with an offer of surrender by the sultan, and with some reservations the offer was accepted, but as the negotiations proceeded it became evident that Ali Dinar was acting in bad faith. A second offer of surrender, which came after the occupation of Kebkebia in September, and the surprise and flight of a force under Zacharia, the sultan's eldest son, in October, led to nothing. The wily African prince was merely playing for time, and in the beginning of November an expedition was sent out against him. The force consisted of Sudanese troops and camelry, and was led by Major H. J. Huddleston, of the Dorsetshire Regiment, who on November 3 marched into Kulme, almost without opposition, and received a large number of surrenders. At dawn on the 6th, Ali Dinar was surprised at Giuba, 30 miles from Kulme, and was shot through the head as he fled. Shortly afterwards his chiefs and headmen surrendered and all resistance disappeared.

CHAPTER 6

Coming of Conscription

ON New Year's Day, 1916, it was clear to every intelligent person that there was no prospect whatever of an early termination of the Great War, the more so because each combatant nation realized, more clearly than ever before, that nothing less than its very existence was at stake. It was not a war for the possession of a fortress, a country, or even a continent, but for the right of a nation to live and develop as it wished. Under such conditions, with weapons increasing every day in their destructive power, it is not surprising that the demand for men became more and more insistent. The European countries, with their conscript armies, automatically called the older men to the colours from time to time, but Great Britain, where the voluntary system was so deeply rooted, had to adopt other methods.

Taking the long view, the Derby scheme, although it had done a good deal to move the nation, was a failure, and this contingency had been foreseen. On the day after the issue of the report (January 4, 1916), Mr. Asquith, then prime minister, introduced into the House of Commons a bill for compulsory military service. No other course was open to the ministry if the war was to be prosecuted, and that for a simple reason.

Definite pledges had been given that the married men, who had attested under the Derby scheme, should not be called upon for active service while the single men who had not attested remained in civil life. This meant that of the 830,000 attested men who were available (See Vol. II, Chapter 23), only about 300,000 could be called upon at once as over one half, 487,676 to be exact, were married men.

The bill applied to England, Wales and Scotland, but not to Ireland, and affected all single British men and widowers without children dependent on them who were between the ages of 18 and 41 on August 15, 1915. The men were offered the choice of voluntarily joining one of the Derby groups; if they did not do so a day would be appointed five weeks after the bill passed, and on that day, unless they had been exempted, they would be

MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECH

deemed to have enlisted for the duration of the war. Certain exemptions were made. Persons to whom compulsion could not be applied were clergy and ministers of any denomination, persons with certificates of exemption, those medically rejected, men necessary in national employments, men who supported relatives and would leave dependents without support, necessary civil servants, and conscientious objectors.

The premier gave a clear statement of his position. He was opposed to general compulsion, and did not think that any case had been made out for it. This bill was confined to a specific purpose, the redemption of the pledge publicly given by him to the House on November 2. That pledge was given because, at the time, overwhelming evidence was submitted to him that if it were not given there was serious danger of the whole campaign breaking down. The premier dismissed the idea that when he spoke he was not defining the general policy of the Cabinet.

After he gave the pledge in Parliament he had received neither then nor subsequently any sign of protest or remonstrance. He could not treat the estimated number of the unmarried men who had not attested—650,000—as anything but a substantial and even considerable amount, even when all possible deductions were made from it. "Our primary obligations, mine at any rate, must be to keep faith with those to whom I have given that promise." There were only two ways in which the promise could be fulfilled. One would be releasing the married men from their obligations, and the second course would be to treat the single men of military age, without exemption or excuse, as though they had attested or enlisted. "This course," he said, "we propose to adopt in this bill. I mean to keep my promise. We must keep our promises, and do not let it be said that we dallied and delayed in the performance of an obligation of honour." Even now the defenders of the old voluntary system did not give up hope. They thought that they had a considerable strength in the House, and they placed much reliance upon Sir John Simon, who had resigned his office of home secretary owing to his dislike of the bill. Sir John was known as an able lawyer and a skilled parliamentarian, but when he sat down after a long speech, which was evidently meant to be one of the great efforts of his life, everyone knew that the case against the bill had broken down.

Two other speeches drove home the premier's declaration. One was from Mr. Bonar Law, and the other by Major General

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

J. E. B. Seely, who spoke with a passion, enthusiasm and emotion that stirred the House. The Liberal war minister of other years, looking now the soldier he was, for he was serving at the time as a brigadier general with the Canadian division, told how he had long opposed conscription, but since the prime minister and Lord Kitchener said this bill was necessary, he held it his clear duty to support them. Then he turned on those who denounced the bill in the name of liberty.

Liberty to do what? When the Lusitania has been sunk, when poisonous gases have been turned on, when thousands of innocent lives have been destroyed in defiance of every law of war and humanity, when overwhelming masses of your countrymen have risen in horror and said: We will not be ground down by Prussian despotism and tyranny. Then you are going to appeal to liberty—liberty that you may send another man in your place.

The debate was concluded on the second day, when an eloquent speech from Colonel John Ward, the commander of the Navvies battalion, thrilled the House. Mr. Herbert Samuel pulverised Sir John Simon's figures and arguments. When the division came there was a majority in favour of the bill of 298—403 against 105. The minority of 105 included no fewer than 60 Nationalists. The action of these in voting against a bill which did not apply to Ireland created so much unfavourable comment that when the second reading of the bill came on the Nationalists decided not to vote. The opposition thus dwindled to 39, and the second reading was carried by a majority of 392.

On Monday, January 24, 1916, the bill passed its third reading by a majority of 347, the opposition having now fallen to 36. The members who voted against the bill, either on the introduction or on the second reading, found in many cases that their action created great resentment. The Liberal organization in Sir John Simon's own constituency asked him to resign. Another member pledged himself after the first reading not to vote against the bill again. Great efforts were made to enlist the Labour party as a whole against the bill, and a conference of Labour delegates carried a resolution against compulsion. It was soon found, however, that all hopes of united and solid Labour opposition were vain. Many Labour representatives were among the bill's warmest advocates.

The attitude of organized labour at this time on this matter is worthy of examination. On January 27, 1916, the Labour

LABOUR PARTY'S ATTITUDE

party held a conference in Bristol. At this conference a card vote division on conscription resulted in 219,000 votes in favour of universal military service, and 1,796,000 against it. The bill enforcing compulsory service only on single men was favoured by 360,000 votes and opposed by 1,716,000. But a proposal to agitate for a repeal of the bill was opposed by 649,000 votes and favoured by 614,000 votes. The fact was that the Labour delegates, especially those representing 600,000 miners' votes, were uncertain of the feeling of the trade unionists. The trade unions had supplied most of the men of the new armies. At first all the trade unionists had been prejudiced against any form of compulsory service, and many of the thoughtful spirits among them had given up valuable skilled work for the country and entered the recruiting offices in the hope of making any measure of conscription unnecessary. Their great fear was that the system of conscription would remain in force after the war, and that justifiable strike movements would then be dishonestly defeated by calling the men up as soldiers and making them obey the will of their employers by means of military discipline.

The British railwaymen were probably the most important body of labour with a dread of the industrial aspect of conscription. The men themselves were splendid; they were working lines at an unending high pressure, feeding the fleets and the armies and saving the civil population from a famine of both materials and food. In spite of the great strain upon them day and night, railway accidents remained small in proportion to the enormous traffic, and though the men themselves worked as hard as any other war workers, and received some increase of wages to balance the higher cost of living, they were not repaid for their intense labours in the way that many skilled men were. Perhaps it was the long stress of their work that made them a little nervous.

The miners, as they had shown in their great consenting vote, were in a more warlike mood. One of the great mining constituencies had returned a Labour member distinctly in favour of conscription, and in the front of battle, where many of the miners had become tunnellers, they were among the keenest fighters in the world. Some of the socialists among the miners had been inclined to make difficulties, with a view to bringing about the nationalization of the mines, and a large number of men were indignant at the high price at which coal was being sold, and

· COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

anxious either to force the price down, or at least to get a larger share of the profits they thought were being made.

In February, 1916, a great effort was made to bring into the ranks sufficient untrained single men, i.e. men who were not employed in the making of munitions, in order to make the bill, which came into force on March 3, a dead letter.

Mr. John Redmond issued a manifesto to young Irishmen calling them to the colours, and Lord Derby addressed a personal letter to every single man of military age who was liable to service. But the single men began to search for cover. In one borough in London—Islington—it was found that some thousands of single men had departed leaving no address. Published reports of proceedings at the military service tribunals which were set up in the various cities and other localities to decide doubtful cases also exhibited a deplorable amount of cowardice on the part of a number of conscientious objectors.

The Society of Friends was on its trial before the nation during the spring of 1916. Some of its members were doing noble work at home and abroad and maintaining the glorious traditions of practical humanitarianism. But the general feeling was that the Friends had flourished in trade and finance under the protection of forces which they had no right to condemn. There was no question of their sincerity, but considerable doubt of their bias and narrowness in interpreting the Christian gospel. It was felt that the primitive Christianity which they professed to restore went with personal poverty and a community of goods. They had totally disregarded Christ's attacks on wealth, and, while themselves growing one of the richest bodies in the kingdom in proportion to their numbers, had escaped the ultimate duties attaching to their wealth by exaggerating, in such a way as to pervert it, the doctrine of non-resistance.

Oxford and Cambridge, having poured their stores of virile and gallant youth into the services, were strangely stricken by the blight of conscientious objection. Cambridge produced in Mr. Bertrand Russell the philosophic pillar of the new doctrine of pacifism. He was able to give the convenient dogma of non-resistance a larger scope than Christianity afforded, and so make it a weapon to the hand of every pro-German agitator of an irreligious cast of mind. Another light of Cambridge, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, who had been working in the interests of the Union of Democratic Control, also became the intellectual guide

A. MEETING IN TRAFALGAR SQUARE

to all the young men of Britain whose attitude encouraged the view that they would rather be ruled by the kaiser than fight against him. Such was the class that provided the larger number of conscientious objectors of the intellectual type, who joined forces with some members of the Society of Friends and with some Nonconformist congregations, though moved by no religious principles themselves. Most of them, however, were put in the way of salvation by the military service tribunals, through which they were passed for duty in a new non-combatant corps.

A somewhat unexpected reinforcement to the party of conscientious objectors was the East London federation of suffragettes, which, led by Miss Sylvia Pankhurst, tried to hold a peace meeting in Trafalgar Square on April 9, 1916. The meeting, however, was broken up by a large crowd of soldiers and civilians, and Miss Pankhurst and her supporters were collected by the police and moved from the danger zone. On the same day, at a meeting of the No-Conscription Fellowship in the Friends' Meeting House in Bishopsgate, London, the chairman, Mr. Clifford Allen, was alleged to have declared that young recruits who deserted would be received in the homes of married men in sympathy with the no-conscription movement. Then, amid much cheering, Mr. Clifford Allen went on to say that the only alternative to conscription allowed by the conscientious objectors was that the government should immediately enter upon peace negotiations.

All this agitation to impede the development of the national strength was but the buzzing futility of flies round the wheels of the war machine, an idea that Edmund Burke in his "Reflections on the Revolution in France" had eloquently expressed a century and a half before:

Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate chink, whilst thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field; that, of course, they are many in number; or that, after all, they are other than the little, shrivelled, meagre, hopping, though loud and troublesome, insects of the hour.

A very strong majority of the people of the United Kingdom and the overseas dominions was determined to win a lasting, victorious peace. Attempts were made by some of the civil departments of the government to maintain British commerce

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION


even at the expense of military power. An inter-departmental committee existed for the purpose of representing the industries of the country against the War Office, and marking its indispensable men. At the time when the national register was made, in August, 1915, the reserved occupations—the workers in which were starred—were munition making, certain branches of agriculture, coal-mining, railway work, the merchant service, and public utility services. These were presumed to represent four-fifths of the exemptions of men of military age, while the remaining fifth was reckoned to be made up largely of men in the export trades. When Lord Derby made his report as to the numbers of men available for service, he had a fairly precise idea of the number of starred men, but he was mistaken in regard to his calculations of the number of men in certified trades.

Lord Derby afterwards discovered that the number of men who were able to get into reserved occupations between November, 1915, and January, 1916, was much beyond his estimate. The result was that the bill compelling the single men to serve did not produce the recruits needed by the War Office. The whole cause of the shortage was the reserved occupations list. Lord Derby appealed to the inter-departmental committee to reduce the number of starred men and remove certain industries from the reserved list. He also approached Lord Selborne, president of the board of agriculture, who would not agree to the proposals, as he regarded the men engaged on the food resources of the country as absolutely indispensable.

But men had to be found for the army, and as Lord Derby could not get the inter-departmental committee to unstar some men and remove some trades from the reserved list, he made a direct appeal to the government to take action. The result was a conference under Mr. Walter Long, the president of the local government board, and attended by the secretary of state for war, the president of the board of trade, a representative of the board of agriculture, the home secretary, and other representatives of government departments. While the conference was trying to obtain more men from the reserved industries and the munition works, Lord Kitchener stated on March 15, 1916, that he would need more groups of married men than he had expected. He also went on to say that, even if he had obtained all the single men anticipated from the group system, he would still have required a large number of married men in the spring of 1916.

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SINGLE MEN!
WILL YOU MARCH TOO
OR
WAIT TILL MARCH 2



THE COMING OF CONSCRIPTION. Owing to the terrible toll of Britain's manhood in 1914-15 and the drying up of voluntary enlistment, conscription of men for military service became a necessity in the winter of 1915. The Derby scheme was the government's first attempt to secure an adequate number of volunteers, and men are seen here reading a poster reminding them that on March 2, 1916, the first Compulsory Service Act passed on January 21, would come into force. This measure was at first applied only to unmarried men between 18 and 41.



A SENUSSI STRONGHOLD. The illustration shows Siwa from the date market built in limestone rocks, with houses one on top of the other, and narrow streets, the town is the capital of the oasis in the Libyan desert that was for a time the home of the founder of the Senussi sect. Siwa figured prominently in the British campaign against the Senussi in 1919.



MAHOMET'S BURIAL PLACE. Many places of ancient renown became prominent in the war. One was Medina, which was besieged in 1916 by the forces of the King of the Hejaz, who joined the Allies in that year. Second only in sanctity to Mecca, where Mahomet was born, is Madina; his tomb here is in the splendid mosque visible in this photograph. It was hither that the Prophet fled from Mecca in 602, the year that marks the beginning of the Moslem era.

E.N. 40



HEADQUARTERS OF THE IRISH REBELS. Liberty Hall, Dublin, was the chief stronghold of the insurgents in the Irish rebellion 1916. It was situated in Bevetford Place, facing the Custom House.

MARRIED MEN CALLED UP

By this time there was considerable unrest throughout the country in regard to the married men who had attested under Lord Derby's scheme. The threat of breaking up an immense number of homes by calling the married men up for service aroused a strong feeling of resentment among the married and unmarried women of the nation, particularly in regard to the large number of exemptions which had been given to single men. Lord Derby admitted that the military service bill had only carried out the letter of the prime minister's pledge. There were 1,100,000 men of military age unattested, and the number of single men among them was very large. Some 40 per cent of the 1,600,000 munition workers under Mr. Lloyd George's scheme were reported to be single men. Doubtless a large proportion of these bachelors in the war factories were skilled mechanics who could only be gradually replaced, but thousands of them had fled to the war factories for refuge since the making of the national register.

On March 4, 1916, the first call on attested married men was made. Proclamations were posted in regard to the eight groups, 25 to 32, referring to married men between the ages of 19 and 26. April 7 was the date fixed for their calling up, and it was reported that nine more groups of married men, between the ages of 27 and 35, would be called by proclamations to be posted in the middle of March. Thus, only six groups of married men would be left in civilian life, and it was stated that all attested married men would be serving long before the autumn.

The unexpectedness and sweep of this recruiting measure shook the country. The attested married groups held mass meetings, and protested against the injustice. They quickly formed themselves into a national union of attested married men, and strongly agitated by letters to members of Parliament, by public meetings, and by deputations to the leading men in the government. They had two principal grounds of complaint. In the first place they argued that their homes were being broken up in order to fill the ranks at a time when hundreds of thousands of single men in the flower of their strength were escaping military service. In the second place they called attention to statements made, apparently upon official authority, during the working of Lord Derby's scheme, which had led them to think that if a married man did not attest he would have no right to appeal. The representatives of the national union stated that many of the married men had

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

attested on the understanding that there would be compulsion for all. They also accused Mr. Asquith, when he received a deputation from them, of not having fully carried out the pledge given in regard to compelling single men to serve before married men were called up.

The national union of attested married men made a stand upon the principle of equality of sacrifice. In other words, the attested groups asked for a general system of compulsory national service for all men of military age. Their grudge, of course, was heaviest against the single men who had escaped service, but they also wanted to include all available married men who had not attested. There were reckoned to be 1,029,231 unattested single men and 1,152,947 unattested married men. The two groups were estimated to be capable of yielding together more than 800,000 fit recruits.* The feeling in the attested groups ran deep and strong, and practically every member of Parliament felt some of the stress of it from his electors. Mr. Asquith had a somewhat angry interview with a deputation of the national union on April 12, 1916, but he was not inclined to adopt their policy of conscription of every fit man up to the age of forty-one. .

Two days before the deputation to the prime minister, Sir William Robertson, as chief of the imperial general staff, made his final report to the Cabinet in regard to the number of men needed to end the war. Then, at a Cabinet meeting on April 15, which was held in consultation with the military authorities, a decision was arrived at not to pursue a national policy of compulsion. A sub-committee of the Cabinet, composed of Mr. Asquith, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. McKenna, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, was reported to have gone thoroughly into the question of recruiting and to have discovered that the men needed by the imperial staff could be obtained by three methods. The first was the compulsory enlistment of all lads reaching the age of 18, the second was the combing out of some 300,000 single men from reserved occupations, and the third was the enlistment of all attested married men.

This scheme did not come into operation. A strong party in the Cabinet, headed by Mr. Lloyd George, stood out for the principle of equality of sacrifice. The dispute turned largely upon the point whether the attested groups of married men should bear all the burden of service, leaving a very large body of unattested fit men of military age free from the obligation of

PARLIAMENT IN SECRET SESSION

training for battle. The lowest estimate of the number of married men of military age fit for service and unattested was given by Mr. Asquith as 200,000. But Mr. Lloyd George reckoned that a considerably greater number than 200,000 could be spared, without any appreciable fall in production, from munition work and other vital industries and brought into a general scheme of compulsion.

For some days neither party in the Cabinet would yield. April 17, 1916, was the first day of public anxiety, and the tension continued until April 19, when Mr. Asquith announced:

There are material points of disagreement in the Cabinet, and if these points cannot be settled by agreement, the result must be the break-up of the government. The Cabinet is united in believing that this would be a national disaster of the most formidable kind. It is in the hope it may be averted by a few days' more deliberation that I shall propose that this House, at its rising to-day, adjourns till Tuesday.

On the afternoon of April 20, however, the Cabinet came to an agreement upon the proposals to be made to Parliament upon the subject of recruiting, and it was arranged that these proposals should be submitted to a secret session of the House of Commons on Tuesday, April 25. The fact was that under the influence of Mr. Arthur Henderson, president of the board of education and sole Labour member in the Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George and his group had made concessions in order to save the Coalition from breaking to pieces.

In the secret session the prime minister impressed the majority in the House with the fact that the military situation was such as demanded a change of policy. He made an especial attempt to win the general consent of the representatives of organized labour, to whose anti-conscription views, he afterwards publicly admitted, he attached great importance. He proposed a plan that did not involve immediate compulsion, but carried on the scheme of getting recruits by instalments if they could be got to come forward in requisite number by the dates required by the military authorities. Four weeks of voluntary recruiting were arranged, as had been proposed by Mr. Arthur Henderson. Then, to meet the immediate needs of the situation, the government put forward a measure to keep time-expired men in service until the end of the war, and to transfer territorial troops into regular battalions where needed, and also to apply conscription to all lads reaching the age of 18.

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

These proposals were embodied in a military service bill, which was brought before the House of Commons on April 27, 1916. Mr. Walter Long asked leave to introduce the measure, and the result was an astonishing situation, for which no parallel can be found in recent times. The bill was killed before it was born. In the debate not a voice was raised except in criticism or condemnation, and the strongest attack was made by Mr. Stephen Walsh, a Labour member who represented a large body of miners. He said that there was no fair play in the measure, and that the prime minister had led the Labour members to understand he would resign if a measure of the nature of any compulsion was introduced. Yet Mr. Walsh went on to say that if a scheme of general compulsion were introduced he would now vote for such a measure.

Why temporise any longer? It is simply fooling with the whole business. When the last military service bill was before the House, I suggested that men who had gone into reserved occupations since August 25 should be brought within its scope. Now, several months after, the government are endeavouring to "comb out" those who ought never to have been there. We were told this was being vigorously done.

I know something of the area in which I act as miners' agent, and there not a single man is being brought out of the mines. That is the vigorous way in which the process is going on! Not a single one! Papers have been supplied and have been filled up, but not a single person has been brought out, though there is the very best ground for believing that at least 3,000 men between 18 and 41, who never worked in mines before, have gone into the mines for the purpose of escaping their military obligations. And that which is true of my part of Lancashire is true, I believe, in a greater degree of the whole area of Great Britain.

The rights and privileges of citizens have been advanced. I know nothing that gives me a right to skulk in safety at the expense of others. Let us have a straightforward bill. Let the government take its courage in both hands and say: "This necessity has arisen and must now be resolutely met." If it makes an appeal such as that to the country it need not despair of a response.

It was clear that the proposal for general compulsion was the only measure which the House would support. Mr. Lloyd George and his group, whose resignations had been expected 10 days before, proved to have a majority in Parliament as well as overwhelming support in the country. In these circumstances Mr.

DETAILS OF THE BILL

Asquith accepted the defeat of his bill, and arranged to bring in a measure for general and immediate compulsion.

The prime minister asked leave to introduce the bill on May 2, 1916. In his speech on this occasion he summarized some of the reasons given in the secret session for the necessity of obtaining more recruits. The forces of the empire consisted of 42 regular and 28 territorial divisions, with one naval division and 12 Dominion divisions, which, excluding India, made 83 divisions. For the purpose of maintaining a British army of 70 divisions a weekly inflow of 25,000 to 30,000 men had to be obtained. The provision of at least 200,000 recruits from the unattested married men class was, the prime minister stated, of vital importance to the maintenance of the strength of the army in the field, in view of the contingencies of the summer and autumn campaign. Moreover, the number of men needed could, it was estimated, be spared from industry without crippling the output of munitions, or the maintenance of sea power and ocean transport.

The new bill laid down that every male British subject between 18 and 40 years of age was to be deemed to be duly enlisted in the regular forces for general service, unless he came within the exceptions set out in the schedule to the Military Service Act of January, 1916. Time-expired men were to be retained in service for the duration of the war. Members of the Territorial Force were to be transferred to the regular forces if the army council so required, and the army council was given power to review the medical certificates of men who had been rejected for unfitness since August 14, 1915. The main outlines of the bill were not altered in its passage through Parliament, except that time-expired men over military age who had done 12 years' service were exempted, and men dismissed from certified occupations were given two months' grace instead of being made liable to be called up in two weeks. This step was taken to avoid the appearance of industrial conscription and prevent employers from threatening to turn men quickly into the army if they did not give way on some disputed point.

On the second reading of the bill, on May 4, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George stated that the imperial general staff had made an irresistible demand for every available man to be called up and trained for the field, and he asked his critics if they could bring forward some ground of principle that would override even military necessity. He pointed out that every great democracy whose

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

liberties had been menaced had defended itself by resort to compulsion. Washington had won independence for America by compulsory measures, and Lincoln had kept democracy alive by conscription. He maintained that when his critics said that conscription was contrary to the principles of liberty they were talking in defiance of common sense and the whole teaching of history. Even if the measure produced only 200,000 men, which was an underestimate, that meant 10 divisions of infantry. In the first critical battle of Ypres, when the troops on both sides were at last exhausted, a single fresh British or German division would have meant victory to the country that could bring it up. The minister for munitions went on to say that we might even have to take greater risks in regard to our financial power and form a larger army should certain contingencies arise.

Then the labour minister, Mr. Arthur Henderson, frankly admitted that of all members of the Cabinet he had hitherto been the greatest drag-weight on the question of compulsion, but now that compulsion had become a military necessity he was quite convinced that conscription as the alternative to defeat would unite and not divide the nation. He pointed out that, owing to the rough-and-ready system of voluntary recruiting, men from skilled trades had gone into the army, and thereby directly created the grave difficulty in regard to a shortage of merchant ships. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that considerably more than 200,000 unattested fit men of military age could be spared from industry in order to increase the means of making a victorious peace. The House then divided on the bill. There were only 36 votes against it, while the votes in favour were 328.

Mr. Lloyd George addressed a meeting of his constituents at Conway after his victory in the House of Commons. He said that he had 300,000 women in his munition works, engaged upon tasks which no one before the war assumed a woman was capable of discharging—such as metal work, chemical work, and other heavy labour. In his young days, he observed, a far larger proportion of women were engaged in agricultural work than was now the case, and, if the need arrived, women could still look after the farms and let the men fight. He remarked that the colossal effort made by Lord Derby to recruit the men in groups had a mixture of compulsion in it, and a great many disadvantages of both conscription and voluntarism, without the advantages of either. He stated that, while working

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT CONWAY

harmoniously under the prime minister, he had had some differences of opinion with him, and he asked what use he would have been if he had not stated his views freely, frankly and independently. Free discussion was wanted in the council chamber—counsellors were not merely automatic machines, and, if the nation required only automatons, Mr. Lloyd George said he would not be one of them. In a remarkable passage he observed:

I want to say one thing: time is not an ally. It is a doubtful neutral at the present moment, and has not yet settled on our side. But time can be won over by effort, by preparation, by determination, by organization. And we must have unity among the Allies, with design and co-ordination. Unity we undoubtedly possess. No alliance that ever existed has worked in more perfect unison and harmony than the present one. But there is still left a good deal to be desired in regard to design and co-ordination. Strategy must come before geography. The Central Powers are pooling all their forces, all their intelligence, all their efforts. We have the means. They, too often, have the methods. Let us apply their methods to our means and we shall win. I believe in the old motto, "Trust the people." Tell them what is happening. There is nothing to conceal. They are a courageous people, but they never put forward their best effort until they face the alternative of disaster. Tell them with what they are confronted, and they will rise to every occasion. You can trust the people. I read a story the other day about a mining camp at the foot of a black mountain in the Great West. The diggers had been toiling long and hard with but scant encouragement for their labours, and one night a terrible storm swept over the mountain. An earthquake shattered its hard surface, and hurled its rocks about, and in the morning, in the rents and fissures, the miners found a rich deposit of gold. This is a great storm that is sweeping over the favoured lands of Europe. But in this night of terror you will find that the hard crust of selfishness and greed has been shattered, and in the rent hearts of the people you will find golden treasures of courage, steadfastness, devotion, and the faith that endureth for ever.

The new military service bill received the royal assent on Thursday, May 27, 1916. The nation had reverted in the great crisis of its fate to the method of Saxon and Norman times, when the king had a right to take for the purpose of national defence every man, ship, and available chattel in his dominion.

This principle was affirmed in 1757 by the Militia Act, by which each county had to furnish a stipulated quota towards a grand total of 32,000 men for the whole country. The county quotas

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

varied from 80 to 1,600, apportioned among the parishes of the respective counties by the lords lieutenants. If any parish failed to supply its required number by voluntary enlistments a ballot was to be held to make up the deficiency. The ages of eligibility were from 18 to 45. During the War of American Independence (1776-83), when the militia was extensively used for garrison and other home service, the practice of substitution became common, and the price of substitutes rose to the then considerable sum of 10 guineas. The period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) saw many modifications of the Militia Act, but the general principle of conscription was maintained, and with it the practice of substitution.

Meanwhile, the calls to the remaining groups of attested married men, which had been postponed during the great agitation in March, were gradually posted by the military authorities. Groups 33 to 41, including men of from 27 to 35 years of age, were called up by proclamation at the end of April, and on May 29 these married men went out to join the colours. June 24 was fixed as the date for the calling up of all remaining married men, and July 24 was the ultimate date for all men to report at recruiting offices. Conscription in 1916, reluctantly undertaken with the grave consent of the majority of citizens, resulted in a profound upheaval of home life in Britain. Though the men came up with brave faces, attended sometimes by their wives and children, there was deep anxiety of mind in all the emptied and emptying homes. The only class of married men in uncertified occupations who were likely to be released from military duties were those who were the sole heads of businesses with a family of three persons depending on them. These men, according to instructions sent to the tribunals, were to be released in the national interest by reason of their value as contributors to the national revenue.

The state had made certain special allowances to the new married recruits. Besides the usual cost of their upkeep on military service and the ordinary allowance to their families, there had been established a system of government relief to meet the rent, insurance and other liabilities of married recruits up to the sum of £104 a year. Then, in order to prevent the permanent breaking up of the homes of the wives and children, the local government board, towards the end of May, 1916, empowered all local authorities to make arrangement for the storage of furniture

IRELAND EXEMPTED

belonging to men serving in the forces. The plan was intended to apply in particular to married men whose wives and children were preparing to live elsewhere during the absence of the breadwinner. The local authorities were permitted to incur reasonable expenditure in storing the furniture of recruits, though they did not seem to move very quickly in the matter when the first new groups went into the recruiting offices. All this tended to increase the cost to the nation of the services of married men at the very time when their value as contributors of revenue was annulled. But so urgent was the need of more soldiers that the process of gathering in the married men went on with great speed.

The people of Ireland had from the beginning been left out of all schemes for national service. The establishment of the national register and the stoppage of emigration of men of military age produced a bad effect on the Roman Catholic population. The fear of conscription led a large number of men to join the Sinn Fein movement, and many people who at first rather favoured the British cause began to sympathize with the rebel movement. Sinn Fein organizers became extremely active in many parts of the west and south of Ireland, and in January, 1916, some of the young priests began to deliver seditious sermons, calling on the people to arm with any weapons they could find. The result was the Easter rebellion of that year, which is described in the next chapter.

The complementary problem to the supply of men was the supply of munitions. In the spring of 1916 the speed of production in some of the war factories was not satisfactory. Some trade unionists, men with years of experience, were outpaced in their special work by women who had picked up their skill since the outbreak of war. The trouble on the Clyde became serious in March, 1916, when men engaged on heavy guns urgently needed by the army in the field came out on strike. One of the Clyde agitators was the chairman of the Independent Labour Party in Scotland. Some of the ringleaders were deported, and about a score of men fined, and the strike ended on April 3, 1916. The vital problem of the dilution of skilled labour by new and half-trained or untrained men and women also produced a strike at the Harland & Wolff yard in Belfast at the end of March, 1916, and in other places the hesitation of some sections of trade unionists to cooperate loyally in the general interest with the newcomers in the shops and factories delayed the development of the

COMING OF CONSCRIPTION

nation's warlike strength. On the other hand, skilled mechanics, urgently needed at home, were doing ordinary infantry work in the army; and, as was said at the time, boilermakers were tending camels in Egypt.

Great as was the worth of a trained soldier, the value of a man skilled in armament work was greater. France had for months been combing out her armies to recover all her first-rate mechanics, and it looked as though Great Britain would also have to revise the mistakes made in her first great burst of recruiting energy, which had impoverished the workshops. There had been no forethought and no organization of the nation's energies during the volunteer movement. Tens of thousands of men had become tyros in war who were already, without knowing it at the time, the finished pillars of the country's military and naval power. It was because so many highly patriotic men had left the Clyde yards for the barracks that the work of the sinister agitators there went on with such increasing virulence.

The leaders of the trade unions were not unaware of the angry feeling pervading the very large section of trade unionists who had enlisted for military and naval service. The leaders knew also that the majority of men remaining at home were anxious to win the war at all costs, and that only a small, noisy minority of born "slackers" and ca' canny working-class profiteers were, when matters came to the ultimate test, ready to help Germany by preventing Great Britain from becoming a great military Power on the Continental scale.

From the point of view of those Labour leaders who were supporting the coalition cabinet, the difficulty was that they represented a most important class that still needed to be educated in the matter of national service. Members of Parliament of the pro-German school now and then proclaimed to the world that their design was to save the loss of British lives; but the people of Britain did not agree that French, Italian and Russian conscripts ought to be allowed to fight to exhaustion for the freedom of civilization while the fine volunteer British army grew smaller in the autumn of 1915 because the casualties could not be made good by compulsory service.

CHAPTER 7

The Irish Rebellion

IN the midst of their deep preoccupation with the war, British statesmen had given comparatively little attention to the trend of feeling among the extreme nationalists of Ireland. To the casual observer it might have seemed that Ireland was content to wait till the end of the war for her emancipation from British rule. In 1914, when feeling was running high, the Great War came to overshadow the political controversies which were then raging; John Redmond had pledged his country to the support of the Allied cause, and over 250,000 Irishmen of all shades of opinion had joined the Imperial forces. With the increasing food shortage the country districts prospered exceedingly, but in the towns the story was very different. Excepting Arklow, where Kynoch's explosive works were situated, there were few towns that had benefited from the war. In Dublin particularly war prices of commodities went side by side with pre-war rates of wages, and here was found fertile soil in which to foster the seeds of rebellion.

This was the state of affairs in 1916 when a number of intellectuals drawn partly from Irish Republicans and partly from Sinn Feiners launched the idea that the time had arrived to take advantage of England's preoccupation and strike for liberty. The rebellion—if it is worthy of such a name—was a product of the times when the whole world seemed to have but the one idea of force for the cure of all injustice.

It was Professor John MacNeill, head of the Irish volunteers, who was nominally responsible. James Connolly, a well-known politician, seconded him; but with these exceptions hardly any of the leaders had more than a local or a factional reputation. For example, there was Joseph Plunkett, a minor poet, Pearse, a dreaming schoolmaster, De Valera, then an unknown enthusiast, not one of them known outside his own small circle. For supplies they counted on Germany. Russian rifles had been purchased with American money and were to be landed by a German ship, arrangements for which had been carried through by the one-time

THE IRISH REBELLION

British consul, Sir Roger Casement, who had earned his knight-hood by his fearless exposure of Belgian atrocities in the Congo. Ardent nationalist though he was, it is to be doubted if he approved of the armed rising at that time. Seeing clearly that Germany was using Ireland as a mere catspaw, he secured a passage in a German ship and landed at Tralee Bay to warn his countrymen. One of his messages got through to Professor MacNeill in time to prevent the "manœuvres" which had been ordered in many places. Sir Roger was arrested on landing.

On April 22 "The Irish Volunteer," the official organ of the revolting parties, announced:

Arrangements are now nearing completion in all the more important brigade areas for the holding of a very interesting series of manœuvres at Easter. In some instances the arrangements contemplate a one or two day bivouac. As for Easter, the Dublin programme may well stand as a model for other areas.

Next day at a conference in Dublin Castle it was decided to arrest the leaders of the revolutionary movement as soon as sufficient military force could be collected to overawe their followers. The approval of the chief secretary for the arrest and internment of all leaders was secured, but before any effective steps could be taken the outbreak had occurred. Pearse and Connolly had gone too far to be turned aside by any warning.

The first shot was fired shortly after noon on Easter Monday, April 24. It was fired, with a fine sense of the dramatic, before the seat of Imperial authority in Ireland, Dublin Castle, and killed an unarmed policeman on duty. The act was an epitome of the rebellion—a rising spacious and in a sense fine in its conception; murderous and, by contrast with that conception, petty in its execution. The insurrection was foredoomed to failure from the outset. It proposed, as an indispensable complement to the seizure of Dublin, a general rising throughout the country. Such a rising was an integral element in the rebel plans, and the nature of those plans must be briefly reviewed if the progress of events in the capital is to be made intelligible.

The seizure by a surprise stroke of the capital—the government buildings, the strategic positions, the nodal points of communication, physical and other—was immediately, to a large extent, successful; but it depended for its ultimate success on other factors. It demanded a larger rebel force than was at once available, and it required that while this larger force was being

THE RISING IN DUBLIN

concentrated the forces of the Crown should be prevented from rapid and effectual intervention. The concentration of this larger force in turn depended on such a general rising throughout the country as would not merely put the Irish provinces in rebel hands and disperse military forces to deal with the provincial risings, but would also enable surplus rebel troops to be made swiftly available for the aid of the bodies holding Dublin.

It depended, that is to say, upon a wholesale arming of the rebel forces for which, despite months of secret preparation, no adequate provision existed in the country. It presumed the immediate landing from overseas of a great quantity of arms and ammunition. The interception, three days before the rebellion, of the vessel carrying these warlike supplies was the ultimate cause of the speedy collapse of the insurrection in the capital. This implied that the provincial rising must be largely abortive. The miscarriage of the provincial rising was ensured by the confusion which prevailed at the rebel headquarters on the receipt of the news that the vessel was lost, at which the orders to the provinces were cancelled, and then, too late, confirmed.

The rebels struck in the city of Dublin, therefore, in circumstances which prohibited them from expecting on the one hand any material reinforcement from the country, and from anticipating on the other hand any serious obstacle to the rapid concentration of military forces upon the capital. They struck with a strength probably inadequate to the task to which they immediately set their hand, and certainly inadequate to the lengthy prosecution of that task. At the outset of the revolt a proclamation was issued by the Sinn Féiners calling upon the people of Ireland to rally to the support of "the provisional government of the Irish republic." It declared, *inter alia*, the right of the people to the ownership of Irish land long usurped by a foreign people and government. It announced the birth of the new Irish republic as a sovereign and independent state, and the signatories pledged their lives to the cause and to its exaltation among nations. Religious rights and property were guaranteed, equal rights to all citizens and universal suffrage were among the tenets propounded.

The shot fired before the castle was the signal that set in operation in Dublin various bodies which totalled rather less than 3,000 men. The outbreak took the authorities completely by surprise. Dublin Castle itself was garrisoned by three soldiers

THE IRISH REBELLION

with blank cartridges. Many officers of the troops in Dublin were absent at a race meeting in the vicinity. Unarmed soldiers were everywhere about the streets with no suspicion of the instant danger in which they stood; for from the moment of the rising soldiers, whether armed or unarmed—many convalescent wounded were in the streets—and policemen were shot at sight by the rebels without challenge. Many civilians were killed on the first day of the rising, but in the majority of cases they were not fired upon deliberately; the action of the rebels was directed against uniformed representatives of the Imperial authority. The scattered and helpless soldiers and police were rapidly withdrawn from the centre of the city, into effective occupation of which the rebels entered without serious opposition.

Their operations proceeded upon an admirable strategic plan. They seized, or attempted to seize, every dominating point in the city. At the castle, which would have fallen an easy prey, they refrained from attack, expecting a ruse, until the garrison of three was so strongly reinforced as to make the attempt hopeless. The rebels occupied, however, a newspaper office commanding the castle yard, from which they assailed the troops with rifle fire and bombs. Out from the centre of the city, houses commanding most of the canal bridges on the south side were occupied and garrisoned in strength. Beyond the canal, houses commanding the junction of the roads from Kingstown were similarly seized; the occupants, in all these cases, were summarily ejected.

Nearer the centre a rebel force, commanded by Countess Markievicz, entrenched in St. Stephen's Green, an ornamental park dominating an extensive grouping of road communications. Other bodies occupied and organized for defence adjacent buildings and Messrs. Jacobs' great biscuit factory, and, nearer the river, Boland's mills at Ringsend. The north side of the river did not offer such a simple scheme of points of strategic advantage, but on this side also every suitable position was occupied.

Efforts of the rebels to seize the arteries of communication were less successful. The General Post Office in Sackville Street was taken at once by a large force, which expelled the staff, some of whom were in league with them, at the point of the bayonet, and all telegraphic communication was promptly cut. At the General Post Office the rebels, under command of P. H. Pearse, "commandant general and president of the provisional government of the Irish republic," established their

THE DEFENCE OF TRINITY COLLEGE

military headquarters. For the rest of the week Dublin was completely isolated, except for the telephone system. The rebels committed a grave blunder in their neglect to seize the Central Telephone Exchange. This was protected by the ruse of an old woman, who informed the force detailed to seize it that the building was full of troops. It was, in fact, garrisoned by nothing more formidable than 20 girl operators, who stood their posts with a fine courage throughout the rebellion.

The maintenance of telephone communication was of the first importance to the military authorities in the development of rapid and effective measures to suppress the revolt. The railway stations also were largely immune from the rebel efforts. On the south side the two stations of the Dublin and South-Eastern Railway were both seized; but one of these was found to be unsuitable for defence, and was almost immediately evacuated. Both the terminus of the Great Southern and Western Railway and that of the Great Northern were strongly held by soldiers, and no effort to capture either was made by the rebels, who had the terminus of the Midland Great Western within the area of their occupation. They attempted to destroy the railway lines some miles out from the city, and were so far successful in these attempts that no trains except troop trains were able to reach Dublin for the rest of the week. By the afternoon of Easter Monday the whole centre of the city was firmly in rebel hands, with a strong cordon of fortified posts in the suburbs, which the more or less abortive risings in the vicinity of the capital were intended to strengthen further with an outer cordon.

One place alone in the central area of the city stood like a rock in the surge of revolution. That place was Trinity College, and the story of its defence is the most stirring chapter in the history of the insurrection. Trinity College occupies a commanding strategic position in the city, and formed a rallying-point of capital importance in the operations for the suppression of the rebellion. To its defence during the first days of the rising was wholly due the fact that the city's commercial centre on the south side of the river was spared that visitation of fire and sack which later obliterated its commercial centre on the north side. The college, a massive pile of grey stone, towering high above the surrounding roofs, completely dominates in front the Bank of Ireland and Dame Street; to the left Grafton Street (leading up to St. Stephen's Green); and to the right

THE IRISH REBELLION

Westmoreland Street (leading to the river and across the bridge to Sackville Street)—the three streets which contain the bulk of the banks, insurance offices and business houses.

The possession of the college by loyal forces effectually prevented the extension of the rebel operations from Sackville Street across the river into the commercial area on the south side, or any serious outbreak of looting in this area; and it prohibited communication by the most direct routes between the rebel headquarters in the post office and the outlying rebel bodies in St. Stephen's Green and elsewhere on the south side.

These important results were secured in a manner which added an heroic page to the history of Ireland's historic university. The call to arms overseas had drained the strength of the Officers' Training Corps to the utmost; only those members remained behind who for sufficient reasons could not obey it. When the rebellion broke out the members of the Officers' Training Corps in the college mustered an exiguous garrison of 30 rifles. The senior officer in charge, Captain Alton, a Fellow of the university, promptly organized the defence. It was decided to hold only the main block of buildings, dominating the three streets in front and commanding an open field of fire in the rear across the college park towards one of the Dublin and South-Eastern railway stations, which the rebels held in force. During the night of Easter Monday a picket was posted in the college park, close enough to the station to hear the challenges of the rebel sentries and the frequent exchange of the password, "Limerick," but this picket was withdrawn before dawn.

The gates were barricaded; sand-bags were placed in the windows and on the parapets of the roof, and a brisk fusillade was exchanged on the right with the rebel positions across the river. A few soldiers in the neighbouring streets and in the Central Soldiers' Club opposite the college, including some Anzac sharpshooters, were summoned to strengthen the garrison in the defence. Fortunately the rebels were impressed by its parade of strength, and were ignorant of its actual poverty. Trinity College was, perhaps, the one place in the city where no spy was present to aid the rebels. One daring spy did gain admission in the disguise of a soldier, but he was detected before he succeeded in escaping to betray the situation. The rebels, in consequence, made no actual attack on the college. Action was continued with the positions beyond the river; looting in

"THE IRISH TIMES." APPEARS

the streets under fire from the college was prevented; several rebel dispatch-riders on bicycles who attempted to run the gauntlet were shot; the sharpshooters made good practice on snipers on the surrounding roofs. The garrison held the commercial centre of Dublin in the south side in trust until the advance of the troops in the city relieved it.

The city, except for the area dominated by Trinity College, remained in effective rebel occupation from Easter Monday, throughout Tuesday, into Wednesday. During this period and the subsequent days of desperate street fighting until the end of the week, the social and economic life of Dublin was completely paralysed. The chief business quarter of the city was inaccessible. No trains ran into the city; no trams ran through it. The supply of gas and electric power was cut off as a measure of precaution. The food problem early became acute, and was growing desperate when the rebellion collapsed. Prices rose quickly to famine level, though actual shortage was not, in the great majority of cases, aggravated by any attempt of the shopkeepers to mulct the people in their necessity.

With all ordinary means of vehicular communication suspended, the citizens, in high station and in low, went foraging for their own supplies. The behaviour of the crowds, in the entire absence of any authority for a considerable period over wide areas, was remarkably orderly; the amount of looting, in view of the unique opportunity which the rebellion presented, was surprisingly small. Dublin was cut off from the world, without letters, and without newspapers, save one. The exception was "The Irish Times," which enjoyed an advantage over its contemporaries in that it possessed a suction gas plant of its own, and was not wholly dependent for its motive power upon the city gas supply.

Its office lay in No Man's Land between Trinity College and the rebel positions across the river, and here, under a state of siege, it was published daily until the Friday of Easter week, when mechanical difficulties interrupted its issue until the following Monday. Dublin's only newspaper, however—no newspaper from outside was able to circulate during the week—was prohibited from publishing anything but the official communiqués and proclamations. Nobody knew how serious the rebellion might be. Nobody knew the state of the provinces. There were rumours of risings here, there and everywhere, of large

THE IRISH REBELLION

rebel forces marching on Dublin, of a German landing in Kerry. But, as the days passed and the fighting spread, and the great fires, whose glare by night was visible for miles around, broke out, though there was growing strain, there was always calm and nothing in the nature of a panic.

The people of Dublin went their way with a nonchalance not generally attributed to the Irish temperament. In spite of the military restrictions on movement, under martial law, the citizens followed the progress of the fighting with a close interest that often came near to foolish recklessness, and sometimes paid its extreme penalty. They gave the troops from England a welcome which vastly surprised these unfamiliar men, who imagined at the outset that every inhabitant of the city was a potential enemy. Food was short; but with the soldiers arriving in the city from Kingstown, citizens cheerfully shared, or surrendered to them altogether, the last square meal which they had in immediate prospect. Women and girls ran out of houses in the suburbs during the hottest action to give food and drink to the troops, or to help the wounded into shelter.

On the south side of the city, where the decisive action developed, the advance guards of the Territorial battalions—railed across England, packed in transports across the channel, and tramping from Kingstown into Dublin—reached the suburbs on Wednesday morning. They were thrown immediately on their arrival, in an advanced state of exhaustion, into desperate street fighting of a most savage kind. Their marching van, a battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, came under heavy rifle fire from strong bodies of rebels posted in the corner houses commanding the junction of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road.

Here, on the afternoon of Easter Monday, a body of the Dublin Volunteer Training Corps, composed of professional men over military age, returning without arms from a route march in the Dublin mountains, had been ambushed by the rebels. Six of its members were killed and ten wounded. The Volunteers made their way to Beggar's Bush Barracks, reinforced the besieged garrison with nine officers and 81 men, and helped splendidly in the defence of the barracks until the arrival of the troops from Kingstown. Thus the Irish Rebellion made history for more than one branch of the armed forces of the Crown. The Trinity College Officers' Training Corps was the

DUBLIN SURROUNDED

first university corps that had been required to defend its own university from attack ; the Dublin Volunteer Training Corps comprised the members of the first Volunteers in the United Kingdom who shed their blood in their country's cause ; and the military operations in Dublin in Easter week were the first operations conducted almost exclusively by units of the Territorial Force and the new army, the regular army being represented scarcely at all except in the higher command.

The Territorial battalions first engaged fought under the most trying conditions with a cool courage and an indomitable cheerfulness. The Sherwood Foresters, who, as related, came under a heavy fire at the junction of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road, suffering several casualties, immediately took such cover as was to be found behind walls, and proceeded in a businesslike fashion to the reduction by rifle fire and bombing of the houses in which the rebels were posted. Their colonel, meanwhile, rode his white charger up and down the open street, smoking a cigarette, and by a miracle escaped untouched. With the reduction of this first rebel outpost by the Sherwood Foresters the relief of Dublin had begun.

By this time (Wednesday, April 26) a military cordon, composed on the north side of reinforcements from the Curragh and the North, and on the south side of troops landed at Kingstown, had been thrown round the whole city, inside the wholly ineffective outer rebel cordon, and in immediate contact with the strong inner cordon of fortified posts. From this date the weakness inherent in the rebels' situation operated progressively towards their downfall. Their numerical deficiency, actually for the execution of their plan of campaign and relatively in proportion to the forces arrayed against them, made it impossible for them to maintain their internal lines of communication.

In the result, therefore, the isolated strategic points which they had seized became so many traps into which they were gradually penned. Heavy fighting was necessary, however, before this decision emerged. From Wednesday the cordon drew in gradually towards the centre of the city, enclosing the main body of the rebels within it, and leaving behind it detached bodies to be surrounded and submerged. The cordon closed more steadily and against a more obstinate resistance on the south side, where it was further removed at the outset from the centre of the city. By Thursday, St. Stephen's Green, the

THE IRISH REBELLION

seizure of which was apparently intended by the rebels to cover the approaches to the city over the southern canal bridges, was cleared by an operation that was quite independent of the main operations.

The rebel occupation of this park was the most faulty piece of strategy. The green was dominated throughout by the upper stories of the square of houses enclosing it. It was commanded in particular by the towering building of the Shelbourne Hotel, situated at a corner of the green. This was the most fashionable hotel in Dublin, and its visitors throughout the week experienced a strict siege. The windows were plentifully riddled with bullets by the rebels, but no casualties were recorded. On the roof of the hotel a small force of soldiers early in the week mounted a machine gun, which raked the green from end to end. The rebels soon found their position untenable and, having suffered considerable loss, evacuated the green, retiring to the building of the Royal College of Surgeons, upon which the machine gun from the Shelbourne Hotel continued to play.

After this clearance, the military cordon closed in on the south without encountering much opposition. Fierce fighting developed on the north side, where at one point a day and a night were spent in an advance of 150 yards down a narrow street. The most determined fighting of all, however, occurred in forcing the approaches from Kingstown on the west, by way of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road, towards the heart of the city. For a distance of half a mile every other house was a fortress, which had to be reduced by rifle fire and bombing before the advance could proceed. Behind the advance accurate sniping from the roofs broke out as the troops moved forward, and it was long before the lines of communication were wholly cleared of hidden irregulars.

The troops pushed steadily on over Baggot Street and Mount Street canal bridges. They were very desperately engaged in the warren of mean streets inside the latter bridge on the right of the line of advance. Here, against Boland's mills, a high stone building overlooking the basin of the Grand Canal, artillery was brought into action for the first time in the course of the operations. A nine-pounder, smartly handled by naval gunners, did good work in enabling a close cordon to be drawn round the Ringsend area towards the mouth of the river, while the main advance proceeded. By Thursday, pickets had penetrated into the

LIBERTY HALL

heart of the city, and communication was established between the advancing bodies and the garrison of Trinity College, which, with its academic cloisters packed with horse, foot and artillery, became the advanced base of the military operations.

From this point, while fighting continued against isolated rebel positions, the main operation consisted in the reduction of the area round the post office, the chief rebel stronghold, the seat of the republican government, and the headquarters of the rebels' military command. In this operation the military tactics were varied. Whereas there was fighting of the closest kind in the earlier phase of the action, now the rebel defences were methodically reduced by more distant artillery, machine gun and rifle fire. From Trinity College to the post office in Sackville Street is a distance of some 500 yards. The Liffey, crossed by O'Connell bridge, intervenes. At the end of Sackville Street, abutting on the bridge, the rebels occupied houses and shops immediately commanding the bridge, and bringing the two streets—Westmoreland Street and D'Olier Street—which converge upon it from the college, under a searching fire.

On the left of these rebel positions, facing the river, Liberty Hall, a squat stone building, the headquarters of James Connolly's "Citizen Army," could bring enfilade fire to bear on O'Connell bridge and direct fire on Butt bridge, the lowest of the river bridges. This rebel outpost, however, was early reduced by the combined operations of a gunboat lying in the Liffey off the Customs House and field pieces manœuvred from Trinity College into the adjacent streets. With the destruction of Liberty Hall, forces were able to move, though still not without considerable risk, across the river, and the operations of the troops on the south side were closely linked up with the operations of the troops pressing in on the north side. The rebel positions immediately commanding O'Connell bridge were riddled and rendered untenable by artillery and machine gun fire, largely directed from the roof of Trinity College, and by Friday the military lines had been advanced right down to the river by way of Westmoreland Street and D'Olier Street, in the block between which, however, persistent sniping was continued by one or more elusive rebels.

Meanwhile, on Thursday evening, a great fire had broken out. How it originated—whether through the shelling from Trinity

THE IRISH REBELLION

College, the explosion of a rebel ammunition store, or some accident of looting—will probably never be known. It broke out on the west side of Sackville Street, immediately in rear of the rebel fortified post fronting on the bridge, and raged and spread without ceasing from Thursday evening throughout Friday and Saturday, until Sunday. The military operations made it impossible, except at long intervals, for brief periods, and at certain points, for the Dublin fire brigade to attempt to cope with the conflagration. The fire, fanned by a breeze from the sea, spread from the west side of Sackville Street, where it had devastated a wide area, across to the east side. The whole of the west side of Sackville Street, comprising 47 buildings, was gutted. In all, here and in the surroundings streets, some 230 buildings were demolished. They included two churches, a Presbyterian and a Methodist, as well as a Church of Ireland Mission to Seamen church, four hotels, several banks, the bulk of the important business houses and the Royal Hibernian Academy. Fortunately, few residential houses were within the devastated area, although it contained some tenements, and the loss of life directly due to the fire was small.

On Saturday, April 29, there came the end of the criminal adventure which had wrought this widespread havoc and destruction in the heart of Dublin. The area of the post office was by this time closely invested, and early in the afternoon the rebel headquarters was itself in flames. James Connolly, the military director of the rebel operations, although P. H. Pearse was in nominal command, had been seriously wounded on the Thursday, and his injury contributed largely to the disintegration of the rebel defence.

Hopeless as their situation had become, the leaders displayed a cool courage. P. H. Pearse spent the closing hours in the post office in writing a vindication of the rebellion; Connolly, on Friday, although there was by this time little or no chance of getting it circulated, composed a heartening order of the day to the rebel forces. Driven out of the post office by the flames, the rebel leaders with the garrison retired to the block of buildings fronting on the river, where the law courts are situated, known as the Four Courts. The exits from the post office were under military fire. To draw this fire and cover their escape, the rebels sent out first about a dozen officers whom they had captured on Easter Monday and kept in close

RESISTANCE ENDS

but not harsh confinement during the week. Some of the officers thus sent out were wounded by their comrades' fire.

The rebel leaders, having made good their temporary escape, held a council of war. Of the fighting which attended this final phase of the rebellion no clear account is possible. It was a confused and desperate affair of ambuscades and sniping in streets and alleys where the glare of the fires paled the sun and the crash of falling masonry mingled with the roar of artillery and bombs, the vicious knocking of machine guns and the rattle of musketry. The rebel remnant, surrounded by the soldiers and the flames, fought with the courage of despair.

The inevitable end came early in the afternoon, when P. H. Pearse went out under a white flag, and, after an offer of surrender on terms, which was at once rejected, agreed to unconditional capitulation. He then issued the following document:

In order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, now surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, members of the provisional government present at headquarters have agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the commanders of all units of the republican forces will order their followers to lay down their arms.

The cease fire was sounded throughout Dublin, and one by one, as the news of the surrender at headquarters was confirmed, the various detached bodies of the rebels about the city made their submission. By nightfall on Saturday, April 29, although single snipers still haunted many roofs, all organized resistance to the forces of the Crown was at an end.

Both in loss of life and material damage it had been a costly business. Property was destroyed to an estimated value of two million sterling; but this sum, of course, did not include the loss of individual property, due to robbery and loot by the mob while still out of hand. Among the military and police the casualties were 124 killed and 397 wounded; among civilians there were 180 killed and 614 wounded, according to the hospital returns; while a number of snipers—how many perhaps will never be exactly ascertained—were buried by their friends in cellars, and only discovered and disinterred later as their secret graves were located. Besides these, 15 rebels were shot by order of court-martial, while more than 100 were sentenced to varying terms of penal servitude and imprisonment.

CHAPTER 8

Battle of Jutland

WHEN the German light cruiser Magdeburg was sunk in the Baltic Sea towards the end of 1914, her secret signal books fell into the hands of the Russians and were sent by them to London "for information and action as requisite." The officials of the Admiralty were not slow to grasp the value of the prize which had come into their hands, and ordered an intensive study of the books. As a result they found themselves in the happy position of being able to take in a fair proportion of German naval wireless messages, not only from the main transmitting station, but even, on occasion, from ships at sea reporting their position and course. This eased what would otherwise have been an intolerable strain on the Grand Fleet by allowing it periods of rest and for refitting when no German offensive seemed imminent. It is true that the Germans had also to a certain extent pierced the English codes, and had even established at Neumünster a station for transmitting to their ships intercepted English messages.

Thus, in the closing days of May the British naval staff were able to warn Admiral Jellicoe of activity at German naval bases which pointed to the imminence of an important operation. It was known also that Admiral Scheer, a sailor with a bold, aggressive policy, had been appointed to the command of the High Seas Fleet. Suspicion became certainty when at 5 o'clock on May 30 it was known that the Germans were coming out in force. The Grand Fleet, which had already raised steam, was ordered to concentrate eastward of the "Long Forties," about 60 miles from the coast of Scotland.

Admiral Scheer's original plan was bolder than anything that had been attempted before. It envisaged a bombardment of Sunderland followed by a quick retreat which was to lure Admiral Beatty towards a line of waiting submarines supported by battleships which would destroy those of his ships which had passed the submarines. The plan involved the employment of airships for scouting purposes to warn him of the possible

THE FLEETS IN CONTACT

approach of the main British fleet; and, if the weather proved unsuitable for airship reconnaissance, his alternative plan was to proceed up the Danish coast to embark on a campaign against cruisers and merchantmen outside and in the Skagerrak in the hope that his presence off the Norwegian coast would bring out forces against him. The weather conditions proved the Sunderland plan to be undesirable, and on May 30 Admiral Scheer decided to adopt the alternative scheme. His submarines had for some time been in position off Scapa Flow, Moray Firth, the Firth of Forth and the Humber, while the remainder were placed north of the Terschelling Bank in order to intercept forces coming up from the south-west.

Although Admiral Jellicoe had been warned that some movement was afoot, he had no idea of the forces to be engaged, and the very knowledge the Admiralty possessed of the German call-signs defeated its object in one important matter. On leaving for sea, Admiral Scheer transferred his flagship call-sign to the naval centre at Wilhelmshaven; so that the British directional wireless, picking up messages with his call-sign, could only believe that he was still in harbour. Admiral Jellicoe, informed of this, imagined that nothing more than one of the familiar cruiser raids was contemplated.

The fleet he led out was one of overwhelming size: 28 Dreadnought battleships and nine modern battle cruisers supported by 31 cruisers of various types and ages were to be faced by 16 German Dreadnoughts, with six pre-Dreadnought ships and five battle cruisers. In speed the British fleet was the superior, and in actual hitting power of its guns it had a preponderance of two to one. Only in destroyers was there something like equality, the British having 85 and the Germans 72. *

The fleets came into contact about ten minutes past two, when the Danish steamer *Fiord* was stopped by a German destroyer about 120 miles west of the Danish coast, in the latitude of Aberdeen. A German officer approached her in a destroyer numbered "Hoch See Flotte 7," belonging to a squadron of 15 destroyers and 18 light and heavy cruisers. He asked the Danes if certain vessels which were just appearing on the horizon were British. The skipper said he did not know. The correct answer came in a tone of thunder from two of Sir David Beatty's light cruisers, scouting in advance of his force, which sighted the German destroyer. At 2.10 p.m. the *Galatea*.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

flagship of the 1st light cruiser squadron, under Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, made the signal, "Enemy in sight." Speed was increased from 22 knots to the highest the engines could give. Both cruisers then opened fire at 2.28 p.m. The British 6 in. guns outranged the smaller German craft, but as the gunners of the *Galatea* were beginning to hammer the enemy three large German cruisers steamed up to help their destroyers. The *Galatea* poured a series of salvos into the enemy's ships, which fired erratically and made no hits.

A few minutes later she turned to meet the larger British ships and supply them with information. Beatty turned at once to the south-south-east, his object being to place his force between the Germans and their base and thus to cut them off. Five minutes later he received a second report, which informed him that the Germans were in strength and that he had to deal with something more than an isolated detachment of light cruisers. At 2.35 a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward, and Sir David had now placed the Germans in such a position that they could not get away without fighting him. He therefore altered his course once more, turning directly towards them, to open battle.


The British dispositions at the moment when the enemy was sighted were as follows: The 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons, with three destroyer flotillas, were scouting in advance, moving generally eastward. Behind them were Sir David Beatty's six battle cruisers, and astern of them again the four fast battleships of the 5th battle squadron, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. These had been late in obeying Admiral Beatty's signal to turn south-east, and so were about 10 miles astern. c Sixty-five miles to the northward was Admiral Jellicoe with the rest of the fleet and the main force of battleships. Still obsessed by the incorrect information in the Admiralty message, he was coming late to the rendezvous at easy speed, on the presumption that Admiral Scheer was still in the Jade. As soon as he picked up the *Galatea's* signal he increased speed to 18 knots.

Meanwhile, Sir David Beatty was moving at 22 knots with his six battle cruisers and four fast battleships towards the Skagerrak in a south-easterly direction. He was feeling for Admiral Hipper's main force now he had cut it off. At 3.31 p.m. he sighted the five German battle cruisers and the news was

LONG RANGE GUNNERY

received with cheers by the crews. The moment the British fleet came into view Admiral Hipper turned and steered towards the German battle squadrons and Horn Reef. Sir David Beatty had already altered his course to east-south-east and increased speed to 25 knots, in instant pursuit, forming line of battle without waiting for his four fast battle-ships to close upon him. It would have taken only a quarter of an hour, but minutes were precious.

Admiral Hipper at the opening of the action was favoured by fortune and by the great distance from the battle of



the most powerful British ships, otherwise his five battle cruisers should have been caught and sunk by the combined force of the British battle cruisers and four supremely powerful British battle-ships. As it was, the German admiral began a furious running fight with Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. The action opened at 12 minutes to four at a range of about 16,000 yards. Before sighting the enemy Sir David Beatty's battle cruisers had been steaming in line ahead and with 400 yards between each vessel and the next. This order is the most flexible for manoeuvring purposes; but when fighting, if the enemy is ahead, only the leading ship has a clear field of vision and can bring its guns into action.

To clear the smoke and enable all his ships to fire, Sir David Beatty formed his six battle cruisers in a line of bearing—i.e. a diagonal line astern of the flagship. Admiral Hipper's

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

light cruisers and destroyers, which had formed his van when he was steaming westward, became his rearguard when his squadron turned south-east. The German light craft hung behind the rear German battle cruiser, ready to dart between the two forces of big ships and defend or attack as directed. The British squadrons of light cruisers and destroyer flotillas steamed in advance of the battle cruisers, eagerly waiting to assail or repel the enemy.

As the action opened, Sir David Beatty began to bear more to the east, and so reduce the space between the parallel curving course of the German and British battle cruisers. In closing, some advantage was sacrificed. The large British projectiles made a much bigger splash in the water than did the 11 in. and 12 in. German shells. This told for better spotting and hitting at a great distance. The German guns, however, were finely calibrated, and seem to have been fitted with sights of high quality; the German range-finding instruments were, indeed, equal to or even better than the British. By 3.54 the range had closed to about 13,000 yards, both squadrons steering on parallel courses, but although the *Lion* and the *Tiger* were both hit on the hull, little or no great damage was done to the German ships, though the *Lützow* was hit twice. Moreover, the British fire control was badly hampered by its own destroyers, who were pressing up on the engaged side in the hope of a chance to make a torpedo attack. Both main and secondary armaments were in action, and ships were drenched and half blinded by the columns of water thrown up by the shell falling around them.

While the British ships were passing through this fierce pounding the 1st and 2nd battle cruiser squadrons received two staggering blows after only 15 minutes of firing, when every material advantage seemingly rested with Sir David Beatty. There were six British ships in action against five German ships, with four additional and more powerful British ships approaching, but not yet within range. The *Indefatigable* was the rear battle cruiser in the British fleet, and the German gunners concentrated upon her and gave her a terrific pounding. Part of her fire control position was shot away, and then she was struck by a series of salvos. Under the enemy's massed fire the *Indefatigable* seemed to heel over until her bilge keel could be seen. Then a salvo of shells appeared to blow the bottom out of the ship. In her Captain Charles F. Sowerby and some 790 officers and men

THE QUEEN MARY LOST

went to their death. Two survivors only were picked up later by German light craft. The fire control officers in the German squadron singled out the Queen Mary to be the next victim of the massed fire of their guns. She had just holed her opposite number in the German line, and her gunlayers had received orders to shift target.

While splendidly fighting she was struck by a salvo upon her deck forward. Then there was a terrific explosion. The Queen Mary burst into flames, capsized, and after only 30 seconds disappeared in one burst of glare and smoke. The Queen Mary, commanded by Captain Cecil I. Prowse, with a complement of over 1,000 officers and men, was a most serious loss. She was, with the Tiger, the latest of the British battle cruisers. She had a belt of 9 in. armour, and 9 in. armour over her heavy gun positions, while the Indefatigable had only a 4 to 7 in. belt and 7 in. armour over her heavy gun positions. Yet the newer and stronger ship was sunk by a few minutes' concentrated fire as the older ship had been.

Two minutes before the Queen Mary sank the British gunners set on fire the third battle cruiser in Admiral Hipper's squadron. This did not put her permanently out of action. As was proved by experience gained in the Dogger Bank battle, battering the side armour did not speedily destroy the ship, despite the fact that all the battle cruisers used guns of immense power. When the Queen Mary sank the weather conditions had changed to the advantage of the enemy. The British vessels could be made out with comparative ease, but the enemy ships to the north-eastward had entered a patch of haze that rendered their outlines very indistinct. As soon as the mist became troublesome the destroyer forces on either side prepared to strike with the torpedo. Two British flotillas were ordered to attack as opportunity offered. At 4.15 p.m., when the air was growing hazy, 12 British destroyers shot speedily across the zone between the big ships.

The German flotilla which attacked simultaneously was more numerous than the British. It consisted of one light cruiser with 6 in. guns and 15 destroyers. The German cruiser had an immense advantage over destroyers in her heavy battery, steady platform, and fire control installation, but the British ships, by skill, manœuvring, good gunnery and dauntless courage, did their best to atone for their lack of material advantages. In a brief,

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

furious engagement at close quarters two German destroyers were sunk, and the light cruiser and 13 remaining hostile destroyers were compelled to retire to the shelter of their own big ships.

After only eight minutes in action, the *Lion* was hit on her midships (Q) turret, and but for a fine piece of heroism this might well have proved disastrous. Nearly all of the turret's crew were killed and its commanding officer, Major Harvey, of the R.M.L.I., was mortally wounded. The turret was completely wrecked and caught fire. Twenty minutes later a cartridge in the breech of one of the upturned guns slid out, caught fire, and ignited the charges in the cages. The blast flamed down the trunk of the turret and roared 200 feet in the air through its shattered roof. Had it reached the magazine the *Lion* must have followed the *Queen Mary*; but there had been time for the dying man to call down the voice tube: "Close watertight doors and flood magazine."

Whilst this was happening, Admiral Beatty, high on Monkey Island, as the topmost forebridge of a warship is called, was apparently unmoved. It is recorded that when a signalman came up with the report, "*Princess Mary* blown up, sir," he turned to his flag captain with the remark, "*Chatfield*, there seems to be something wrong with our — ships to-day. Turn two points to port." In other words, engage the enemy more closely!

The British destroyer attack was pressed home with great fury and the secondary armament of the German battle cruisers came into play. Yet, gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward Bingham, the *Nestor*, *Nomad*, and *Nicator*, the destroyers nearest the German battle cruisers, charged at top speed on the smoking line of big ships and each fired two torpedoes. The gunners in the German battle cruisers, with their secondary armament of 6 in. guns, could concentrate their fire on these three vessels, which alone of the 12 destroyers were able to push home. The *Nomad* was badly hit, and could be made out, stopped, between the British and German lines, where she was subsequently caught and sunk by the enemy. The *Nestor* and *Nicator* turned south-east, but ran into the midst of Admiral von Scheer's battleships. Through waters swept by a terrific fire Commander Bingham and Lieutenant Mocatta held steadily on. Reaching a favourable position, each fired a torpedo at the second ship in the enemy's line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before

AN AWE-INSPIRING SIGHT

she could fire yet another torpedo the Nestor was badly hit, and swinging to starboard, almost collided with the Nicator. The Nicator altered course to avoid a collision, and was thereby prevented from firing her last torpedo. She escaped, with wonderful luck. But the Nestor was a wreck with engines stopped, and was caught by the enemy and sunk. Many survivors were picked up by enemy craft, among them Commander Bingham, who received the Victoria Cross, and Lieutenant Commander Whitfield, who was promoted while prisoner of war to the rank of commander.

Commander Hodgson, in the Moorsom, of the 10th flotilla, also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet, and his boat escaped like the Nicator. Meanwhile, the Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent and Termagant broke through the enemy's screen of destroyers and pressed their attack on the German battle cruisers. The Petard fired all her torpedoes across the enemy's line. The destroyer losses on both sides up to this point were equal, the Nestor and Nomad being balanced by the sinking of two German destroyers. The British admiral, with a sadly diminished force of four battle cruisers, still gallantly maintained his position to the close of the first phase of the battle.

The crisis of the battle cruiser action was at its height when at 4.10 Admiral Evan-Thomas with his four fast battleships opened fire. The German gunnery which had begun the action so brilliantly was already beginning to deteriorate, and the 15 in. shells, pitched with great accuracy at the range of 17,000 yards, hastened its demoralization. Had they been 5,000 yards nearer, the destruction of Admiral Hipper's squadron would have been inevitable. From 4.15 to 4.43, says Sir David Beatty, "the conflict between the opposing battle cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th battle squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at a very long range. The British fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy deteriorating considerably. At 4.18 the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire."

The scene at this point in the battle was the most awe-inspiring that the imagination can picture. The great grey ships tore through the water to the note of an unceasing, unearthly thunder as the salvos multiplied. The water rose in gigantic spouts, sometimes 200 feet high, as the falling shells lashed it like a monstrous hailstorm. Far away dim forms could be

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

indistinctly seen spurting flame in the mist, impalpable as ghosts, with dense smoke pouring from their funnels, and with the glow of fires in their hulls, caused by the British high-explosive shells. At moments the enemy passed altogether from view, though his fire always continued, and frequently the British gunlayers had no better target than the flashes of the German big guns.

Admiral Hipper, however, had now done his part, and the next phase of the battle was opening. At 4.33 p.m. Sir David Beatty learnt from the light cruiser Southampton that the German battle fleet was near at hand, ahead and to the south-east of him. He recalled the destroyers, and four minutes later the Lion sighted the dim shapes of the German battleships moving swiftly towards it through the haze. For an encounter with these powerful, heavily armed ships his battle cruisers had not been built, and the odds in gun power would be enormously against him unless he promptly retreated. Moreover, a retreat would lead the enemy into Admiral Jellicoe's grip supposing the enemy pursued.*

Beatty turned away from the enemy, reversing his course and steaming north-north-west instead of south-south-east, towards the British battle fleet. Admiral Evan-Thomas' four fast battleships had not yet turned, and were still steering the old course, so that they were moving in exactly the opposite direction, engaging the German battle cruisers with all guns as these cruisers turned, which they did when the German battleships arrived on the scene; Admiral Hipper, thus leading the enemy's line, moved north-north-west. The Southampton, with the 2nd light cruiser squadron, continued meanwhile to hold on southward to discover the High Seas Fleet. The British light cruisers steamed within 13,000 yards of the enemy, and at this short range came under a "very heavy but ineffective fire."

The change of course from a south-easterly to a northerly direction was a ticklish matter. Admiral Hipper altered course soon after Admiral Beatty did. As the British ships turned in succession they came under fire from both the German battle cruisers and the leading German battleships. Windy Corner was the name the British sailors gave to the turning-point. The rear battle cruiser in Admiral Beatty's squadron, the New Zealand, passed through waters lashed by a furious hail of heavy projectiles, but escaped with only a trifling scratch. Behind the New Zealand the Barham, Warspite, Valiant and Malaya had



THE IRISH REBELLION. In Easter week of 1916 a group of Irish malcontents rose against the British. In the Dublin fighting members of the Irish Volunteers and members of the Citizen Army, led by James Connolly, took part. British soldiers are seen here firing at the rebel strongholds in Sackville Street. The Irish force occupied points of vantage in upper-storey windows, and the British troops used for cover anything that came to hand, in this case empty casks



RUINS OF A REBEL STRONGHOLD. This photograph gives some idea of the damage caused in Dublin by the disturbances which broke out on April 24, 1916. When the rebels were driven from St. Stephen's Green by soldiers from the Curragh, they set fire to the buildings. There was serious destruction in the course of the fighting and the casualties numbered over 110 military and about 800 civilians. Outside Dublin the attempted risings reached no serious proportions.

SCHEER'S SUCCESS

now taken station, and were pounding the German battle cruisers. Admiral Scheer's flagship and her sister ships of the *König* class had drawn close enough to fire salvos at them. But the latter, notwithstanding their speed, carried thick armour, and at the range of 14,000 yards the German shells did not penetrate. They stood the German fire admirably, and suffered little loss or damage. One hit received by the *Barham* dented her side six inches deep without breaking the surface of the plate.

About this time, towards five o'clock, the light cruiser *Fearless*, with the destroyers of the 1st flotilla, arrived on the scene of battle and took station ahead of Admiral Beatty's ships. The light cruiser *Champion*, with the destroyers of the 13th flotilla, took up a position covering the four fast battleships from torpedo attack, while the 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons steamed to starboard, and the 2nd light cruiser squadron to port of Admiral Beatty's flagship.

Admiral Scheer had reason to be well satisfied with the position. He had concentrated a great force against the British cruiser fleet, and in the first part of the battle, when all the odds were against the five German battle cruisers, they had sunk two out of the 10 large British ships opposed to them. His position was not, however, as the event proved, so strong as he supposed. For the game that Admiral Hipper had played against Admiral Beatty was exactly that which Admiral Beatty was playing on a larger scale against the German commander-in-chief. Admiral Scheer had risked five large German ships against 10 large British ships in order to lure the British cruiser fleet within range of the German battle fleet.

Admiral Beatty was now placing eight large British ships in a running fight against 22 German capital ships in order to lure the High Seas Fleet within range of the battleships of the Grand Fleet. When the great race began the British battle cruisers were well in advance of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, and the 5th battle squadron was well ahead of the 1st German battle squadron. The Germans could not bring their rear ships into action because of the admirable tactics of the British fleet. Admiral Beatty, as he worked ahead, closed somewhat on the enemy to crush the head of the German line, altering his course to north (the Germans were steaming north-north-west), and shortening the range to 14,000 yards. Another German battle cruiser quitted the line "in a considerably damaged condition."

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

At 5.35 Sir David Beatty turned north-north-east, heading the enemy off eastwards and enabling Admiral Jellicoe, who was now coming up to the north-north-west, to pass between the Germans and their North Sea bases if he were so disposed. If the enemy had not turned east under this pressure, Admiral Beatty would have worked across the head of the German line and shattered the leading German ships. At 5.50 the first ships of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet came into sight. They were the three battle cruisers, under Admiral Hood, of the 3rd battle cruiser squadron. Six minutes later the dim shapes of Admiral Jellicoe's battleships could be made out 10,000 yards north of the Lion.

At 6.5 the Onslow, still on the engaged bow of the Lion, sighted a German light cruiser, the Wiesbaden, at a distance of 6,000 yards, which was apparently trying to torpedo Admiral Beatty's flagship. The British destroyer steamed out and engaged the cruiser, closing from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, and pouring into her some 58 4 in. shells. The German light cruiser, though much more heavily armed, and possessed of a far better fire control system, was hit again and again by the gunners of the Onslow.

When she had been sufficiently hammered, Lieutenant Commander Tovey swung his frail craft round and charged at the German battle cruisers. He ordered all torpedoes to be fired. But just as he gave the order his boat was struck amidships by a heavy shell, and amid the confusion only one torpedo was released. Thinking that all his torpedoes were gone, Lieutenant Commander Tovey, with his ship nearly broken in two, began to crawl away. But finding he had three torpedoes left, he again approached the Wiesbaden and torpedoed her fairly under her conning tower, without, however, sinking her.

Then, turning on the German battle fleet, this officer fired his two remaining torpedoes at the enemy's battleships just as the steam failed in his damaged boilers. The Onslow was afterwards taken in tow by another damaged destroyer, the Defender. Having a shell in her foremost boiler, the Defender could only make 10 knots; but at a quarter past seven in the evening, when German shells were falling round both boats, she closed with the Onslow and took her in tow, and the two damaged boats struggled on together until the afternoon of June 1st, when the work of towing the Onslow was transferred to tugs.

Reinforcements now began to reach Sir David Beatty. Rear Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, with the 3rd British battle

THE CHESTER IN ACTION

cruiser squadron, consisting of the *Invincible*, *Inflexible* and *Indomitable*, was coming up, steaming in advance of the Grand Fleet, and fast nearing the scene of action. At 5.30 Admiral Hood had observed the first indications of battle in gun flashes and the sound of firing to the south-west.. The haze was too thick to permit a clear view of what was happening, and he dispatched the light cruiser *Chester* (Captain R. N. Lawson) to reconnoitre and enable him to effect his junction with Beatty.

The *Chester*, eagerly pushing in, found herself cut off by a squadron of four German light cruisers, which had seemingly worked between her and Admiral Hood's battle cruisers in the mist. She broke through the enemy after a fierce fight, and soon after 6 o'clock rejoined the 3rd battle cruiser squadron. Admiral Hood, as the result of his reconnaissance, turned north-west. Apparently he had steamed too far to the east in the haze and smoke. At 5.50 he was seen from Admiral Beatty's ships, and at 6.10 he sighted Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. He was then on the port bow of the *Lion*. As he came up he poured a heavy fire into the German light cruisers which had engaged the *Chester*, and they turned away, the *Wiesbaden* a wreck, and the *Pillau* and *Frankfurt* badly knocked about.

In the northward turning movement Sir David Beatty had won so fine a start over Admiral Hipper, thanks largely to the excellent scouting of the *Southampton*, that the British admiral in the end was able to force the Germans either to turn once more or to have their line crossed. His ships closed to a range of 12,000 yards as they threatened the head of the enemy's line, and increased speed to the utmost. Admiral Hood's squadron was now closing on the enemy's van. Its three additional battle cruisers formed part of Sir David Beatty's command, and Admiral Beatty by wireless ordered Admiral Hood to take station at the head of his line of battle. Admiral Hood's three ships as they entered the battle drew in exceedingly close to the enemy's line. Beatty, noting the determination of his lieutenant, who might have cried like Troubridge at St. Vincent, "let the weakest fend off," once more altered course with the dash and alertness that marked his leadership, to give support, and at 6.25 turned east-south-east. Then "the weakest fended off." The German leading ship began to turn slightly, hauling round to south-south-east in that shell-smitten sea amidst the clouds of smoke and the unceasing roaring of the guns.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

As she entered the battle the Invincible opened fire upon an enemy battle cruiser of the Derfflinger type, more than her match in guns, and greatly her superior in displacement, armour and modernity. Admiral Hood was so pleased with the shooting that he hailed Commander Dannreuther in the gunnery control top: "Your shooting is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can." Just then the mist cleared about the Invincible and revealed her clearly to the Derfflinger and the König, who got home with several salvos on her thinly armoured sides. In a minute the Invincible was nothing but a flaming mass; in another a terrific explosion burst her asunder, and as her following ships drove on through the smoke only the bows and the stern were to be seen. Commander Dannreuther was flung out of the top into the sea unharmed, and clung to a raft with five other survivors, cheering the following ships as they raced past. The rest of the crew, over 1,000 officers and men, perished with the admiral.

About the time that Admiral Hood entered the battle, or perhaps a little earlier, Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, with his 1st cruiser squadron, consisting of the armoured cruisers Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince closed up. The Germans had flung out a squadron of light cruisers with a flotilla of destroyers to attempt a torpedo attack on the British battle cruisers. His orders for battle laid down clearly that his first duty was to engage enemy cruisers, and with the Warrior close astern he bore down in the direction of the flashes. Arbuthnot drove at the enemy light cruisers, one of which was swiftly disabled by salvos from the Defence and the Warrior, not far from the spot where the Onslow was at work. Sir Robert could see that the torpedo menace to Sir David Beatty's ships was extreme. But as he pressed home his smashing attack, which broke up the German screen of light craft around the head of the German line, and cleared the way both for Admiral Hood's battle cruiser squadron and for Admiral Jellicoe's battle divisions, a patch of mist lifted. The weak armoured cruisers had done their work too well. Within 6,000 yards of them were three German battle cruisers and the array of German battleships of the König and Kaiser class.

Against the tempest of 11, 12 and 14 in. shells which swept them the old British cruisers were helpless. It is possible that, as Admiral Jellicoe suggests in his dispatch, the three ships were lamed before they could withdraw. But it is also possible that

WARSPITE AND WARRIOR

Sir Robert Arbuthnot did not intend to retire. The Defence was repeatedly struck aft, and a terrific explosion occurred in the stern, but she still held on towards the enemy, firing with her remaining guns. Then she was hit forward, and in the smoke, steam, and flame of a great explosion one of the finest of British fighting admirals vanished with the Defence's captain, officers and men. Captain Bonham, in the Black Prince, also held on steadily against the German battle cruisers and battleships, and was crippled but not sunk, and his vessel disappeared from view to be sunk later in the evening.

Meanwhile, the Warrior was swept by salvos from the German battle cruisers, which concentrated all their guns upon her when the Defence blew up. Almost the first salvo that struck her disabled her starboard engine room and, wrecking her hydraulic pumps, compelled the turret crews to work their guns by hand. Then as the German battle cruisers passed, making their turn southward, several German battleships came within range and hammered at the crippled armoured cruiser with all their guns. One shell wrecked the dynamo room, extinguishing the electric light in the magazines and all the other compartments below, and cut off all the telephones. The deck was torn up and the engine room badly holed. The ship was in deadly peril when Admiral Evan-Thomas' squadron of fast battleships passed by.

As he was proceeding under heavy fire the Warspite, the second ship in his line, seemed to all who watched in the British fleet to turn to help the Warrior. With her eight 15 in. guns the Warspite engaged several German battleships, which thereupon left the almost helpless Warrior in peace and turned their guns on the Warspite. This movement occurred through an accident which made the Germans think that the Warspite was their prey. The steering gear broke down—perhaps injured by the enemy's fire—causing the helm to jam in such a position that the great battleship was carried straight towards the enemy into a hell of fire. Despite this, Captain Phillpotts worked his ship round the Warrior, which slowly crept out of action, using her port engine. Scarcely was the Warrior out of range when her port engine room became untenable, and the ship stopped dead. Happily the Warspite was worked round, and the engineers again got the steering gear into action, with the result that she was once more brought under control and returned to her station with only 17 men of her complement lost.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Up to this stage of the battle, fierce as it had been, there had been nothing new or incalculable. The battle cruisers had fought before at the Dogger Bank, and both Hipper and Beatty were experienced in this kind of running fight. The next half hour was to bring in new, imponderable elements into the arena. At a rate of over 30 miles an hour the British and German battle fleets were approaching one another, each representing in gunnery and design the best of its national effort. Years of specialized thought had been given, hundreds of millions of money had been poured out, to make the battle fleets the visible expression of the national might. The time had come for the lighter craft to stand aside; a conflict of the giants was toward.

Each admiral came to the fray to some extent blindfold. Briefly, the events of the day may be summarized thus: Hipper had enticed Beatty towards the German battle fleet; Beatty, having sighted the German battle fleet, had turned north to draw them towards Sir John Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet. Admiral Scheer, coming up from the south-east, was informed at 5.45 that his advanced forces were in violent action, and he altered course to support them. He was kept fully informed of the course of the fight, and when Beatty turned north, Scheer's leading ships were near enough to fire at the Queen Elizabeths as they, too, turned northward. To his mind the engagement had become a stern chase, and full speed was ordered for the High Sea battle fleet. In spite of the fact that the Friedrich der Grosse worked up to 20 knots, the last of the Queen Elizabeths was out of range by 7 o'clock. The advanced forces were in desultory action ahead, slowly veering to the east, and in the increasing mist were slowly lost to sight.

Sir John Jellicoe, coming from the north-west leading the centre of the British battle fleet, was almost as deeply mystified. He knew that Beatty had been in action for two hours, and the speed of the battle fleet had been worked up to nearly 20 knots. Advancing in column of divisions he only required the precise bearing and course of the enemy to deploy his fleet into line ahead for the battle. His aim, naturally, was to guide his front so that when the enemy appeared it would be directly ahead of him; then by turning the leading ships of the columns to port or starboard the whole fleet would string out in line of battle in four minutes.

But where was the German fleet? Commodore Goodenough,

THE GRAND FLEET ARRIVES

clinging to the enemy and reporting constantly, was four miles out of his reckoning; Beatty, deep in the fog of battle, twisting and fighting, was seven miles to the westward of his supposed position; the error of the Iron Duke was over four miles east. Thus the cumulative error was 11 miles, and any signals of position were wrong to a varying extent. The horizon was alive with the light of fighting: the air quivered with reverberations. Suddenly appeared the Lion six miles away, but more than four points to starboard of the Iron Duke than had been expected. At six o'clock, as soon as Beatty was sighted, the flagship signalled: "Where is the enemy's battle fleet?" Beatty, now no more than two miles ahead of the Marlborough, on the right of the battleship column, replied "Enemy's battle cruisers bearing south-east," but did not add their course. Immediately the commander-in-chief repeated "Where is enemy's battle fleet?" to which no reply was given.

For nearly 10 minutes more the British battle fleet advanced in deep perplexity and in great anxiety, for minutes were of vital importance. At last came illumination. At 6.14 the Valiant passed the news from the Barham "High Sea Fleet in sight bearing south-south-east," and Beatty reported them south-south-west of the Lion, which gave a position about four points on the starboard bow of the Iron Duke. The direction was correct, but owing to the errors in position it seemed that the König, the leading ship, was three miles nearer than she actually was.

The moment had come to deploy the Grand Fleet into line of battle, and since the enemy was not directly ahead it became necessary to deploy from one wing or the other. To deploy on the starboard side—that nearest the enemy—was the admiral's natural impulse, but to do so was to risk the piecemeal destruction of his starboard columns as they deployed masking the fire of the fleet. Indeed, shells were already falling between his leading divisions. It would have been possible to deploy from the centre, the flagship leading the van into action and the columns falling in behind; but the manœuvre was a complicated one, and it was not the occasion for complications. There remained only a deployment to port on Admiral Jerram.

Hardly had the movement begun when Admiral Burney and his starboard division came under fire at a range of about 14,000 yards. To the ordered flurry of the manœuvre in peace time was added the confusion of battle. Beatty with his attendant light

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

craft was storming across the horizon, checking indeed the deployment of the port wing, the Grand Fleet cruisers and destroyers were racing towards their battle stations ahead of the Grand Fleet, their wakes criss-crossing the torn seas in crazy patterns, and their funnel smoke blanketing the whole area. It was not until after 6.30 that the Iron Duke fired her first shots at the König.

At 6.20 the Wiesbaden, a flaming wreck, passed down the line of British ships. Fired on by the Iron Duke and other ships, she was seen to sink later. The general course of the big ship battle in this phase was that the two lines, British and German, steamed on two generally parallel curves, the German fleet inside the British curve. The position was almost identical with that at Tsushima in 1905, where the battle very quickly settled down to a fight between the big Russian and Japanese ships, the Russians steaming on the inside curve and the Japanese on the outside in difficult conditions of visibility, so that at times Admiral Togo altogether lost sight of his enemy in the mist and smoke. To keep on an inside curve, however, the Germans had in the critical hour of the battle to allow themselves to be driven away from their naval bases. They were forced to obey the British initiative.

The Iron Duke opened fire on the König and began to hit her at the second salvo, only ceasing to hit when the target ship turned away. The other ships of the 4th battle squadron principally directed their fire at the series of targets formed of German ships which alternately started out of and vanished in the obscurity. About the same time that the 4th battle squadron closed with the head of the enemy line, consisting of Dreadnoughts of the König and Kaiser classes, with one or two battle cruisers, the 2nd battle squadron, under Sir Martyn Jerram, came into action with the German Dreadnoughts and with a cruiser which had dropped back owing, apparently, to damage.

During the course of the action the leading British battleships pressed close to the enemy, bearing in a south-westerly direction and diminishing the range to five miles. This was short range for Dreadnought and super-Dreadnought engagements, and when the 15, 13.5 and 12 in. shells got home the effect must have been dreadful. In many of the German ships the secondary gun positions were covered with 6, 7 and 8 in. armour. The large British shells that missed the vital heavy gun turrets in the German Dreadnoughts would rend the armour over the German secondary guns.

THE GERMANS TURN AWAY

In the Grand Fleet the 1st battle squadron, under Sir Cecil Burney, sustained the heaviest answering fire from the fugitive German ships. But only the Colossus was hit, and her damage was of the most trifling description. She fired on a German light cruiser, probably one of those which had already been battered by Admiral Sir R. Arbuthnot. The vessel was seriously damaged, but it opened on the Colossus, and was given a dose of 12 in. shells, upon which it vanished in the mist. Next a three-funnelled cruiser, perhaps the Wiesbaden, was made out, burning heavily; but she, too, fired and received a terrible answer from the Colossus, which left her ablaze, enveloped in smoke.

The experience of the other ships in the 1st battle squadron was similar—enemies suddenly appearing out of the mist and as suddenly vanishing. Though German marksmanship had fallen off, the Germans still fought bravely, and one example of their courage is noted by Sir J. Jellicoe in regard to the Wiesbaden.

If Sir John Jellicoe had been in perplexity up to this point, so also had Admiral Scheer. There was no longer any question of continuing his raid on the Skagerrak, for he knew by this time the English battle fleet must be aware of his presence and would come to meet him. At last he caught sight of the mass of British ships stretching in a vast arc across his horizon, and he realized that he was running into a fleet which outnumbered and outgunned him hopelessly. The Lützow was disabled and the Derfflinger was in little better shape. He must disengage his force; but how? To turn away in succession would be fatal, and would expose the rear divisions to concentrated fire.

Accordingly, at 6.35 he turned his whole fleet about, every ship turning simultaneously. *Gefechtskehrtwendung* (battle turn-away) was a manœuvre well understood and practised in German manœuvres. It was indeed an essential manœuvre for a weaker fleet in face of a stronger force, and one to which no effective counter move had been discovered. Difficult enough in peace manœuvres, it was dangerous in the extreme in the disordered conditions prevailing. It is to the great credit of German seamanship that it was accomplished without accident. As he gave the order for the turn Admiral Scheer launched his destroyers to attack, and, covered by their smoke screen, he disengaged his battleships and made off to the westward towards England. In three minutes he was out of sight, and the British battleships ceased firing.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Jellicoe's position was difficult. To turn by divisions or in succession towards the invisible enemy was to lay himself open to torpedo attack. Since Admiral Scheer was to the west, and the Grand Fleet was between him and his base, Jellicoe turned away to avoid the torpedo attack and steered south. Scheer, in the meantime, after steaming west for 20 minutes turned his whole fleet round again by the same manœuvre and proceeded eastward. In his account of the battle he gives as his reason a desire to re-engage the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

The manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate breaking loose at night.

The more reasonable explanation of his manœuvre is that he hoped to cut in behind the Grand Fleet, or at worst on the tail end of it, and force his way through. Be that as it may, his manœuvre brought him straight against the middle of the Grand Fleet, the last thing he could have desired. As the German van appeared out of the mist all the British battleships within range opened fire, and for the second time the German ships were under a tempest of shell. The Seydlitz burst into flames, and the Lützow, badly damaged, fell out of the line burning fiercely. Each moment the fire became more intense as the range closed. With the quick decision that characterized him all through the action, Scheer at 7.17 p.m. once more signalled the *Gefechtskehrtwendung*, and ordered his destroyers and battle cruisers to cover his retreat with an attack pressed home and a smoke screen. The actual wording of the signal as entered in their logs was:

Charge the enemy. Ram. Ships denoted are to attack without regard to consequences.


In their heavy smoke screen he thus turned once more to the westward and vanished. Sir John Jellicoe, with no light craft at hand to counter the torpedo stream launched at him, turned four points to the eastward, and sent the 4th light cruiser squadron from his port wing to engage the oncoming destroyers. This they did cutting across the line at high speed, and at the same time the battleships turned four points away, and were thus able to avoid the torpedoes nearing the end of the run. The German flotilla lost one of their number, but they had saved the fleet. Blinded by the smoke screen Jellicoe had no idea of the completeness of the German withdrawal, and turned south-west to regain contact.

SIGNALS FROM BEATTY

At 7.40 a signal came from Beatty giving the enemy position as north-west by west from him about 10 miles, and Sir John Jellicoe immediately changed course in the direction he had indicated. At 7.50 came the signal from Beatty: "Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy's battle fleet." Received in the Iron Duke at 7.45 p.m. in cipher, it was probably 10 minutes before it could be in the admiral's hands. At 8.7 he ordered Admiral Jerram, who was well ahead of him with the 2nd battle squadron, to follow the battle cruisers. Scheer by this time had bent his ships round from a westerly to a southerly course, and thus the Lion and her companions once more regained touch for a few minutes. The Tiger fired at ranges varying from 9,000 to 15,000 yards. The guns of the Seydlitz and Lützow were practically out of action, and in this engagement one of the Derfflinger's turrets was wrecked; but a section of the German battle fleet appeared in the nick of time, and once more the sorely damaged battle cruisers escaped in the oncoming darkness.

Sir David Beatty had continued his east-south-east course until 10 minutes to seven. He then saw the leading battleships three miles from

the Lion in a north-north-westerly direction. He reduced his speed to 18 knots, and began to steer westwards, once more heading off the enemy. He ordered the Indomitable and Inflexible, which had been ahead of him, to prolong the line



BATTLE OF JUTLAND

astern. At seven o'clock the mist had gathered so thickly that no ship more than four miles off could be seen, and the German squadrons were for the time invisible. For nearly an hour, between six and seven o'clock, when the British ships were steaming north of the enemy's line through the thickest part of the mist, their position was much more favoured by the thick weather than was the enemy's position. A curtain of haze veiled Admiral Beatty's three battle cruiser squadrons, till only indistinct greyish outlines could be made out amid the grey mist, while the German ships in the clear water southward and westward showed up against the sun at intervals, enabling Beatty to punish them very severely.

While the British battle cruiser squadrons were pursuing the crumpled head of the enemy's line, the Marlborough, leading the British van, was torpedoed. Whether the weapon came from the destroyers or the crippled Wiesbaden is not clear. A terrible column of water and smoke rose abaft her forward turrets. The great ship heeled over slowly to starboard as the sea rushed into her torn side, then she slowly righted herself. A British light cruiser drew near to her, to be of use in case she went down; but the water-tight compartment system used in constructing modern battleships proved admirably efficient. The Marlborough, though listing to starboard, maintained a remarkable speed in the circumstances. At 7.3, nine minutes after the mishap, she fired four salvos at a four-funnelled German cruiser, and at 7.13, immediately afterwards, caught an enemy Dreadnought of the König class with 14 rapid salvos, hitting the German frequently until the latter turned out of the line.

Seeing that all the guns and gun positions were no longer level, the shooting was remarkably fine. About 10 minutes to eight the Marlborough was again attacked by two German Dreadnoughts, which opened fire at a range of about 12,000 yards. Their shooting, however, was not good. All the shells of their first five salvos fell short. The sixth and seventh salvo also missed. It was only at the eighth salvo that they hit one of the Marlborough's funnels. The Marlborough, on the other hand, is reported to have put her first salvo on the target as she opened fire on the leading German vessel. In one of the stokeholds of the Marlborough the men were working up to their middle in water, and many of the gunners were stripped to the waist in the Trafalgar style.

GERMAN SHIPS DAMAGED

The 4th battle squadron, in which Admiral Jellicoe's flagship the Iron Duke was placed, principally fought German battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist, getting home effectively on several enemy ships. The 5th squadron of fast battleships, under Admiral Evan-Thomas, which had taken station astern, seems to have been lucky in keeping the enemy almost continuously in sight, for the Barham is said to have been firing lyddite shells without intermission from 6.5 p.m. until a quarter to eight. The men then cooled their guns for 26 minutes, while the Grand Fleet took up the firing. At 11 minutes past eight the Barham reopened fire and continued for a few minutes, after which fire was ceased for the night. In the long engagement of the 5th battle squadron, which had been Admiral Beatty's mainstay during all the critical period of the battle, several fires broke out in the Barham and her sisters, but all were quickly extinguished.

Sir David Beatty next ordered his 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons to sweep to the westward and discover the head of the enemy's line, following himself in the same direction at 8.20 p.m., when the two German battle cruisers and the battleships were again discovered, this time well to the north. In a terrific onslaught the Lion engaged the leading German ship at a range of less than six miles, set her on fire, the flames reaching up to the tops, and then tore open her port side, giving her a heavy list. The Princess Royal, with her 13.5 in. guns, set fire to a three-funnelled battleship (probably of the Heligoland class), while the New Zealand and Indomitable made an attack with their sixteen 12 in. guns on the third German ship. They set her on fire and hit her so badly that she heeled over and hauled out of the line. If only the weather had continued clear, the British battle cruisers should have sunk these three ships, which they had severely damaged in a contest lasting barely a quarter of an hour. A heavy mist came down once more from the sinking clouds and enveloped the broken head of Admiral von Scheer's fugitive fleet. The German ships were last seen by the Falmouth at 38 minutes past eight, when they were steaming westward.

This was the close of the battle between the big armoured ships. The British fleet now lay to the south and east of the enemy's forces. At 8.40 Admiral Beatty's six battle cruisers felt "a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

by heavy wreckage." As, however, subsequent examination of the bottoms revealed no sign of such injury, he concluded that "it indicated the blowing up of a great ship." The concussion was probably caused by the destruction of the hapless Black Prince, which was last seen from the British ships soon after 6 p.m., rapidly losing touch with the fleet through injury to her masts and wireless. A wireless signal was received from her after 8 p.m., but about the same time that the heavy shock took place she fell in with the German battle fleet abreast of their centre. In a moment the searchlights were on her, a tempest of shells at point blank range tore her and set her alight from stem to stern. With a fearful explosion she sank with all hands in four minutes. A second survivor of Admiral Arbuthnot's luckless squadron, the Warrior, was at 8.40 p.m. taken in tow by the seaplane carrier Engadine and dispatched forthwith to a British naval base.

In regard to the general conditions of the fleet action, the British navy does not seem to have got more battleships into battle than the enemy had in line; indeed, according to Lord Sydenham, only 11 of Sir John Jellicoe's battleships were engaged. The enemy's tail-end of Dreadnoughts, doing 20 and 20.5 knots, were unable to keep up with the speedier ships of the Kaiser and König class during the preliminary race northward against the British cruisers. It was mainly between 6.17 p.m. and 7 p.m., when the mist was often light, and many enemy vessels showed up against the sun, that the leading British battle squadron struck its heaviest blows. These fell upon some three German battle cruisers, three or four ships of the König class, and four or five ships of the Kaiser class.

Throughout the engagement between the heavy ships encounters between light craft were proceeding almost continuously, and the story of these forms an epic in itself. Certain of these encounters almost attained the dimensions of a battle as the destroyers fought to gain favourable vantage points for the attack on the large ships, and the light cruisers of either side strove to cover them, and the victors drove in on the opposing line of battle. One of the sharpest of these minor battles took place about 5.30 p.m. on May 31, when, as we have seen, Admiral Hood, with his 3rd battle cruiser squadron, was approaching the main engagement, and sent the light cruiser Chester (Captain Lawson) in to reconnoitre. The Chester appears to have found

THE DESTROYER SHARK

the four German light cruisers between her and Admiral Beatty's ships. First she tried to get round the enemy's screen, but the Germans opened out, and forced her to run the gauntlet. Shells burst about her, holing her funnels and bridge, but none struck a vital spot. Within five minutes three of her guns were disabled, and their crews dead or dying. Early in the action John Travers Cornwell, a boy working with a gun's crew at an exposed spot, was wounded. Around him all the gun's crew were killed or injured; but the boy stood at his post until the end of the fight. Nothing then could save him. The Victoria Cross was awarded to him after death for his conduct in the hour of danger.

While the Chester was fighting her way through the gauntlet three British destroyers were surrounded by the advanced light craft of the German High Seas Fleet. They were the Shark (Commander Loftus W. Jones), the Acasta (Lieutenant Commander John O. Barron), and the Christopher (Lieutenant Commander F. M. Kerr). They were steaming in front of the Grand Fleet, engaged, like the Chester, in seeing if the course was clear for Admiral Hood to swing his squadron down into Admiral Beatty's line. Observing a destroyer attack to be imminent, the Shark steamed out to meet it.

The Shark ran into a flotilla of destroyers and light cruisers, and after firing a torpedo at the leading German ship, was battered to pieces in less than ten minutes. One shell struck a propeller; another penetrated an oil-tank. Being out of control and in the centre of a very heavy fire, the maimed destroyer was reduced to a wreck, with dead and wounded strewn about the deck and most of her guns put out of action; but when the smoke cleared away Commander Jones and two of his men could still be seen fighting with the only remaining gun. Then another German shell struck home, and a fragment of it hit Commander Jones on the leg and severed his limb. Able Seaman Hope, a survivor, describes the last scene when the gaff on which the ensign was flying was shot away:

Captain Jones, seeing the ensign hanging down the mast, asked what was wrong with the flag, and seemed greatly upset as he lay on the deck wounded. Twice he spoke of it. Then I climbed up the mast and unbent the ensign from the gaff. I passed it down to Midshipman Smith, R.N.R., who then hoisted it on the yardarm. Commander Jones seemed to be less worried when he saw the flag was hoisted again.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Soon after a torpedo struck her, and she sank. Only a handful of men were rescued by a Danish steamer after being five hours in the water. Some of those who had clung to a raft dropped off exhausted.

Behind the Shark was the Acasta, and one of her petty officers reported that his company saw their leading destroyer fight her last gun and sink, and then took her place in the battle line. The distance between the British and German destroyers narrowed to a few hundred yards, both sides using all guns as fast as they could be loaded. The Acasta put on the utmost possible speed, and apparently drove through the enemy's screen and reached a point within easy torpedo range of the German battle cruisers and battleships. At one of these a torpedo was discharged, and the Acasta's crew attended to their heavy casualties and set to work to save their ship. She was terribly battered, but they kept her afloat through the rough night, and on Thursday morning she was taken in tow and safely reached port. The Acasta and the Christopher would have suffered the same fate as the Shark had not one of the light cruisers of the 3rd battle cruiser squadron come to their help.

It may have been observed that both Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty at times employed their light cruisers for torpedo work. The reason seems to have been that these very fast vessels, originally designed for reconnaissance work and the support of destroyers, were magnificent though rather costly instruments for torpedo warfare by a chasing fleet against a retiring fleet. The speed of certain of the British light cruisers was over 30 knots. At this pace they could often overtake the German battle squadrons, as the Falinouth and Yarmouth had done soon after the Invincible went down. When they got ahead of the German capital ships and were able to approach under cover of mist they enjoyed the same advantages as the flotillas guarding the rear of the German fleet. That is to say, their torpedoes travelled towards the enemy battle squadrons, instead of travelling behind them and having to overtake them.

It was a new and exceedingly daring tactical use for a light cruiser squadron to make daylight torpedo attacks. The Germans do not seem to have attempted anything of the kind, but they employed isolated light cruisers to support their destroyer flotillas, and they also used any single light cruiser that chanced to be near the huge British ships, in desperate attempts to

THE NIGHT PASSES

relieve the pressure upon the head of their line when it became perilous. It is wonderful that the 4th light cruiser squadron should have been able to operate under the enemy's guns in daylight at a range of 6,500 yards, and should have succeeded in crippling a modern German battleship supported by the fire of a heavy squadron.

The British light cruisers in the battle were vessels of considerable size and represented the highest pitch of light cruiser construction. Each carried a complement of several hundred officers and men. The Calliope class was thus a most valuable force, and it was probably owing to the very favourable cover afforded by the mist that the audacious and successful course was taken of launching the squadron in a daylight torpedo attack. It was one thing to talk of hussar strokes as German torpedo officers had done; it was another thing to discern in the smoke, mist and tension of battle opportunities for delivering these hussar strokes with complete success. The British torpedo attacks were entirely magnificent. Had the Harwich force been with Admiral Jellicoe he would have been able to deal a decisive stroke towards winning peace for Christendom in the night of May 31-June 1.

At nine o'clock in the evening of May 31 the Grand Fleet and the battle cruisers had completely driven the enemy westward and cut him off from his bases. His broken van seems to have been in a latitude a little north of Dundee at 8.30 p.m. It was followed by the British cruiser fleet and 1st and 3rd light cruiser squadrons on a south-westerly course until 24 minutes past nine. No enemy ships were then found to the south-west of him, so that the main British forces were established between von Scheer and his base. The cruiser squadron under Admiral Beatty then began to move down in the darkness towards Heligoland, and on a parallel course a little distance eastward the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet also moved in the night towards Heligoland and the triangular stretch of water in the Bight in which the German bases lay. When day broke on June 1, 1916, the British fleets were only 85 miles from Heligoland.

Admiral Jellicoe decided not to risk his fleet in a close night action in these misty waters. Darkness and fog offered too many opportunities for destroyer attacks by the enemy and too much risk of firing on friends. Besides this, the British ships would have been liable to blunder into minefields hastily laid by the enemy for the express purpose of snaring the British fleet in

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

the darkness. So in the deepening night the two fleets steamed on almost parallel courses for a time no more than six or seven miles apart.

For Admiral Scheer the situation was fraught with the direst peril. With a stronger fleet between him and his base he was liable to annihilation if he were discovered at dawn. Night was his opportunity for a desperate venture. At 9.14 he made the signal "Our own main body is to proceed in. Course south-south-east $\frac{1}{4}$ east. Speed 16 knots." And turning from his southerly course he made direct for the Horn Reef. About 9.30 p.m. his advance guard of cruisers came into action with the rearguard of the Grand Fleet. Commodore Hawksley in the *Castor* received the British challenge for the day by flashlamp, and for the moment he was deceived. The first two challenges were correct, but the last two were wrong, and in another minute he was drenched in searchlights and under heavy fire at 2,000 yards. The *Castor* was hit several times, and she turned away blazing; the enemy also disappeared. Indeed, deep uncertainty prevailed as to whether the attackers were or were not enemy ships.

Commodore Goodenough with the 2nd light cruiser squadron was next in action. Engaged in keeping touch with the crippled *Marlborough*, he had fallen astern of station when five cruisers were sighted. A moment later the *Dublin* switched on searchlights and opened fire. The range was so short that hitting began at once, and a concentrated fire was poured into the *Southampton*. Her bridges and superstructure were swept away, midships gun crews and searchlight parties were nearly all killed, but she was able to get off a torpedo, and the flash of an explosion was observed a few moments later. Immediately the *Germania* switched off searchlights and retired. The *Dublin*, too, was badly hit, her navigator killed and the charts destroyed so that she lost touch and did not rejoin the squadron till 10 a.m. next day. The action was visible from the *Iron Duke*, but it was some time before news could be signalled through, and Sir John Jellicoe, concluding that it was a destroyer attack supported by cruisers, held on his course believing that he was still between the Germans and their base. Scheer, however, was in a happier position. The German station at Neumünster had intercepted the British order to the destroyers and light craft to take station astern of the Grand Fleet, and had passed it on to him. His chance had come to break through the tail end of the line.

TWO BRITISH FLOTILLAS

Had Sir John Jellicoe possessed sufficient destroyers his tactics would probably have been to search for the enemy with light craft and harry him continually in nocturnal torpedo attacks. The need of small craft on this great day was absorbing. Destroyer convoys were required by the Marlborough and the Warrior. The security of the Grand Fleet and the cruiser fleet, whose safety from nocturnal torpedo attack was vital to the interests of the Allies, engaged a very large number of light cruisers and destroyers.

The destroyers of the 13th flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in the light cruiser Champion, took station for the night astern of the battle fleet. The 2nd light cruiser squadron was also placed in the rear of the battle line during the night, having at 9 p.m. helped to repel the German destroyer assault on the 5th battle squadron. The general consequence was that the mightiest fleet in the world, which was twice as strong as the fleet ranking second in strength to it, could only spare three destroyer flotillas for nocturnal attacks against an enemy who had been badly battered by gun fire. Much, however, might have been accomplished in the North Sea on the night of May 31, 1916, if the Grand Fleet had possessed a much larger number of fast ocean-going destroyers.

About 11.20 p.m. Captain Wintour, leading in the Tipperary, with the Ardent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Garland, Ambuscade, and Contest behind him, was aware of approaching ships. All the boats of the 4th flotilla were oil-fired, and the Tipperary, the destroyer leader, was 1,850 tons, 320 feet long, with a beam of 32½ feet. She carried about 160 officers and men, and had six 4 in. guns and six torpedo tubes. Built in 1914, she had a reputed speed of 31 knots. The boats she led were mainly of the 1913 class, of about 935 tons, 260 feet long, with a 28 feet beam, a reputed speed of about 30 knots, three 4 in. guns, four torpedo tubes, and a complement of 100 officers and men. The 4th flotilla had taken part in the opening of the fleet action, when two of its boats, the Shark and Acasta, had fought against great odds. But the odds were immeasurably greater in the final action which it fought so gloriously.

In some doubt whether the approaching ships were friend or foe, Wintour held on his course with all torpedo tubes trained to starboard. The British destroyers found the position of the German ships by the flash of their guns or the loom of their

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

shapes in the great lanes of light which the searchlights opened up in the darkness. The searchlights were switched on and off in all directions, their beams springing up and disappearing in a most confusing manner, while the British gunners aimed their 4 in. shells at the great reflectors. The Tipperary was the first to be caught by the storm of shells. She was hit by a heavy projectile, turned into a mass of raging flame and quickly sunk.

From German sources it seems to have been the Dreadnought Westfalen that hit the Tipperary with two salvos at a range of under a mile. Most of the British destroyers got off torpedoes, but one cruiser received a death blow. The rest of the Germans turned away in such haste that the Elbing was badly rammed by the Posen and had to be abandoned. The smaller British destroyers, darting about the black sea like deadly dragon-flies in zigzag movements, designed to put the German gunners off their aim, broke right through the German screen of light craft and found themselves between two lines of German battleships. They turned to steam up between these two lines in the very centre of the enemy's main forces. The position was extraordinary, such as young destroyer lieutenants imagined in their wildest dreams, but never soberly hoped to achieve against so cautious an enemy as the Teuton. The weight of metal and high explosive brought against the mosquito craft was enormous. The range at times was almost point-blank, and the Germans occasionally tried to ram as well as shoot. On the other hand, from the German point of view, the situation was unnerving.

The Ardent, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Arthur Marsden, raced up to a German battleship that was going at a tremendous speed, and, steering into position, fired a torpedo that seemed to strike about amidships. The German leviathan lurched and reeled, and her crew could be seen rushing about the decks. Spinning round, the British destroyer marked another great ship and dashed towards it, but was struck by a heavy shell, set on fire and sunk. The Garland (Lieutenant Commander Reginald S. Goff) and the Ambuscade (Lieutenant Commander Gordon A. Colcs) also released torpedoes against the battleship first attacked by the Ardent, and Admiral Jellicoe gave all three vessels credit for helping to destroy the enemy.

Close behind, Lieutenant Commander Trelawney, in the Spitfire, found himself bearing down upon two large German ships, the nearer of which turned out to be the battleship

THE FORTUNE ON FIRE

Nassau, which altered course to ram him. He accepted the challenge: the two ships met bow to bow, the German firing her foremost guns on the impact and sweeping the Spitfire's bridge, funnel and searchlight away, tearing off 60 feet of her bow plating and leaving behind on the crumpled deck 20 feet of her own side and anchor fittings. In spite of her damages the Spitfire was able to get home on her remaining boilers. Trelawney was wounded and had a marvellous escape from death. As he stood on the bridge a shell passed across his chest, striking the buttons on his uniform, and carrying away the signalling gear and two of the men.

The Fortune (Lieutenant Commander Terry) sighted a big German ship as the British flotilla turned up the lane between the two lines of enemy vessels. She rushed at her big foe and launched two torpedoes, one of which was followed by the roar of an explosion. But dozens of guns were turned upon the Fortune, and she was blown to pieces. The first salvo smashed the forebridge, killing everyone upon it. Then the foremost gun was knocked overboard with its crew; the gunlayer, who was aiming the gun at the moment it was struck, had the gun-sight driven against his face, but went overboard with no injury except a black eye. The foremost boiler was smashed; the after-stokehold and the engine-room were caught by a shell, and the amidships gun was blown into the sea with its crew.

With both her engines torn out, the Fortune stopped dead and began to go down. The survivors of her 100 officers and men, as one of them, Chief Petty Officer H. Hamnant—who tells the story—relates, slammed away with their after-gun. When this was knocked out, they trained a torpedo tube upon their nearest enemy. Just as the torpedo was fired the tube was struck by a shell, which lifted it in the air as the torpedo was leaving it, and completely finished the Fortune, setting her badly on fire forward. There were then 35 men alive of the Fortune's complement of 100. They watched the battle flash around them, saw the fires die down in the Ardent and Tipperary, and observed, as they thought, a Dreadnought blaze up and glow like a gigantic cinder, and then go hissing to the bottom with one gun banging away at the British destroyers. As that terrible night wore on many of the men on the rafts began to die from exhaustion. When at last the destroyer Moresby arrived with a number of light cruisers, only 17 men

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

remained alive out of the 35 who had taken to the rafts when the *Fortune* sank. Only one of the British attacking boats seems to have come through unhurt, but the total loss of the *Tipperary*, *Ardent* and *Fortune* must be regarded as very small in view of the extreme risks run and the havoc reported to have been inflicted on the enemy.

From this we may presume that the midnight charge of the 4th destroyer flotilla scattered the hostile fleet, breaking up its principal formations, and compelling Admiral Scheer to make at once for Wilhelmshaven at any risk. Both Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty appear to have thought that the enemy would remain throughout the night cut off from his base and be compelled to renew action at daybreak in circumstances that meant annihilation. Sir David Beatty remarked in his report: "Our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances." Sir John Jellicoe states: "I manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases . . . and at daybreak on June 1 the battle fleet, being then to the southward and the westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels."

During the night the speed of the torpedoed battleship *Marlborough* declined, till she had difficulty in keeping her station in the fleet. It was decided, in consequence, that Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney should transfer his flag to the new battleship *Revenge*. The transfer was effected at 2.30 a.m. on June 1, and the *Marlborough* was dispatched to a British base. The enemy must have been watching her closely with his submarines, which no doubt had received orders to be in readiness to intercept any injured British ships. Such, however, were the skill and vigilance of the commanders of the British light craft, and so excellent was the moral of the ships' company, that the German submarines were beaten off. The *Marlborough* regained harbour quite safely, and some weeks later was again present in the British order of battle.


The *Warrior*, which, as we have seen, had been badly damaged early in the battle, was less fortunate. She was now in tow of the *Engadine*, and her hull was sinking lower and lower in the water. The sea was rising; the waters in which the damaged vessel was being towed swarmed with enemy light craft and submarines. There was little sleep for anyone on

LOSS OF THE POMMERN

board her. Early in the morning the Warrior developed a heavy list to port, and her last moments were clearly at hand. The wounded were brought up on deck, and were transferred to the Engadine as the Warrior sank.

At about 11.30 a startling message was sent by Admiralty wireless: "German battle fleet ordered home at 9.14 p.m., battle cruisers in rear. Course south-south-east, $\frac{1}{4}$ east. Speed 16 knots." This was Scheer's signal to his own fleet which the cryptographic department had intercepted. Could it be trusted? When plotted on Admiral Jellicoe's chart it seemed, owing to a minor error, to place the Germans in the position of the Iron Duke at that moment. Earlier in the day the Admiralty wireless had misled him, and he therefore disregarded the latest message.

So, soon after midnight the German fleet steamed homeward across the track of the Grand Fleet. Scheer's great peril was over, and there remained but one more force that could bar his way. This was the 12th flotilla, nearly 30 miles to the north-east of the British fleet. It consisted of two flotilla leaders, Faulknor and Marksman, with twelve 34 knot destroyers. At 1.45, just as a hint of dawn appeared, the German ships were sighted, and Captain Stirling prepared to close with them, after signalling to the commander-in-chief his news. He led his ships round to the attack in face of a very heavy fire, so heavy that the results could not be seen. There was, however, a tremendous explosion, and it was seen that in that second of time the battleship Pommern had vanished with her crew. As the Moresby was turning she caught sight of four big battleships in the mist. An explosion followed which they hoped might be from one of the monsters; it came, however, from an unfortunate German destroyer, V4, who found herself between the destroyer and her objective, and was sunk instantly.



BATTLE OF JUTLAND

This fierce little action took place only about 30 miles away from the Grand Fleet, and if only the signal had got through there might still have been time for some, at all events, of the enemy to have been cut off. But it never reached the Iron Duke, nor did one sent 20 minutes later when the Germans had turned away. So the last chance vanished, and Scheer passed on his way without further molestation. Both Jellicoe and Beatty, obsessed with the idea that the enemy was still to the westward, turned north just before 2 a.m. to collect the scattered destroyers and light-craft. For an hour the northerly course was held, hoping for a sight of the enemy. At 4.15, however, the last hope died when an Admiralty message was received that at 2.30 a.m. the High Seas Fleet was in a position only 16 miles from Horn Reef.

Admiral Beatty, still under the impression that Scheer was to the westward, asked to make a sweep in that direction; but this, with the latest information in his hands, the commander-in-chief knew to be hopeless. He realized that the chance had passed, that Admiral Scheer, aided by luck, the mist and bold tactics, had slipped through his fingers. So he signalled "Enemy fleet has returned to harbour." Even now Admiral Scheer was not out of the wood. Three British submarines had taken up their positions. When they had put to sea on May 30 their instructions were to lie on the bottom till June 2. In the absence of further orders they lay placidly on the bottom whilst the German fleet passed over them.

One more peril was in his way. The minelayer *Abdiel* had run a line of 40 mines 15 miles south-west of the *Zyl* lightship. As Admiral Scheer passed near the lightship at 5.30 a loud explosion was heard and the *Ostfriesland* was seen to be in difficulties. It was thought to be a submarine attack, and frantic firing broke out on phantom submarines; but the *Ostfriesland* was able to go ahead, and the tired fleet had crossed its last danger line. About nine o'clock the British northward sweep finished, and there was nothing more to be done, no disabled ships were to be found, no more survivors could be hoped for, and at 11 o'clock the Grand Fleet returned to Scapa Flow.

It remained but to count up the losses of this action. On the British side were sunk three battle cruisers—*Invincible*, *Indefatigable*, *Queen Mary*; three cruisers—*Black Prince*, *Defence*, *Warrior*; eight destroyers—*Ardent*, *Fortune*, *Nestor*, *Nomad*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*.

THE RESULTS EXAMINED

The Germans lost one battleship—Pommern; one battle cruiser—Lützow; four light cruisers—Elbing, Frauenlob, Rostock, Wiesbaden; five destroyers—S35, V4, V27, V29, V48.

In personnel the British casualties amounted to 343 officers and 6,104 men killed; 51 officers and 513 men wounded, and 10 officers and 167 men prisoners of war. On the German side were killed 172 officers and 2,414 men; and wounded 41 officers and 449 men.

The battle of Jutland gave rise to acute controversy, and discussion chiefly centred on the following points:

1. Jellicoe's general idea, expressed in his memorandum of October 30, 1914, in which he announced his intention of refusing to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy's battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing (British) fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn.

This idea was approved in 1914⁹ by the Admiralty, and it has been claimed that the Admiralty thus sanctioned in advance the tactics at Jutland, when he turned away and abandoned hope of a decisive victory. To this argument it has been answered that the Admiralty sanctioned these tactics under conditions entirely different from those obtaining at Jutland. They were intended for a British fleet not markedly superior in capital ships, short of destroyers, and fighting over water selected and prepared by the enemy. At Jutland the British were enormously superior in capital ships, were distinctly superior in destroyers, and were fighting over an area which was definitely known not to have been prepared. There was no risk of mines or submarines.

2. The general conception of a battle fleet as a force which is to be preserved intact and not to be used to destroy the enemy. This was not the idea of the greatest leaders in naval war. Nelson, in his attacks at the Nile and Trafalgar, used his ships remorselessly, aiming, whatever his own loss, at the total destruction of the enemy. "Not victory but annihilation" was his watchword, and in this he differed from earlier and less energetic leaders, such as Howe, who sought rather to drive the enemy back to port than to destroy him.

This conception of the battle fleet was the direct cause of a campaign against building capital ships in 1920, as it was quite natural for the public to argue that if an enormous preponderance

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

in battleships had failed to secure decisive results at Jutland because of the risk from torpedoes and submarines, a battle fleet was of little value, and it would be a sounder policy to build submarines. Such a view is held by no foreign staff, and was indirectly condemned by the British naval staff in 1921, when it was decided to lay down four battle cruisers of the largest size. It was certainly not held by Beatty, who throughout the battle of Jutland continued to press the enemy with determination, despite his losses. But it is undoubtedly entertained by many British naval officers as letters to "The Times" in 1920 showed.

3. The failure of Jellicoe to maintain visual touch with Beatty. Visual touch is important, as otherwise, in the tumult of battle, correct positions may not be signalled by an advance force engaged to the main force supporting it, and false movements of the supporting force may result, as actually happened at Jutland. In this case Jellicoe knew from the information supplied that the enemy's fleet was at sea, and he also knew the approximate position at which a collision was to be expected, so that the maintenance of visual touch, within signalling distance, was of peculiar urgency.

4. The late deployment of the battle fleet. This was one of the consequences of the failure to maintain visual touch. Many of the British battleships were actually straddled, i.e. had German shells dropping on either side of them, before the deployment began. That is to say, they were attacked before they were in a formation to attack themselves or to bring their guns effectively to bear.

5. The deployment away from the enemy. There were great tactical risks in deploying towards the enemy, but such a deployment would have been covered by Arbuthnot's movement, by the fire of Beatty's battle cruisers and by the 5th battle squadron; and it is known from German sources that the German fleet was at that moment in a condition bordering on panic. "The sudden stroke is the trump card of the leader who wishes to dominate the battle." The swift attack paralyses the enemy and leaves him no time for reflection or counter-manoœuvres. The deployment away from the enemy gave the Germans breathing space and time to recover from their alarm. It also lost time, which is a factor of the extremest importance in war. The loss of Arbuthnot's ships and of the Invincible was among the results of the deployment away.

THE TURN AWAY

6. The turn away of the battle fleet at 7.16 p.m. This came at a moment when under a fearful fire, when the British battle fleet was apparently hitting with every salvo, and half a dozen German ships appeared *in extremis*. The turn was slight, but it was sufficient to enable the Germans to disengage. It was carried out by the whole line, though it appears from the official documents that the 2nd battle squadron, which was at the southern end of the British line, was never seriously threatened by German torpedo craft. This squadron did not on its own initiative answer Beatty's appeal to follow him (made at 7.47), but waited for positive orders from Jellicoe, which came, but came too late.

7. The failure to keep touch with the enemy during the night following the battle and the failure to attack the enemy next day. The first had been explained by the action of the Germans in jamming the wireless signals of the British light cruisers and destroyers to the battle fleet, but the fact remains that the course and position of the Germans were signalled by the Admiralty wireless with instruments and wavelength which could not be jammed.

8. Effectiveness of the torpedo against the battleship. Neither submarines nor mines were employed by either side in the battle, and it yielded no light on the question of their value. Many submarines were reported by British battleships engaged, but these battleships do not seem to have been informed that the position of the German submarines was known and was far away from Horn Reef, where the engagement was fought. The actual effects of the torpedo were small. No British capital ship was put out of action by this arm, and only one British destroyer was sunk by it. On the German side only one ship, the *Rommern*, a weakly protected pre-Dreadnought, is known to have been sunk by a British torpedo. Her magazines exploded and she went down with all her crew. Two or three German capital ships were struck by British torpedoes and continued in line; they are stated to have suffered little damage from the hits. Probably not fewer than 200 torpedoes were discharged by both sides, with, as the net result, the loss of only one armoured ship, and that an old one, besides minor craft.

CHAPTER 9

Russia's Last Great Effort

AT the end of the 1915 campaign Germany had believed that Russia was beaten to a standstill. The retreat was, however, not due to any failure in the spirit of the Russian troops, but to a lack of arms and equipment. The man power of Russia was far from exhausted, and during the autumn of 1915 and the early months of 1916 great efforts were made to equip the new armies which had been raised. Supplies had been received from America and from all the Allied Powers ; and every factory, mill and workshop in Russia had been set to work to produce arms and equipment.

Surprise was the chief note of the great Russian offensive that began in June. As that month opened the Russian armies in Europe were disposed in three groups along a front of about 800 miles in length from north to south. The northern Russian armies, composing the first group, and temporarily under General Kuropatkin, well known from his connexion with the Russo-Japanese war, stretched along the Riga-Dvinsk line. The central Russian armies, forming the second group, were under General Evert, who had shown distinguished ability in the great retreat, and they took up the line from Dvinsk to the marshes of the Pripet. The southern Russian armies stood on the front from the marshes to the Rumanian frontier, and were led by General Brusiloff. All three groups were under the command of General Alexeieff, who was nominally subordinate to the tsar.

Over against the northern and central Russian armies lay the eastern German armies, including one Austrian army corps, all under the supreme command of Hindenburg. Opposite the southern Russian armies five Austro-Hungarian armies, with which were incorporated several German divisions, stretched down from the Pripet marshes through Volhynia, Galicia, and the duchy of Bukovina to Hungary and Rumania. These armies were commanded by the Archduke Frederick, with his headquarters at Lemberg, and General Linsingen, whose headquarters were at Kovel. From the Pripet to the Pruth, the

THE CONTENDING ARMIES

boundaries north and south of the area in which Brusiloff was about to begin his offensive on the enemy, the battle front was nearly 270 miles in length, over a country that did not rise into considerable hills or steep eminences till the Carpathians were reached, but was rendered difficult by its being broken by rivers and streams with lake-like expansions and marshy tracts, as well as by broad belts of forest. Below the Pripet it passed through Volhynia along the Styr to Chartorisk, thence over open, undulating ground to Olika, to the west of the fortress of Rovno, struck south to the east of the fortress of Dubno, on the Ikva, into Galicia, where it lay on the Strypa, west of Tarnopol and east of Buczacz, and crossing the Dniester at Uscieczko, which the Russians had retaken in the winter, swung eastwards to the Dniester again, and, lower down, to the Pruth in Bukovina, with Czernovitz well to the south-west of it. Both combatants had strongly fortified it.

On the Russian side of the front the four armies of General Brusiloff's command were, from north to south, respectively, the Russian 8th army under General Kaledin, in Volhynia, the Russian 11th army under General Sakharoff, in Volhynia and Galicia, the Russian 7th army under General Shcherbacheff, in Galicia, and the Russian 9th army under General Lechitsky, in the region of the Dniester. There were in all about 1,000,000 men of all arms under his command.

On the German side of the front, two Austro-Hungarian armies held the part of it which lay in Volhynia and bent down some distance into Galicia. The Austro-Hungarian 4th army, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, stood on the line from the Pripet to about Chartorisk on the Styr. Next came the Austro-Hungarian 1st army, under General Pulhallo von Brlog, with Lutsk and Dubno in its possession, and facing Rovno, held by the Russians—the three fortresses formerly termed the Volhynian triangle. South of Pulhallo lay the Austro-Hungarian 2nd army, under General Böhm Ermolli, with its right north-west of Tarnopol. Below Böhm Ermolli, Count Bothmer, with forces predominantly Austrian, held the west bank of the Strypa and the line to a point north of Buczacz, where he connected up with the Austro-Hungarian army of General Pflanzer-Baltin, whose troops occupied the remainder of the front to the Dniester and Bukovina. The total strength of these five armies was about 41 divisions, including three German divisions.

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

On Sunday, June 4, an official Austrian communiqué gave the first news of Brusiloff's offensive to the world. On the morning of that day the Russians brought their artillery into play against the whole of the Austrian north-eastern front. Their fire was especially violent on the Dniester, on the Lower Strypa, in the region north-west of Tarnopol, and in Volhynia, where the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand near Olika, covering a front of 17 miles, was being subjected to a severe bombardment.

After mentioning that a Russian gas attack on the Dniester had failed to do the Austrians any harm, the communiqué concluded by saying that everywhere there were indications that assaults by infantry were imminent. Next day the Russian headquarters reported in somewhat laconic sentences that fighting had begun the previous morning "from the Pripet river front to the Rumanian frontier," and that the Russians had won considerable successes in many sectors, capturing a number of prisoners, besides guns and machine guns. It was added, however, that the struggle was developing further, and the manner in which it was developing was shown by the significant words, "Our artillery is progressively demolishing the enemy's works and shelters, and as the success of the artillery preparations becomes evident, our infantry advances and captures the enemy's positions."

On June 5 and 6, Brusiloff's offensive developed further. On the former day the Austrians were forced to withdraw for three miles from their first-line trenches at Okna, on their extreme right flank, thus preparing the way for the success of Lechitsky in Bukovina. But also on that day and on the next the Russians, under Kaledin's leadership made even more progress in their advance from Olika towards Lutsk. Here the assaults of the Russian troops proceeded in waves of thousands of men, fresh forces being thrown into the fighting masses as opportunity offered. A few miles lower down in the same district they were marching victoriously upon the same goal from the direction of Mylnoff. All this region was of extreme significance strategically, as the Austro-German bases and railways lay behind it. No great distance away, west of Lutsk, was the Vladimir Volynsk base on the railway from Kovel to Rava Russka, and north-west of the fortress was Kovel itself, where the railways from Rovno and Sarny met and joined up with other important lines. Vladimir Volynsk and Kovel were the obvious

FIGHTING NEAR LUTSK

Russian objectives, with Kovel much the more valuable of the two. Pushing on rapidly, Kaledin's main columns converged on Lutsk from the east and south-east, and captured the stronghold in the evening of June 6 without having to encounter any serious resistance.

Lutsk was once more in Russian hands. It had powerful defence works, and its capture should have given Kaledin much trouble, but practically it was taken by surprise, owing to the panic caused by the impetuous energy of the Russian advance. From his starting point Kaledin had advanced no fewer than 25 miles in about two and a half days, and he had been fighting all the way. On June 7 and 8 his forces were crossing the Styr and its tributary the Ikva at many points, and hotly pursuing the Austrians, who, however, made an attempt to check him at some places. By this time German reinforcements from the front above the Pripet had begun to come upon the scene and stiffen the Austrian resistance. On the 8th and 9th a sanguinary battle raged at Rojishche, 13 miles north of Lutsk, where was the chief passage over the Styr.

Both the bridge and the town were taken after desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The place was important both as a military base of the enemy, and from its position on the Rovno-Kovel railway, the light railways from Lutsk on the south and Kolki on the north joining the main line there. Of even greater importance than Rojishche, and equally important with Lutsk, was Dubno, the southernmost fortress of the Volhynian triangle, and there also the Austrians, with German supports, made a determined stand in order to prevent the Russians from crossing the Ikva; but they failed utterly, though not without first exacting a heavy penalty from their conquerors. This region was one of oak forests, and easily capable of the most formidable defence; the enemy took every advantage of the natural difficulties of the position, but was unable in the end to withstand the fierce and prolonged Russian assaults, and the fort and town of Dubno fell on the same day as Rojishche. The Russians had never relinquished Rovno, and now they had regained possession of the two other fortresses of the Volhynian group—Lutsk and Dubno.

Westward of Dubno they marched on, forcing the enemy back continually, and occupied Demidovka. Southward, on June 13, they had got as far as Kozin, nearly 20 miles from Dubno, in the direction of Brody on the Rovno-Lemberg railway, and on the

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

16th entered Radzivilov, some miles closer to Lemberg. In this region, where Kaledin's army joined up with that of Sakharoff, the front of the Austro-Germans had been deeply pierced, while Lemberg, though still some distance off, was threatened.

Kaledin for some days longer continued his advance towards Vladimir Volynsk and Kovel after the capture of Lutsk and Rojishche. On June 12 he took Torchin, on the high-road from Lutsk to Vladimir Volynsk, and rather more than half way between the latter centre and Olika, where he had first broken through the enemy's front. On the following day he was fighting at Zaturtsy, still nearer Vladimir Volynsk. He had advanced nearly 45 miles due west, and the Austrians had retired from the Styr to the Stokhod. With another column he struck up from Rojishche along the Rovno-Kovel railway towards the latter river, but some miles lower down that stream, the course of which was to the north, and on June 16 he reached Svidniki, some 21 miles from Kovel. It was obvious that Germany would have to make very great efforts if Kovel and Vladimir Volynsk were to be saved, as from her point of view they must be.


What was known as the Lutsk salient had now been formed. On the north it began at Kolki in a tract of marshy land, on the east side of the Styr. In this district fighting had been desperate. On June 10 the Austrians, who were in superior numerical strength, attacked the Russians as the day dawned at Semki, east of Kolki, and under cover of a concentrated fire forced Kaledin's troops across the Styr; but there the enemy was held up. Three days later Kaledin took Kolki, and afterwards advanced to Godomichi. From Kolki the salient ran along the Styr, through Sokul to Svidniki on the Stokhod, and thence went on to Zaturtsy, on the road from Lutsk to Vladimir Volynsk, where it reached what might be called its apex. South of Zaturtsy it was bounded by the line Lokachi-Svinyukhi, whence, bending eastward to the Styr again, it crossed that river and travelled along the Plashchevka, an eastern affluent of the Styr to Kozin. Roughly speaking, it was a semicircle, with a radius of about 45 miles from Olika.

It was chiefly against the Lutsk salient that the Germans, under Linsingen, now proceeded to start a powerful and not unsuccessful counter-offensive, beginning about June 16. It was certainly high time for the Germans to bestir themselves. Kaledin was only some 20 miles from Kovel and Vladimir



Russel

EARL BEATTY, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET. On the outbreak of war Earl Beatty (then Sir David Beatty) was in command of the battle cruiser squadron. His first action was off Heligoland, August 28th, 1914. On January 24, 1915, Beatty fought the battle of Dogger Bank and on May 31, 1916, after sighting Admiral Hipper's squadron of battle cruisers opened the battle of Jutland. In November of that year he succeeded Jellicoe in command of the Grand Fleet. Off Rosyth on November 21, 1918 he received the surrender of the German fleet.



H.M.S. QUEEN MARY DESTROYED AT JUTLAND. A salvo hit the Queen Mary, a terrific yellow flame burst out and a heavy and very dense mass of black smoke completely enveloped the ship. This photograph shows the immense size of the smoke-cloud of the explosion.

From Tarceett & Hooper. "The Fighting at Jutland," Macmillan & Co. Ltd

A CHECK FOR THE AUSTRIANS

Volynsk, and Sakharoff about 60 miles from Lemberg. In the course of the 12 days of his advance Kaledin had taken nearly 72,000 prisoners including over 1,300 officers, 83 guns, 236 machine guns, and a vast quantity of all kinds of material. To restore the situation, which was equally bad for their ally on two other parts of the front, and promised well nowhere, the Germans now brought reinforcements from France, amounting to four divisions. At the same time the Austrians withdrew all their reserves from the Trentino, thus weakening their offensive against Italy. They even brought up troops from Serbia and Albania. Taking full advantage of their superior railway facilities, they in one way or another succeeded in concentrating forces to attack the Russians and, with superior artillery, to check them.

In the whole of the Lutsk salient the Russians found the general pressure of Linsingen so heavy that they could not advance, and were obliged to retire from some of the positions on the Stokhod and make a fresh alignment on the Styr. They also withdrew from Lokachi for a distance of four to six miles in an easterly direction on the Zaturtsy-Shklin-Lipà line. The Germans had succeeded, at least for the time, in forcing Kaledin back from both Kovel and Vladimir Volynsk. For the next few days there was something in the nature of a lull in this part of the salient, now somewhat flattened out by the German counter-offensive. But the Germans attacked again, and this time with many heavy guns and a large supply of high-explosive shell. On June 28 they had stormed and captured the village of Linievka, which lay west of Sokal and about three miles from Svidniki. In the first days of July there were violent battles, fought with great fury on both sides. From Linievka the Germans, under cover of an extremely heavy fire, started an offensive, but it was held up.

Near Zaturtsy the Austrians, in massed formations, delivered a powerful assault on the Russians along the Lutsk-Vladimir Volynsk road, but they were thrown back. In the neighbourhood of Ugrinov, between Shklin and the Styr, the Austro-Germans, who had been reinforced, pressed the Russians closely, and the salient was now seriously threatened. But during the fighting around Lutsk there had been fresh developments both on the main battlefield above the Pripet and on the right flank of the salient. During the first week in July the Russians began a strong offensive on the front above the Pripet in the neighbourhood of Baranovichi, a great railway junction and a place of

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

cardinal importance to the Germans. With a view to relieving the pressure on the Lutsk salient, General Alexeieff instructed General Evert, in command of the central Russian armies, to attack in force on July 3 south of Tsirin, some miles north of Baranovich. At the same time the Russians attacked Hindenburg at other points farther north. At Tsirin, Evert broke through two lines of the German defensive organization, capturing 11 guns and nearly 3,000 prisoners. Severe fighting took place near Smorgon, on the Minsk-Vilna railway, and at Tcherneshki the Russians carried part of a German position. South of Lake Naroch a portion of the enemy's first line trenches was stormed with the bayonet. The object of these attacks was to prevent Hindenburg sending many fresh troops to the aid of Linsingen. For about a week a series of battles raged in this area, with daily offensive and counter-offensive movements of extreme ferocity; but when the position below the Pripet improved, the Russians withdrew to their original front, and the struggle in these sectors died away.

Kaledin, although holding the Austro-Germans well on the line to which he had retired on the Lutsk salient, required reinforcements in order to resume his advance towards Kovel and Vladimir Velynsk. These were forthcoming when the Russian 3rd army, under General Lesh, which had been stationed above the Pripet, appeared on Kaledin's right flank. Lesh had won distinction in the Russo-Japanese war, and had been in command of the Russian forces opposing Mackensen on the Lublin-Cholm line in August, 1915. He took the field above Kaledin, first in the region of the Lower Styr, between the Pripet and the Sarny-Kovel railway, and struck towards the Stokhod. In this area the enemy's troops were partly German, belonging to the command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Lesh had not been expected by the Germans, perhaps on account of the swampy nature of the country, which in anything but a very dry season made military operations on a large scale well-nigh impossible. The weather, however, had been hot, and the small streams, lakelets and marshes in the district had become negotiable.

In the region of Volchetsk, Lesh drove the Germans and the Austrians from their fortified positions, and put them to flight. In the course of the fighting the Russians took a battery of six Krupp guns, which, in the words of the communiqué, "had hardly time enough to fire a few shots." By July 7 Lesh had

GENERAL LESH'S ARMY

advanced from his starting-point a distance of 11 miles, driving the enemy out of Manevichi, a station on the Sarny-Kovel railway, while immediately to the south of the railway the troops, after a sharp fight, occupied the village of Kamaroff.

After dislodging the Austro-Germans from many points south of Nobel on the Pripet, Lesh marched on towards the Lower Stokhod, and on July 8 reached Leshnevka, a few miles from that river. On the same day another column gained possession of the enemy's well-organized entrenchments east of the small towns of Ugly and Navoz, and pressing on the heels of the retreating foe crossed the Stokhod near the former place.

Within a day or two the Russians were lined all along the Lower Stokhod, which was Lesh's immediate objective, with Kovel behind it. On July 11 and for some days afterwards there was heavy fighting on the river, as the Germans had brought up some troops and many big guns; but the Russians maintained themselves in the positions they had conquered. Once the Austrians succeeded in getting to the right-hand bank near Gulevichi, but were repulsed, with a loss in prisoners of 800 men. Not only was Lesh successful in this local offensive, but his action, by indicating an enveloping movement from the north on Linsengen's forces who were attacking Kaledin, had at once a marked effect on the struggle of the Russians on the Lutsk salient. It soon became clear that the German counter-offensive was able to make no farther progress, and for a little time, along portions of this area, the fighting took on the character of trench warfare.

As soon as Lesh's advance relieved the pressure on Kaledin's army the latter broke through the opposing line, and two days later was fighting with success a pitched battle on the Rovno-Kovel railway at Svidniki. At Kiselin, Kaledin put the enemy to flight by a sudden blow. A week later, near Svinyukhi, he thrust back by a vigorous counter-offensive a German attack in massed formation. On the 20th Lesh defeated a formidable assault on his lines near Ugly. The middle of the month was marked by heavy rain, which flooded the marshy reaches of the Stokhod, prevented movements in force, and gave the enemy an opportunity of strengthening his defensive works in the region of that river. Towards the end of the month, however, Kaledin once more advanced. Fighting with great energy, he pushed Linsingen out of his heavily fortified entrenchments at Trysten,

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT..

a pivotal point about four miles from the Stokhod, and forced him to the opposite side of the stream. It was a serious defeat for the Germans, who admitted it in an official communiqué by stating, "North-west of Lutsk, after severe unsuccessful attacks, the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines at Trysten, and obliged us to evacuate the positions we still held in front of the Stokhod."

At the beginning of August there was widespread fighting, particularly strenuous at Stobikhva and Lyubashevo, north of the Sarni-Kovel railway, in all this part of Volhysia, but in the upshot the Germans were compelled to retire from most of their ground on the left bank of the Stokhod, including the bend formed by that river where it approaches the Styr. At that time the Russians were about 20 miles from Kovel, north, east and south of it, the point they held nearest it being Vitonesh, 18 miles south-east, this town also being about the same distance from Vladimir Volynsk. On August 3 they were on the Stavok, a western tributary of the Stokhod. The general position a week later in this northerly part of the Lutsk salient—to retain that name, though there was no longer really a salient—was that the Russians, having driven the Austro-Germans from the western bank of the Stokhod, after overcoming as stubborn a resistance as any seen in the war, had no great natural obstacle to surmount in their advance on Kovel or Vladimir Volynsk, to both of which their menace was very real.

On the left flank of the Lutsk salient the Russians, under General Sakharoff, were equally successful. In the first week of July the counter-offensive of Linsingen was directed in this area from Shklin, almost due south of Torchin, Ugrinov, and the little river Lipa flowing into the Upper Styr. For he had concentrated strong forces in the neighbourhood of Stojanow, the terminus of a railway from Lemberg, and Gorokhov, a few miles east of Sokal on the railway from Kovel to Rava Russka. His intention was to strike up at Lutsk from the south-west, and he probably hoped that under cover of his attacks west and north of that fortress he would be able to distract the attention of the Russians from this sector; but in this he was wrong, for Sakharoff, guessing what was the German plan, anticipated and thwarted it.

Sakharoff's front in July extended from about Svinyukhi, south-west of Lutsk, across to the Lipa, along which it lay,

THE MOVE TOWARDS BRODY

thence passed over the Upper Styr, and continued along the Plashchevka to Kozin, on the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railway. The part of it north of the Lipa was heavily bombarded by Linsingen on July 14. Two days later Sakharoff suddenly attacked him. The Russian general struck unexpectedly at both of Linsingen's flanks, drove them in and crumpled them up. Fighting continued next day, with the advantage to the Russians. Linsingen had to stand on the defensive. In those two days Sakharoff captured about 13,000 men, 30 guns, of which 17 were heavies, thousands of rifles and shells, and an abundance of other war material.

On July 18 Sakharoff was bombarding the new German line on the Lipa with some of the big guns he had taken on the 16th, and was using the German shells. Having recovered somewhat, Linsingen, two days afterwards, attempted to advance on the line Zviniany-Elizaroff, but was quickly checked by Sakharoff, who on that same day and the following fought and won a great battle, termed by the Russians the battle of Berestechko, in this area. While making a feint on his left against the strong Austrian position at Ostrov, he delivered a powerful and successful assault from Novoselki on the flank of Linsingen, many of whose troops fled in disorder.

As a result of their success on July 20 the Russians advanced from Ostrov, and the next day took by storm the town of Berestechko. With scarcely a halt Sakharoff continued to make marked progress. On July 23, after fierce encounters in the streets, he dislodged the Germans from the village of Galichanie, on the south bank of the Lipa. On the night of the 24th he began the third of the series of operations by breaking through the Austrian front, which was protected by rows of wire entanglements, on the river Slonuvka, an eastern tributary of the Upper Styr, in the Galician part of its course. To cover his real attack, which was directed towards Brody, Sakharoff attacked fiercely at Leszniow, farther west, and there the Austrians claimed some success; but it was only in appearance. All day long on the 25th the Russians pressed on across the Slonuvka. Next day they were fighting for the possession of the fords of the Boldurka, a more southern affluent of the Upper Styr, which it joined about nine miles north of Brody.

On the 27th the Russians were well on their way to Brody, and as they approached the town they heard explosions and saw

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

fires breaking out in it. Their aeroplanes reported that processions of goods trains were leaving the place. The enemy was, in fact, preparing to evacuate Brody, and was destroying such of his stores as he could not save. Early in the morning of July 28 Sakharoff captured the town. At the end of the month he had reached the Upper Sereth and its tributary the Graberko, from 10 to 16 miles south of Brody.

Sakharoff's contribution to Brusiloff's offensive, which in the north now embraced the entire area between the Sarni-Kovel railway and the Rovno-Lemberg railway, as well as the district above the former to the Pripet, was of great tactical and strategical importance. From July 16 to 28 Sakharoff had advanced from 40 to 50 miles, and his line of march south and south-westward menaced both the Rovno-Lemberg railway, with Lemberg itself, and the Austro-German army of General Bothmer, on the Strypa, west of Tarnopol. His successful offensive on the Sereth, which was beginning as July closed, continued into August, and threatened Bothmer with envelopment from the north.

Sakharoff's enveloping movement now was of material assistance to General Shcherbacheff, who had been standing from the commencement of Brusiloff's offensive on June 4 over against Bothmer, on the Strypa. On August 12 the Russian high command issued a statement announcing that on that day

As the result of seven weeks of persistent effort on the part of the glorious troops of General Sakharoff and Shcherbacheff, under the direction of General Brusiloff, the fortified villages of Gliadki, Worohijowka, Cebrow, Jezierna, Pokropiwna and Kozlow, the powerfully organized wood of Burkanow, and the whole line of the river Strypa fell into our hands. The whole sector of the winter base position established by the enemy in front of Tarnopol and Buczacz is in our possession.

These events marked the completion of the first stage of Brusiloff's campaign. It had been brought about not only by Sakharoff and Shcherbacheff, but also by the offensive of General Lechitsky in Bukovina and in the whole region of the Dniester and the Pruth.

Shcherbacheff's share in driving the Austro-Germans from their winter front was for several weeks somewhat negative, but in the start of the general offensive he was successful in the sector of which Buczacz was the centre; opposite Tarnopol he failed to make any considerable impression. On his part of the

AN ARTILLERY PARK TAKEN

line, as on every other part of it, the Russians, after an intense artillery preparation, attacked the enemy on June 4 in force. Their main assaults were in the direction of the three railways leaving Tarnopol for the west. These were the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway, which joined the line to Lemberg from Rovno, via Dubno, at Krasne; the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway running through Brzezany to Chodorow, where it linked up with the line from Stanislaw and Halicz to Lemberg; and a third railway that went due south from Tarnopol on the east side of the Sereth to Czortkow, whence it turned west through Buczac and Nizniow, reached Stanislaw, and connected with the system from Lemberg. Of these railways the first, which was part of the Berlin-Odessa line, was the most important.

The struggle between Shcherbacheff and Bothmer fell into two sectors, the forest of Burkanow lying in the middle. On June 4 the Russians penetrated the Austro-German trenches north-west of Tarnopol at various points, but were unable to maintain their ground, and at Kozlow their attacks broke down in front of the wire entanglements under withering Austrian fire. Their assaults, which for a time were incessant, were carried out with the most reckless courage, but though they were supported by some Belgian armoured cars, they failed to reach their objective. South of Burkanow the Russians were much more successful. On June 8 the Petrograd communiqué announced that on the Trybukowce-Jaslowiec front, which lay a little north of the Dniester, Russian infantry, under cover of artillery, carried by a vigorous blow several strong positions and had got quite close to the Strypa. They crossed the river on that day, entering Buczac at dawn, and developing an offensive along the Dniester, carried after bitter fighting the village of Scianka, and in a battle of equal intensity took the village of Potok Zloty, both of these places being on the west side of the Strypa, the one eight and the other four miles beyond the stream.

Among the many captures they made was an artillery park with great quantities of shells at Potok Zloty, a battery of 4 in. howitzers at Ossowice, north of Buczac, and a large number of prisoners, with the staff of an Austrian battalion. Higher up, near Tarnopol, Bothmer held firm, though his front from Buczac to the Dniester had been completely broken. On June 11 near Bobulince, north of Buczac, the Austrians, assisted by German troops which had been brought into the district, forced

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

the Russians back, and they were unable to regain the line which they had lost. Shcherbacheff overthrew the enemy on the 15th at Hajworonka, on the west bank of the Strypa, but the Austrians rallied and put up a determined resistance, which was not ineffective. Nor was there much change during the rest of the month.

Fighting of an indecisive character continued throughout July on this part of the front, the Russians attacking near Gliadki in the northern sector, and lower down on the Strypa; in the second week of the month stubborn combats took place at various points, in the course of which the Russians captured several thousand Austrians and Germans, besides guns and machine guns. As the month drew to its end the Russians were on the Koropiec, south of Buczacz, but their gains had been small, and Bothmer maintained himself in what practically was his old position west of Tarnopol. He had, however, increasing reasons for uneasiness, for Sakharoff, to the north of him, had taken Brody, and was pressing downwards on his left flank, while on his right the progress of Lechitsky upwards was not less dangerous. Early in August Germany showed the apprehension with which she viewed the general situation by placing the whole eastern front under Hindenburg, with the exception of that portion of it on which Bothmer still stood, and also that which had been commanded by Pflanzer-Baltin. The part excepted was left in charge of Austria in the person of the Archduke Charles, heir-presumptive to the Emperor Francis Joseph, but Bothmer was responsible for it in reality.

In the second week of the month Sakharoff, as has been narrated, had forced the Gliadki-Worohijowka sector, and Lechitsky was on the Koropiec, near the Dniester; both Bothmer's flanks were enveloped. Thus threatened, the German commander, who had stubbornly held out on the Strypa since the start of Brusiloff's offensive 10 weeks before, withdrew from his winter front on that river, and on August 12 retired to entrenched positions about 10 miles west on the line of the Zlota Lipa, which he had had plenty of time to prepare. Next day Sakharoff was in Jezierna, and Shcherbacheff was in Podhajce, close to the latter's new front, while lower down Russian troops were crossing the Zlota Lipa.

Great as the success of Sakharoff had been, it would scarcely have made Bothmer retreat from the Strypa had it not been

A WEDGE IN THE AUSTRIAN FRONT

for the success which had attended the operations of General Lechitsky in Bukovina and in the region lying between the Dniester and the Pruth. Lechitsky had to negotiate most difficult country—more difficult, indeed, than that on any other sector of the front as it existed early in June. From the north it was protected by the formidable line of the Dniester, on which only one bridge-head—that at Uscieczko—was in the hands of the Russians when the great offensive began, and it offered no facilities for an invasion on a large scale. South-eastward, however, they held the north bank at Usciebiskupie, in Galicia, from which a road went south to Okna and Czernovitz.

Below this crossing the mountains of the Berdo Horodyszcze walled in the east side of the duchy from the Russian province of Bessarabia, and below that again lay the then neutral frontier of Rumania. Thus the front of the Austrians under Pflanzer-Baltin was exceedingly strong by nature, and all that military science could do had been done to strengthen it. Yet Lechitsky forced it.

There was one point alone where he had a chance, and though it was little short of desperate, he took it. Into the Dniester flowed from the south the little stream called the Onut, and it made a cleft and a tiny valley among the hills of the Berdo between Okna and Dobronowce, in the north-east corner of Bukovina. It was commanded by the Russian guns stationed on the high bank of the Dniester on the north side, and after being shelled was turned into a means of access into the duchy. Simultaneously with his drive across the Dniester at Okna, Lechitsky attacked the Austrians south-east of it at Dobronowce, and after four days of terrific fighting captured it.

Lechitsky had driven a wedge deep into the Austrian front. In their retreat the Austrians blew up the railway bridge at Jurkowce, and by June 10 had been forced out of Zaleszczyki, the most important bridge-head on the Dniester, where both a road and a railway crossed the river, and which had been the theatre of the heaviest fighting in previous phases of the war.

By the same date, or a day later, Lechitsky had entered Horodenka, the meeting-place of several roads, and all Bukovina was open to him. Pflanzer-Baltin's forces fled partly up the Pruth, and partly towards Tysmienica and Stanislaw. Advancing with great rapidity, Lechitsky was in Sniatyn on June 13, and was marching along the railway towards Kolomea.

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT ..

To the east he was fighting his way across the Pruth to Czernovitz, the doom of which was already sealed. He was held up for a while south of Bojan, and the strong line of the Pruth gave him a good deal of trouble; but at four o'clock in the afternoon of June 17 he captured by assault the Czernovitz bridge-head on the left bank of the river, and after bitter fighting at the fords—the bridges having been blown up by the Austrians—occupied the city, which now changed hands for the fifth time, the first being as far back as September, 1914. During these fluctuations most of the cosmopolitan people of the capital of Bukovina had adapted themselves with apparent aplomb to the changes which took place, and no later than a fortnight previously the town had been gay with flags in satirical commemoration of the time of its Russian occupation; it received the returning Russians with expressions of joy.

With the capture of Czernovitz that portion of Pflanzer-Baltin's army which had been on the Pruth was thrown back upon the Carpathians, and Lechitsky lost no time in pursuing it to complete its defeat. Crossing the Bukovinian Sereth, one of his columns took Radautz on June 21, having marched 30 miles south; and less than 24 hours later was in Gora Humora, 20 miles farther in the same direction. By the night of June 23 it was in Kimpolung, but not till after a fierce struggle in which it captured over 2,000 Austrians. This movement, taken in connexion with other of Lechitsky's movements in the same area north-westward, made him master of Bukovina, a land more than half the size of Wales, in 19 days.

Other portions of Lechitsky's army were advancing westward. The town of Kutyn, on the borders of Bukovina and Galicia, lying on the Czeremosz, a southern tributary of the Pruth, was taken after a fight on June 23, and the Russians advanced from it along the road to Pistyn, a few miles south of Kolomea, on which more of his columns were converging from the east and the north-east. Pressing on from Sniatyn, the Russians stormed the heights overlooking the Rybnica, another affluent of the Pruth, and on June 28 fought a great pitched battle on the ground lying between the Dniester and the Pruth, on a front bounded on the north by the Czortowiec, a southern tributary of the former river, and on the south by Czerniawa, a northern tributary of the latter. Kolomea, the centre of four railways, fell to Lechitsky on the last day of the month.

RUSSIAN SUCCESSES

As July opened, Lechitsky pushed on westward. The Austrians, who had received reinforcements from the Italian front, made a stand seven miles beyond Kolomea, but were defeated. At Tlumacz, 12 miles to the east of Stanislaw, Bothmer, now in command of the Austrian troops in this sector, checked Lechitsky and threw him back for some distance. This, however, did not interfere with the main movement of the Russian general, and on the 4th he captured Potok Czarny, only six miles from Delatyn and 15 from Kolomea. Bothmer was again tackled both north and south of the Dniester, and this time with success, his forces in this region being overwhelmed and put to flight. Lechitsky's cavalry made a dash for the railway running from Delatyn south through the Jablonica pass into Hungary, and seized the small town of Mikuliczyn and cut the line, thus making it impossible for Austria to transfer forces from the south to this area. A terrific combat took place on the right bank of the big river near Zuyaczow on July 5, and after yet another desperate contest, in which Russian heroism and contempt for death were characteristically displayed, Lechitsky on July 8 occupied Delatyn, an important road centre and railway junction.

This marked an advance of nearly 70 miles from his starting-point five weeks before, and during that period he had fought and won at least three great battles. Pflanzer-Baltin was now succeeded by General Kövess. Bothmer remained in command of such of Pflanzer-Baltin's troops as had escaped westward from Lechitsky, and Kövess was at the head of the rest of the defeated Austrians in the Carpathians and Southern Galicia, who had been reinforced with drafts from the Trentino and Isonzo fronts, as well as by part of some Turkish divisions, the balance going to Bothmer. Having compelled Bothmer to fall back at Nizniow to the north side of the Dniester, Lechitsky, with that river on his right and the mountains on his left, was secure on both flanks. In the far south of Bukovina his cavalry were scouting near the Kirlibaba pass and striking into Hungary in the third week of the month, while fighting for the crests of the Carpathians was going on in other districts.

Bothmer, thus deeply outflanked on his right, must have withdrawn from the Strypa, on which he still held a front of about 25 miles, had it not been that Lechitsky was unable to move. For days rain fell in torrents in this region, as in that of the

RUSSIA'S LAST GREAT EFFORT

Lutsk salient, and snowstorms swept the Carpathians, jeopardizing his communications and forbidding an advance. Both the Dniester and the Pruth were flooded, the former rising 10, and the latter 16 feet. For two or three weeks Lechitsky was condemned to inaction, but on July 28 he threw the enemy back in the direction of Stanislau and captured Jezierzany, on the Tlumacz road, 18 miles east of that city.

Following up his attack along the Tlumacz road and to the north and south of it, Lechitsky successfully advanced, in spite of the fiercest opposition, on a front of 16 miles, on August 7, stormed his way through Tlumacz to Tysmienica, took Nizniow on the Dniester, and entered Ottynia, farther south on one of its tributaries. The ground he gained was about 74 square miles in extent, and in these operations, and in those of the next day, which gave him Tysmienica, he captured 7,500 men, nearly half of whom were Germans, five guns and 63 machine guns. More than that, Stanislau was appreciably nearer. On August 9 his troops occupied the right bank of the Bystrzyca, and took the joint railway-station at Chryplin, only two miles from Stanislau.

The Bystrzyca alone stood between Lechitsky and the town. The enemy had blown up all the bridges, and was arrayed on the opposite bank. There was an obstinate fight, but on August 10 Stanislau fell into Lechitsky's hands, the Austro-Germans making off northwards in the direction of Halicz in full flight. No fighting actually occurred in Stanislau itself, for the enemy had evacuated the town, which the Russians reported "untouched and in good order," with the exception of some parts of the railway. So, for the third time since the outbreak of the war, Russia held this extremely important Galician town. With the retirement of Bothmer from the Strypa, as the result of pressure from Sakharoff and Lechitsky on his wings, and Shcherbacheff on the centre, the first part of Brusiloff's offensive was completed. In 70 days, on their whole southern front, the Russians had advanced over a distance of about 20 miles on their centre in front of Tarnopol, and over a distance of from 60 to 80 miles on their right flank in front of Rovno and their left flank in the Bukovina; and so had reconquered several thousand square miles of territory.

CHAPTER 10

Revolt in the Hejaz

IN the year 1916 the Arabs of the Hejaz came over to the Allied cause. This notable addition considerably aided the ultimate conquest of Palestine, and led in later years to events of wide-spread significance in the Middle East. The story of the revolt in the Hejaz and the campaign against the Turks—one of the most thrilling of the war—is the subject of this chapter.

Formerly a vilayet of the Turkish empire, the Hejaz is a district of Arabia, part of the kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd. It lies to a depth of some 200 miles along the east coast of the Red Sea for nearly 700 miles and stretches from Akabah on the north to Asir on the south, its boundaries on the east being, from north to south, Great Nefud, Nejd, and the Great Arabian Desert. It owes its importance to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Besides Mecca and Medina, the towns of Hejaz are Jeddah and Yembo, the ports respectively of these two cities, and Taif, in the south, the centre of the Arabia Felix of old.

In these cities and towns live most of the inhabitants of the country which for the most part is a raised plateau, whose western side is formed by rugged mountains descending sharply to the Red Sea. The land lacks perennial rivers, and is fertile only in its few valleys. The annual *haj*, with its many thousands of pilgrims in normal times, is the chief source of the wealth of Hejaz. The Arabs are undoubtedly an ancient race, but until the advent of Mahomet and the development of Islamism Arabia figured hardly at all in history. The deserts on the east and the mountains on the west that bordered the coastal tract, especially in the Hejaz (a word which itself means a barrier), precluded invasion or immigration on a large scale from either side. For unnumbered centuries life proceeded with little or no change in the primitive patriarchal communities of the land.

Early in the seventh century a wonderful change united the Arabs as never before. The Koreish tribe had the keepership of the idol house, the Kaaba at Mecca, and one of its members, disgusted with the idolatry of his country, proclaimed the faith

REVOLT IN THE HEJAZ

in the one God, of whom he declared himself to be the prophet. This was Mahomet. In 612 he propounded his religion, and it soon became not only a religious but a powerful political force, which originated the caliphate and conquered large portions of Africa, as well as a good part of Europe. Nor was the conquest merely military or religious, for with it, in its best phase, went literature, art, and science. Under the Abbaside caliphs, schools flourished as far apart as Bagdad and Cordova, and magnificent libraries were established at Alexandria, Cairo, and elsewhere. The Arabs advanced the science of medicine, and the Arab Avicenna wrote the famous "Canon of Medicine," which was the physician's first text-book. In mathematics and astronomy the Arabs excelled, and all this at a time when Europe was passing through a period of declension and darkness.

Since 1517 when the emir of Mecca acknowledged Selim the Grim both as caliph and lord of the Hejaz, the emirs or sherifs of Mecca, though usually in fact independent, were nominally Ottoman vassals. The hold of the Turks on any part of Arabia was never very secure; the Yemen, for instance, was in a constant state of rebellion, and from 1891 Turkish rule was almost confined to a few places on the coast. The construction of the Hejaz railway, however, from Damascus to Medina, by the sultan Abdul Hamid, appreciably increased Ottoman power in western Arabia. It was begun in 1901 and completed in 1908, covering a distance of 1,105 miles. The ostensible object was to facilitate the *haj* or pilgrimage to the Holy Cities; but the real motive of the enterprise was strategic and political: to tighten Turkish hold on the Hejaz.

Thus the tension between Arabs and Turks is explained by a combination of secular hostility with a feeling of superiority on the part of the Arabs, who resented the overlordship of a race not to be compared with their own in cultural achievement. When Turkey entered the war in the beginning of November, 1914, the situation in Arabia was quiet, except in Nejd and Asir, which were in open revolt, and in the Yemen, where the Turks took the offensive against the British in Aden. But distrust between Turk and Arab was everywhere acute, and while the Sherif Hussein at Mecca held back from an immediate breach with Turkey, his reply in December, 1914, to British overtures indicated friendliness to the Allied Powers, which under favourable conditions might develop into active cooperation.

HUSSEIN ACTS

British policy in Arabia on the outbreak of war with Turkey aimed to keep open and unhampered communications through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and to thwart the Turkish attempts to raise the Mahomedan world against the Allies by the proclamation of a jihad. Thus no time was lost by the British foreign office, and on the day that Turkey declared war a communication was sent to Sherif Hussein assuring him that if he and the Arabs actively assisted Great Britain, she would recognize the independence of the sherifate and of the Arabs. In January, 1915, Sir H. McMahon arrived in Egypt as high commissioner with instructions to foster the sherif's friendship, and in February, 1916, the "Arab bureau" was formed to study and develop British policy in Arab affairs, and to collect information bearing on the subject.

In the spring of 1916 Sherif Hussein finally decided to take action to assist in expelling the Turks from Arab territories. The Arabs in the Hejaz rallied to the sherif of Mecca, who was head of one of the two principal families in the Hejaz, and of the tribe of the Prophet. His decision to break with Turkey was precipitated by the arrest and execution of many leading Arabs in Damascus and Homs by Djemal Pasha. Among the victims were members of Hussein's tribe. Moreover, the tomb of Abd el-Kader, who was held in veneration throughout Islam, was desecrated; and Enver Pasha on a visit to Mecca had displayed, by his conduct, contempt for the Mahomedan faith.

The religious issue struck the final spark; but an assurance given by Britain in October, 1915, had reconciled Hussein to an increase of friction with Constantinople. This assurance, to be distinguished from the vague promise of support and recognition of Arab independence offered in November, 1914, was in the form of a reply to a request made by Sherif Hussein in the middle of 1915. He proposed that Great Britain should acknowledge Arab independence within an area bounded on the north by latitude 37, from Mersina to Persia, on the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, on the south and east by the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the frontier of Persia. The protectorate of Aden was excluded from these demands. Great Britain replied by pledging herself to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the prescribed territories, subject to certain exceptions such as the districts of Mersina, of Alexandretta, and of that portion of Syria lying west of the

REVOLT IN THE HEJAZ

districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, which was not purely Arab, and to reservations that Great Britain would nowhere act to the detriment of French interests, and that the Turkish vilayets of Basra and Bagdad were likely to be subjected to British control.

While these somewhat protracted negotiations were being carried on, the Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and France had been concluded. Two areas, "A" and "B," were determined upon, in which France and Britain respectively were to uphold an independent Arab state or confederation of states. "A"—the French sphere—included Aleppo, Homs and Damascus, and "B" lay to the south, extending east to Mesopotamia, and west to the Jordan, Gaza and Akabah. In two other spheres France and Great Britain were authorized to take part in administration after consulting the Arab rulers. The "Blue" area, covering approximately Syria north of Acre and west of Damascus and Aleppo, was to be under French influence, and the "Red" area, the Tigris-Euphrates valley from north of Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, under the influence of Great Britain.

The standard of the Arab revolt against Turkey was raised by Sherif Hussein on June 5, 1916, when he proclaimed his independence at Mecca. Two months later he issued a proclamation "To the Moslem World" which embodied the grievances of the faithful against Constantinople and explained the reason for his maintaining friendly relations with the Turkish government until the breaking-point was reached. The emirs of Mecca had acknowledged the Turkish government "because they desired to strengthen the congregation of Islam." The committee of Union and Progress (the agents of which were Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha and Talaab Bey) had, on securing power, sapped the foundation of the caliphate.


The lust of the committee was unsatisfied until it departed from the precepts of the Koran, thus breaking the only enduring bond with the true followers of Islam. It was open to all men to see that the rulers of Turkey were Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha, and Talaab Bey, who were doing whatsoever they pleased. . . . They wrote to the Judge of the Sacred Court of Mecca translating the verses in the Sura of the Cow (the second chapter of the Koran), and enjoining them to reject the evidence of believers outside the court, and only to consider the deeds or contract engrossed within. They manifested their guilt when they hanged one day 21 of the most honourable and enlightened Moslems. To destroy even so

THE CAMPAIGN OPENS

many cattle at one time would be hard even for men void of all natural affection and mercy. Even supposing they had an excuse for this evil deed, God saith, "Do not punish anyone for the sins of another," and they had no reason to exile and torture the innocent families of these ill-fated men and to rob them of their possessions.

So passions were aroused, fluctuating zeal was maintained by the distribution of gold, and inter-tribal jealousies were suppressed if not eliminated through more than two years of desert warfare by fostering and keeping alive a vision of national independence. The Arabs had the advantage over the Turks of swift movement and a thorough knowledge of the country. They out-numbered the 20,000 enemy troops garrisoning the towns by two to one; but the Turks were strong in artillery and highly disciplined, while the Arabs had scarcely any artillery and were untrained.

The campaign opened at Mecca, and caught the Turks unawares, so that they were compelled to fight on the defensive. Sherif Hussein recognized that the acid test of his claim to independence would be his ability to receive and safeguard pilgrims to the Holy City. Thus he must become master not only of Mecca, but of the port of Jeddah and of the intervening strip of country. He divided his forces, foot, camelry, and horsemen, into four parties: one remained at Mecca, and the others, each led by one of his sons, proceeded westward to Jeddah, north to Medina and south to Taif. Sherif Hussein himself supervised the attack on Mecca. He remained in his



palace directing operations even under heavy shell fire. On June 5, when he declared independence, the townsmen supported his cause without hesitation. The Turkish garrison refused to surrender, and the Arabs captured the main bazaar, the residential section, the administration buildings and the sacred

REVOLT IN THE HEJAZ

mosque of the Holy Kaaba. The forts of the three hills overlooking Mecca were garrisoned by Circassian mercenaries and carefully selected Turkish troops, who opened fire with their artillery on the Great Mosque. The violation of this sacred shrine provoked the Arabs to desperate hand-to-hand fighting which carried the day. The sherif's own words may be cited to show how great a part religion played in the campaign, and how deep was the resentment caused by the action of the Turks:

What stronger proof of the faithlessness of their hearts to religion and of their feelings towards the Arab can we desire than the bombardment of that ancient house which God has chosen as His House. . . . From Fort Jyad, when the revolt began, they shelled it and the first shot struck a yard and a half above the Black Stone . . . other shells fell in the precincts, of which they made a target for their guns, killing daily three or four who were praying within the mosque till they prevented the people from approaching for worship. This will show how they despised God's house and denied it the honour given to it by believers.

Sherif Hussein's captures at Mecca were 1,100 men, 28 officers, and four guns.

The first news of the Arab revolt reached Europe by telegram from Cairo on June 21, when the fall of Jeddah was announced. In this action the British Red Sea patrol cooperated with the Arab forces who were first beaten off by the artillery and machine guns of the Turkish garrison. Seaplanes from the Ben-my-Chree dropped bombs on various Turkish positions, and strongholds north of the town were bombarded by the Indian marine ship Hardinge and the light cruiser Fox. Blockaded on the land side by the Arabs, and in the Red Sea by British vessels, the garrison capitulated after about a fortnight's siege. The Arabs captured 1,400 rank and file, 45 officers and 16 guns and machine guns.

The first phase of the campaign encouraged Arab hopes of independence, and British and French hopes of defeating the Turk. In Egypt, Hussein's successes gave pause to the pro-Turkish party, and trade was almost immediately resumed between Suez, Suakin and Jeddah. Sir Reginald Wingate, governor-general of the Sudan, cooperated with the newly established Hejaz government in the work of administrative reorganization which included the establishment of a public works department, the opening of schools, and the issuing of a

THE SIEGE OF TAIF

weekly newspaper, "Al Kibla," as the organ of government. On the Red Sea Turkish power quickly evaporated. On July 10, the Idrissi captured Kunfrida, the port and chief town of the principality of Asir. Rabegh, 100 miles north of Jeddah, was also captured. On July 27, a Meccan force coming north from Jeddah by boat surprised and captured Yembo with the help of a British warship. A German mission headed by Major von Stotzingen, charged with setting up a wireless station on the coast to communicate with the Germans in East Africa, was forced to retire from Yembo to Damascus. North of Yemen, only Akaba remained in Turkish hands.

The Arab force under Emir Abdullah which laid siege to Taif, 70 miles south-east of Mecca, encountered a stubborn resistance. The Vali Ghaleb Pasha commanded the defence of the town. The garrison consisted of 3,000 men with 10 75mm. Krupp guns. Not until September 22 did the garrison surrender, after Abdullah at the head of 5,000 Arab tribesmen had first contented himself with investing the town until the arrival of Egyptian soldiers whose artillery bombardment wore down the Turkish defence. The fall of Taif resulted in the capture of 10 guns, 1,760 rifles, 800 bombs and shells; 83 officers, 1,982 men and 72 civilian officials surrendered. It marked a stage in the campaign at which the whole of the Hejaz except the railway and Medina was cleared of Turks.

The Turks, beaten from Mecca, had resolved to hold Medina at all costs. The arrival of Turkish forces from Damascus had been delayed by the tearing up of a large section of the railway near El Ala, and the Turkish outposts had been driven from the gardens of the Medina palaces to the refuge of the city walls, but the Emir Feisal, who lay siege to the town, found himself matched against an enemy superior to the Arabs in training and equipment. He was defeated on July 3 by a sortie of Turks from the town. They sacked the suburb of Awali which Feisal had occupied; and followed up this success by mowing down by artillery fire a disorderly Arab force which attempted to storm the great fort overlooking the city; and on August 3 Feisal's brother Ali, who had occupied part of the railway in the north and later joined forces in an attempt to hold the road to Mecca, was driven back to Ghadir Rhabegh, 20 miles south of Medina, in a running fight which lasted 28 hours. Thus at the end of 1916, Medina remained in Turkish hands, and Arab hopes were

REVOLT IN THE HEJAZ

drooping because the enemy threatened Mecca. The reverse inflicted on the Arabs made it possible for the Turks to repair the railway line connecting them with Damascus and to bring reinforcements (including Austrians and Germans) from Syria.

The retention of Medina was of the utmost importance to the Turks, since it was the burial place of Mahomet, and its possessors might persist in making a plausible claim to the hegemony of Islam. The delay caused in Turkish operations by the assembling of reinforcements in Medina, however, gave the Arabs an opportunity to transform themselves into a disciplined army. General Sir R. Wingate was appointed to supervise British reinforcements and to advise the sherif. Rifles were shipped to the Hejaz and the Arab forces were reorganized. Two forces were concentrated on Medina, one under Abdullah on the east and north-east (4,000 strong), and a second under Ali (8,000 strong) on the south. Feisal was given command of a force 8,000 strong based on Yembo.

In December, 1916, the enemy was based on Medina, while active cooperation was taking place between Allied forces in Egypt and the Arabs. At this critical hour the grand sherif, who had assumed the title of King of the Hejaz on November 16, was officially recognized by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy. King Hussein paid a special visit to Jeddah with his chief ministers, and received congratulations from the commanders of British and French cruisers.

The moral of the Arabs was revived by Captain T. E. Lawrence, the much discussed scholar-soldier. In the autumn he had been given permission by the general staff at headquarters in Cairo to work amongst the Arabs. He conceived the bold plan of deflecting the Turkish forces based on Medina from a successful march on Mecca by an attack on El Wejh, the Red Sea port north of Yembo which was held by 1,000 Turkish troops. In December, the situation of the Arabs was grave, in consequence of a defeat south-west of Medina which enabled the enemy to establish himself in the hills half-way between Medina and Rabegh. Thus, Feisal's army based on Yembo was separated from Ali's force based on Rabegh. The attack by Feisal and Lawrence on Wejh in January, 1917, culminating in the capture of two-thirds of the defending garrison, and simultaneous raids by Emir Abdulla's forces north-east of Medina, surprised the Turkish command. The enemy had believed the main Hejaz

A TYPICAL RAID

army to be in Rabegh, and were advancing on Mecca, which was now delivered from the possibility of Turkish attack.

The fall of El Wejh played a great part in the restoration of Arab fortunes, and was brought about by the assistance of British supply ships on the march from Yembo, and of warships in the assault on the town. Bombardment of the main Turkish fortress from the sea was followed by an attack upon the garrison by a landing party of Arabs who had been carried up by sea and an attack from the desert at the same time. The sea attack was conducted by Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss from his flagship the *Euryalus*. The grand sherif was impressed by the effectiveness of the British navy. He is credited with this comment—in reference to the power of the British empire: "She is the great sea in which I, the fish, swim. And the larger the sea, the fatter the fish."

It must not be forgotten, however, that French assistance in the Hejaz also contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Turks. In September, 1916, Colonel E. Bremond arrived in Jeddah at the head of a French military mission. A detachment of French Moslem troops was landed in the Hejaz with machine guns and mountain artillery. In his book on the Hejaz campaign, Bremond emphasizes the importance of the part played by the French, and says cynically of Lawrence: "A man who represents £200,000 sterling, or who brings with him 2,000 laden camels, must clearly receive nothing but general admiration." (*Un homme qui représente deux cent mille livres sterling ou qui amène deux mille chameaux harnachés, ne trouve évidemment que des admirateurs.*) It must be left to the historian of the future to apportion praise and criticism justly.

During 1917 Feisal succeeded in getting all the Arabs in the north who had been divided by tribal feuds to support him, among others the sheikh of Howeitat. The Turks now concentrated on guarding the Hejaz railway. From February onwards frequent raids upon the railway were organized by the Arabs. A typical raid is described by Macmunn and Falls in their "Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine":

On February 12, Bimbashi (Major) H. Garland, Egyptian army, left Wejh with a party of 50 Bedouin, reaching the line south of Toweira, 120 miles north-west of Medina, after eight days' camel riding. He had been told by the Arabs that trains now ran only by day, so thought he might work at leisure under cover of darkness. He sent a party to lay

REVOLT IN THE HEJAZ

explosives under a bridge south of the station, while he himself mined a section of rails farther down the line. Then he heard a train from the north enter the station, stop, and quickly start again. He had a few minutes only to complete the laying of a reduced charge, and ran back when the train was within 200 yards of him. The explosion came when he was 50 yards from the line, and he saw the engine leave the rails and crash down the embankment. The Turkish guard poured out of the blockhouse at the station, but the Arab who had been at work at the bridge pluckily fired his charge also, destroyed the bridge and thus cut off the train.

Exploits of this sort, carried out in the north by Feisal's forces, in the south nearer Medina by those of Ali and Abdulla, with the aid of British and French officers and of Egyptian, Indian and French Moroccan troops, became almost of weekly occurrence. Fighting on a large scale was rare. The Turks kept to the blockhouses, and moved out to patrol or mend the line only in considerable strength, accompanied by pack artillery and machine guns. The Arabs, never attacking when the Turks were in force, played their game of tip-and-run, under the inspiration of their British advisers, with trifling loss to themselves and a steadily rising list of casualties to the enemy.

On July 2 an Arab force under Captain Lawrence defeated the Turks at Abu el Lissal; on July 3 the Turkish garrison at Gawaia capitulated; and on the 6th the Arabs entered Akabah, which base was to serve them throughout their successful campaign of 1918.

Little occurred in the winter of 1917-18, but by April, 1918, Feisal captured Tafleh, near the southern end of the Dead Sea, and held the latter against a powerful attack by the Turks who had been reinforced by the railway; he also took El Kerak. Both Maan and Medina held out. In the summer of 1918 the armies of the king of the Hejaz numbered 40,000 men, who became the extreme right wing of Allenby when he conquered Palestine and Syria. In coordination with these operations, Feisal took part in the advance on Damascus, which was entered first by some of his troops on the night of September 30-October 1. During the war the Hejaz forces killed or immobilized 50,000 of the enemy, and their military services were of great value to the Allies. Medina capitulated to Hussein, under the terms of the armistice with Turkey, in January, 1919.

CHAPTER 11

Blockading the Central Powers

EARLY in 1916 the question of the Allies' blockade of the Central Powers became acute and caused the British government much uneasiness. In February, 1916, a ministry of blockade was formed to deal with the whole subject, and Lord Robert Cecil (later Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), became the first minister, combining the duties with those of under-secretary for foreign affairs. In no other phase of the war was there such difficulty and perplexity as in the exercise of naval pressure against the commerce of enemy states, and in deciding upon the exact rights of neutrals.

From the first the British and the French navies in the North Sea and the Adriatic interfered with the sea borne trade of Germany and Austria-Hungary. At a later date the fleets of France and Great Britain, reinforced by the navies of Italy and Russia, operated against the maritime traffic of Bulgaria and Turkey, while maintaining their watch on the coasts of the central empires. Trade in the Baltic was not interrupted seriously until the autumn of 1915, but all other seas adjacent to the enemy states, and also to the neutral states through which sea borne goods could be transported by rail and road, river and canal, to enemy destinations, were dominated by the warships of the entente Powers.

From the very beginning of the war Great Britain could have seriously disturbed the transit across the Baltic of goods bought or sold by Germany and Austria if her submarine flotillas had been sent through the Sound. Had she retained and developed the direct, simple and comprehensive methods of blockade of the days of Nelson and of the American Civil War there would have been no immediate difficulties or perplexities. Those methods were direct and simple because they were founded on the principle that might is right, and throughout the nineteenth century the possibility of a blockade on these lines was a potential weapon in the hands of Great Britain ; and her naval superiority made it certain that she could wield it effectively.

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

But when agricultural states, such as Germany, entered upon a period of intense industrial activity, with vast sea borne imports of raw material and sea borne exports of manufactures, the scope of British sea power began to trouble them.

The possibility of pressure from Britain by such a blockade as Abraham Lincoln had established against the Confederates during the American Civil War was one of the reasons of Germany's efforts to create a great fleet. A leading German authority in the matter was Vice Admiral Baron Curt von Maltzahn, professor of naval strategy at Kiel. In his work on Naval Warfare, written in November, 1905, he violently denounced the American doctrine of blockade as further developed during the Spanish-American War of 1898. He said:

The United States hold that if the commander of a vessel, which might be thousands of miles from its destination, can be proved to have had the intention of entering a blockaded port, he is guilty of trying to run the blockade. In other words, the United States hold they would have been justified in stationing their cruisers at the mouth of the Elbe to keep watch over German ships sailing from our harbours, lest these ships should be bound for the blockaded port of Havana.

Admiral Maltzahn doubtless had in mind the defence of the German coast against a British blockading squadron by German submarines. If, after the American doctrine, blockading squadrons could act hundreds or thousands of miles away from the blockaded coast, submarines could not seriously impede a blockade. The submarine of 1905, for instance, could not have interfered with a blockading squadron in the North Atlantic.

During the Civil War the American policy inflicted heavy losses on British trade, but it was valuable to Britain as a great sea power in establishing a belligerent's right to make the fullest use of the blockade. But at the second Hague conference in 1907 several naval conventions were agreed to, largely at the instigation of Germany. They included one for the creation of an international prize court, and in the following year a conference of the principal naval powers was convoked in London to agree to the rules which were to govern the court. One of the proposals put forward by the German delegates to the conference was that many kinds of raw materials should be included in a list of goods which could never be declared contraband or liable to seizure in belligerent ships by belligerent cruisers. Among the articles which the Declaration of London placed in this free list were raw

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

cotton, jute, flax, hemp, silk and wool, copra, oil seeds and nuts, rubber, raw hides, iron, copper, nickel and other metallic ores, wood-pulp, bleaching powder, ammonia and such curious things as office furniture. On the other hand, foodstuffs, forage and grain could be treated as contraband of war.. In addition to these extraordinary inclusions in and exemptions from the list of contraband, it was agreed that if a neutral vessel were found to be carrying contraband to a neutral port she could not be seized. Her papers, whether true or false, were to be accepted as evidence of the destination of the goods.

Perhaps the master-stroke of the German delegates was the first chapter of the Declaration, laying down an entirely new law of blockade. Its very first article forbade a blockade extending "beyond the ports and coasts of or occupied by the enemy" (such a blockade as Britain must establish in case of war). Other articles forbade the blockading forces to "bar access to neutral ports or coasts," and prohibited the capture of neutral blockade runners "except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective." This very ambiguous phrase seems to have been meant to forbid anything like a long-distance blockade, enforced by warships some hundreds of miles from the enemy's coast, such as had been carried out in the American Civil War by the United States. This hampered the British fleet in every conceivable manner.

It was a triumph for the German diplomatists. Britain, who could not live on her own produce, was to be deprived of foodstuffs by enemy cruisers raiding her trade routes; while Germany—who wanted raw cotton for her smokeless powder, oil for her nitro-glycerine and dynamite, jute for her sandbags, iron, copper, nickel, tungsten and other ores for making fine steel for guns, rifles, bayonets, shells and other munitions of war, rubber for her military motor transport, and wool for the clothing of her troops—was to get all these things without interference. Under the Declaration of London all these war stores were to be allowed to enter Germany, provided they were carried by neutral vessels.

The British government, however, accepted the Declaration and it was embodied in a naval prize bill which was passed through the House of Commons by Mr. Asquith's government, but was thrown out by the House of Lords. The fact that the bill was defeated was fortunate for this country, which would otherwise have been completely bound by its provisions. But even though

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

the bill was not passed there was in the early days of the war considerable hesitancy on the part of the British government in using unrestricted powers of blockade. If they had been used to the full, Great Britain could have prevented a very large part of the American cotton crop of 1914 from passing into Germany, to be used in the manufacture of explosives. She could have stopped the enemy from getting fat for nitro-glycerine, considerable quantities of ore for fine steel manufacture, copper for cartridges and shellbands, and large quantities of food. American cotton was the decisive article of contraband, because without it Germany and Austria-Hungary would soon have run short of powder. They would have had to resort hastily to wood or other inferior cellulose material. Large new plants would have been required; every gun, howitzer, Maxim and rifle would have needed different sights; and then all these weapons would have been diminished in carrying power and in precision.

The position of the British government was, however, a very difficult one. Sir Edward Grey explained in public that any attempt to prohibit neutral commerce with Germany would have led to some of the principal neutral Powers joining Germany and Austria, and declaring war upon the Allies. Besides that, Russia needed free transit of war stores and general material through a friendly Sweden. Sweden, on the other hand, was agitated by a strong and energetic pro-German party, known as the Activists, that eagerly sought for any fairly popular motive for bringing their country into the field against Russia and invading Finland.

The French government was anxious as to the attitude of Italy. At the beginning of the war Italy was friendly, and allowed the French army along the French-Italian frontier to be moved against the invaders. Nevertheless, German financial, commercial and political influences permeated the entire fabric of Italian life. It was questionable whether the French blockading squadron in the Mediterranean could seize Italian ships containing cotton, copper and other war material consigned to agents who were engaged in transporting the goods into Austria or into Switzerland for dispatch to Germany. For many years Italy had retained a grudge against France, and fought her in a tariff war. It was quite possible that the severe methods of a full blockade, their general interference with Italian shipping and their restriction of trade between Italy and Germany,

SWEDEN'S TRADE

would alarm the Italians, spread a belief that the French were jealous of Italy's extending commerce, play into the hands of the German diplomacy, and thus keep the Italians from extending their sympathies with the Allies to the point of joining them in the war.

Finally, Great Britain had her own risk of trouble with the United States of America. The government, anxious not to be involved with neutral Powers, continued to act on many of the conditions laid down in the Declaration of London. During the last six months of 1915, however, the pressure of the blockade was considerably increased. In the autumn of 1915 the British fleet established a virtual blockade of the Baltic and prevented the passing of large quantities of Swedish iron ore into Germany. The steamers carrying it kept within the territorial waters of Sweden, then crossed the Sound into the territorial waters of Denmark, skirted the fortified coast of Germany, and hugged the territorial waters of the Netherlands. At Rotterdam the iron ore was transhipped into river boats and conveyed to Krupp's work on the Rhine. Ore from Norway also passed through Rotterdam to Krupp's works at Neuwied; and according to a statement made in the House of Lords by Lord Devonport in January, 1916, some iron ore from Spain, which had to cross the Bay of Biscay and meet the British blockading ships, reached German agents at Rotterdam.

In the spring of 1916 there seemed a certain amount of tension between Sweden and the Allies. Britain had stopped the import of Swedish chemical wood-pulp, and hampered the Swedish match-making industries by putting a tax on matches. Swedish and other timber was also placed upon the list of prohibited imports, and Canadian lumbermen came to England to cut down wood needed for pit-props. According to Norwegian rumours, there was in May, 1916, some danger of the Activist party in Sweden intriguing their country into a war with Russia, with a view to helping Germany. But whatever danger there had been appeared to have been dissipated by July, 1916, through the negotiations of the Russian foreign office. But no agreement in regard to the restriction and distribution of imports was arrived at between Sweden and the Allies. Swedish publicists went so far as to deny the validity of the American doctrine of ultimate destination, and only the Socialist party in Sweden showed any sympathy with the Allies.

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

The stand made by Sweden against the blockading policy of Great Britain and France was naturally used as an effective lever against the Allies by the government of the United States. In a note against the blockade delivered in London on November 5, 1915, and hailed in Berlin as the international Magna Charta of the seas, the American ambassador denounced British methods of naval pressure as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." Amid a mass of detailed objections there were two principal contentions against the blockading operations. One was that no proper blockade of the Central Powers existed, as Britain did not regularly maintain a cordon of intercepting ships in the Baltic waters. The other was that delay was caused by new methods of search. The note declared that:

It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to trade with the Scandinavian countries, and that German naval vessels cruise both in the North Sea and the Baltic, and seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. It is an essential principle, which has been universally accepted, that a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all nations. This principle, however, is not applied in the present British blockade, for, as above indicated, German ports are notoriously open to traffic with the ports of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

In reply to this note Sir Edward Grey first went back to the basis of American thought in the matter, and cited a remarkable passage in a letter from W. H. Seward to the American ambassador in Paris in 1863: "The true test of the efficacy of a blockade will be found in its results," wrote Mr. Seward. "Cotton commands a price in Manchester and Rouen four times greater than in New Orleans. Judged by this test of result, I am satisfied there was never a more effective blockade."

Thus the great rise in price in Germany of many articles most necessary to the enemy for the prosecution of the war was the fundamental test whether the British blockade was effective or not. From another point of view the British foreign minister dealt with the geographical problems of the blockade. He insisted that the sea traffic across the Baltic was of no more decisive importance than the land traffic over the Danish and Dutch frontiers. As his reply ran:

Commerce from Sweden and Norway reaches German ports in the Baltic in the same way that commerce still passes to and from Germany across the land frontiers of adjacent

THE U.S.A. PROTESTS

States; but this fact does not render less justifiable the measures which France and Great Britain are taking against German trade. . . . If the doctrine of continuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some Swedish port and across the Baltic, or even through neutral waters only? The best proof of the thoroughness of a blockade is to be found in its results.

A marked impression was made on American opinion by the arguments of Sir Edward Grey, and the view that the blockade, though perhaps loose in style, was generally sound in principle, appears to have gained strength in influential quarters in the United States. Yet President Wilson and his secretary of state, Mr. Lansing, stubbornly objected to British methods of search.

They averred that Britain had broken the settled law of nations by refusing to search ships at sea and taking them into port for thorough examination of the cargoes. An American official in London was said to have informed the American government that this method of delaying American shipping was a subtle British trade device, designed to prevent the American mercantile marine from growing powerful enough to compete with the British mercantile marine. The point was raised in the American Note of November, 1915, but it was not rebutted in the British reply of April, 1916, for, as Sir Edward Grey remarked, it had been completely settled by interim negotiations. The British government had been able to prove there was no foundation for the suggestion made by the American official; and he was removed from the position he occupied.

This baseless suggestion had created dangerous resentment against Great Britain even throughout the early months of the war, when no effective naval pressure was being exerted by the navy. All the protests of the American government were inspired by this suspicion that American shipping was being interfered with for unfair purposes of commercial rivalry. It afterwards transpired that at about this time there was an enormous rise in the world export trade of the United States, surpassing all previous records, and making it evident to the American people that the blockade was not injuring them. Too deeply absorbed herself in war work, Britain could not capture the world markets from which her blockading squadron excluded the enemy; so that large new fields of enterprise were opened

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

to the people of the United States. It was the grand age of gold for them. The Americans redeemed the larger part of their debts to Europe, and became a leading creditor nation instead of one of the principal debtor nations. Important American newspapers began to ridicule their own government for pretending that the British blockade had injured American oversea commerce, and with the real ground of tension thus removed the situation became very much easier.

At the same time, the important point in regard to our new method of search was developed in an unexpected manner; for Sir Edward Grey, in this technical affair, called to his aid Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. A report from the commander of the Grand Fleet was forwarded to the American authorities. In his report the British admiral did not speak merely in the immediate interests of his own blockading squadrons and his own nation; he showed there were reasons of permanent and universal force in his methods of search. It was, he argued, the greatly extended power of the submarine that brought about the new developments. Also, the increased bulk of cargoes in large modern ships and the ease with which concealment could be made of small parcels of exceedingly valuable metals made examination in port necessary. Sir John wrote:

I dispute the contention, advanced in the American Note, that there is no difference between the search of a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. The fallacy of the statement must be apparent to anyone who has ever carried out such a search at sea. There are other facts which render it necessary to bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the manner in which those in command of German submarines . . . attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, without visiting the ship, and therefore without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe for a neutral vessel, which is being examined by officers from a British ship, to remain stopped on the high sea. It is therefore in the interests of the neutrals themselves that the examination should be conducted in port.

Still the new Coalition government continued to observe some of the restrictions which the Declaration of London imposed. Cotton was not listed as contraband until August 20, 1915. According to a passage in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the government of the United States, cotton had continued to enter Germany up to June, 1915. The fact seems to have been that the foreign office and its assistant committees were averse to

A WHITE PAPER

using direct blockading methods, and preferred the very slow method of getting guarantees from the neutral funnel states by means of coaling arrangements and other economic factors.

In a White Paper published on January 4, 1916, it was stated that the enemy's export trade had then been practically stopped, and that with the curtailment of his credit in neutral countries his imports from such countries would automatically diminish. No figures were given in connexion with German export trade from August, 1914, to February, 1915—the months in which Mr. Winston Churchill said that Britain was exercising such economic pressure against Germany that she would be helpless by November, 1915. It was, indeed, admitted that neutrals had freely been ordering German goods in the first seven months of the war, and receiving them under the terms of the Declaration of London. But it was stated that from March, 1915, to September, 1915, German and Austrian imports into the United States had fallen to the value of £4,400,000, as against a value of £24,800,000 obtaining before the war.

The White Paper then pointed out that the plan of drawing up agreements with importers in Norway, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland was being put into execution. Even in Sweden bodies of merchants had come to terms in regard to particular commodities of special importance, such as cotton and rubber. Undertakings backed by pecuniary penalties had been given, and many shipping lines had entered into engagements not to carry for enemy agents various articles of contraband. Rubber, copper, wool, hides, oil, tin, plumbago and certain other metals were largely controlled by British authorities, with the result that their import into Germany had been stopped for some months without any serious friction with any neutral.

The other side of the case, however, was presented on January 24, 1916, by Lord Charles Beresford, in a letter to the press in which he said:

The conviction is gaining ground that had the navy been allowed to act, and had we used our legitimate rights as a belligerent, the war would have been ended some months ago. We have neglected to use the tremendous force ready to our hands represented by the power of the fleet.

I acknowledge there are difficulties now, but they are of our own creating. Preferential and permissive agreements with some neutrals have caused, and will cause, more difficulties. An effective blockade is impartial. Owing to want of decision

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

and prompt action at the beginning of the war, we are now in a hopeless muddle and an inextricable tangle.

The following short summary of contradictory orders-in-council and proclamations since August 4, 1914, accounts for the position:

The proclamation of August 4, 1914, made eleven articles absolute contraband and fourteen articles conditional contraband, among the latter being foodstuffs, etc.

The order-in-council of August 20, 1914, substituted the lists of the proclamation of August 4, 1914, for those of the Declaration of London.

The proclamation of September 21, 1914, added nine more articles to the list of conditional contraband.

The proclamation of October 29, 1914, withdrew the list of September 21, 1914, and made the whole of the previous articles mentioned in former proclamations absolute contraband.

At the same time the Declaration of London order-in-council No. 2, 1914, annulled and replaced the earlier order-in-council of August 20, 1914.

The proclamation of December 23, 1914, again withdrew the list, and fresh lists of absolute contraband were published.

The order-in-council of March 11, 1915 (owing to public pressure after murder and piracy on the high seas), added a large number of articles to the list of absolute contraband. With regard to this order, the prime minister stated that "*commodities of every kind* were to be prevented from leaving or entering Germany." This intimation was received with acclamation throughout the country. The neutrals regarded this order as a reprisal not coming under international law.

The prime minister stated one thing, the order-in-council stated another.

The proclamation of May 27, 1915, added some articles to the list of absolute contraband, and some articles to the list of conditional contraband. What becomes of the prime minister's statement that "*commodities of every kind* were to be prevented from leaving or entering Germany"?

On August 21, 1915, raw cotton was added to the list of absolute contraband, although all commodities were to be prevented from entering Germany after the order-in-council of March 11, 1915. Thousands of bales of cotton, which are necessary in the manufacture of high explosives, entered Germany between March 11, 1915, and August 21, 1915. No wonder the end of the war is not yet in sight.

War is won by fighting; not by confusing proclamations and orders-in-council or the appointment of countless committees. Unshackle the navy, and the result will be apparent in a few weeks.



JELlicoe's DASH TO JUTLAND.

This remarkable photograph shows Admiral Jellicoe's battleships steaming through the North Sea to engage in the battle of Jutland May 31, 1916. They came up through the mist without the Germans being aware of their arrival.

Imperial War Museum



RAMMING THE SPITFIRE. In the night fighting after the battle of Jutland there was great uncertainty as to the character of the German ships encountered. This sketch, based on the reports of British officers, depicts the ramming encounter between the British destroyer Spitfire, of the 11th destroyer flotilla, and the German Dreadnought Nassau. The latter was mistaken by the British for a German cruiser—hence the three funnels in the sketch. Both vessels survived.


From "The Fighting of Jutland" by J. Macmillan & Co., Ltd.




Cribb, Southsea
Sir Charles Madden,
chief of the staff to
Admiral Jellicoe
1914-16



Central News
Hon Horace Hood
3rd battle cruiser
squadron, went down
in his flagship



Russell
Sir William Paken-
ham commanded the
2nd battle cruiser
squadron at Jutland



Cribb, Southsea
H.M.S. Minotaur, British cruiser which formed part of the
2nd cruiser squadron at Jutland. Built 1906. It was the
name ship of a class of three cruisers



Russell
Admiral Sir H. Evans-
Thomas commanded
the 5th battle
squadron



Sutton
Hon E.B.S. Bingham
gained the V.C. for
gallantry against
enemy destroyers




Sir Robert Arbuth-
not, 1st cruiser
squadron, went down
in his flagship
Defence


JUTLAND COMMANDERS AND A JUTLAND CRUISER



The Invincible British battle cruiser, was sunk by gunfire at Jutland. Previously she took part in the battle in the Heligoland Bight.



The Black Prince, British armoured cruiser, was also sunk by gun-fire. Launched in 1904, she carried six 9.2 in. guns, and displaced 13,550 tons.



The destroyer Shark was sunk by gun-fire.

THREE BRITISH SHIPS SUNK AT JUTLAND

LORD BERESFORD'S LETTER

It is reported that new orders have been issued to the fleet this month (January, 1916) to the effect that German-Americans bearing American passports are not to be interfered with. The effect of this order, if true, will be to allow reservists once more to proceed to Germany.

The action of the navy appears to be controlled by three different departments—the foreign office, the board of trade, and the Admiralty. Executive orders are given to the fleet contrary to directions conveyed in orders-in-council. When is this foolery going to stop and the navy be allowed to put a paralysing grip on Germany?

If the government wish to end the war, firm measures must be taken. Orders should be given to the fleet immediately to exercise to the full its legal and legitimate use of sea-power, the only measure for bringing the war to an end, and the best assistance we can offer to our Allies. Why should not the four navies of the Allies have a broad strategic plan of blockade and put it into action at once?

Lord Beresford did not speak for himself alone. Behind him an important current of public opinion made itself felt against the shackling of the blockading squadron by the foreign office. At a meeting of City men in London on February 14, 1916, Lord Devonport was strongly supported when he, too, stated that the blockade was not being conducted in a satisfactory manner, and that the foreign office system of allowing contraband to enter Holland and Scandinavia, under guarantees from distributing agencies, were resulting in an immense amount of smuggling. In the House of Lords a few days later Lord Sydenham also pleaded for a closer blockade, and discontent was also expressed in the House of Commons.

When the ministry of blockade was formed Lord Robert Cecil, with Rear Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, who had been in command of the blockading squadron, as his naval adviser, took stronger measures. Beginning in February, first with Egypt, then with Greece, Holland, Scandinavia, Portugal and Spain, the leading agents of the Germanic empires were entered on black lists, and all consignments to these persons or firms were liable to capture. In March, enemies and neutral agents of enemies in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Central America, East Indies and the Philippines were black-listed. And finally persons and corporations in the United States engaged in contraband commerce with the Germanic empires were entered on the list, which practically covered all the important productive

BLOCKADING THE CENTRAL POWERS

centres of the world. Violent protests arose from the German organizations in the United States, but "unhyphenated" American opinion did not appear to be deeply perturbed.

The poor harvest in Germany in the autumn of 1915 began to affect the new supplies from the harvest of 1916. There was just enough general discomfort to aggravate the gloom of the national mind when military affairs on both frontiers were unsatisfactory. The loss of the ordinary imports of Russian fodder, cheap Russian eggs and grain was a more direct blow than the blockading operations inflicted. By partly keeping from the enemy, in the summer of 1915, the wheat and meat of Argentina and the United States, and raising throughout the civilized world the price of all foodstuffs, Britain helped her eastern allies in making things somewhat uncomfortable for the munition makers and transport workers of Germany.

The new minister for blockade and his new naval adviser continued to work with energy over the problems of their work. An order-in-council, issued on March 30, 1916, removed some of the diplomatic fetters from the fleet. Both conditional and absolute contraband were made liable to capture if found on a neutral vessel bound for a neutral port but destined for the enemy. Goods consigned to a person known to have forwarded goods to the enemy were also made liable to condemnation. No vessel or her cargo was to be immune from capture for breach of blockade simply on the ground that she was at the time on the way to a non-blockade port.

This made a great rent in the Declaration of London, and at last, after nearly two years of crippling timidity, the codes of rules which never had any legal force and which were injurious to the interests of the country were completely abolished. In July, 1916, the Declaration of London was abandoned by an order-in-council reviving full maritime rights. The confiscation of contraband cargoes and of neutral ships carrying contraband was to take place if more than half the cargo were contraband. Any neutral ship carrying goods indirectly to the enemy and running the blockade was made liable to capture and condemnation on her next voyage. The principle of ultimate destination was made applicable to cases of contraband and blockade. Hostile destination of contraband articles was to be presumed to exist, unless the contrary were shown, in all doubtful cases.

CHAPTER 12

Opening of the Somme Battles

At the end of 1915 Sir Douglas Haig took over the command of the British forces from Sir John French, and one of his first activities was to explore the possibilities and decide upon the scene of a large British offensive in the spring of 1916. In this he was encouraged by the decision of the British war committee, which made a definite ruling that France and Flanders were to remain the main theatre of operations, and that in the spring an offensive should be carried out in close cooperation with the French and in the greatest possible strength.

Under these conditions the alternatives which presented themselves to the British commander were (1) an attack in the spring north of the Somme by 15 divisions on a front of about 24,000 yards, and (2) a larger operation, combining with the French astride of the Somme and employing about 25 divisions. By February his idea had crystallized to the extent of ordering Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of the 4th army, to consult with General Allenby as to ways and means.

The great bend of the Upper Somme and its tributary the Ancre intersects a rolling tableland dotted with small towns and furrowed by many shallow streams. The Somme is unfordable, and has many windings. Nowhere does the land rise higher than 500 feet, and until the higher ground is reached the poplars flanking the great Roman highroads are the chief landmarks. The valley of the Ancre is somewhat similar, but on a smaller scale.

On the north the plain has large undulations, rising beyond the Frise valley to a ridge more than 300 feet above the Somme flats, and marked by Guillemont-Longueval-Bazentin le Petit-Pozières-Thiepval. At Thiepval it reaches the Ancre, to be continued on the other side by the line of high ground marked by Beaucourt-Hébuterne-Gommecourt-Fonquevillers. To the north of this ridge the ground falls, to rise again to another swell of ground running south-east and north-west through Bapaume.

Up to the summer of 1916 there had been little activity on the Picardy front. The fighting had consisted mostly of local raids

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

and local bombardments, but the trenches on both sides were good, and a partial advance offered few attractions to either. Amiens was miles behind one front, vital points like St. Quentin, Cambrai and La Fère were far behind the other. In July, 1915, the British had taken over most of the line from Arras to the Somme, and on the whole they had a quiet winter in their new trenches. The Germans transformed the chalk hills on which they lay into a fortress which they believed to be impregnable.

From Arras southward the Germans held in the main the higher ground. Their front consisted of a strong first position, with firing, support and reserve trenches, and a labyrinth of deep dug-outs; a less strong intermediate line covering the field batteries, and a second position some distance behind, which was of much the same strength as the first. Behind these positions lay fortified woods and villages which could be readily linked up with trench lines to form third and fourth positions. The German defences were well served by the great network of railways radiating from La Fère and Laon, Cambrai and St. Quentin, and many new light lines had been constructed. They had ample artillery, with a plentiful supply of ammunition, and numberless machine guns, as well as the necessary skill to use them.

Early in March General Rawlinson held a conference of the corps commanders of the 4th army, and directed them to prepare their plans and carry on with the necessary preparations so that there might be no loss of time. Early in April a plan was forwarded to G.H.Q. in which General Rawlinson stated that with the comparatively small resources which, he was informed, he would have at his disposal, he could not deal effectively with an objective having a width greater than 20,000 yards and a depth of from 2,000 to 5,000 yards. He discussed the question as to whether an attempt should be made to rush the whole of the German defences in one assault, as at Loos, or whether the advance should be carried out by stages. Secondly, should there be a short, intense bombardment or a longer, methodical one of 48 to 72 hours? General Rawlinson recommended a long bombardment, which must aim at destroying both the wire obstacles and the machine guns which guarded the approaches to the German trenches. If the artillery did their work well, he concluded, the rest would be easy.

After further conferences had been held it was agreed between Général Joffre and Sir Douglas Haig that the combined British

THE BRITISH PREPARATIONS

offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June. The preparations were necessarily very elaborate, and took considerable time. Sir Douglas Haig gave the following details in his dispatch, when he wrote:

Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to be accumulated beforehand within a convenient distance of our front. To deal with these, many miles of new railways—both standard and narrow gauge—and trench tramways were laid. All available roads were improved, many others were made, and long causeways were built over marshy valleys. Many additional dug-outs had to be provided as shelter for the troops, for use as dressing stations for the wounded, and as magazines for storing ammunition, food, water and engineering material. Scores of miles of deep communication trenches had to be dug, as well as trenches for telephone wires, assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun emplacements and observation posts. Important mining operations were undertaken, and charges were laid at various points beneath the enemy's lines. Except in the river valleys the existing supplies of water were hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the numbers of men and horses to be concentrated in this area as the preparations for our offensive proceeded. To meet this difficulty many wells and borings were sunk, and over 100 pumping plants were installed. More than 120 miles of water mains were laid, and everything was got ready to ensure an adequate water supply as our troops advanced.

The bombardment of the German line began on June 24 and was accompanied by heavy discharges of gas, with deadly effect, and by the destruction of most of the German captive balloons, achieved by the air forces. On June 25 the trial registering of the new British siege guns was undertaken with such increasing intensity that the fire resembled the grand bombardment. In the night the extraordinary heavy gun fire continued and assisted a series of ten raiding parties, who broke into the German fire trenches and took some prisoners.

When day broke the bombardment was resumed along the whole front and the German batteries became curiously silent. The new Royal Garrison Artillery were still only practising and getting an exact knowledge of their weapons and of the science of cooperating with their aerial observers. Heavy explosions of ammunition dumps in the enemy's rear and concentration on his gun pits, resting places and lines of communication made this practice fire resemble the real thing. By night all the sky was lighted with the unceasing flash of the guns, and at Amiens and

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

other westerly French towns people began to climb to their roofs in the darkness and watch with grim joy the radiance on the horizon. Nearly a quarter of a million of shells a day were being spent in this enormous registering fire.

Sir Douglas Haig used his parks of new artillery in much the same way as a fencer employs his rapier. Possessing, in his huge fleets of motor-lorries and his network of light and ordinary railways, a rapid means of supplying every sector, the British commander continually shifted the direction of the main head of shell that was pouring from the British war factories. On June 27 he selected the region between the Ancre and the Somme as his chief demonstrating point, and with his great rail-mounted guns steaming into action he pounded the enemy's lines between Gommecourt and Mametz, and then launched a series of raids at this point. At the same time a strong demonstration was made against the important German position at Angres, well to the north of Arras, where the Highland Light Infantry inflicted heavy loss on the Germans and took a considerable number of prisoners.

Gas attacks were used all along the front further to annoy and distract the enemy, and induce him to prepare in the wrong place for the coming offensive movement. On June 28 the registering fire ceased, and the veritable bombardment opened. Rumours ran, in both France and Great Britain, that the attack would be made on this day, and that Albert was the principal centre of operations. The enemy seems to have been misled to a considerable extent by the changing point of intensity of the British fire and by the rumours that his secret agents collected. He expected the attack to occur between Arras and Albert, and his principal artillery and best and most numerous troops were rapidly collected on this line. But with stern and effective reticence the army commanders under Prince Rupert of Bavaria refrained from replying to the extraordinary hostile fire. For one of the chief aims of the British gunners, from June 28 to July 1, was to discover the enemy batteries, which had been reorganized and strengthened in view of the coming attack.

In a great artillery duel these batteries could have been destroyed or weakened by counter-firing, and the task of the British infantry would then have been much facilitated. The Germans had always begun their great offensives by provoking an artillery duel. But when their strategy was to stand upon the

RAIDS AND GAS ATTACKS

defensive they showed wisdom in keeping their guns silent and hidden, and letting their infantry in the trenches endure to the uttermost.

The British guns thus appeared entirely to dominate the battlefield, and when they were joined by the artillery of all the French armies from the Somme to the Aisne, the scene by day and night was one of infernal splendour and fury. Amid the deafening tumult and acrid smoke the work of the infantry was almost as heavy as that of the gunners. In the toil of feeding the guns the crews were not sufficient, and the infantry had to help to transport the shells from the lorries and trucks.

Towards the end of June the raids and gas attacks augmented in number and violence. At Neuve Chapelle, on June 30, the German position was penetrated deeply to the second line, making it appear that a genuine offensive was contemplated at this point. The Vimy ridge, south of Loos, which had been the scene of an early demonstration by some fine Lancashire troops, was the principal point of concern of the enemy commander, and it was from this ridge to the height of Gommecourt that he arrayed his main forces with new guns and the support of the Prussian Guard. But when the hundreds of British guns were suddenly augmented by hundreds of quick-firing mortars, at dawn on July 1, 1916, the Germans found they had been outplayed. Only a small section of the front was assailed where they were thoroughly prepared. This small sector ran from Gommecourt to Thiepval, and here the Prussian Guard, with hundreds of concealed guns, was ready for any event. But south of Thiepval, in the sectors of La Boisselle, Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban and a dozen more villages to the south, which were attacked by the British and the French, the enemy was taken at a disadvantage.

Early on the morning of July 1 every gun along a front of 25 miles was firing. The roar of gun fire was incessant, and eight minutes before zero the Stokes mortars joined in with a hurricane bombardment of 30 rounds a minute. At 7.30 a.m. wave after wave of British infantry rose and, with bayonets glistening, moved forward into a blanket of smoke and mist as the barrage lifted from the enemy's front trench.

The attack was conducted by the 4th British army, numbering some 144,000 infantrymen, arranged in six army corps. Near Gommecourt was the 7th army corps, under Lieutenant General

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

Sir T. D'Oyly Snow; then came the 8th army corps, under Lieutenant General Sir A. Hunter-Weston; the 10th army corps, under Lieutenant General Sir T. Morland; the 3rd army corps, under Lieutenant General Sir W. P. Pulteney; the 15th army corps, under Lieutenant General H. S. Horne, and the 13th army corps, under Lieutenant General W. N. Congreve, V.C. The leader of the immortal division at Ypres in 1914, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, promoted chief of the 4th army, was in command; Sir Douglas Haig, as commander-in-chief, exercised general control, with Lieutenant General Sir L. E. Kiggell as his chief of general staff. The opposing commanders were General von Marschall, on the Gommecourt-Serre front, and General von Below, with General Sixt von Armin as one of his army corps commanders, on the Somme front.

When the British guns lifted, all the attacking forces from Gommecourt to Thiepval rushed into an inferno. The opposing fronts faced each other on gentle slopes, with the narrow bottom of the Ancre brook making a level in the southern part. The Germans held a series of high points of great natural strength, interlocking with each other and commanding each other. The northern heights of Gommecourt was the westernmost German salient in France, and it had therefore been fortified with extreme industry and skill and garrisoned by the Prussian Guard. The German artillery was densely massed in the rear of the seamed and ravined plateau.

The enemy knew the great movement was coming. Before the quick-firing mortars ceased to pound the enemy's fire-trench, and before the field artillery finished shooting down the wire entanglements and the heavy guns lifted on the hostile rear, German gunners were back in their bomb-proof shelters and traversing the ground between the fronts with their terrible cross-fires of machine gun bullets. All along the British line dense smoke screens were projected over the enemy's trenches to blind his gunners and his observation officers. But this device did not have full effect, as the hostile machine guns and artillery had all their ranges carefully marked, and maintained a regular mechanical sweep of fire over No Man's Land and the British trenches. It was as though a gigantic single machine gun was levelled at the British lines, worked by some mighty engine.

The front line of the 13th corps, which was on the right of the British line next to the French, extended from Maricourt to

THE BRITISH 13TH CORPS

beyond Carnoy. The corps included the 30th division (Major General J. S. M. Shea), the 18th division (Major General F. I. Maxse), and the 9th division (Major General W. T. Furse). The 89th brigade of the 30th division, consisting of the King's and Bedfordshires, made a successful attack on Dublin trench, its first objective, and many Germans were taken prisoners. The new position was then consolidated and new trenches dug. The 21st brigade was also successful in crossing the German front line and taking many prisoners, but some of the British regiments lost heavily, notably the King's and the Green Howards. The objective of the 18th division was Pommiers redoubt, and after two mines had been fired with success under the enemy's parapet the 55th, 53rd and 54th brigades advanced in line. The Germans put up a stout resistance, and there was much hard fighting, but Pommier trench was captured and at once consolidated.

The 30th division, having achieved its first objective, now proceeded to advance on Montauban and La Briqueterie, the 90th brigade leading the way. The brigade composed of Manchesters and a battalion of Royal Scots Fusiliers soon suffered severely from a German machine gun, but went on and reached Train Alley before the barrage was timed to lift. After a prolonged wait the troops advanced under a smoke barrage and occupied Montauban. The enemy then began a methodical bombardment of the village. After Montauban was taken the way to the capture of La Briqueterie, with the important German observation post in its chimney stack, was clear, and a company of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment occupied the position with a few casualties. It was due to the efficiency of artillery support as well as to careful rehearsing that the 30th division had achieved its objectives, but owing to failure on other parts of the British battle line Major General Shea was ordered to delay his further advance through Bernafay and Trônes Wood to Guillemont. The energies of troops were therefore devoted to consolidating the position. Meanwhile the 18th division had captured the remainder of Montauban Alley, thus attaining its second objective.

As a result of the successes of the 30th and 18th divisions, the 13th corps had driven the Germans from the entire sector of the Montauban ridge allotted to it as the objective in the first phase of battle. Night came with the corps in occupation of its conquests; but in spite of the comparatively easy advance the losses were over 6,000.

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

On the left of the 13th corps, the 15th, composed of the 7th division (Major General H. E. Watts), the 21st division (Major General D. G. M. Campbell), and the 17th division (Major General T. D. Pilcher), faced the head of the Fricourt salient, the corner stone of the German line between the Ancre and the Somme. Part of the 91st brigade of the 7th division led the attack on the head of the Mametz spur and the eastern half of Mametz village. In spite of the heavy casualties the troops reached a point near their objective, but were held up. Another bombardment of Mametz was ordered by Major General Watts, but it did not lessen the resistance of the enemy, and the British troops suffered further severe losses.

The 21st division began its attack with a West Yorkshire battalion of the 50th brigade reaching the German lines with little loss, but the Germans rallied and practically annihilated two companies. The 63rd and 64th brigades advanced on Fricourt Farm and Round Wood and suffered heavily, but went on to hold Lozenge Wood and Round Wood.

While the brigades on the inner flanks of the 7th and 21st divisions had been making fruitless efforts to reach Fricourt and the ground in the valley between this village and Mametz, the other four—the 91st, 20th, 63rd and 64th—were strengthening the line gained earlier in the day on the Mametz and Fricourt spurs. Taking advantage of the assault on Fricourt early in the afternoon, the four brigades made fresh efforts to go forward, and shortly after 4 p.m. the whole of the ruined village of Mametz was in British hands. The losses of the 15th corps were over 8,000 of all ranks.

The 3rd corps, consisting of the 34th division (Major General E. C. Ingouville-Williams), the 8th division (Major General H. Hudson) and the 19th division (Major General G. T. M. Bridges), was situated on the forward slopes of a ridge between Albert and La Boisselle. The 34th division, consisting of the 101st, 102nd and 103rd brigades, met with unexpected opposition from the start. It was found out afterwards that a German overhearing station had, at 2.45 a.m., picked up part of a British telephone message which pointed to an assault later that morning, and so the Germans were ready. The 102nd and 103rd brigades, particularly, were unfortunate in losing many of their battalion and company commanders. At 10 a.m. part of the right column of the 34th division had reached a position on the further side of the

OVILLERS AND LA BOISSELLE


Fricourt spur; the second column was lying out in No Man's Land, held up by machine gun fire; the third was in possession of a small sector of the German trenches round Schwaben Höhe, and the left column, except for a few individuals, had failed to reach the German front trench north of La Boisselle, and had withdrawn to its starting place. Sausage redoubt remained in German hands, but by evening two communication trenches were available across No Man's Land into the German trenches, held on either side of the redoubt, and the men in the front line were able to hold on to the two small footings they had gained.

The 8th division, which was composed of the 23rd, 25th and 70th brigades, had as its objective the assault of the Ovillers spur, but came under severe fire from the start of the advance, and sustained heavy casualties. The 23rd and 25th brigades met with little success. The attack of the 70th brigade was at first more successful, but they, too, met with strong opposition and were faced with heavy machine gun fire, having very few unwounded men left. The losses of the 8th and 34th divisions on July 1 were over 11,000; Ovillers and La Boisselle were both still in the hands of the enemy, and the 3rd corps had nothing as compensation for its heavy losses except a success on the right by two battalions of the Royal Scots next to the 15th corps and a holding by two battalions of the Tyneside Scottish at Schwaben Höhe.

The 10th corps consisted of the 32nd division (Major General W. H. Rycroft), the 36th division (Major General O. S. W. Nugent), and the 49th division (Major General E. M. Perceval). Its front line lay on the lower slopes of the western face of the Thiepval spur, with the Ancre behind it, then passed over the Thiepval Wood spur, along the front of the wood, and crossed in front of Hamel to the western bank of the Ancre, continuing across the Auchonvillers spur to the right flank of the 8th corps.

The 32nd division, which was composed of the 14th, 96th and 97th brigades, began with an attack by the 97th brigade on the Leipzig redoubt, the defenders of which were taken prisoners. The objective was an assault on the Thiepval spur, but the Germans put up a stout resistance and the British troops were shot down in hundreds. It was believed at corps headquarters that British troops had entered Thiepval, and this rumour resulted in the artillery leaving the village alone throughout the day.

The 36th division, which contained the 107th, 108th and 109th brigades, carried all before them at the start. The Germans on



THE GREAT BRITISH AND FRENCH ATTACK IN THE SOMME AREA

The map shows the region of the fighting and the ground gained by the Allies in successive stages from July 1, 1916, when the battle opened, to November 20 when it died down.

ULSTER TROOPS IN ACTION

the height brought their trench mortars into action as soon as the British guns lifted, showing that no vital damage had been done by the long and heavy bombardment. Then through the German barrage and the rake of machine gun fire the Inniskillings, with the Irish Fusiliers; Irish Rifles and other battalions of the Ulster division, English troops and the Newfoundland Regiment made a heroic attempt to achieve a great victory against all odds. The Inniskillings, advancing with great dash, went over the ridge south of Beaumont-Hamel and flanking the Ancre brook. On their right a battalion of Fusiliers heading the main Ulster force stormed into the hollow where the trickle of water of the Ancre flows down to join the Somme. The Inniskillings won the ridge and vanished into the smoking furnace of the valley.

What made the charge of the Ulstermen especially memorable were the circumstances in which it was undertaken. In the first place, the British bombardment in the Ancre section had not been completely effectual. Much of the barbed wire and other entanglements had been blown away, but awkward patches still remained, and even the parapet of the enemy fire trench had not been battered down, but only holed, and the holes formed a kind of battlement which the Germans used as machine gun emplacements. All this was only the beginning of the Ulstermen's difficulties. The massed German artillery was of great strength about the Ancre brook, where the Ulster division was formed up in a wood for attack. Long before the hour of assault, when the British guns were still maintaining the general bombardment, the German gunners opened an overwhelming shell fire upon the packed trenches in the woodland. Some of the leading battalions suffered heavily, yet, when these untried Irishmen emerged from the shattered wood and began to walk slowly over No Man's Land, they went as steadily as though they were on the training ground. The enemy's gun fire continued to rake them from the left, and the enemy's machine guns enfiladed them from a village on their right.

The front line of German trenches was stormed by the Fusiliers, and on the flanks their comrades thrust and bombed the Germans from a series of redoubts. A large number of prisoners was taken, and they refused to cross their own shell barrages, begging to be allowed to lie down and wait. But the Ulstermen shepherded them across the zone of death, and continued to work forward and upward, while the fire increased in raking

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

power from both sides of the Ancre hollow. The German second line was taken through a curtain of shrapnel and machine gun fire, and then, with the enemy's fire pursuing them in greater intensity as more enfilading redoubts were approached, the brown waves burst over the third and fourth German lines until only the fifth line remained to be conquered.

Officers in neighbouring corps and divisions fighting on the heights around the great salient made by the Ulstermen were amazed at the terrific drive of the division. But they pointed out that the last and fifth line could not be carried until the flanks of the victorious force were cleared. The Ulstermen had produced a long, narrow salient, like a knife-thrust, running through the enemy's lines on either side of the Ancre. It was necessary to widen the conquered position in order to get more elbow room, and to destroy various enfilading hostile posts before the final thrust could be delivered. In several places German machine gunners had retired during the charge of the Ulstermen into caverns running beyond the main underground chamber. The attacking troops had thrown bombs by the half dozen into the principal caverns and had seemed to clear them. But in many cases the Germans had sheltered in the outrunning chambers, and when the bombs had all exploded they cautiously crept up and peered through periscopes. Then, finding no British garrison at hand, they emerged and resumed the struggle. Thereupon the Irishmen were raked from the rear, and their thinning lines began to waste away at a deadly rate.

The order was given for the division to stay in the enemy's captured fourth line until both flanks were cleared and the "resurrected" Germans in the rear were cleared off. But it was the anniversary of the Boyne, and the original order to the division appears to have directed them to press onward as far as they could hold. Very probably the second order, countermanding the final attack, did not get through the enemy's shell curtains and streams of flanking machine gun fire. However this may be, the Ulstermen continued their incomparable charge. The German gunners swept them with shrapnel as they worked forward in rushes from the fourth line. Yet, by a miracle, small parties of brown figures could be seen through field glasses from the British lines struggling forward into the last German trench system. The fifth line was won, but the heroic remnants could not get up sufficient hand bombs to establish themselves strongly.

THE NEWFOUNDLANDERS

The Ulstermen at this time still held in their grasp the promise of a great and far-reaching victory. Though half the men were out of action, and the advanced fifth line driven in, they still held Thiepval Wood on the southern heights of the Ancre, while across the brook they maintained connexion with the forces fighting around the Serre plateau. Some 6,000 Ulstermen, closely wedged all round by the enemy, but thrust well into the hostile line, constituted the central pivot for both the attacking British wings. If their principal gains could have been maintained, the pressure on the German front would have been doubled, and the combined thrust towards Bapaume and Achiet could have been driven home with unusual speed. Reinforcements were, therefore, sent up to the hard-pressed Ulstermen, but the enemy machine-gunners and snipers who had arisen from their caves and dug-outs made things very difficult in the narrow angle of advance. The first strong supports seemed to reach their objective through the valley, and sent up signals of success. Then a second support of English battalions went forward, with much hard fighting and fearful losses. Later in the day the Newfoundland Regiment charged over the hill on the north-western slope with the aim of clearing the flank of the Ulstermen.

The Germans were increasing in strength and cutting off patrols and groups and bits of battalions between Serre and Beaumont-Hamel and the Ancre brook. When the Newfoundlanders appeared on the ridge, in air from which the smoke had cleared, they encountered a converging machine gun fire through which they could not pass. There was in particular a south-easterly slope firmly held by the Germans and packed with guns that raked every foot of land on the northern slope across which the Newfoundlanders marched. This slope had been reconnoitred the night before by British patrols and found to be weakly held. But it had been greatly strengthened by the German commander on Saturday morning. Clearly he knew what was coming. The enemy's fire was like a driving rain across a Scottish moor, but never a Newfoundlander wavered. Wounded men crawled for shelter into shell holes, while German bullets swept the top of the grass above them with the effect of a heavy wind. The regiment wasted away on an impossible task, and few returned at night to the lines. By a miracle some managed to reach the German line on the height, and there found that the hostile wire entanglement was practically intact.

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

Getting no assistance on their flanks, the Ulstermen in their advanced positions were subjected to a series of vicious attacks with hand grenades. Yet they not only withstood the Germans, but drove them back with heavy losses. But at nightfall they ran out of bombs, and after continuously and desperately struggling for 14 hours, and capturing a large number of prisoners, of whom only 500 got through the German shell curtain, the Ulstermen began to fall back to the two first German lines. There they made another great stand through Saturday night and all Sunday, until a relieving force, organized of men who had been fighting for 36 hours, carried ammunition and water to the gallant garrison. Vain as seemed the sacrifice of thousands of Irishmen, Englishmen and Newfoundlanders, it was on this pivot of the Ancre that the southern British wing won forward to victory.

The 49th division, which was composed of the 146th, 147th and 148th brigades, was in corps reserve. It was ordered to move to Thiepval Wood in readiness to support either the 32nd or the 36th division, as required. The 146th brigade suffered heavy losses in advancing, but little was achieved, and, as the "Official History" observes, "The piecemeal employment of the 49th division by 10th corps headquarters had accomplished nothing."

The withdrawal of the 36th division from Schwaben redoubt decided the corps commander to put an end to any further efforts to capture Thiepval village, and the remainder of the night was spent in reorganizing the scattered units, while the men of the 96th and 97th brigades still lying out in No Man's Land were able to get back to the British lines under cover of darkness. The total casualties of the 10th corps on July 1 had been over 9,000, more than half of them in the Ulster division.

The 8th corps was composed of the 29th division (Major General H. de B. de Lisle), the 4th division (Major General the Hon. W. Lambton), the 31st division (Major General R. Wanless O'Gowan), and the 48th division (Major General R. Fanshawe). The front of the corps facing Beaucourt-Serre had a succession of ridges and valleys before it, and the ends of Y ravine, Beaumont Hamel valley and Beaucourt valley penetrated into it. The Colincamps-Beaucourt spur where it crossed the front line was known as Redan ridge.

The plan of attack was that the 29th and 4th divisions should advance due eastwards into and across the Beaumont Hamel valley on to the Beaucourt spur, where lay the German

ENGLISH BATTALIONS

intermediate line. Ten minutes before zero on July 1 a mine of 40,000 lb. of ammonal was exploded under Hawthorn redoubt, the barrage lifted, and the Stokes mortars opened a hurricane fire on the German front trench. The Germans were ready for the assault, and directly the British infantry advanced they were met with very heavy fire. The 87th brigade suffered heavily during the advance, and was compelled to halt well in front of the German position, which was not entered anywhere. The assault of the 86th brigade, which was to carry the village of Beaumont Hamel, fared no better, fire being opened as soon as the men left the trenches five minutes before zero, and the attack failed not many yards from the sunken lane, half-way across No Man's Land. The 88th brigade was ordered to move up its two leading battalions behind the 87th brigade.

The 4th division also sustained severe casualties in this assault. The leading battalions of the 11th brigade came under the fire of four machine guns, which did much damage. Small parties of troops entered the Quadrilateral redoubt and gained a support trench, where they were reinforced by other regiments. The 10th and 12th brigades, which were in reserve, came up to reinforce the advanced units of the 11th brigade. Men of the Essex, King's Own and Royal Warwickshire regiments crossed the German position, entered Munich trench, and passed beyond it.

For the attack of the 31st division towards Serre, Major General Wanless O'Gowan detailed the 93rd and 94th brigades, retaining the 92nd brigade in reserve. As elsewhere on the corps' front, when they began their advance on July 1 they were met by heavy machine gun fire, and only a few isolated parties were able to reach the German front trench, where they were either killed or taken prisoners. A few of the troops eventually entered Serre. Efforts to reinforce the party which had entered Serre were of no avail, and orders were then given to suspend the attack.

Lieutenant General Hunter-Weston, the corps commander, then ordered that all efforts must be directed to gaining and consolidating the German intermediate position, Munich trench. To support the centre and left of the 4th division, reported to be in that locality, he directed that two battalions of the 88th brigade and the right of the 4th division should carry out a combined converging attack through Beaumont Hamel village and across the head of the valley.

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

On the front of the 29th division the garrison in the Hawthorn redoubt crater was driven out before noon on July 1, and an effort made shortly afterwards by Lancashire Fusiliers to advance broke down under machine gun fire. On the front of the 4th division the troops holding Munich trench were forced to retire, and by noon the remnants of the advanced troops, short of bombs and ammunition, were falling back to the Quadrilateral redoubt. The 4th division was considerably disorganized, and in these circumstances attacks by the 88th and 10th brigades failed to materialize. The heavy losses sustained by the 93rd and 94th brigades made it impossible for them to undertake any further offensive operations that day.

Thus at the end of the day the 8th corps had nothing to show for its very heavy losses except a footing in and near the Quadrilateral, and this had to be abandoned on the following morning. The clearing of the battlefield of the 8th corps, apart from the great number of casualties (over 14,000—greater than in any other corps), presented many difficulties, and not until the evening of July 3 could it be said that most of the wounded had been moved: another 12 hours elapsed before No Man's Land could be reported cleared.

Part of Sir Douglas Haig's plan was to lengthen the front of attack by a subsidiary offensive against Gommecourt. This operation was allotted to the 7th corps, which was composed of the 56th division (Major General C. P. H. Hull), the 46th division (Major General the Hon. E. J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley) and the 37th division (Major General Lord Edward Gleichen).

North of Gommecourt was the 46th (North Midland) division (T.F.), composed of the 137th, 138th and 139th brigades. They had the most difficult task of all. They were on the extreme northern edge of the attacking line, and had to open the battle by making a thrust along the northern side of the high-wooded enemy salient at Gommecourt. The height itself was not assailed, as it was impregnable to a frontal attack, but an attempt was made to envelop it by Midland troops on the north side and London troops on the south side. The Germans were well prepared on this sector, being in very strong force with many new guns, and with their positions not seriously injured by the great British bombardment.

Thus when the troops came out on July 1, they were swept by machine gun fire on their flank from the peak of Gommecourt,

LONDON REGIMENTS

raked in front by streams of bullets, and further crushed by a shell curtain between the wire entanglements. So numerous were the German guns that they were able to maintain another barrage over the British trenches. The Midlanders were brought down in such numbers that only a remnant reached the German line, and the reserves, with the shell curtains falling behind them and before them, were unable to strike home with any effect. The courage of the troops was superb, but the enemy's machinery of slaughter was too powerful and precise to be overcome. The survivors, who had attempted to make a long thrust below the peak, were at last recalled after reaching the point they had been set to attain.

But, like all the apparently beaten British troops on the northern sector of attack, the Midlanders were accomplishing very effective work towards victory on July 1, though they did not know at the time that they were in any way successful. The enemy had a large number of new guns, a vast store of shell, and two divisions of the Guards corps as a local strategic reserve—all ready to strengthen any weak part of his line. This great mass of men and guns was partly misplaced, through being stretched above Arras; and at any cost it had to be prevented from moving quickly down to the Somme, where it was urgently and vitally needed. The North Midland division was the first British force to engage in the great northern holding action, which made the British and French northern successes permanent and less costly at the junction-point of the Franco-British forces.

The 56th division was composed of London regiments, and included the 167th, 168th and 169th brigades. The assault of this division on July 1 was carried out with the greatest dash, and the failure to capture the Gommecourt salient cannot in any way be attributed to the gallant regiments attacking it, for they did practically all that was asked of them. In charging, the men had to cover a very broad stretch of ground 400 yards deep in some places. Yet they almost completely escaped the front and flank machine gun fire. Their good fortune was probably due to the fact that the wind was in their favour. Blowing from the south-west, it rolled the black clouds of screen smoke in blinding, choking masses over all the hostile gun positions. As the wind was south-west, only hostile trenches lying on a northerly or north-easterly line were liable to be smothered in the black smoke discharged from cylinders by

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

the British troops. All trenches in the German angles running south of the attacking force were saved from the smoke-screen, and the German machine gunners in the southern positions had a clear field of fire.

The enemy tried to crush the charge at the outset by an enormous barrage of high-explosive shell. The great bursts of explosion opened the ground under the feet of the advancing men, destroyed some of them so that they could not be traced, and caught many others with flying fragments of steel. Half walking and half running, they reached the ruin of the German first-line trenches, which was a confused mass of tumbled earth, timber wreckage and strewn sand-bags. But many of the dug-outs, going 30 feet down, had remained intact. As the line had been strongly held these were full of Germans, who came out with bombs and machine guns to contest the position. The Londoners, however, remained masters of the situation. A number of them swirled into the strong underground system on the left, and with their hand bombs knocked out machine guns and machine gun crews. On the right another battalion, with equal quickness, stormed a formidable redoubt in a very nasty piece of ground. Then, secure at the wings, the centre went forward, part staying to clear the caverns while others bombed their way down by the shattered German communications. Some 400 prisoners were taken with remarkable ease and celerity.

For some hours the Londoners held on to the first zone of captured works containing three lines of trenches, and to various strongholds and redoubts in front of the second zone of defences. Meanwhile, the other British troops on either side of the London division had been beaten back, leaving the metropolitan troops in a salient of the enemy's lines. Thereupon the Germans, having held their ground successfully on the northern and southern sectors near Gommecourt, massed their guns on the Londoners. In addition to intensifying the curtain of high explosive and shrapnel over No Man's Land, so preventing supplies of reinforcements from arriving, the phalanxes of German artillery smashed the British trenches and communications.

Numerous as was the British artillery, which had apparently dominated all the field to a depth of 10 miles during the last week of June up to July 1, it could not cope with the unexpected number of hidden German guns. The command of the air won

THE RIVAL ARTILLERY

by British aviators was not of much immediate use, as an extraordinary quickness and precision in discovering the hostile gun positions and registering upon them would have been needed to wage a successful artillery duel. The trapped London battalions were assailed by numerous parties of bomb-throwers, who had abundant ammunition and maintained a furious combat until the small supply of bombs of the British was exhausted. Desperate efforts were made by the Territorial reserves to get new bomb supplies through the walls of shell fire. A party of 60 men set out; three came back. All the carrying parties failed, with terrible casualties, and many single men perished in vain attempts to get through with bombs. The British guns tried to maintain a similar impassable barrage over the German communications, but the German bomb-throwers not only got through the shell curtain, but crossed to the top of the trenches and flung their missiles down upon the Londoners.

Late in the afternoon of July ~~the~~ the battalion on the left of the salient was enfiladed by heavy machine gun fire, and the supply of bombs was practically exhausted. For some time the Londoners went about collecting German bombs, but this curious method of getting supplies was soon worked out. At last, surrounded by increasing numbers of hostile bomb-throwers, hammered by shell fire, swept by streams of bullets from machine guns, and with most of their leading men picked off by snipers, the Londoners left a number of heroic rearguards, and, carrying their wounded, retreated—a tragically diminished force—through the barrages to their own lines.

As the "Official History" points out, the operations of the 7th corps had left it in the position from which it had started, with only the satisfaction of knowing that it had kept some German infantry and artillery from the main battle. The success of the 56th division, the more remarkable on account of the failure of the divisions on either side, cost the lives of over 1,300 of some of the best infantry of the armies in France.

The German organization and resource as displayed in the northern sector were marvellous, but when it came to a sheer test of manhood on fairly equal terms the German veteran was not a match for the British recruit. The Briton's advantage rested largely in his athletic habit of body and his sportsman-like spirit. A friendly French military critic, indeed, said that the Briton entered the campaign on the Somme as a sporting

OPENING OF THE SOMME BATTLES

athlete, and emerged from it a cautious professional soldier. In this connexion it must be borne in mind that pure pluck and gameness were the only available qualities of race that could have carried the new levies through their fearful ordeal. The punishment they received, to use the word in a sporting sense, was indescribable. But the men who survived went steadily on. Among them were the Middlesex, the Devons, the Lancashires, South Wales Borderers, the Dublins, Inniskillings and the Border Regiment. The Royal Irish Fusiliers, York and Lancasters, Seaforth Highlanders, Hampshires, Somersets and Essex also nobly distinguished themselves.

In the fierce confusion of hand-to-hand fighting, amid the maze of German trenches, redoubts, tunnels and entanglements on the Serre plateau, regiment after regiment drove into their first objective, and then vehemently tried to penetrate the enemy's second zone of defences. Sometimes the advance over the great down was undertaken with more spirit than science. The signalling between the foremost infantry and the protecting heavy artillery miles in the rear does not appear generally to have been conducted with the precision of the French operations.

Like the French, the British used Bengal fires and rockets to indicate their successes. But this method could not convey to the observation officers any detailed information about affairs in the distance; and the military critic of the leading newspaper of France, "Le Temps," remarked that some of the staff work in the northern sector was wanting in efficiency, with the result that the efforts of various successful battalions were not rapidly co-ordinated and strongly supported. It is true that many of the members of the brigade and divisional staffs were, like the troops they handled, going through their apprenticeship and winning experience as they went along, and the difficulties they had to contend against were greater than those on the French sector. The two gigantic shell curtains, which the massed German guns maintained by means of new shrapnel and high explosive, were calculated to upset all staff work, even the most experienced. Telephone lines lasted scarcely a minute, and the men who tried to lay new ones fell before they could do so. Messengers and liaison officers perished when attempting to get through the barrages, and in the dull atmosphere of the afternoon both heliographic work and ordinary aerial observation were impeded.

THE RESULTS EXAMINED

At the end of the first phase of this struggle the British gains were limited to small breaches cut out of the German front line and united to the British fire trenches. The men would have done better had they not gone so far. The advance had been too quick and hasty. All that was actually accomplished after the rushes into Serre and Thiepval, and the partial envelopment of Beaumont-Hamel, was a great and costly holding action on a winding front of more than 10 miles. It facilitated the main advance towards Bapaume, and in this measure served a purpose. But clearly the movement was not designed merely to hold the enemy, it was intended to break the first zone of German defences across the Ancre brook, and speed, by a northerly turning movement, the Franco-British advance on Bapaume, Combles and Péronne.

This indecisive result of the attacks interfered with Haig's and Foch's plan of the offensive. It left the British army on the La Boisselle and Montbauban line with scarcely any elbow-room in which to work forward. The enemy retained a tremendous flanking fire over the small new British salient, together with rampart after rampart of high downs overlooking the comparatively low ridges around Albert from which British observation officers directed their guns. Months had to pass before some of the high ground round Thiepval was won, giving room and observation to the British forces.

Thus the battle of July 1, 1916, ranks with the battle of the Lille ridges on May 9, 1915, as failing to achieve its main objective. At Rouges Bancs and Aubers Sir John French had lacked heavy guns and high-explosive shell. This great deficiency in the machinery of war had been made good when the battle of July 1 opened, but the issue of the battle was practically identical. Something more was needed than thousands of guns and millions of shells. This something the new British armies laboriously and terribly acquired, sifting out new leaders of talent and staff officers of ability and general experience as it crawled forward from trench to trench and from shell hole to shell hole.

CHAPTER 13

French Fighting on the Somme

EARLY in 1916 a Silesian regiment made a surprise attack on the southernmost point of the British front at Carnoy and on the linking French position across the Somme at Frise. The British troops repulsed the enemy from Carnoy, but the French troops which had held Frise lost the trenches and made no effort to recover them. The French communiqué pointed out that this village in the marshes was a point not worth holding by either side, and that they willingly surrendered it to the enemy. It was generally thought at the time that this statement was merely a palliation of weakness on the part of General Foch. But later events proved that the report he had sent to French headquarters was matter-of-fact truth. Frise, lying in a mass of reeds, looped by the lagoons and branching waters of the Somme and dominated on either side by the cliffs of the high chalk plateau, was a death-trap to the army that held it. The French were glad to let the Germans occupy it.

The German thrust at Frise, however, incited Sir Douglas Haig and General Foch to consider together the natural difficulties of the geographical and tactical situation on the Somme. The junction point of two large armies, speaking a different language, drawing their supplies from different bases, and working on different methods of attack and defence, was undoubtedly a point of great weakness. The large valley of the Somme, with its marshes, streams, and canal, had seemed to be a natural division between the Allied hosts. Sir Douglas Haig and General Foch, however, found that the valley accentuated the inconveniences of their point of junction. It allowed the enemy too many opportunities of massing and striking against one ally, before a combined artillery and infantry counter-attack could be improvised. To overcome this weakness the delicate junction point of the two armies was shifted northward, the French army took over both banks of the Somme, and afterwards relinquished its front in Artois, enabling Sir Douglas Haig to organize one long British line from Ypres to the south of Albert.

PREPARATIONS BEGIN

General Foch, however, still remained somewhat at a disadvantage in possessing merely some three miles of lines north of the Somme, from Maricourt to Eclusier. Owing to the small area of the ground, he could deploy only a small French force north of the river, and this force was at a disadvantage in being cut off from its main army by two and a half miles of swamp and water, and in having a foreign army on its left, with an alien staff, with strange weapons, ammunition of uninterchangeable character, and entirely different methods of fighting. For example, British troops when on the defensive relied greatly upon their Lee-Enfield magazine rifles, with which they could fire 15 rounds in 30 seconds, while French troops relied mainly upon their fast and flexible 3 in. quick-firing field gun, which enabled them to withdraw from their trenches and then recover them by a surprising and lightly purchased recoil.

Preparations for a French offensive on the Somme had begun in March, 1916. Veiled by the increasing activity of the airmen, hosts of troops gradually transformed the countryside. There had only been one railway line feeding the front after the German guns had destroyed the fragment of main track running to Albert. But the French troops increased the 10 miles of railway running from Bray to Rosières to hundreds of miles of track. At the same time the British troops doubled the lines running to their bases and created numerous branch lines until more than 610 miles of new lines were constructed, with more than 100 new stations. Just before the battle the work was pushed on with extraordinary intensity. One railway station, with first-rate platforms for handling heavy shells, was built by French soldiers in five days.

The British army staff culled expert lumbermen from the Dominion forces and set them working in speed competitions with French axemen among the woods near the Somme to get timber for the great offensive movement. Huge quarries were blasted in the nearest hard rock to obtain macadam for new motor roads and stone for the new railway lines. Great new waterworks were constructed as for a city of millions of inhabitants. For every army corps needed 15,000 gallons of water a day. The French had thousands of motor-lorries, liberated from Verdun by the completion of the light-railway system. The British army also had an enormous fleet of motor-vehicles, and the Allies used their new and old roads for bringing up troops and material.

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

This relief was especially necessary towards June 26, 1916, when General Foch began to join in the extraordinary British bombardment of the German lines. Sir Douglas Haig opened his hurricane fire a week before his troops advanced, and instead of massing his guns and storing most of his shell on the Somme sector, he first concentrated his fire around Arras and around Lille. An extremely flexible and smoothly working system of shell transport and gun transport was needed in order to deceive and perplex the enemy by continually shifting the terrible stress of heavy gun fire. But both the British and the French had constructed, in their huge new railways of ordinary and narrow gauge and in their maze of new motor roads, the means of quickly changing their points of terrific gun fire. General Foch seems to have thrown his greatest weight of metal on the Chaulnes and Roye sectors, leaving the Somme front comparatively quiet.

On June 29 the German 6th army made a strong raid between Chaulnes and Roye in an endeavour to test the French strength there, but its attacking infantry was broken by gun fire before it reached the opposite trenches. The German commander was completely misled by the tremendous force of General Foch's artillery demonstration in the south, and removed regiments from the neighbourhood of Péronne towards Chaulnes. While the Germans were marching away from the real point of attack many of the great French guns had come back to the Somme and were being dug into emplacements.

General Foch did not regard the famous French 3 in. quick-firer as a piece of artillery. He called it a machine gun, and used it practically as such. His main weapon of attack was the heavy piece of very large calibre. In addition to the big howitzers employed in the Champagne offensive in the autumn of 1915, several still more powerful types of siege guns had been transformed into mobile artillery. Most of the great pieces mounted along the coasts of France had been taken out of the forts for use in the army. Before the war the French navy had 13.6 in. guns and numerous 11 in. and 12 in. guns, some employed in coast batteries and some stored in larger number for replacing the worn-out guns of the battle fleet. The huge pieces of French naval ordnance were adapted to the needs of land warfare, and built into a kind of land gunboat running on rails, capable of rapid transport, facile gun-laying, and progress behind every strong infantry advance. Some special new army howitzers of

NAVAL GUNS USED

16 in. calibre were mounted in the same manner. Some of the pieces had a range of 20 miles. The new French and British howitzers and cannon of very large calibre were turned into mobile pieces by the engineers. On June 28 parks of these monster guns moved suddenly into action along the Somme, and tremendously reinforced the large ordinary mass of fixed heavy howitzers which were pounding the German lines from their concealed gun-pits. When the railway artillery arrived and each piece went to the place marked out for it, the reason for the construction of hundreds of new railway stations became apparent to every infantryman. The infantry, that for four months had dug and built and carted, had a final intense spell of navy work imposed upon it. The troops had to help the gunners in transporting the lighter kind of shell from rail and motor trucks to the underground storing places in the hillside. They had to collect their own stores of hand grenades, aerial torpedoes, and other ammunition close to the front, for transport into the enemy's lines when these were captured; and when all the immense and varied work of portage was going on the face of the countryside had to be changed at once.

Every object of a destructible character which had served or had seemed to serve the Germans as a ranging mark for their guns was destroyed throughout the area in which the French 11th army was operating. Big tree trunks, ruined houses, and other noticeable small features were removed with unexpected suddenness, so that German forward observing officers and German aerial observers would find their firing maps almost useless in the morning. They could no longer tell their gunners to train a few points away from some small object that had marked the landscape since the beginning of trench warfare. New and emptier firing maps had to be made by the Germans, but they were given no time in which to make them.

When morning came and the kite-balloons ascended in the rear of the German lines for their usual work of gunnery control, squadrons of Allied airmen soared up and over the front. Then above these squadrons circled the flower of French Fokker fighters and the picked fighting pilots of the British Flying Corps. General Foch had collected the best airmen from Verdun and Champagne, and the struggle for the mastery of the air began.

The mastery of the air was won with surprising rapidity. The lower attacking squadrons swooped upon the German kite-

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

balloons through a tempest of shrapnel. Each pilot planed down in a steep curve and fired into the envelope of the German balloon a special missile, causing the gas to explode in a sheet of flame. All that the Germans could do, with the air dominated for 13,000 feet above them by layers of Allied machines, was to haul down their balloons in frenzied haste. In all, 15 German observing balloons were brought down by the new missile, which seems to have been the invention of a French naval officer, and first used at Verdun two months before. Although the Germans at times sent one of their remaining balloons up for a few minutes they hauled it down before an Allied pilot could approach; the German guns and the German staff were practically blinded. Their machines could not attempt to cross the Allied lines, singly or in fighting squadrons, without being assailed by a superior number of French and British machines of remarkable power, handled by men of consummate skill. The weather was bright and sunny, but the sky was dark from the enemy's point of view.

General Fayolle had an entire fleet of photographic machines operating all day over the enemy's lines. Each piece of destruction wrought by the French guns was photographed immediately afterwards, and in a short time the photograph was developed and fixed, and being closely studied by French staff officers. If the picture was not entirely satisfactory the observing machines again went up, followed by photographic machines. The gunners fired some ranging shots, and received messages from the observing machines, under whose direction they again poured an intense fire on the half-destroyed works, when more photographs were taken for the use of the staff.

There seems to have been little counter-battery firing from the German side. Especially in and around the ravined plateau of Santerre, looped by the Somme and overlooking Péronne, did the German artillery seem very weak. It was indeed reported that the Germans began withdrawing their heavy guns from Santerre, when the enormous increase of French fire showed the German commander he had been mistaken by General Foch's demonstration at Chaulnes and Roye. But he could not retire many guns, and he could not withdraw or reinforce his troops, for when the huge French parks of artillery were definitely set to their work their action was like that of a titanic and irresistible piece of mechanism. The longest ranged cannon kept up their fire on the distant German railheads; other batteries of naval

NEW AERIAL TORPEDOES

guns maintained an incessant tempest of high-explosive shell and shrapnel on the roads and railways. Then the communication trenches, often beginning six miles in the rear of the enemy's fire trench, were incessantly battered by high-explosive shell.

The German front line was destroyed by great aerial torpedoes, of a new model, launched from new mortars of an improved quick-firing kind. The destruction of the enemy's barbed wire was undertaken by the "75's." All this went on in daylight and darkness, with the effect that the German infantry, artillery, engineers, and army service corps, who occupied three zones of defensive lines, were cut off. Meanwhile, upon every trench, every system of works, and every sap, there rained the great shells from the French heavies and mortars. General Fayolle blasted a way for his troops with deadly precision and appalling mass. He was on the retired list when the war opened, but having obtained the command of a regiment when General Joffre reorganized the officering of the armies, he won distinction under General Foch during the underground battles in Artois, and then rose, like General Pétain, to an army command during the arduous autumn struggle in the German lines in Champagne. In fact, Fayolle and Pétain emerged from the slippery, muddy slopes of Champagne as the proved leaders in the next French offensive movement. General Foch welcomed his old comrade back to Picardy, and with him planned in the minutest detail all the new technique necessary in the slow, progressive advance which he contemplated.

In particular, his experiences in Champagne, where by a rapid thrust he had almost broken right through the German lines, convinced him that success mainly depended upon a closer, simultaneous cooperation of guns and infantry. The problem was to connect an advanced victorious wave of troops a mile or more in the enemy's lines with the motionless heavy batteries four, five, or six miles behind them, so that the distant monster guns should act continually with the infantry like a row of giant machine guns. Every ordinary means of signalling was developed by long practice. The infantry carried small white flags with which they marked each position they conquered, and in each position they also lighted Bengal fires and signalled with rockets. Likewise, they flag-signalled, they heliographed, they used telephones, rapidly laid behind them by observing artillery parties, and also portable wireless instruments.

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

During the month of preparation the personnel and the matériel of the French Flying Corps were greatly increased. Instead of relying on officer pilots, as did the British army with its class traditions, the French Flying Corps recruited its personnel largely from young non-commissioned officers of proved merit. The young men of the new school were encouraged in a frank, democratic way by official bulletins that gave the names and the list of victories of the best fighters, so that the sporting spirit of the French public was largely concentrated upon the achievements of men like Guynemer.

The supreme weapon of the new French offensive, on which General Fayolle depended to save his troops, was the formation of a large corps of infantry airmen. It was the special work of these men to scout in advance of each French attacking force, and watch from an altitude of 100 to 300 feet the progress the men made and the obstacles they encountered. It was expected that the loss in pilots and machines among the new infantry aviation squadrons would be very considerable, for they would have to move very low down in a much restricted area, expose themselves while watching their own troops and the enemy's machine gun positions, and be further occupied in wirelessness to their batteries and to their headquarters. They were also trained to bring their machine guns and Lewis guns into action by swooping on enemy forces. Happily, the Germans were entirely taken by surprise by this well-organized system of aerial direction in the attack.

The fire of the French and British guns increased in fury on June 29, which was the date that seems first to have been fixed for the assault. But no order was given to the troops, either because the bombardment was not thought to be sufficient, or more probably because the rumour as to the date of the movement had been deliberately allowed to reach the enemy and induce him to pack his reserve trenches. During the last two days of the bombardment these reserve trenches were subjected to an especially terrific fire, and several zones of shrapnel were maintained over all the enemy's routes of supply and reinforcement. According to a German statement, every place within 10 miles of the firing line was smitten with heavy shell and incendiary projectiles. Then in the morning of Saturday, July 1, 1916, the British and French infantry forces climbed out of their trenches and advanced into the German lines.

THE SOMME MARSHES

General Fayolle's army connected with the British army north of the Somme at the village of Maricourt. Here, General Balfourier, the army corps commander of the 20th corps, had his troops of the 29th division—the Iron Division—stretched down to the river at Vaux. Then by the canal locks in the river valley, at Eclusier, another famous French African force, the Colonial division, extended southward towards Fontaine-les-Cappy, where a fine Breton force was arrayed.

The crux of the position was the dividing line of the Somme valley, separating the Ironsides from the Colonials. The small split stream of the Somme ran through marshes from one to two miles broad, the marshes being cut by a canal as well as by the river. Above the wide, winding zone of the marshes rose on either side a rampart of chalk. The river cliffs were occupied by the Germans north-west and south. All the hamlets woods, and fields in the large southern angle of the Somme running to Péronne were dominated by the main German heavy batteries on the slopes of Mont St. Quentin, north of Péronne; and at Villers Carbonnel, four miles south of the town, there was another important mass of long-range German siege guns.

The consequence was that, although Péronne was only about six miles from the trenches of the Colonial division, there was no chance of storming the town by direct frontal attack. For the great, curving, marshy river valley turned sharply south by the old, grey, lovely walled city, and if the French troops had there crossed the stream, canal, and marsh they would have had to work through a large stretch of low ground westward, which was commanded by an amphitheatre of downs, on the farther slopes of which the Germans had placed guns by the hundred. In other words, the wedge of low-lying, seamed tableland extending from the southern French sector to the enemy's railhead at Péronne was a great natural trap. Troops who stormed into it from the west would be held up by the river and exposed to a cross-fire of artillery. This was no doubt the reason why General von Einem thought that the Allied bombardment on the southern side of the Somme was merely a demonstration to distract his attention.


General Foch, however, had worked out a brilliant and subtle method of turning the marsh-moated and hill-ringed wedge of chalk south of the Somme into the main leverage point of the Allied advance. About four miles north of the river was the

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

town of Combles, around which ran a branch railway which the enemy had enlarged and connected with a network of field railways. This railway, nicknamed the "Tortillard," or "Wriggler," by the Allied troops, twisted down ravines screened from direct fire. But General Foch calculated that if the wedge of the Santerre plateau, south of the river, could be won, tunnelled, and excavated, it would become a superb base for heavy howitzer fire against all the German positions northward around Combles. The fact that the southern wedge of chalk was 150 feet or more lower than the northern main German artillery positions did not militate against howitzer fire effects so long as the Allies held the mastery of the air and possessed a stronger force of monster mobile siege guns.

So the principal operation of General Fayolle's army consisted in making a rapid seizure of the low river promontory of Santerre, on a six-mile front from the village of Curlu on the northern bank to the hamlet of Fay in the south. It was known that the fighting would be hardest among the northern downs and ravines around Combles, and that when the enemy was thoroughly alarmed and able to concentrate men by the 100,000 against the Allies he would strike his hardest blows by the river, at the delicate junction point of the French and British armies. It was for this reason that the Iron Division was placed north of the river, alongside veteran British regiments commanded by Sir Henry Rawlinson. For practical purposes the men of the Iron Division and their comrades of the 20th army corps formed part of the British army. They worked slowly forward with the British troops in a slow, half-circling, and very wide sweep directed through Bapaume and Combles, towards the rear of Péronne. The task of capturing Péronne was given to the British army and the French corps connecting with it.

But this apparently very round-about and gradual operation pivoted upon General Fayolle's remarkable plan for conquering quickly and at little cost the low promontory of Santerre, south of the river. On Saturday morning the French Colonial and Breton troops advanced to the attack. Half an hour before the advance the Bretons asked permission to sing, and, chanting the Marseillaise, they went forward in platoons with their lines as straight and steady as they would have been at manœuvres in peace time. They captured the hamlet of Fay, and between Fay and Soyécourt they advanced to the



S. Cribb.
The Barnham, British battleship of the Queen Elizabeth class. At Jutland she was flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir H. Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th battle squadron.



Permission of Cammell, Laird & Co.
The light cruiser Chester, aboard which the boy hero John Travers Cornwell was mortally wounded at Jutland. For his heroism in remaining at his gun-post he was awarded the V.C. posthumously.



The battleship Agincourt commanded by Captain H. M. Doughty at the battle of Jutland was originally built for Brazil, transferred to Turkey in 1913, and was taken over by Britain immediately war broke out.

TYPES OF BRITAIN'S NAVAL MIGHT



Imperial War Museum

GERMAN COMMANDER AT JUTLAND. When the Great War broke out Reinhold von Scheer commanded the battle squadron at Kiel until appointed commander-in-chief of the High Sea Fleet at the end of 1915. He was highly praised in Germany, the view being that he was superior to the British commander in tactics and seamanship. He published his own account of the battle in 1920.



THE SEYDLITZ ON FIRE. The German battle cruiser Seydlitz, dimly visible among smoke and flames, was hit many times by the British in the historic sea fight at Jutland. Once a torpedo struck her, but, gravely damaged though she was, she yet survived the ordeal.

From Laurence & Hooper's "The Fighting at Jutland," Macmillan & Co., Ltd.



Imperial War Museum

OPENING OF THE SOMME ATTACK. The real innovation at the Somme battle was not the long preliminary bombardment but the creeping barrage. The infantry went forward behind an advancing wall of shells. This photograph of the assault on Mametz on July 1, 1916, was taken just after the barrage lifted.

COLONIAL TROOPS AT DOMPIERRE

outskirts of Estrées, where was a vast subterranean fortress the approaches of which were drenched with shells by a park of heavy German guns at Villers Carbonnel, four miles directly in front of Estrées. Months had to pass before Villers Carbonnel was even remotely threatened by the French troops. This was the main rallying-point for the German forces south of the Somme. Many of its guns were destroyed by the plunging shells from the monster French artillery; but the German managed to transport new howitzers at night across the river valley and maintain the strength of the position. The Bretons dug themselves in near Estrées and swung their northern wing forward towards Belloy and Assevillers. Behind them were some regiments of the Foreign Legion, which afterwards relieved them when they had gallantly won and held the most difficult and most critical position in the Allied line of advance.

Meanwhile, the Colonial division enjoyed itself in an amazing fashion. On this point of the front, between Frise and Dompierre, the Germans had not expected to be attacked, and were completely taken by surprise. This was the chief reason why the French Colonial division, forming the centre of Fayolle's army, had an astonishingly easy task in the morning of July 1.

Neglecting the village of Frise, in a marshy loop of the river on their right, the Colonial troops marched into the ruins of Dompierre and Becquincourt, which formed together a large mass of shattered buildings the size of a town. For nearly two years the Germans had burrowed deep and linked up their caverns with tunnels until the two connected villages were transformed into a subterranean Gibraltar. But the new French monster siege guns had smashed in many of the thick vaults, choked the entrances, broken the armour that had protected machine guns and artillery, and destroyed practically every wall above ground. After so extraordinarily devastating a bombardment as this there was no infantry battle, but merely a walk-over. The remnant of the garrison at Dompierre, consisting of 200 men and officers, was captured by the French Colonials at the cost of only one man killed on their side. The hamlet of Bussus, south of Dompierre, was also carried with little loss. The casualties of the entire Colonial division numbered only 640, after breaking through the entire system of the first German zone of defences and reaching the second zone between Herbécourt and Assevillers.

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

Yet the hostile organizations were extremely elaborate. At Dompierre, for instance, the attacking troops had to cross in the first place the German fire trench; in the second place the twin trenches, 100 yards behind, protected by fields of barbed wire; in the third place the Wolff trench, with another zone of wire entanglements 100 yards farther; and in the fourth place the village itself and the connected ruins of Becquincourt, with their underground maze of fortified works. One large cavern, west of Dompierre, was equipped with two great vats for the manufacture of poison gas. From the vats pipes ran into the fire trenches. But the heavy French shells had broken the gas system before a favourable wind could be used by the enemy.

At Estrées, farther south, the Breton reservists avoided a frontal attack, and rapidly working round the village on both sides enveloped it and stormed it from the rear. There were batteries in the Bois de Mereaucourt, north-east of Dompierre, batteries in the folds of ground behind the village, and a mighty collection of guns south-east of the village. And when the French gunners lifted on the German rear, indicating that their infantry was about to advance, hundreds of German guns put a great curtain of shrapnel over the French fire trenches and the neutral zone between the opposing hedges of barbed wire. At the same time the French communication trenches were also shelled with a view to stopping the arrival of supports, reinforcements and supplies.

But among other things, such as aerial infantry, General Fayolle had thought out during his experiences in Champagne a new method of deploying troops. Each assaulting regiment advanced in single files through the zone of hostile shell fire. The target they thus presented was reduced to less than three feet wide. Near the enemy's fire trench the thin stream of blue-clad figures changed formation, and went forward in slow, long waves of attack in very open order. If any machine gun that had escaped destruction then opened fire upon them, all the men fell down and sought for cover in the shell holes. Their officers would not allow them to charge, and often prevented them from trying to creep cautiously round an active centre of resistance. There was, indeed, some trouble at first, especially with some of the French Colonial troops, accustomed to swift, fierce, hand-to-hand bomb and bayonet conflicts in former offensive movements. But

FAYOLLE'S SLOW ADVANCE

the strangely loud drone of propellers at once confirmed the orders violently shouted by the French officers.

The novel aerial infantry of France was operating just in advance of each attacking wave, at a height varying from 300 to 100 feet. Some of the pilots came low and shot down, from the rear of the enemy machine gun positions, the German crews, and then signalled their own infantry to advance. Other pilots, who could not bring their guns to bear on some deadly knot of resisting Germans, dropped smoke bombs upon them, or wirelessly their position to the French artillery. Then above the heads of the sheltering attacking troops screamed a shower of well-aimed shells, which blasted away all opposition. The troops then arose and walked onward, preceded by their aerial scouts, machine gunners and bomb throwers.

It would have been easy for Fayolle to smash through the hostile organizations and win all the promontory in the angle of the Somme valley. This rushing conquest might have been completed in 24 hours. As it was, the Colonials and the Bretons only occupied the centre of the German first line on Saturday. Then on Sunday the Colonial division drove into Bois de Mereaucourt behind Frise, bombed two battalions of Germans out of their shelters, which had been dug to a depth of 60 feet, and a French infantry division, working along the river, then enveloped Frise and its reed-grown peninsula of marsh. At the same time the main fortresses in the German second zone of defence from the river bank to Assevillers were crumbled into a wilderness of broken chalk, powdered brick, and splintered wood by the incessant fire of the French heavy guns. By the evening of Sunday, July 2, the village of Assevillers was reached and the whole of Herbécourt taken, the captures including many heavy German siege guns.

The next morning the Foreign Legion was deployed between Estrées and Assevillers. The Foreign Legion had been badly shattered near Vimy ridge in the spring of 1915, and practically destroyed in a terrible yet victorious charge in Champagne the following autumn. But sufficient officers survived to transmit the great spirit of the Legion to the thousands of new foreign recruits. Reborn from its triumphant grave in Champagne, the Foreign Legion charged again on the German works by Estrées which the Bretons had been unable to conquer, captured 500 prisoners, and then swept onward, by their left, to Belloy, a

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

hamlet beyond the second German line. Belloy was stormed on July 4, with the ravine west of Assevillers. As Belloy was scarcely two miles west of the grand German artillery centre of Villers Carbonnel, the work of the Foreign Legion was carried out in circumstances of extreme difficulty. The German commander brought back the troops he had vainly sent to Chaulnes and Roye, and collecting reinforcements from the Aisne front poured them continually against the Estrées-Belloy sector.

The Foreign Legion, like its predecessors of the Breton division, was soon forced to stand on the defensive, and search for cover in ground that the French guns had already rendered untenable. The Legion thus succeeded to the most desperate job on all the Allied line of advance. Elsewhere troops could withdraw a few hundred yards without seriously upsetting the design of the great progressive attack. But the point held by the Legion was the supreme pivot on which all the French and British troops northward were slowly wheeling. The Legionaries had to hold fast, and fast they held, until by a gigantic artillery duel the massed French siege guns beat down the German ordnance at Villers, and made it necessary for the enemy to reconstruct the lines of traffic in his rear. Thereupon, there was a pause, during which the forces on each side slaved at engineering operations.

Meanwhile, the Colonial division and the Moroccan division, reinforced by young French infantry, continued their promenade along the southern cliffs of the Somme, that rose in places 200 feet above the canal, stream, and marsh. In the morning of July 3 the village of Feuillères was conquered, together with Bois du Chapitre, more than two miles behind the first enemy line. In the afternoon the third zone of German defences was penetrated by the canal at Buscourt, and pierced again two and a half miles southward at the village of Flaucourt. At Flaucourt the magnificent fighting men from French Africa were more than three miles inside the hostile front, after only 55 hours of fairly light combat and remarkably small losses. A force of about 20,000 German troops had been put out of action—nearly a third of it had been captured, more than a third of it had been killed, and a large part of the remainder seriously disabled. Here a force of Guards and divisions formed of a medley of battalions had been caught by shell fire as they marched up to strengthen the breaking lines. When they came into action they were hammered to pieces by the heavy French howitzers.

MOROCCAN TROOPS

After the Colonial troops had captured Flaucourt, which with its caverned ways was the principal rallying point for all the German forces in front of Péronne, the division was informed it was to be sent to rest quarters. The men were much offended. They had only been fighting night and day for 55 hours, going on short rations, and suffering from thirst on the sun-smitten plateau. "Why should we hand over our victories to other men?" they said. "We are not tired. We took Flaucourt, and we want to keep it."

Hearing this, General Fayolle allowed the Colonials to have their own way. On the left wing by the river a French infantry brigade, on the night of July 4, captured the farm buildings of Sormont, and the Moroccan division with the Colonial troops pushed onward from the French centre, while on the right wing a great leap forward was made towards the village of Barleux. Barleux was scarcely more than a mile north of the mass of German guns at Villers Carbonnel. The German commander answered this move by a violent bombardment of the exposed French flank at Estrées and Belloy. It was costly work for the German gunners to fire in the darkness, against which every tongue of flame from their pieces could be seen, either by direct observation from the French lines or by aerial observers in kite-balloons and night-flying aeroplanes. The long-range railway batteries in the rear of the French forces fired at the targets of flame and wrought great havoc. Nevertheless, the German gunners stood to their dangerous work.

Among the troops collected for the answering German thrust was a Bavarian division, which displayed a fine gallantry. Some companies of the Foreign Legion were hard pressed in Estrées, and the eastern part of Belloy was captured. But the Legionaries and their comrades had only retired in accordance with the disconcerting tactics of the men who handled the 3 in. quick-firers. A storm of little melinite shells fell on the lost portions of the two villages; a brief message along the telephone wires brought a tornado of bigger shells from the French rear. Then abruptly both the light and heavy pieces lifted, and the resilient French troops returned with bombs and recovered all the villages. Having thus staggered the enemy, they attacked him on both flanks along the system of trenches captured by July 5, completing the conquest of all the second German positions south of the Somme on a front of six miles.

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

The tireless Colonial division advanced from Flaucourt to Hill 63 on the road to the village of Barleux. The German commander again launched a furious flank attack on the Estrées-Belloy line, but the Foreign Legion had organized its quick-firing batteries and shattered every wave of assault well before their trenches were reached. This defeat exhausted the hastily gathered German reinforcements on the Péronne sector. On July 8 the left wing of French infantry operating by the river seized some of the farm buildings of Bazincourt—a victory which brought the French line at this point five miles into the enemy lines. Then the enormous parks of heavy French guns that had been brought up behind the French infantry division and the Colonial division swept the end of the Santerre plateau with a tornado of shells quite as terrific as the bombardment of June 30.

Under the arc of roaring projectiles the French infantry advanced on the fortified village of Biaches, which was a German divisional headquarters, while a Colonial regiment moved out more to the south towards the dominating point of the Santerre plateau, known as La Maisonette. The eminence by the chateau of La Maisonette, known as Hill 97 (318 feet high); was surrounded with woods, affording magnificent cover. The height was only a mile away from Péronne, with the canal and river gleaming at its foot and miles of lower country stretching eastward. Across these low tracts ran the main German railway line of communication to Roisel, nine miles distant, and Cambrai, Mons, and Cologne. Then, in the same low exposed country, a second important railway line of communication ran south-eastward towards Ham and Noyon, while a third line ran south to Chaulnes and Roye. The hill of La Maisonette was, therefore, a position of extreme strategic importance, which was fully realized by the Germans. Modern artillery had greatly increased its importance, especially in the conditions of the new trench warfare. There was a height across the river about a mile north of the town, the famous Mont St. Quentin, which was 42 feet higher than La Maisonette and also backed by downs of much greater altitude. The enveloping movement by Bapaume was therefore more necessary, under modern artillery conditions which favour the defence, than it had been in earlier days.

On the other hand, the extraordinary range, the enormous fighting power, and rapid rate of fire of the latest type of heavy pieces of ordnance gave La Maisonette a curious, independent

AN UNEXPECTED CHECK

value of its own. No infantry advance could be made from it across the river valley into the wide stretch of low country beyond, because the German guns on Mont St. Quentin and the greater northern height near Bouchavesnes would have annihilated the attacking troops in the great hollow around Péronne. But, though any infantry movement was impracticable from La Maisonnette, a gigantic artillery operation against the three railway lines of communication at Péronne was easy.

In the morning of July 9 a reconnoitring line of French grenadiers investigated the north-west, western, and south-western trenches of Biaches. Then in the afternoon, with the bombardment working up to its supreme intensity, the main French forces of infantry walked forward, with their advanced supports of the new French aerial infantry. It took only a few minutes to capture the system of trenches, and, while the cleaning-up companies stayed and completed their work, the first and second waves of assault rolled into the village. In the underground defences by the shattered houses the struggle was fierce but short.

When the trenches had been reached and passed and the village taken, there occurred one of those checks in the assault which are frequent in the modern war of position. In spite of the greatly improved method of aerial reconnoitring, a strong hostile work had been left unsubdued in the rear of the new French line. Near the road to Herbécourt was an old position known as the fort of Biaches, which formed part of the bridgehead of Péronne, and had been flanked first to the right and then to the left without being enveloped. Unseen wire entanglements hidden in the grass held up two charges. The German machine guns continued to fire, and seriously interfered with the French operations. The French brigadier general tried at first to destroy the redoubt by the massed fire of trench mortars. But their shells had not sufficient penetration. So the engineers were asked to push a sap into the work and blow it up; and it was found it would take at least six days to mine the fortified caverns.

It looked as though the entire infantry operations around Biaches would have to be postponed in order to allow the heavy guns to make precise measurements of the little island of resistance from which the victorious troops were held up only 30 yards away. A few trial shots from the French monster guns might have blown up the French infantry instead of breaking into the

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

German shelters. Then a French captain said: "I can surprise the work." He had learnt the exact position of the trench leading to the fortress, and going ahead of his party of eight volunteers he worked at first alone into the position and found it empty. All the Germans were under shelter, as the volunteers behind the captain were throwing hand grenades. The captain shouted, "Come out!" A group of grey figures appeared; then another group emerged with a sergeant, who seemed to be the leading spirit of the defence, for the officers continued to remain underground. The astonished Germans stared at the French captain, and then made a movement of fight. But the captain shot the first man down with his revolver, crying "Forward!" His own eight supporting men arrived, and the two German groups surrendered. Searching in the shelters, the Frenchmen found two officers and many more men, and returned at last down the communication trench with 114 prisoners.

While the attack on the Biaches positions was thus drawing to a successful close, a regiment of the Colonial division advanced on La Maisonette. Here the first defences were carried in one fierce leap, and on the left the triangular wood south-east of Biaches was conquered as far as the cemetery. Then an orchard on the right, where machine guns had been concealed between the trees, was cleared by a terrible bayonet charge. The two flanking forces closed around the chateau on the hill, and after suffering in an ambush formed by a party of Germans who pretended to surrender and then fusilladed the men who came forward to receive them, the Colonial regiment took La Maisonette. The German commanding officer, a colonel, was found in his shelter with six other officers, and 200 survivors of the garrison were made prisoners.

The Colonials took only 75 minutes to conquer La Maisonette. This gave General Fayolle, at Hill 97, the culminating point of the battlefield, with an observation post overlooking the German lines on the right bank of the river from Mont St. Quentin to Mons-en-Chaussée. The Germans had organized the position with great care, especially in the northern tract of woodland, Bois de Bias. Caverns 30 feet below the ground were connected by tunnelling with the positions in the valley near the canal, and in the marshes hidden batteries of machine guns were trained on the northern slopes. It was difficult to attack the Germans in the marshes, and General Fayolle made no attempt to do so.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LA MAISONETTE

He did not want Péronne. The general situation was such that Péronne was for the time more useful to the Allies as an enemy position than it would have been if captured by the Colonials. At this stage it is necessary to refer to the map of the theatre of all the Somme operations in order to understand that point in the strategy of General Foch which the German commander had overlooked. It will be seen that the French infantry division and the French Colonial division had, by July 9, done more than interrupt the railway, road, and canal communications of Péronne. They enfiladed the German positions north of the river from Guillemont and Ginchy to Combles and Rancourt. All the main defensive positions of the enemy in the vital sector where the army of General Balfourier and the army of Sir Henry Rawlinson were cooperating in attack became subjected to a terrible cross fire of heavy shells from French guns placed in the large wedge of newly won territory south of the river. Cléry, Feuillaucourt, and Mont St. Quentin in the first line; Hardecourt, Maurepas, and Bouchavesnes in the second line; Guillemont and Ginchy, Combles and Morval, Rancourt and Saillisel in the third line—all these main northern hostile positions of decisive importance were outflanked by the southern French advance into La Maisonette. Around Bray and around Albert were some thousands of British and French guns firing straight against the German front north of the river Somme, and it was more than the German gunners on this sector could do to reply to this frontal artillery attack. But a day or two after La Maisonette was won a considerable part of the French artillery south of the Somme was brought up and concealed in the woods and ravines in front of Péronne.

In the circumstances, it did not much matter that the southern heights from Feuillères and Dompierre to Biaches and La Maisonette were considerably lower than the northern heights occupied by the Germans. Howitzers never aim directly at a target. They fling their shells high into the sky, in such a way that they can pitch on distant, unexposed slopes and invisible ravines. There is no need to place a howitzer on a hill, and, in fact, the best position for such a piece is a lower slope or a valley that enemy guns cannot reach by direct fire, and enemy observers cannot see except from kite-balloons or aeroplanes. As the Allies held the complete mastery of the air the Germans could not discover the positions of the French howitzers on the Santerre plateau. •

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

All that the German commander could do was to endeavour to mass guns on the southern line of the new French wedge south of the river, and especially to increase his artillery at Villers Carbonnel. But here again General Fayolle had a marked advantage in cross fire against his opponent. In the first place he could continue to concentrate heavy artillery from Estrées to Soyécourt, directly in front of Villers Carbonnel. In the second place he could abruptly turn all his guns in the La Maisonette wedge southward against Villers Carbonnel, while he also hammered this position with frontal fire.

From the German point of view, therefore, the loss of La Maisonette was exceedingly alarming. No point won by the Allies, from Neuve Chapelle to Loos and from the attack on the Labyrinth to the storming of Tahure, was so critically important as La Maisonette. The new German commanders, General von Gallwitz, and General von Stein, a former minister of war and assistant chief of staff, came to Péronne and Combles with new armies to retrieve the endangered situation.

General von Falkenhayn was nearing the end of his extraordinary reign. He retained sufficient power to rob Hindenburg of his best remaining man—Gallwitz, who had forced the Narew, capturing Warsaw and its great neighbouring fortress when Leopold of Bavaria was unable to effect anything. All that the new commander could do, however, was to launch, under cover of heavy mist in the evening of July 15, a strong infantry attack on Biaches and La Maisonette. The French troops in the village and around the hill acted in their usual manner, which should have contained no surprise for a German tactician accustomed to their ways. When the hostile batteries on Mont St. Quentin and around Villers Carbonnel opened a hurricane fire the French infantry retired by underground ways, leaving only a few machine gunners to impede the coming advance.

At heavy cost the German infantry entered the village and stormed the hill. The French infantry retired before its losses were severe, and calmly waited until the apparent victors were massed on the edge of the plateau. Then the stupendous weight of every French gun within range fell upon Biaches and La Maisonette, and upon the main German artillery positions and communications. When the French gunners lifted from the hill and the village the French infantry charged, and the enemy was broken and trapped. Fierce, terrible hand-to-hand fighting went

END OF THE FIRST PHASE

on amid the woods in the darkness, and by the morning the ground was again firmly in the possession of the French.

Up to this date the loss of La Maisonette had not been admitted by the German staff, and the attack launched in great force across the river was designed to recapture the hill and make it appear as though it had not been in French possession. According to a statement issued in Berlin, the kaiser came to the Somme to watch the fighting. After the anxious emperor had his anxieties increased and his belief in Falkenhayn finally destroyed by witnessing the first vain and costly counter-attack across the river, the new German commander on July 18 made another prolonged and violent attempt to recover La Maisonette. But each wave of assault was smashed by French fire. General Fayolle's master-gunners had got hundreds of additional guns into position during the nine days since the Colonial troops stormed the hill. On the left at Biaches some small German parties managed to creep along the canal into a few houses, but they were bombed out of the ruins in a few hours.

The definite consolidation of the great French conquest of La Maisonette marks the end of the first phase of the Allied operations on the Somme. The flanking fire from numerous heavy howitzers, which the French were able to train for a radius of many miles over the Bapaume sector, was largely responsible for the succeeding victories of the French and British troops north of the river. In the second phase of the Allied operations the main interest shifts across the Somme to the army of General Balfourier and the armies of Sir Douglas Haig. General Fayolle's main forces then stood fast at La Maisonette, and formed the handle of a great and terrible sickle that quickly cut down half a million Germans. The southern army, however, did not remain entirely on the defensive in regard to infantry actions, while its guns were striking the enemy sideways and cutting his Péronne communications. The infantry, including the African troops and many French regiments, moved across the river to join the British forces, and a new French battering-ram, the 10th army under General Micheler, came into action on a new, long northern front. On Thursday afternoon, July 20, all the first German zone of defences from Estrées southward to the hill of Vermandovillers, two miles north of Chaulnes, was stormed and held, and a strong German counter-attack easily broken with machine gun fire and shell fire.

FRENCH FIGHTING ON THE SOMME

In the war of positions Chaules was linked with Cologne and Metz and transformed into one of the vital points of the great German salient. The German commander had long been anxious about Chaules, and it will be recollected that he drew troops away from the Somme in order to prepare against a blow that General Foch did not deliver. When, however, the Colonial troops stormed La Maisonette, Gallwitz reversed the policy of his predecessor and weakened his lines around Chaules in order to strengthen the artillery and infantry south of Péronne.

In turn General Foch suddenly extended his line of attack southward, and by storming into Vermandovillers he compelled Gallwitz again to move guns and troops back to Chaules and relieve the pressure on General Fayolle's forces in the southern angle of the Somme. During August, 1916, there was a tremendous artillery duel around Chaules, and in the first week of September General Micheler launched his series of magnificent attacks. All the first zone of German positions from Barleux to Chilly, south of Chaules, was stormed and occupied, and the communications of Chaules were cut.

The direct, immediate, and local effect of this stroke was to lighten the labour and free the striking power of the French forces in the angle of the Somme. The Germans had to weaken their artillery concentrations around Villers Carbonnel and Mont St. Quentin in order to make a stand about Chaules. But by weakening their artillery around Péronne, Gallwitz and his staff brought more trouble on their heads. The French guns in the southern angle of the Somme again turned north towards the Combles and Bapaume area, and there cooperated in another terrific day and night cross fire with the French and British guns north of the river. So far as could be seen at the time, General Foch and Sir Douglas Haig possessed a series of extraordinary advantages over the enemy, which they were developing with terrible mathematical precision.

South of the Somme the Germans were half enveloped and disastrously enfiladed. From the middle of July their sound and saving course was clearly to retreat to the next strong line beyond Péronne, and thus avoid the great and draining waste of life and expense of munitions. But no withdrawal took place.

CHAPTER 14

Autumn Attacks on the Somme

THE Englishman learns slowly from books, but quickly from experience. When he is mixed in proper proportion with his kinsman the Lowland Scot and his fellow-islanders the Gael and the Welshman the combination does not lack intellectual quickness. The lesson all the British troops had received early in July, 1916, from General von Marschall and General von Buchs had been a hard one, but it was rapidly turned to profit. Sir Douglas Haig and General Kiggell came down to the Somme, and with Sir Henry Rawlinson and his brilliant lieutenants improved the organization of the armies.

Meanwhile, Sir Henry Rawlinson's army, after being checked by the heavy rain at the end of the first week in July, was reinforced by the 2nd army corps under Lieutenant General C. W. Jacob, and continued to move forward all along the line towards the enemy's second zone of defences on the Bazentin ridges. There were four main obstacles to the British advance. On the left was Contalmaison, which the Prussian Guard had recovered. In front of this village was the great Quadrangle work, which was connected by a German light railway with the large obscure fortress of Mametz Wood. Then, about two and a quarter miles east of the great wood, was the German bulwark of Trônes Wood.

Contalmaison was the chief key position, as it was the support to the frontal downland village of Ovillers. In Ovillers the German garrison was still strongly holding out, and it could not be taken in the rear until a way of approach was secured from Contalmaison. The first two drives into Contalmaison had failed, owing to the enemy's strength in the Quadrangle and Mametz Wood. Therefore, instead of attempting any further single operations, Sir Henry Rawlinson arranged, on July 10, a general attack against the Contalmaison-Quadrangle-Mametz line. The German garrisons had been served with an emergency ration of seven days' food, and given the order "To the last man." But though they were the finest troops in the German empire, and included a large force of the Prussian Guard, they were not equal

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

to the task assigned to them. The preliminary British bombardment was of unparalleled intensity; part of the garrison of Contalmaison lost heart under it, and, fleeing in the open, were caught by the British shrapnel barrage and also mowed down by the machine guns of their enemy's supporting forces.

Amid the partial confusion caused by this flight, the north-eastern corner of Contalmaison was stormed by two companies of British troops. This was an extraordinary achievement. For the Prussian Guard in and around Contalmaison were ten times as numerous as the victors. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. He had expected an attack from the south, where there was an open space of 1,200 yards, swept by his machine guns and his artillery fire. But a small British force had worked the day before towards Horseshoe trench, on the flank of Contalmaison. The Horseshoe position was carried by a British officer, accompanied by one man. They made their way across the intervening space with a load of bombs, killed the enemy gun crew and bombed out the other occupants of the trench. This fine feat opened the way to Bailiff Wood, and in the afternoon of July 10, 500 men from Bailiff Wood rushed the north of the village and began to bomb their way southward.

At the same time another and a larger British force of 2,000 men advanced on Contalmaison in short, swift rushes covered by artillery fire. Taken on two sides, the Prussians fought variously. About 200 of them were as brave as men could be, and struggled until they died, but by far the greater part broke when the British bayonet lifted over their parapet. Again as they fled the British artillery caught them, and their bodies were afterwards found in masses beyond the village. The Germans furiously counter-attacked, but in vain. The British guns had moved forward and covered all the approaches to the village.

Contalmaison, however, was only the left flank of the battle line of July 10. South of the village was the great Quadrangle work, which was connected by a German light railway with Mametz Wood, Bazentin and Martinpuich. The Quadrangle, with its line of plunging fire, wire entanglements and redoubts, resisted the first frontal attack. But on succeeding days most of the work was gradually mastered by bomb fighting of a most ferocious kind. Quadrangle trench, Quadrangle Alley and Wood trench, all held in great strength, were conquered by the evening of June 10. There then remained only one formidable position

MAMETZ WOOD

lying south of Contalmaison. This consisted of Quadrangle trench and Acid Drop Copse.

The Quadrangle support was the western bulwark of Mametz Wood as well as the southern outwork of Contalmaison. So when most of the Quadrangle had been reduced by the afternoon of July 10, Mametz Wood became exposed to attack on three sides. The wood was a masterpiece of defensive strength. In the autumn of 1914 it had consisted of 220 acres of finely cultivated saplings, which were being gradually thinned to produce good timber. The enemy allowed the wood to run wild for two years, until it became a tangled jungle of young trees and brambles through which a man had to twist his body in order to get forward. In this dense growth the enemy cut drives to facilitate the movement of his troops, built a light railway, concealed batteries of guns, most of which he afterwards removed, constructed machine gun redoubts, and threaded the southern end of the wood with lines of barbed wire.

Mametz Wood was so strong that the British general operating from Montauban decided at first to leave it for siege operations, and work round on either side of it until it was enveloped. His patrols had begun to penetrate the southern edge on July 6, and they caught the Germans asleep there, killed 50 of them, and found two field guns put out of action by British shell fire. The attacking troops then consolidated themselves in a small patch of trees known as Marlborough Wood, lying between Montauban and Bazentin, and flanking the eastern skirts of Mametz Wood. From this eastern position the British general prepared his main attack upon the jungle forest. The enemy on the Bazentin ridge saw what was coming, and in the afternoon of the general British attack the German guns opened a terrific barrage fire over the bare valley between Marlborough Wood and Mametz Wood. But the British attack on this side never developed. All the preparations had been a ruse. For while the German guns were barricading the eastern valley a strong British force stormed into the southern side of the wood and, preceded by a moving zone of terrific artillery fire that overwhelmed the garrison and levelled the trees, forced their way right through the tangled growth.

In the night the Germans bombarded and then launched a strong counter-attack from the north-eastern and northern sides of the woodland. This counter-attack completely failed owing to the fine musketry, machine guns and bombing skill of the new

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

British soldiers. In the morning of July 11 five Welsh battalions again advanced through the northern stretch of the broken tangle of trees. Most of the ground was won, but there was a strip of 50 yards on the northern edge which the Germans made impassable. In their line of works there they had trench mortars as well as machine guns and rifles, and they checked every Welsh charge by means of big bombs and streams of bullets.

The Welsh troops retired, and for half an hour their artillery pounded the edge of the wood. Then another advance was attempted, but the bombardment had not put all the German machine guns out of action, and the newly fallen timber made barricades against the attack. Nevertheless, the Welshmen once more resumed their heroic work, and in a final effort they carried the enemy's lines in the afternoon, and by nightfall on July 11 the new British line was within 300 yards of the second zone of German defences on the Bazentin ridges.

While the battle was going on in Contalmaison and Mametz Wood the German commander tried to redress the losses on his left by a furious drive from his right into Trônes Wood. This wood was some two and a half miles from Mametz Wood, stretching across the top of the narrow valley along which a stream ran to Fricourt. It lay about a mile east of Montauban. The enemy had two railway lines running through it and connecting it with Guillemont and Combles. Trenches extended through the middle of the wood and along the northern and southern sides, while wire entanglements with machine guns behind them protected the western edge from assault. The Lancashire troops that captured Montauban quickly extended their hold to the large intervening woodland of Bornafay Wood. Then, on July 8, a lodgement was gained in Trônes Wood by fighting of a most violent character, in which the British infantry, assisted by French gunners with "75" quick-firers from the famous 20th corps, rapidly developed their partial grip into an advance of 1,000 yards through the dense green tract.

Trônes Wood then became a long, wide wedge, 1,400 yards from north to south and 400 yards along its base, driven against the enemy's second line at Guillemont and Longueval. But there was a serious disadvantage in the new British salient. It was swept on three sides by heavy German gun fire, and also enveloped on these three sides by German infantry. General von Arnim, therefore, exerted all his available strength in men and

TRÔNES WOOD

shell to cut off this long wedge of woodland. After a bombardment by guns of all calibres, the German infantry attacked in the evening of July 8, and was shattered by French and British guns. Again, in the afternoon of July 9, the Germans charged in great force, were broken by gun fire, re-formed, charged once more and were completely broken by the French and British guns.

General von Arnim spent his men's lives in tens of thousands in an effort to recover Trônes Wood. With 6 in., 8 in., and 12 in. howitzers he sought out the light French and British artillery that had broken his former charges. He hammered the wood from end to end with high explosive and shrapnel, and then, by enveloping assaults, he strove to recover the last bulwark of Guillemont and Longueval. A strong attack from the east was completely repulsed, but as it ebbed away another grey mass stormed into the southern end of the wood, and as the leading battalions reached the last German trench there, their supports were caught by gun fire and they themselves were smashed by hand bombs, bullets, and bayonets.

The German commander was being supplied with new troops, collected by reckless withdrawals from all other fronts. Unperturbed by his tremendous losses, he flung out two more divisions at night to repeat the enveloping assault. For the fifth time his men completely failed under a hurricane of shell fire from British guns west of Trônes Wood and French guns near Hardecourt. But in the afternoon of July 10 a sixth desperate attack enabled the Germans to regain the greater part of the wood. Successful as the enemy's tactics seemed then to be, the British 4th army had by far the larger balance of human gains.

In the morning of July 11 the wood was again swept by the Allied artillery with shells ranging down from 700 pounds to 18 pounds. After some hours of a general ploughing fire, the guns massed in a single gigantic machine-like effect, and tore up the ground in great masses as the British infantry again advanced. On July 12 the enemy again counter attacked and recovered a considerable part of the wood. The next day the West Kents entered the salient that the British soldiers had begun to call Hell Hole Wood, but after a swaying, hand-to-hand conflict, they had to give ground.

By an enveloping operation the German commander cut off 100 of the West Kents in the upper part of the wood and broke into the battalion headquarters of the regiment on the southern side.

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME.

The temporary headquarters was badly battered by the enemy's heavy shell fire, and as officers and men were driven to seek cover, the gun fire lifted and the German infantry charged forward in the darkness. "Stand to!" cried an officer who saw them coming, and with a dozen orderlies and signallers, who hastily armed themselves with bombs and rifles, he beat off the counter-attack.

For 24 hours the Germans attacked the little band of heroes on all sides. They tried to rush the Lewis gun positions by bomb attacks, delivered under the covering fire of massed machine guns. They attempted to creep in the darkness from shell-hole to shell-hole and wear the West Kents out by lobbing grenades at them. But the British captain had arranged such lines of fire with his Lewis guns and rifles that every attack was broken.

The situation was one of indescribable strain; for Sir Henry Rawlinson, thinking that the wood had been entirely lost, was subjecting all of it to a bombardment of unparalleled intensity. The British general was preparing to storm the enemy's Bazentin line. For this purpose he had massed on the narrow Somme sector all the guns, unneeded for local defence, that had been employed in the first huge bombardment. On the rest of the British line there was only artillery for protection and demonstration effect. Every available British gun, with many French guns, was trained on Trônes Wood and on the surrounding villages and ridges. On July 1 the gun fire had been too much dispersed, owing to the fact that the army still had not all the artillery and shell required for action on a wide front.

On July 14 the guns and head of shell were concentrated on a very small segment of the hostile line. Part of this bombardment fell on the West Kents. But they grimly endured the hurricane of shell, which had its helpful side, as it interfered with the movements of the enemy. Despairing of carrying by infantry attack the position held by the West Kents, the Germans parleyed and asked them to surrender to avoid destruction by artillery. No surrender being offered, the enemy began to place field guns in position. Meanwhile, the tornado blasts from the massed British guns rose to an extreme intensity on the morning of July 14, and behind the moving barrage came the Sussex and other English county regiments. Trônes Wood was slowly but decisively conquered in a terrific infantry action conducted under a stupendous double crash of shell from British and German arcs of artillery. All the ground wrecked by British gunners to help

A BRITISH SPEAR-HEAD

their troops was again ploughed by German gunners to check the British advance. Amid these contending storms of thunderbolts the Sussex heard the cry, "Hallo, boys!" It came from the glorious party of West Kents who were thus rescued.

Sir Douglas Haig brought down men from the Ypres salient, hardened to every form of trench warfare, with five divisions that had won their first honours around Loos, and formed these into a new spear-head of attack. For a week the staff officers worked day and night, snatching little sleep and little food at odd hours, while they linked the new forces with those that had won the first battle, and arranged more guns and more shell against the strongly reinforced enemy batteries. On July 11 the new bombardment began in a manner that made the first great bombardment of July 1 seem an ordinary operation. The sky, ridges of ground, earthworks and woods about Bazentin blazed with bursting shell. The sight and the sound were such as to make even the waiting troops of the attack sweat with fear, and always the nerve-racking tumult increased as more British batteries of monster guns steamed into action. Clusters of shell burst all along the German second line, tearing open the ground and making fountains of flame.

As the day broke the guns suddenly ceased. But the silence was still more deadly than the tumult. It was the moment of the great infantry attack, and as the gunners ceased firing to change their range, tens of thousands of dim figures sprang from their assembly trenches and went out and up the pitted slopes where the ruins of the villages of Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit, Longueval and Guillemont glimmered on the great ridge. Everything was exactly timed. The dawn broadened, enabling the men, who had got safely out in the open in the darkness, to see their way, discern each other, and keep formation. Then all the British guns crashed on their new targets and a rattle of machine guns came from the enemy's line.

Additional German gunners had come from Gommecourt and other northern sectors to inflict, by their terrific barrage, another decisive defeat upon the attacking British infantry. But conditions were different from those at Gommecourt. Five minutes after the German curtain of shrapnel and high explosive fell on and in front of Mametz Wood an aeroplane hummed over the thin lines of khaki figures. It was scarcely more than 500 feet high, and the pilot went right through the shrapnel curtain. Other

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

machines swiftly followed him, until the entire scene of enemy activity was being studied by the new British aerial infantry. Some of them were spotters, who eyed the red tongues of the hostile barraging guns and at once brought down upon them salvo after salvo of heavy British shell. Others were veritable infantry of the air, who swooped with machine gun fire upon German troops and even attacked such field artillery gunners and anti-aircraft gunners as were visible from above. At the same time as this direct aerial pressure was exerted against the enemy, the successes and difficulties of the leading British troops were observed by airmen and signalled to the patrolling staffs. At four o'clock one of the German main positions, Longueval, was set on fire by one of the monster British guns, and the ruins burned like a great torch high on the slope against the background of Delville Wood. Meanwhile, attacking British divisions were carrying position after position with clockwork precision.

The British artillery was magnificent. Practically all the wire was cut, enabling the attacking troops to strike the trenches almost without a check, and get into the wood in favouring circumstances before the sky brightened. This saved them from the worst of the enemy's shell curtain, and, working forward with skilled dash, they won the wood in about an hour and a half. In addition to hidden machine gunners and concealed parties of bombers, the troops in the wood had to contend against snipers.

While the attack on the great wood was proceeding, other battalions on the left went in short rushes up the open incline to the village, and in less than half an hour blasted and stabbed their way into the ruins. This underground fortress was held almost entirely by machine gunners, but the British movement had been so quick that it was not clear day when the bomb-throwers began to work beneath the jumble of brickwork and splintered stone on the crowning ridge. At half past five both the wood and the village were won. The enemy forces that had retired on Martinpuich made a hasty violent counter-attack in the morning, and threw back the men who had won the village. But a signal brought the heavy British guns down on their old mark, and behind the tornado of shells Irishman and Briton again advanced and retook all the ruins. A second counter-attack was attempted, but it did not trouble the victors.

It was bad tactics on the part of the local German commander to use up his available troops in this manner. For he still held a

HIGH WOOD

large patch of woodland, three-quarters of a mile from the village, from which he could dominate all his lost position. This dominating point of the Bazentin ridge was the famous Fourceaux Wood, called High Wood by the British soldier. High Wood was strongly connected by a maze of trenches, with Martinpuich and Flers, and was further flanked eastward by an intricate series of works of which Cork Alley was the first. Southward and lower down the slope High Wood was protected by guns around Delville Wood on the one side and Pozières on the other.

When the second and larger German counter-attack staggered and broke under the fire of the British guns, the Irishmen and their comrades advanced up the open slope, and in spite of the German machine guns firing down from the corners of the wood the positions were stormed with superb intrepidity and telling skill. Then, in a fierce, sharp struggle, all the wood was carried as far as the concealed northern line of works, on to which the enemy was able to hang by pouring forces in from either side at Martinpuich and Flers. The operation seemed to be hazardous and unsound. Indeed, the enemy must have thought that this amazing leap on to the crowning tangle of foliage overlooking all his undulating positions running down to Bapaume was a grave tactical error.

The extraordinary first swoop into High Wood was a disconcerting menace to the enemy's third zone of defences. For if the dominating observation point could have been permanently secured, the superior fire of the British artillery could have been constantly directed with precision against nearly everything visible between High Wood and Bapaume. The German commander, therefore, had to concentrate his principal forces on the task of making High Wood uninhabitable by the spear-head of the British army. He turned hundreds of guns upon the southern part of the woodland, and upon the hollow between the wood and the Bazentin villages, and at the same time he fed troops through Martinpuich and Flers into the works around the wood. In spite of these great efforts of the enemy the comparatively small British force in High Wood maintained its ground all the night of July 14 and the day and night of July 15. Only in the morning of July 16 did the advanced troops quietly withdraw to the new British main line in the Bazentin villages.

There was another and somewhat similar leap forward at the most critical point of the right attacking line between Bazentin-

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

le-Grand and Guillemont. Here Delville Wood was stormed and held with magnificent courage by the South African brigade, while the new main line behind them was consolidated. In the first assault along this part of the line there was a check at the hill village of Bazentin-le-Grand, defended by two parallel lines of trenches, rising 130 feet above the river valley, from which the British troops advanced. Some of the barbed cables on the top-most slope had resisted all the shells poured upon them and were almost intact. Charging up the long slopes in the darkness before dawn the British on either side of the village crawled under the entanglements or blanketed them with greatcoats and climbed over and fought down the enemy machine gunners with bombs.

Then, while some of the Yorkshiremen in the centre were being held in shell-holes by uncut wire and machine guns near the sunken road running from Bazentin-le-Grand to High Wood, a Scottish battalion come up in support on the right, leaped into the trenches leading towards the village, and, bombing along, silencing all the hostile machine guns, captured the remnant of the hostile garrison, thus enabling the British centre to go forward into the village.

Bazentin-le-Grand had been dubiously studied by Sir Douglas Haig's staff. It was a natural hill fortress. By reason of its old-fashioned system of deep, vast cellars, and its sheltered position in a northern hollow behind the Bazentin-Longueval ridge, its underground works and machine gun emplacements seemed secure against direct frontal gun fire. A long, violent infantry conflict was, therefore, anticipated in the village. But the British chief gunnery officer had worked better even than he knew. Enfilading Bazentin across the long valley of the Fricourt stream and assailing it frontally by howitzer fire from the direction of Montauban, he had pulverised the picturesque old village. It is estimated that in the last 20 minutes of the preliminary bombardment more than 2,000 heavy shells were pitched exactly on to Bazentin-le-Grand. For two days shells of large calibre had been falling into the village, and when the final delivery of 2,000 shells occurred, the remnant of the garrison had little fight left in them. When, therefore, the Scottish battalion knocked out the six machine guns in front of the village, Bazentin fell practically without a serious struggle.

When Bazentin-le-Grand was taken and connexion made at the cross-roads northward with the force that had taken Bazentin-le-

DELVILLE WOOD

Petit, three more entrenched works were carried in the valley between Longueval and High Wood. Then, while the advance on Longueval and Delville Wood was progressing in a fierce and stern fight, there occurred a most unusual and picturesque incident. For the first time since the autumn of 1914, British cavalry took part in a battle in France. Between High Wood and Longueval was a long slope of ripening corn from which a German force of riflemen and machine gunners were enfilading the advancing British wing. The enemy was concealed in the long green stalks, with a line of hidden sharpshooters protecting his machine guns. No infantry rush attack was practicable in the circumstances; but, to the consternation of the Germans, a squadron of British horsemen and a squadron of dark, turbanned Indians abruptly appeared in the forefront of the British army. The fields were cleared as far as the machine gun positions, and the cavalry then sent their horses back and dug trenches to hold the ground for the infantry.

After the cavalry charge and the advance from the left into High Wood, the main stress of the battle fell upon the South African troops and their Scottish comrades who were fighting around Longueval and advancing into Delville Wood. The great knot of German fortresses around Longueval and Trônes Wood was to make one of the supreme furnaces of the Somme battles. The German positions composed of Longueval, Delville Wood, Ginchy, Guillemont and Trônes Wood formed a rough rectangle with a frontage of nearly two miles. Owing to the situation the enemy commander could quickly throw huge forces against two sides of the British salient, and even threaten the rear of the British from the railway line south of Combles. It was not until the French army worked forward and upward from Hardecourt that the British salient was partly relieved from pressure. There were from four to five blasting cross-fires from German batteries of all calibres playing for weeks on the British salient about Longueval. Yet Sir Douglas Haig maintained the conflict for reasons of strategy.

In the first operations on July 14 a remarkable amount of success was obtained. Trônes Wood was entirely recovered by the Sussex Regiment and their comrades. Above the Englishmen, and working along the Guillemont trench and upward along the "Tortillard" railway towards Guillemont railway station, a body of Scotsmen broke through the wire entanglements and

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

through the double row of works in front of Ginchy, stormed Waterlot Farm, and got a footing in Guillemont. And before this success was fully achieved another fine Scottish force, acting in front of the South Africans, ascended in the darkness the long hill rising in front of Bornafay Wood to Longueval. In the ordinary way the great bare slope to Longueval was impracticable for charging troops. No dense or wide formation could climb the long gradient against machine guns and massed artillery. But the great superiority of the British artillery rendered possible an operation that avoided nearly all the disadvantages of the slope.

While the guns were still pounding all the German lines to a depth of seven miles, the Scottish force went out in the darkness and, in careful touch, gradually moved upward. The enemy did not expect an advance until daylight, and the stealthy attackers neared the first hostile line of works when a huge British shell set the hill village on fire and lighted the figures climbing the jut of downland. As soon as the British movement was seen the German guns threw out a shrapnel curtain, and also ploughed the incline with high explosive, veiling the field with smoke bombs.

Here the dug-outs had been badly made, being probably a hasty improvisation after the battle of July 1. Many were hardly bomb proof, and had suffered badly in the bombardment. Still onward went the Scotsmen into the charred ruins of Longueval, where the great fire had died into a smoulder. In spite of the fire the Germans were still holding the broken walls, the gaping and roofless buildings. German courage and German discipline certainly bred some great examples of heroism. In one important redoubt six machine guns swept the ground and the tumble of earth that had been a road. In spite of the half dozen machine guns the redoubt was rushed and bombed. Then followed a ghastly struggle in the numerous cellars, where a desperate remnant of the German garrison waited in the darkness, and flung bombs at the sound of an approaching footstep.

The surface fighting was also peculiar ; for Longueval was not a village so much as an inhabited wood. It was part of Delville Wood, and the forest trees, though thinned and stripped by tens of thousands of British shells, still partly concealed with their branching foliage the roofs of farmsteads and cottages. As in other wooded places on this day of main conflict between two determined forces, Germans were perched in the trees with

THE SOUTH AFRICANS

machine guns and magazine rifles. Many of them drew blood from the Scotsmen whom they took by surprise, but each of them was in turn revealed by the sound of his weapon and shot down from his eyrie.

As the Scotsmen settled savagely to their work of clearing the woodland village the South African brigade, on July 14, advanced beyond into the inferno of Delville Wood. There were open glades in the park-like pleasance where the German machine gunners had a sweeping line of fire. But, heralded by a terrific hail of British shells, the men stormed through the wood. Caught on their left by machine gunners and sharpshooters hidden in thick undergrowth, and enfiladed on their right by a field gun at close range, the South Africans not only stuck to their task but carried it out quickly in an exultant rage.

This thrust towards the enemy's third zone of defences had to be maintained in order to enable the work of consolidation to go on in Bazentin-le-Grand, Longueval and Trônes Wood. These places were completely wrecked by British and German shell fire, and days were needed for the sappers to build new works and shelters and make secure communications with the Montauban line. The South Africans in Delville Wood and the Scotsmen in Longueval and the Waterlot Farm line had to draw the strongest part of the enemy's gun fire and attract the main force of his counter-attacking infantry in order to enable the British army to consolidate its great central gains.

So for five days the wasting but indomitable brigade of South Africans held the wood they called Hell's Wood against all the mechanical and human forces the German commander could bring against them. The disadvantage of Delville Wood was that the larger part of it sloped down into the Bazentin valley, and was directly and closely dominated by a maze of German trenches on two high downs near Flers. The German trenches, indeed, commanded the left and the right and the rear of the South Africans in Delville Wood. The wood was within range of a plunging machine gun fire as well as direct gun fire. The South Africans had attacked through the concentrated curtain fire of hundreds of German guns, and all the while they held the wood these guns not only maintained their fire but, reinforced by numerous batteries, constantly intensified the bombardment. At intervals the smoke and the poisoned fumes and the blaze of German shrapnel, high explosive, poison gas and blinding liquid

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

flame shells lifted from the South Africans' front and deepened on their rear. Then under cover of machine gun fire from the northern ridges the German infantry advanced.

In the afternoon of July 18 came the enemy's first violent reaction against the British offensive on the Somme. For 18 days the hostile counter-blows had been merely of a defensive kind. The German had struck back simply to win time for strengthening himself on the ground to which he had retreated. But on July 18 the German army commander on the Somme showed his common sense in selecting for attack the right corner of the new British ground, from Delville Wood to Trônes Wood, and the point at which the British and French lines met. The assault opened after a long, intense and terribly heavy artillery fire at half past five in the evening and went on all night. As the leading German battalions fell, supports came forward to the slaughter.

On the Trônes Wood front, where the enemy had generally to make a direct frontal attack, all his efforts were broken. Above the wood, in the angle of Waterlot Farm, three assaults were shattered by artillery barrages and Vickers and Lewis gun fire. But in the extreme salient of Delville Wood, which the Germans attacked from three sides, the South Africans had to give ground and fall back to a trench midway in the park. At the same time the Scotsmen in Longueval had to retire from the low-lying northern edge of the village. All night the fight went on, and all the next day and the next night. On a front of 2,000 yards at Delville Wood, on July 18, the enemy deployed four out of his six divisions, and of the four divisions 13 battalions could be traced from prisoners left in our hands.

By July 21, when the Delville Wood battle was still raging, more German troops had been pushed into the furnace. Yet on this day South Africans were found fighting in the woodland. For seven days and nights they had scarcely slept at all. In the darkness and confusion of one mass German attack 100 of the South Africans suffered a fate similar to that of the West Kents. The trench they were holding ran north and south through the wood. In the retirement of the main body touch was lost, and the small advanced force was enveloped. The enemy could be heard approaching from east and west, for as the Germans advanced they pitched bombs before them at a venture, hoping to provoke the fire of any chance opponents in their path.

THE ATTACKS CONTINUED

The South Africans made no movement until the figures of the Germans were close and distinct. Then with bomb and rifle fire they brought the first enveloping force down, and turned about in their trench to hold off the Germans on the other side. When the Germans re-formed and made a simultaneous attack eastward and westward, half the South Africans in the trench faced one way and half the other way. At last, breaking the ring, a little victorious remnant came forth, joined other troops, and with them renewed the attack. When the South Africans were broken by the enemy's terrific, searching gun fire and his incessant waves of infantry attack, the fragments of battalions, scraps of companies and shreds of platoons rallied beside the Scotsmen in a reserve trench in the rear. Then, a mere handful, the South Africans and Highlanders counter-attacked, and by a miracle of fighting drove back the hostile masses and saved the situation.

When, on July 20, the remnant of South Africans was relieved, leaving the flower of their force in the terrible wood, and the splendid Highland division on the Longueval-Trônes Wood line went into rest quarters, the enemy attacks continued with uninterrupted violence. In effect, the German commander formed an army of nearly 100,000 men into a deep column, less than a mile and a quarter wide, and fed the edge of this column against the British human emery-wheel in the lower part of Delville Wood and Longueval. It was attrition on a colossal scale, and yet of narrow intensity—a gigantic knife formation driven against the most delicate point in the Allied front.

The design of it seemed to have been due directly to the German high command, who selected General von Stein to control the operation. Stein was a man of the Falkenhayn class—a combination of military politician and great staff strategist. Above him on the Somme were two of Hindenburg's best men, Gallwitz and Below, who had shown themselves in Russia to be masters of swarm attacks when they possessed a high superiority in gun power. This superiority they did not possess on the Somme. For some weeks they did not even attain an equality with the Allies in heavy fire power. So they sacrificed men by the ten thousand in attempts to achieve a practical decision by forcing back the British line.

Much of the heaviest fighting occurred in the long, narrow valley running from Flers to the Bazentin villages, and passing through the lower and northern parts of Delville Wood and

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

Longueval. The outskirts of Longueval became, as it were, the Hougomont Farm of the main new British front. By attracting and distracting much of the enemy's chief force the village facilitated the defence of the Bazentin ridge. The Germans had to come down the northern slope of the valley, cross the ravine, and climb up the southern slope. All the ground they covered in order to get within bombing distance of the British works was heavily curtailed by the British artillery.

All this told against the Germans, who were the attacking force. They worked forward by means of strong lines of machine guns under cover of storms of 6 in. shell. The British troops appear to have relied mainly upon the light and handy Lewis gun, with its spurts of fire from a revolving drum. The weight and cumbersomeness of the German machine gun formed a serious disadvantage when the teams had to speed up behind a line of bomb throwers. The British used their guns up in considerable quantities, and abandoned them when they had paid for themselves and a rapid retirement was inevitable.

After the main body of South Africans was relieved, the brunt of the fighting fell upon the Scottish regiments who had made a great fight around Waterlot Farm and Guillemont, and upon the English battalions who moved up in support. The Prussians, who made considerable gains on July 18, were pressed back into the valley on July 19 and July 20. A fresh Brandenburg division advanced up the village street and up the gradient of the wood, only to be countered by the Highlanders. Then, on July 20, Sir Douglas Haig threw a new and unexpected weight into the main battle front, and enabled Sir Henry Rawlinson to make a sudden spring from the Bazentin ridge to High Wood.

This general resumption of the offensive was based upon an important success on the left flank of the British line. Here the downland fortress of Ovillers, which had been stormed and lost on July 1, had barred for more than a fortnight the use of the wide slopes rising by Contalmaison Wood to the high dominant point of Pozières. A force of Prussian Guards held the deep caverns in the chalk height and manned the concrete emplacements in which there were slits for working machine guns. The Prussians were men of an indomitable character. Although all the buildings above them were obliterated by unceasing heavy gun fire, they continued to fight for every yard of ground. Early in the struggle a force of fresh British troops rushed the

A SUDDEN SPRING

underground fortress from the western side and, linking up with the original attackers, left the enemy isolated on the higher ground lying to the northward.

All that then remained to do was to clear out the Guardsmen. But the underground town of Ovillers was not easily cleared out, being held by an heroic band, led by officers who clearly understood the large, strategical value of every day's resistance. For 17 days handfuls of English and Irish soldiers fought the Germans above ground and underground, in broken traverses, shell-craters, ditches, corridors and caves. The Irishmen tried to carry a redoubt by storm, but were caught in streams of machine gun fire. The Cheshires went forward in small parties with hand grenades, and sapped down to the underground city and mined the roof of it. Neither side bombarded the upper ruins, where not a fragment of wall remained two feet high.

The gunners were afraid of hitting their own men, and merely maintained a terrific barrage over the hostile communications. But eventually it was the British shell curtain that completed the conquest of the place. The original large force of Prussians was reduced to 140 men, and many of the cellars were foul with the bodies of the dead. For days no water reached them, and their stock of mineral drinks was exhausted. Worn out by 17 days' fighting, and tortured for want of water, the remnant of the Guard surrendered—two officers and 124 men—and were received with the honours of war by the British.

While the siege of Ovillers was still proceeding, some of the Lancashire men engaged in cave warfare on the right of the underground fortress prepared the way for an important movement that was to follow the fall of the frontal down. Some young officers were asked to send out a patrol northward. A detachment went forward in the darkness, led by a young machine gun officer, who took 16 machine guns with him. With his little but well armed company he struck up an old bit of communication trench leading to Pozières. Thousands of Germans were entrenched on the mile and a half slope leading to the main ridge, but for some reason the vital communication trench was neither garrisoned nor watched. The Lancashire detachment worked upwards for a mile to a strong redoubt containing four machine guns, their teams and a bombing detachment. Taken completely by surprise, the redoubt and its occupants were captured in a moment, and the adventurers then went nearer

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

to l'ozières where by another successful trick they captured four machine guns. When day broke the Lancashires had consolidated themselves in an impossible little British fortress in the heart of the German lines, and close to Pozières. They saw many things which they afterwards reported to headquarters, and which the staff found extremely useful in supplementing the results of aerial reconnaissance. Having seen all that could be seen, the Lancashires did not retire or hide themselves, but opened fire down the great slope on all bodies of German infantry moving beneath them against the British trenches. An infantry attack was made from the hill village, and broken up by the machine guns. The enemy then trained his artillery on the British position and started a wide enveloping movement with his infantry. While the ground was being ploughed up with high explosive, the Lancashires retired, carrying all their own machine guns and the four captured German guns.

This remarkable piece of reconnaissance was of great service during the enemy's incessant attack on the Delville Wood salient. It cleared the way for a great balancing movement against the opposite enemy salient of Pozières, which had become fully exposed to assault after the fall of Ovillers. In the battle of the Bazentin ridges no attempt had been made to extend the action towards Pozières. The farthest point gained by the British about Bazentin-le-Petit was a little over a mile east of Pozières. A considerable part of the intervening space was conquered in the early morn of July 16, when a fine body of English county troops, with whom were some Irish, broke into the trench system around Pozières to a considerable depth. At the same time other attacking troops worked towards Martinpuich, thus exposing more of the eastern flank of Pozières to attack, and increasing the length of the enemy salient.

This operation was covered by a general advance of the Bazentin line, during which the ravine running to Longueval was crossed and a considerable part of High Wood snatched once more from the enemy. The drive into High Wood, which the troops again entirely stormed in their first rush, deeply disconcerted the German commander. He slackened his operation in Delville Wood and Longueval, and turned his main forces to the task of recovering the supreme observation point that overlooked all his centre to Bapaume. In a series of costly attacks he recovered the northern trench in High Wood.

· ASSAULTING POZIÈRES

Every enemy attack was countered with mighty gun power and violent infantry action by the British commander, who had brought Devons, Suffolks, Cornish men and Edinburgh men forward from the Bazentin ridge against the High Wood ridge, while the men in Longueval swept back towards the northern end of Delville Wood. On July 23 all Longueval was won and part of the northern slope beyond carried. This savage thrust once more provoked the enemy commander, who launched more of his men in masses around the Delville ridge salient, which was at last forced by the Brandenburg division. But much of this movement of the British centre appears to have been only in the nature of a demonstration by Sir Douglas Haig. High Wood was still but a pawn in the game he was playing, and though he needed it to safeguard the western flank of his Delville Wood salient, in view of a combined Franco-British movement towards Combles, this Allied movement on the grand scale was not yet ripe for execution. Sir Douglas Haig was threatening his opponent in the direction of Combles, but he was making this threat in order to obtain more elbow room around Thiepval.

It was against Pozières that Sir Douglas Haig was preparing his main attack while he provoked the enemy commander at High Wood. Before the fall of Ovillers the Royal Fusiliers and other London troops began a strong advance along the highway from La Boisselle to Bapaume. Men recruited from the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's, the Baltic and Corn Exchanges had a leading part in the uphill fighting from La Boisselle. The enemy on the Pozières slopes swept the Londoners with machine gun fire and hammered them with shell. But in 10 days of continuous fighting the Royal Fusiliers and their comrades made ground steadily, and skilfully consolidated their gains until these formed another direct way of approach for the critical attack on Pozières. Then, after the fall of Ovillers, a London Territorial division profited by the great reconnoitring achievement of the Lancashires and ascended the slope north of the Bapaume road.

There were then three British spear-heads moving against the three sides of the Pozières salient. From two to four zones of barbed wire surrounded the supreme hill village, which also had a network of trenches running entirely round it, a grid-iron of trenches crossing it, and a subterranean fortress beneath it. German batteries covered Pozières and its long bare slopes from the Ancre sector on the right flank, from the Bapaume

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

sector in front, and from Martinpuich, Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Flers on the left bank. In view of all these difficulties, the Australians and New Zealanders were brought from Armentières to Contalmaison Villa for the closing drive against the height. These overseas troops had not been long in France, but during the Somme operations some of them had finely distinguished themselves near Armentières, on July 19, by making a great raid on a 3,000 yard front against the Bavarian troops. They there carried the whole of the first zone of defences against machine gun fire and a shell curtain, and though the Germans flooded their lost works, the Australians remained all night waist high in water, and, after digging communication trenches back to their own lines, returned with 200 prisoners.

Under the direction of their leader of genius, General Birdwood, the 1st Australian and New Zealand army corps prepared to advance from the tongue of land on which Contalmaison Villa once stood. The direction of the attack ran below the ridge line where the English county regiments had worked towards Martinpuich. In conjunction with the main Anzac attack against the south-eastern side of the enemy salient, another great attack was planned against the south-western side of Pozières by a fine English Territorial force. On Saturday, July 22, the British guns broke in a storm of fire upon the eight mile arc of German positions from Thiepval to Guillemont. As the day wore on the gun fire increased, until every battery with its aerial observer and forward observation officer was working at the utmost pressure.

A fierce bombardment went on at nightfall, and the British artillery then overcame the hostile batteries until midnight, when the British gunners lifted all their fire beyond the Pozières-High Wood ridge. Thereupon the British infantry advanced, broke the enemy system beyond Waterlot Wood by a fine rush, entered Guillemont and engaged the Germans there while the captured works were being consolidated. The British line was pushed forward from Waterlot Farm, partly through Delville Wood and High Wood, with some extension towards Martinpuich.

Meanwhile, the Australians and the Territorials advanced on Pozières. The Australians took two German trenches, and while sappers laboured furiously behind them to link the slope and the flat to the British system at Contalmaison Villa, the charging forces of the division stormed forward again into the small woods at the back of the village street. Capturing two guns and



TROOPS FOR THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE SOMME. Here British troops are seen moving up to the front line at the first battle of the Somme. This official photograph, taken during the battle, shows the nature of the landscape in the Picardy battlefields, to the left of the road being the splintered remains of a considerable wood. The battle opened on July 1, 1916 and continued into November.



TWO FAMOUS COMMANDERS ON THE SOMME. Left, General Sir Henry Rawlinson led the 7th division through Belgium to Ypres in 1914. At the end of 1915 he was given command of the new 4th army, and was responsible for the main attack on the Somme in July, 1916. In the autumn of 1918 he took a leading part in the final offensive. Right, General Sir Henry Horne was the only artillery officer to become an army commander, being promoted to the 1st army in 1916. He was regarded as the inventor, or at least the improver, of the creeping barrage used by the British for the first time in the battle of the Somme.



UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULT ON BEAUMONT-HAMEL. In the first battle of the Somme the British attacked from Gommecourt to Hardecourt, but were repulsed on the north section. Men of the 16th battalion, the Middlesex Regiment, are seen here advancing on Beaumont-Hamel.

Imperial War Museum



TROOPS ADVANCING UNDER BARRAGE. The creeping artillery barrage first used on the Somme in 1916, was directed so as to fall a little way in front of advancing troops to protect them from enemy fire.

POZIERES CAPTURED

bayoneting their defenders, they stabbed and bombed their way into the heart of the village. At the same time the British troops on the Bazentin front carried part of the enemy's new switch line, which had been improvised to connect the south-eastern corner of Pozieres with Martinpuich and Flers. But the Martinpuich forces strongly counter-attacked, recovered the switch line, and with bombs tried to harry the Australians, a small party of whom kept up the struggle in the switch, while their leading battalions closed with the village garrison and spent the night in fighting.

When morning broke the High Street of the village had been cleared and the ruins of the western side were firmly held by the victors. On the opposite side of the village the London Territorials, working forward towards the cemetery in a hollow north of Pozieres, charged up the slopes from Ovillers towards the trenches which the Lancashire men had explored. For three days and nights the Territorials pressed the enemy back, and at night-fall on July 25 they had accomplished their task. They had penetrated the main German line and joined up with the Australians at the top of the village. Deploying to the right and left, they worked down on one side to the Bapaume road, and on the other side fought upward with the Australians towards the Windmill position, which was the crown of all the Somme ridges. In the meantime, the Australians captured Pozieres after a terrific struggle. Delville Wood was also finally captured on July 27.

In the early days of August the British gained further successes, taking positions north-west of Pozieres, between Bazentin-le-Petit and Martinpuich, near to Mouquet Farm, and to the west of Guillemont, and made a further advance at High Wood. On August 18 a steady push was made all along the line from Thiepval to the Somme, and the Leipzig redoubt was captured after an artillery bombardment. The Germans made frequent counter-attacks, which were repulsed.

At midday on Sunday, September 3, the whole Allied front pressed forward. Australian and British troops attacked near Mouquet Farm and towards Thiepval, and against the enemy position north of the Ancre. At Guillemont the men of Munster, Leinster and Connaught showed the fighting power of the Irish in sweeping through the village to a sunken road 500 yards to the east. On the following days further ground was taken, and the British were within 1,000 yards of the town of Comblez, on which the French were pressing in from the south. On September 9 the

AUTUMN ATTACKS ON THE SOMME

same Irish regiments which had helped to take Guillemont carried Ginchy, and by September 10 the British had made good the old German second position, while the French had advanced almost to the gates of Peronne.

On September 12 a comprehensive bombardment began all along the British front from Thiepval to Ginchy. In this stage of the battle a new weapon was to be used. The "tanks," known officially as "Machine Gun Corps, Heavy Section," had come out from England under a veil of secrecy, and had been parked in secluded spots behind the front. Until the very eve of the advance few in the British army had even heard of them. After a preliminary attack in which the Hohenzollern trench and another strong redoubt were stormed, a heavy artillery barrage paved the way for the British infantry to advance. The Canadians took Courcellette in the afternoon; a Scottish division captured Martinpuich, while the London Territorials recaptured High Wood, but suffered heavy losses in so doing. The New Zealanders took Flers with little trouble, led in their advance by a tank, and a division of the New Army cleared Mystery Corner and advanced north of Ginchy in the direction of Lesbœufs. On the right, however, no part of the attack gained its full objective.

On September 25 the Guards captured Lesbœufs and Morval. A division of the New Army having taken Gueudecourt on September 26, advanced to within a mile of the German fourth position, and on the same day the French took Frégicourt, Gough's 5th army captured Thiepval, and Combles fell as the result of a joint British and French attack. The capture of Thiepval was, perhaps, the most striking event so far in the whole advance, for its defences had been elaborated to the highest point of perfection, and it had hitherto defied every attack. The Germans, as reported by their officers who fell into British hands as prisoners, had regarded it as impregnable. And second only to the British problem of Thiepval was the French problem of Combles, solved with a like success.

In all these operations the tanks had played their cheerful part. What they were really like the folk at home could not tell, because anything like an accurate description of their personal appearance was forbidden to the correspondents. All that was certainly known was that they were the queerest thing ever seen on a field of battle. They lounged, they sauntered, they strolled, they waddled; when they were not engaged in ungainly frolics

ITALY'S CAMPAIGN

they sat down somewhere and wiped out something. No one ever thought—certainly no one ever spoke—of them except as live dream monsters playing about casually until they found something to do which interested them, generally of a devastating character. Now and then they came to grief, perhaps because something went wrong with their internal machinery, more often because they got stuck in mud, apparently about the only obstacle which they could neither flatten out nor surmount.

By the end of September the Stuff and Zollern redoubts on Thiepval ridge were in British hands, and all Schwaben redoubt except the north-west corner had been taken. In October further successes were gained, and the British troops had established their position on the crown of the ridge between the Upper Ancre and Courcellette. Meanwhile, the French armies on the British right had pressed forward and gained much ground.

CHAPTER 15

The Italian Front

WHEN, in May, 1916, Italy was preparing to celebrate the first anniversary of her entry into the European conflict, Austria launched a colossal offensive in the Trentino. Equalling, if not in many respects outstripping, the magnitude of the German preparations for the attack on Verdun, the Trentino offensive was the most formidable undertaking that had yet been organized by the Austro-Hungarian staff. It was the long-delayed counter-attack against the positions which Italy had conquered from Austria early in the campaign.

The fundamental idea of its scheme was to mass large bodies of well-trained troops close to the line of attack, so that no time should be lost in bringing up reserves. Eighteen divisions of infantry, selected from the best troops on the Balkan and Galician fronts, were transferred to the Trentino, grouped and distributed so as to form three armies, two of which were intended for the front line, while the third was to be held in reserve. The supreme command was entrusted to the archduke Karl Franz Joseph, with Conrad von Hötzendorf, then chief of the general staff, as his chief assistant. The respective armies

THE ITALIAN FRONT

were placed under the immediate control of three famous generals—Dankl, who had command in Galicia during the early part of the war; Kövess, who had been victorious in the second invasion of Serbia; and Borövic, who had so stoutly defended Gorizia against the Italians in 1915. The number of men in the three armies amounted to over 400,000. They were supplied with stores sufficient to last them six months.

The method followed out in the constitution and grouping of the forces is extremely interesting. An Austrian division normally consisted of four regiments, each regiment being made up of four battalions of 1,000 men apiece. But for the purposes of the Trentino campaign the number of regiments in a division was raised to six. Two of these constituted what might be called a movable depot. As units they were not meant for the fighting line, but were to fill the breaches occurring in the front line regiments during the course of the struggle. By this system each division was enabled to make up its losses automatically, and consequently it was able to maintain a continuous and steady pressure on the foe.

The enormous amount of artillery placed at the disposal of the different divisions and army corps affords another striking example of Austro-German faith in weight of metal. The allotment of machine guns accredited to each battalion was raised from the normal number of eight to the extraordinary number of 32. In addition to this several regiments were supplied with small mountain guns (42 mm.) drawn by dogs which had been trained to follow the troops into the most advanced positions. The artillery of medium calibre was supplemented in similar proportion. Over and above all this was the great supply of heavy guns and the enormous stores of ammunition placed at the disposal of the expedition. The formidable train of siege artillery consisted of 40 12in. howitzers of the Skoda type, four 380's, and four 420's (15 in. and 16.53 in. respectively).

Before coming to the story of the attack it will be well to try to visualize the terrain over which it was fought. Any contour map of the Trentino shows a mass of serrated peaks and towering blocks of mountain in irregular and intricate formation—huge sentries watching over innumerable valleys and passes. Pushing southwards from the main ridge of the Alps, the Trentino forms a colossal triangular bastion. It is a wedge-shaped block of mountains, the narrow point of the wedge

THE TERRAIN DESCRIBED

penetrating far into the great expanse of Italian lowlands which lies between the Alps and the Apennines. From time immemorial this has been the starting point of countless attacks against Italy. The triangle is cleft through its centre by the valley of the Upper Adige, along which runs the southern portion of the Brenner Pass. For our present purpose we shall have to extend the political confines of the Trentino and speak of it in terms of the whole of southern Tirol, from the saddle of the mountain range to the Lombardian Venetian plains.

The Swiss frontier cuts into the western side of the triangle at a point about one-third of its length from its base on the north. Farther south the Toscolano valley leads into Lombardy at a point which seriously threatens the main railroad from Milan to Verona. Moving northwards along the eastern side of the triangle, the first valley of importance is Vallarsa, the opening of which is controlled by Monte Pasubio, 7,325 feet high. Farther north is the valley of the Astico, with the Cima di Campolongo and Monte Verena at its mouth. And still farther north the important valley of the Brenta leads into the Italian plain, dominated on its southern side by the towering heights of the Cima Dodici. In this sector, between Vallarsa and the Brenta, the great attack was launched.

The district is made up of innumerable valleys and passes amid serrated mountains. Mule-paths wind in and out on the shoulders of the hills, and carriage roads follow the serpentine courses of the mountain torrents. Towards Trent these valleys converge, so that it stands to them in the relation of a hub to the spokes of a wheel. It was possible to amass immense quantities of war material here, because even if the Italians were successful in stemming the onrush of the Austrian tide, there would be no need of a serious retreat on Austria's part, the mountains acting as fortress walls for the protection of men and material within.

From the Austrian positions on the protruding bastions of south-eastern Tirol to Vicenza is a distance of some 30 miles. Vicenza stands in the centre of that neck of lowland which extends from the mountains to the Venetian shore and through which the Italian railroads pass on their way to the north-eastern arm of the Venetian plain. If the Austrians should succeed in breaking through they would completely cut off from its base of supplies the great Italian army operating in the Dolomites, in

THE ITALIAN FRONT

Carnia Cadore, and on the Isonzo front. If the purpose were but partially carried out it might eventually succeed in forcing General Cadorna to employ the main body of his army for the defence of the Italian plains, and thus abandon the idea of an offensive on the Isonzo:

The general plan had been prepared long before the war under the influence and direction of General Conrad von Hötzendorf and the late archduke Franz Ferdinand, as part of the war preparations against Italy. A series of fortifications was built at Folgaria and Lavarone, dominating the upper valleys of the Astico, Assa, and Brenta. The whole territory between Vallarsa and Val Sugana was organized and militarized, with no other purpose than that of making it the starting point of a gigantic offensive against Italy at one of the most vulnerable points of her frontier.

On May 15, as the sun's rays were tipping the peaks, one 15 in. naval gun opened fire on the little village of Asiago at a range of 10 miles. Following one another at intervals of 20 minutes, five massive shells fell in the narrow streets, excavating immense craters, and creating consternation amongst the inhabitants. It was the signal for the general outburst. Along the whole line, from Rovereto to Val Sugana, the Italian positions were smothered by an avalanche of fire and flame. On a front of some 25 miles 2,000 guns were in action. Austrian aeroplanes hovered overhead, directing the fire of the artillery.

Towards the evening of May 15 the infantry attack was launched. At all the points along the whole line, from the Adige to Val Sugana, the offensive was simultaneous. Against the Italian position on Zugna Torta, which stands between the valleys of the Adige and Vallarsa overlooking Rovereto, a tremendous assault was made. There the Italians were not well established, because for a whole twelvemonth their trenches had been under fire from the Rovereto forts. Still they boldly held their ground, forcing back wave after wave of the oncoming foe. Five times the Austrians charged up the mountain; five times they were hurled back, their ranks depleted by the fire of the machine guns. Still they came on, reinforced at each charge, until the Italians were forced to abandon the hill.

Up the valley of the Terragnolo—a tributary of the Adige, joining the Vallarsa north of Zugna Torta—another avalanche poured. There the positions were rather thinly held by the

THE AUSTRIAN PLAN

Alpini, who, after delivering several counter-attacks with the bayonet, retired to the defensive line, Milegna-Soglio d'Aspio, which runs from Val Terragnolo to Val Astico, a few miles westward of the old frontier line. Though not strongly reinforced, the Alpini held the vantage points and were well supplied with machine guns.

On the extreme left of the advance, another army moved down the Brenta valley. The left wing attacked Monte Colo, on the northern bank, while the right pressed on towards the high tableland of Asiago, attempting to encircle Monte Verena and enter the valley of the Assa. Clad in white shirts, the moving troops seemed part of the snow-covered mountain. They crept silently along the shoulder of Monte Vezzena on the north and across the valley of the Torra on the south, scaling the mountain to a height of some 5,000 feet, where the Italian outpost was entrenched. When the Austrians were within close range the Italian machine guns opened fire. The enemy replied with a volley of hand grenades. Again and again he was driven back, but he returned persistently to the attack, each time in undiminished strength. Five attacks had been repulsed, and now came the dawn. Viewing the masses of their dead which lay on the mountain, the Austrians lost heart and returned to their trenches on Busa di Verle and Palauro.

The Austrian plan was now plainly revealed. It became evident that the attack in the upper Brenta valley was of a preparatory character, and that the enemy intended opening three roads farther south—namely, along the valleys of the Astico, Posina and Assa. The southward advance along the valley of the Adige was rather of a defensive nature. The capture of Monte Zugna Torta and Monte Coni Zugna would relieve the Italian pressure on Rovereto, and thus obviate the danger of an attempt at an encircling movement by Cadorna's troops.

Along the centre of the new line taken up by the Italians the struggle grew more intense and concentrated, the objective of the enemy being the high tableland between the Astico and the Assa, known as the Sette Comuni. This mass of territory projects as a sort of bastion into the Venetian plain and completely dominates the Astico. In order to move along the Posina and reach Arsiero, where the valley of the Posina joins that of the Astico, it was necessary to secure control of Cima Maggio, the key of the Borcola Pass in the upper valley of the

THE ITALIAN FRONT

Posina. Here an epic struggle took place. During a three days' combat the mountain changed hands several times.

For two days the heavy artillery kept up an incessant bombardment. At intervals the whole mountain seemed aflame. Trenches were utterly destroyed, steel and concrete parapets shattered, the pathways and aerial railroad pillars reduced to a mass of debris. The Alpini abandoned their position, which was immediately seized by the Austrian troops. When the Austrians were grouped and massed on their new ground the Alpini returned to the fray. This time it would have been suicidal for the enemy to use his artillery; and his soldiers were no match for the Alpini. Once more Cima Maggio was in Italian hands. Again the Alpini were driven out by artillery fire; again they returned.

North of Cima Maggio, on the heights of Monte Coston and Monte Costa d'Agra, a similar battle was fought. On the 18th the positions finally fell into Austrian hands; and then it was no longer possible to hold Monte Coston d'Arsiero, which had been one of the pivotal points in the first line of the Italian defence. The Italian centre was now withdrawing to its main defence.

In order to follow clearly the further developments of the struggle, it is important to remember that the line of battle was not continuous. It divided itself into four distinct sectors which were not in actual touch with each other, though they were the scenes of concerted operations. The first sector extended from the Adige to the Terragnolo, the second from the Terragnolo to the interwoven series of valleys which form the sources of the Astico, the third along the high tableland of Asiago, the fourth from Armentera to Monte Colo, on the banks of the Brenta in Val Sugana. The different sectors have their different battle histories. We shall consider them separately.

The movement in the Adige valley brought about the fall of Zugna Torta; but the Austrians were unable to press farther south, owing to the Italian resistance on Monte Coni Zugna. Realizing the extreme importance of preventing the Austrians from moving down the Adige valley or up the Vallarsa, Cadorna ordered Monte Coni Zugna to be held at all costs. On the northern bank of the Vallarsa is Monte Pasubio, which towers to a height of 7,325 feet, and dominates the valley. Directly westward of Monte Pasubio, on the opposite bank, the Pass of Buole leads into the valley of the Adige, south of Monte Coni Zugna. If Monte Pasubio could be taken the Pass of Buole

BORGIO OCCUPIED

would fall into the hands of the Austrians, and Monte Coni Zugna would be turned. An enormous number of heavy guns was brought into action against Monte Pasubio, and a bombardment kept up without a moment's breathing space, day and night, for three weeks. From May 26 to June 1 violent infantry attacks were delivered against the Italian positions, but they were only successful in driving the Alpini to the higher crests of the hill. From there all efforts failed to dislodge them. Deeming it possible, however, to gain possession of the pass, even though the high crests of Monte Pasubio still remained in Italian hands, the Austrians decided to make a blind drive and break through by sheer force of numbers.

For five days the battle raged. Austrian artillery swept the whole sphere, reducing to fragments the beautiful little hamlets that overlook the Adige. Each day operations culminated with an assault against the defenders of the pass, but the Italians would not yield an inch. On May 31 the final assault was made. A whole division was hurled to the charge, and throughout the whole day the slaughter in the pass continued. At last the division rolled backwards, leaving 7,000 dead on the ground. Thus ended the battle of the Buole Pass, and with it the Austrian hope of breaking through to Ala.

The left wing of the advance met with a similar fate. At first the onrush was successful, and on the 17th and 18th succeeded in driving the Italians from their advanced positions in Val Sugana. The Austrians occupied Borgo on May 19. They crossed the Brenta and drove the Italians from Armentera on the 21st. Crossing the Moggio on the 22nd, they occupied Monte Civaron, and on the 25th the Cime Undici and Dodici fell into their hands. Thus they opened the road to Asiago. But this movement brought the extreme left of the advance into the territory of the centre. Instead of moving directly down the Brenta it struck against the Italian position on Ospedaletto and was "cannoned" towards the centre. On the 27th an unsuccessful frontal attack was launched against Ospedaletto which cost the Austrians dearly. From this date onwards no further advance was effected in Val Sugana.

In the sector between the Astico and the Terragnolo the southern half of the Austrian central column was engaged. Having succeeded in driving the Italians from their advanced positions to the first line of defence, the Milegna-Soglio d'Aspib

THE ITALIAN FRONT

position, they followed up their advantage by bringing into play an enormous mass of artillery. A violent artillery attack was made against the positions on Monte Pasubio (7,325 feet), the southern peak of the Pasubian range. This chain of mountains runs from the Vallarsa to the Astico. In the centre stands Cima Maggio (6,150 feet), outside the Italian frontier, and thence in a north-eastern direction runs the line Maggio-Toraro-Spitz. Between Cima Maggio and Monte Pasubio is a depression known as the Borcola Pass, leading from the head of the Terragnolo valley to that of the Posina valley. Borcola is thus a key position. The Terragnolo flows westwards into the Adige and the Posina flows south-eastward into the Astico. By coming up the Terragnolo and crossing through the Borcola Pass into the Posina valley the way to Arsiero is opened, and thence the great channel to Vicenza.

The Italians maintained their ground on Monte Pasubio, but were forced to give up the Coston dei Laghi (Hill 1,859) and retire to the Toraro-Campomolon position. Firmly hinged to Monte Pasubio, as to the pillar^o of a gigantic gate, the line swung still farther backwards, until it finally ran from north to south on the range of mountains which form the southern ramparts of the Posina, its extreme right now resting on Monte Novegno. Here they made a desperate resistance from May 31 to June 15, beating back attack after attack and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. In the retreat to Monte Novegno Arsiero was evacuated, and occupied by the Austrians on June 1.

Meanwhile the northern half of the Austrian centre was moving forward on the Asiago plateau, sometimes called the Sette Comuni position. From May 15 to 21 the Alpini withstood the onslaught of the enemy, and on the 21st were forced to retire to the Verena-Campolongo line. But the territory here was of the most difficult character, constantly under fire from the enemy's great forts and affording very few facilities for the bringing up of reinforcements. The Italians further retired to the valleys of Galmarara and Assa, eventually evacuating Asiago, which was occupied by the Austrians on June 1. The Austrian centre was now well into Italian territory.

After evacuating Asiago and Arsiero the Italian centre fell back on its last line of mountain defence, which ran along the Sette Comuni plateau from the southern banks of the Posina to the Brenta. During the retreat Italian rearguards kept the

A NEW BATTLE BEGINS

enemy constantly engaged in the upper Astico and Assa valleys, with a view to hindering and delaying his advance as much as possible. In the meantime the centre of the defensive line was being strongly reinforced, especially in the Astico valley. For it was now a certainty that the Austrian centre would concentrate its full energy on an attempt to break through the Italian line.

The battle-line of the Italian centre formed two sides of a right-angled triangle. Originally it was straight as a taut string, bound firmly to Monte Pasubio on the south and Ospedaletto on the north. During the offensive the centre of the line had been pushed in a south-westerly direction, while the ends remained firm. Immediately within the angle thus created stood Arsiero. The left wing ran almost directly westwards, from Monte Novegno to Monte Pasubio, the right from Monte Novegno along the Canaglia valley and the Sette Comuni plateau to Ospedaletto. If the Austrians could burst through the vertex of the triangle, the Astico valley and the road to Vicenza would be open to them.

Being now the most important pivotal point in the defence, Monte Novegno became the immediate objective of the Austrian attack. It is the strategic key to the whole series of military positions here. A continuous row of hills runs from the plain to Monte Pasubio, forming a sort of turreted fortress wall. Monte Novegno is the great bastion on the eastern end, Monte Pasubio on the west. Should Monte Novegno fall, the secondary hills must needs follow the same fate. An immediate attack was the main hope of the Austrian cause.

On the afternoon of June 5 the battle began. From the rooftops of their homes the inhabitants of Vicenza could see the Austrian shells bursting over the hill-crests. At least 20 heavy howitzers had been brought into play against the Italian positions, together with upwards of a thousand guns of medium and smaller calibres. For four hours the bombardment continued, completely demolishing the parapets of the trenches and the barbed-wire entanglements. During the bombardment Italian airmen hovered over the enemy's lines and discerned numerous trains of ammunition-wagons, while the massing and grouping of infantry went on on a colossal scale. Austria was concentrating all her might against the gate which barred the way into the Astico valley.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

At seven in the evening the artillery fire abated and the enemy moved to the attack. Everything was silent for a while. The infantry swarmed around the mountain range, making a simultaneous attack from different points. The wooded slopes of Monte Novegno and Monte Cengio offered them excellent cover. Suddenly the Italian artillery rang out at short range, plunging a hail of shell into the woods. But the Austrian supply of human material seemed as unlimited as its ammunition. They came on in massed formation, calling out to one another through the darkness. The enfilading fire from the Italian guns was unable to keep them at bay. They reached the trenches, struggled through the battered terrain, and it seemed for a moment as if they would hold their ground on Monte Novegno. But suddenly, with shouts of "Avanti, Savoia! Avanti, Savoia!" the Alpini fell upon their foe, and before morning dawned the Austrian battalions had been driven back into the woods.

Again the artillery preparation began. For 18 days the struggle lasted, but the Italians did not cede a yard of ground. On the morning of June 24 Italian airmen reported that the enemy was retiring. The counter-offensive had already begun. Meanwhile, the extreme Italian left had driven back the Austrians from the farther side of Monte Coni Zugna. They had swept through the Buole Pass, taking Parmessan and laying siege to the Austrian positions on the northern slopes of Monte Pasubio. The Italian pincers were bending inwards the Austrian wings. On the 24th the Austrian generals learned of the Italian preparations for the conquest of the Cima Dodici. But one road of retreat lay open, the valley of the Assa. A few days more and the great army of invasion would have been entrapped. Realizing how critical their position was, the Austrian generals ordered a retirement. On the 25th they were in full retreat.

By the end of July the Austrians were well back within their old quarters, retaining, however, a few of the outstanding positions. Manifestly, a full pursuit on the part of the Italians was out of the question. The Trentino zone does not afford possibilities for the manipulation of large armies; so the rest of the fighting was left to the Alpini. Anyhow, as matters stood, the enemy had suffered a serious disaster. He had come into Tirol with bands playing and banners flying. It was the first time in the Austro-Italian war that the royal standards had

THE GORIZIA POSITION

been borne at the head of the troops. So confident were the Austrians of victory that they gave to their first attacks the character of a triumphal procession.

If the purpose of Austria's attack on the Trentino had been attained it would have completely dislocated General Cádorna's project for a vast offensive on the Isonzo; but he refused to be stampeded. In reorganizing his forces for the Trentino counter-offensive there had been no need to weaken the Isonzo. To meet the crisis and defeat it he had mobilized fresh forces which could now at short notice be transferred to increase striking power.

Believing that their Trentino exploit had achieved its main purpose, and that the Italian military machine would need a serious overhauling before it could be again set in motion, the Austrians began to send their effectives to Russia, and neglected to make special preparations for the coming storm at Gorizia.

Moving down the valley of the Isonzo from Tolmino to Gorizia two massive hills stand on either hand, Monte Santo (2,230 feet) on the left, and Monte Sabotino (2,000 feet) on the right. As Alpine hills go, they do not tower to great heights, but their bulk is huge, and the surface is gored by great furrows which create a veritable chaos of ridges, valleys and spurs. Monte Santo was the chief Austrian position on the left bank of the river. From this point there was full command of the Gorizia position on the south, and until the Italians captured the bridge-head it was the main support of the Austrian lines on Sabotino. On the right the southern slopes of Sabotino assume the form of a Gargantuan staircase. The chief landings along the descent are San Valentino, San Mauro, Oslavia, Peuma, Grafenburg and Calvario.

At the foot of Monte Sabotino stands the isolated mound called Podgora by the Slovenes, and Piedimonte by the Italians, which in English means "the foot of the mountain." All this region from Podgora to the summit of Sabotino is often called the Hill of Death, for it has been from time immemorial the scene of many dreadful combats. At Podgora the Vippsacco valley opens on the left, forming rather an extensive plain about six or seven miles in breadth, narrowing into an avenue and winding onwards amid the hills. The avenue leads into the plain of Laibach, a distance of about 40 miles. Laibach lies on the main road connecting the Danube with the Adriatic, and is therefore a very important centre.


THE ITALIAN FRONT

Opposite Podgora, on the left bank of the river and within the breach of low ground formed by the mouth of the Vippsacco, Gorizia stands. In a strategic sense the Gorizia position is the key to Trieste for two reasons: Once in control of the Gorizia defences, an army has the choice of two roads to Trieste; it may follow the Vippsacco valley at the rear of the Carso, or it may move southwards on this side of the Carso through Monfalcone and Duino, following the shore road from Duino through Nabresina and Prosecco. Along each route a railroad runs. If an invading army choose the former route, the possession of Gorizia is necessary for its forward march; if it choose the latter, the possession of Gorizia is essential to the defence of its rear.

General Cadorna's plan was to open the attack in the southern section of the line. With an intense eagerness the soldiers had awaited the order to advance. For them it signified the hour of liberation from the monotonous torture of warfare on the Carso. It must be remembered that since the opening of war the Italian line in this sector had never been stationary.

On the morning of August 4 the artillery opened fire against the Austrian positions on the Carso directly opposite Monfalcone. This was the prelude to a general onslaught on the Doberdo positions. During the impetus of the first success the troops were borne forward through the principal line of the enemy. While the infantry encircled Cima Debeli three regiments of Bersaglieri cyclists rode along the shore road from Monfalcone and seized Hill 121, the position which had controlled the approaches and dockyards of Monfalcone since the outbreak of war. Hills 85 and 121 were pivotal points of the Austrian line, which had formed a half circle around Monfalcone, cutting across the railroad and highway that lead to Trieste.

The attack on Doberdo was in the nature of a diversion, intended to deceive the Austrians as to the location where the main offensive had been prepared. The movement of troops along the main roads was constantly carried out under the eye of the Austrian gunners. Snipers had been placed in the observation posts, so that even a solitary pedestrian on the Gradisca or Monfalcone road risked his life at every step. To contend with this difficulty effectively and entirely escape observation the Italians decided to build a series of new roads. While carrying out these operations a system of blindfolding the enemy was adopted. Airmen constantly accompanied the



THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

Map showing the area of the fighting on the Isonzo in 1916.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

engineers and labourers, hovering overhead and warding off hostile aircraft. Long stretches of road were tunnelled through limestone rock. At the points where they emerged into the open, and followed new routes which had been excavated on the crust of the mountain, a system of artificial foliage was employed to screen the passage of guns and troops. Hedgerows were erected, tall pines grew in a night; and in some parts sheets of straw matting were hung on wires stretched from tree to tree.

At six o'clock in the morning of the first Sunday in August the heavy artillery opened fire along the whole length of the Lower Isonzo line. At 10 o'clock the infantry attacked the formidable line of Austrian trenches on Sabotino and Calvario.

The exposed trenches were taken at the point of the bayonet; but the Austrians had built a series of catacombs in the limestone rock, and had fortified the openings with walls of concrete and steel. Into these they retired, belching forth clouds of poison gas and hurricanes of machine gun fire on their foes. Hand grenades and machine guns made no impression on them. Then the Italians brought up huge quantities of petroleum, in the hope of smoking out the enemy. This plan was successful, but the chief garrison in the caverns occupied by the divisional commander on Monte Sabotino steadfastly refused to surrender. Only when his catacomb was a stifling mass of petrol fumes did the leader come forth, followed by hundreds of his men. On the morning of the 7th Monte Sabotino was in Italian hands.

The northern portion of the bridge-head was now in Italian possession. Throughout the day the fight still raged on Oslavia, Peuma and Podgora. In the evening Oslavia and Peuma had fallen; but Podgora still resisted. Directly opposite Gorizia, Podgora shuts out the view of the town from the plain of Friuli. It is a low hill, its highest point being about 800 feet, with a flat surface. It rises gradually towards the east, and then falls precipitously on to the bank of the Isonzo.

At the opening of the offensive the Italians had already gained the greater portion of the hill at the cost of immense sacrifices, but the Austrians were still entrenched on its eastern slopes. The modern epoch of howitzers and high explosives had given a leading advantage to towering hills. Podgora was a supporting point for infantry and light artillery. It had to be won before the Isonzo could be attempted, and this under a converging fire from guns on the higher hills.

PODGORA CAPTURED

Throughout the night of the 7th the battle for Podgora continued. Again and again the attack from the river bank was driven back; but the Italians re-formed, reorganized, and returned to the charge with unabated vigour. Meanwhile, their comrades on the crest were toiling as best they could. Volumes of asphyxiating gas issued from the mouths of the caves, ascending above the crest of the hill in wreaths of sickly yellow and green. Several times the trenches were entered and desperate hand-to-hand struggles took place.

About midday the end came in sight. The men in the trenches were creeping slowly towards the brow of the hill; and now they could see the church spires of Gorizia gleaming from across the river. It was the vision for which their eyes had longed. A wild hurrah rang from the foremost line. They swept over the crest of the hill and began to descend its steep side towards the river. But here the foliage and brushwood, which had been sheltered from the artillery since the start, concealed a hidden forest of barbed wire network, rendered still more deadly by the layers of explosive bombs embedded in the thick grass. The first battalions suffered heavily, but they were vigorously supported by their companions in the rear, while the enveloping column, which had advanced along the river bank, drew the fire of the machine guns and died as they crawled to the mouths of the caves. About two o'clock the enemy's resistance grew spasmodic, and a last wild rush swept the trenches like a whirlwind. Podgora was in Italian hands.

While the centre of the attacking forces was operating opposite Gorizia the right wing toiled upwards along San Michele in an effort to reach the crest that controls Gorizia from the south. If this move were not successful the fall of the bridge-head would have been ineffective, for Gorizia would have remained under the double fire of both pillars, Monte Santo on the north and Monte San Michele on the south. The brow of San Michele is crowned by four peaks, one of which juts like a bastion towards the west, giving a full view of the Italian lines on the side of the Carso. Three lines of trenches were constructed, connected by underground passages, and supplied from subterranean caverns where food and ammunition had been stored. Since the beginning of the war the Italians had made upwards of a dozen assaults against it, and sometimes succeeded in reaching the summit, only to be driven back with tremendous slaughter.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

At half past three on the afternoon of August 6, while the attack on Sabotino was developing, the troops in the San Michele sector received the order to advance. In the course of the first onslaught an unforeseen incident helped to bring about the fall of a large section of the Austrian trenches. While the right column was advancing, the attacking forces on San Martino succeeded in gaining some trenches and making prisoners. As the prisoners left the trenches with uplifted hands, the Austrian commander ordered the machine guns to turn their fire on them. The momentary distraction was providential for the Italians. They seized the western trenches of the San Michele line and had firmly established themselves while the machine guns on San Martino were mowing down Austrian prisoners.

Having once got a footing the Italians clung to their gains with desperate tenacity. They fought yard by yard, almost inch by inch. Having reached the second line of trenches, which constituted the principal defence of the crest, they succeeded in forcing the Austrians to withdraw to the caves. And now began the gruesome business of smoking them out. As on Podgora, the enemy made lavish use of asphyxiating gas, and his machine guns guarded the mouth of each cave. Bales of cotton which had been soaked in petroleum and set alight were now thrown into the cavities, but the labyrinthine system was so spacious that the enemy was able to barricade himself against the fumes. Mountain cannon were used, but to little effect. At length, after siege operations of the most extraordinary type, lasting throughout three days, the second line of trenches was occupied; and on the 9th the whole position fell. The Italians were now in possession of the Carso ridge from Gorizia to the sea.

With the range of hills from Podgora to the summit of Sabotino now in their hands the Italians were masters of the whole bridge-head, and were ready to cross the Isonzo. There are two bridges in the immediate neighbourhood. Both structures had been more or less injured during the Italian bombardment, and both still remained under the fire of the Austrian guns on Monte Santo.

Believing that Cadorna's troops intended to effect a grand crossing in processional style, the Monte Santo guns busily watched the right bank of the river between Carinzia and Campagnuzza. But the Italians had decided to go slowly and carefully, picking their steps and making sure of the conditions on the opposite bank before risking their troops in the open

GORIZIA ENTERED

stream. It was surmised that the Austrians had mined the bridges as they retreated. Italian gun fire had already exploded one of these mines, damaging a portion of the metal bridge. To cope with this danger small bodies of engineers crawled along the girders, carefully removing the unexploded mines which had been hidden there. As this work went on their companions mended the broken section under the fire of the enemy's guns; but the gunners on Monte Santo were hampered, for the Italian occupation of Sabotino made it possible to bring heavy howitzers into play against the Austrian batteries beyond the river.

Rafts were built and the soldiers were sent over in small batches; but the fire was so intense that the losses were very severe. A ford was discovered opposite the mouth of the Vippacco, and the leading files dashed in, wading bravely across, their rifles lifted high in sign of triumph and exultation. Luckily the big guns of the enemy were busy elsewhere. Within about half an hour the leading battalions had reached their goal. It was the signal for a triumphant cheer from the men who stood along the conquered bridge-head. At half past four in the afternoon of August 8 the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel III entered Gorizia. The first to set foot in the city were the advance guards of the Casale and Pavia brigades.

On the night of the 10th the Austrians retreated across the Vallone and took up their new positions on a line that runs along the hill-crests on the other side of the valley. This Vallone is of immense military importance on the Carso. Running almost directly north and south, it is a sort of low pass leading from the Vippacco valley to the sea. Opposite the Doberdo plateau, on the hills beyond the Vallone, Oppacchiasella was attacked and won on the 12th. The Italians were now pressing their enemies backwards into the hills in an effort to clear the way to Trieste. By the end of the month their lines ran from Hill 85, east of Monfalcone, to the high tableland of Pecinko, north-east of Oppacchiasella, thence in front of Vertoiba and along Monte San Marco to San Gabriele and Santo.

Two weak spots still remained in the line. The Austrians had held their ground on Monti Santo and San Gabriele, thus enabling them to annoy the Italian supply trains and troops passing over the Isonzo by the Gorizia bridge. It also gave them the opportunity of destroying the city, just as they destroyed

THE ITALIAN FRONT

Monfalcone from the Carso. That they intended carrying out a programme of destruction was made only too plain by their action during the first days of the Italian occupation. From this point of view the victory was not complete. The whole block of mountains that stand between the Idria and the Vippacco would fall into Italian hands if Cadorna's troops could bring about the fall of Monte Santo and Tolmino. As they stood at the end of August they formed an ugly menace on the flank of the advancing armies.

The great series of battles which swept away the defences of the Carso and the Gorizia bridge-head opened a new phase in the situation for Italy. Now that the Austrians had been driven from their most threatening positions she was able to turn to the general theatre of war and take her stand side by side with the Allies. On August 11 the first battalion of the Italian expeditionary force landed in Salonica. This move brought Italy into direct and open conflict with Germany, and it remained only to present a formal declaration "that from August 28 Italy will consider herself in a state of war with Germany." This document presented to the Swiss government on August 27 formally ended the unhappy Triple alliance.

With the series of battles which culminated in the capture of Gorizia the first phase of the Italian offensive came to an end. In taking Gorizia and the western heights of the Carso they had broken down the principal outer defences of Trieste. But between the Italians and their objective lay the block of savage country known as the Eastern Carso.

Standing at Gorizia and looking towards the south-east, the horizon is everywhere broken by a bewildering mass of hills, varying in altitude from a few hundred to about 2,000 feet, irregular in outline, with rugged slopes fitfully wooded and barren brows where every vestige of plant life is destroyed by the merciless bora or north wind. To conquer this territory was the objective of the three great offensives launched by the Italian army during September, October and November. The whole movement is generally called the battle of the Carso.

The battle of the Carso was begun in the middle of September. The original Italian plan, if it were to reap the full harvest of success, was to open the attack on Gorizia by a heavy thrust against the Austrian left, thus attracting the enemy's centre of gravity southwards towards Monfalcone; then to get round

THE SEPTEMBER ATTACK

behind him through the Vippanco valley, thus cutting the communications with Laibach and inflicting a complete defeat. But Monte Santo controlled the mouth of the Vippanco from the north and hindered the Italian advance through the valley. This hitch might have been countered if the Duino position could have been taken, for then the obvious rôle of the Italian army would have been a direct thrust southwards along the shore route to Trieste, turning the Austrian left and rolling it back towards Laibach; but the Duino position held out as firmly as that on Monte Santo. The result was that the Italians broke through the centre while the wings remained firm.

The defeat of the Austrians on the Isonzo was therefore incomplete, and its incompleteness changed the character of the Italian advance. It became necessary to adopt a defensive rôle on the northern and southern wings, while thrusting forward with the centre, in the hope of breaking through the second and third lines and curling them round the Hermada group, which is the great mountain bulwark directly north of Trieste. This movement would have completely isolated the Austrian left; but before it could be undertaken it was necessary for the Italians to better their position on the extremities of both wings.

This offensive-defensive stroke on the flanks was the scope of the September attack. On the morning of September 14 the action opened. The solemn roar of the big guns was the prelude of the symphony. About 10 o'clock a great crescendo was reached. An hour later the medium and smaller calibres joined in. The whole Carso, from Gorizia to the sea, was fire and flame. Reinforcements were swiftly rolling up. Towards midday the Austrian artillery answered with a tremendous antiphony, and soon afterwards the Italians were ordered to advance.

The sphere of action divided itself into three well defined zones. The conquest of San Grado was the task allotted to the left wing. Hill 144 was the main objective of the right. The rôle assigned to the centre was to support the attack on the wings and move accordingly. The Austrians had guessed where the main effort would be launched, but they did not know its purport. They were puzzled to find out whether the Italians intended clearing the way for the main advance through Duino or through the Vippanco. In other words, they could not guess whether the Italian purpose was to encircle the Hermada or take it by direct assault. The action in each zone may be followed separately.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

San Grado di Merna is a circular mound reminiscent of a Celtic hill fort, some 370 feet in height, situated on the southern bank of the Vippacco, about three miles south-east of Gorizia. On their retirement from Monte San Michele on August 8 the Austrians chose this as the pivot of their defence east of Gorizia. It served as a sort of universal joint, keeping their line on the Carso firmly articulated with that on Monte Santo. Not only does it control the Vippacco road on the north, but also from the western side it overlooks the important route which runs from the plain of Gorizia through the Vallone to the Adriatic. It was, therefore, a central pillar supporting the twin gates of the Vippacco and Vallone. As long as it remained in Austrian hands the Italians could make no headway.

The Italian plan was to attack the stronghold from the west and south simultaneously. At four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was launched by the infantry of the 11th army corps. The Austrian artillery enveloped the western and southern approaches in a dense curtain of fire, so as to hold back the Italian advance, while the Italians pounded the reverse slope and the summit of the hill, with the result that only a fraction of the Austrian reinforcements could reach their objective. Bursting through the enemy's barrage in a brilliant dash, the first waves of the attacking infantry were soon pouring into the front trenches. These were found to have been partially demolished by the preparatory bombardment. A sprinkling of dead bodies lay strewn along the irregular furrow at the foot of the hill, but the bulk of the defending troops had taken shelter in the crater on the escarpment and in the covered communication trenches.

When morning broke the flanking columns had succeeded in overcoming the resistance on the southern slope, and before midday they were nearing the summit. There the Austrians were firmly entrenched in the pilgrim church and in the cellars of the surrounding houses. A well-aimed shell from the Italian artillery struck the campanile, which had served as an observatory, utterly smashing it and breaking in the roof of the church. Sheltered by the debris, the defenders still held out. With a wild rush the Italian troops, led by their commander, entered the churchyard and surrounded the houses.

On the extreme right the struggle was of a similar character. Here the Austrians had held a position which might be called the twin hinge of San Grado. This position is always called

HILL 144

"Hill 144" (its height in metres) in military notices. Standing beyond the eastern slope of Monte Debeli it served the purpose of a watch tower at the southern exit of the Vallone, controlling the road which runs from Gorizia to Trieste through the Vallone and Duino. In Austrian hands Hill 144 had a further defensive value, for it stands in front of the junction where an important highway branches from the Vallone and runs directly eastwards at the northern foot of the Hermada. In conjunction with the Vallone road this forms an outer loop which receives several tributary roads from the important strategic centres on the Carso plateau. Therefore, the fall of Hill 144 would lay bare the arterial supply system of the Austrian defence.

On the western glacis of the stronghold the Austrians had constructed a deep zigzag trench, so well covered and protected that it looked like the casemate of some mammoth fortress. The protecting wall was a cyclopean structure of rocks and sand bags, with thousands of embrasures for the play of machine guns. Lower down, at different points of vantage on the slope, batteries of machine guns were installed connected with the main trench by protected channels. Close to the summit, about 60 yards above the main trench, ran another deep furrow, completely encircling the brow of the hill. A series of covered channels connected both trenches and led into spacious caves where munitions and men could be held in reserve.

The Italian plan was to attack the position from three different points. On the southern shore of the Doberdo lake one column awaited the order to advance southwards against the northern glacis of the Austrian stronghold. From Pietra Rossa, on the south, another column was to advance northwards. On Monte Debeli, on the west, two columns were ready to launch the frontal attack. During the first stages of the struggle these two central columns would have to bear the brunt of the enemy's resistance. Between them and the foot of Hill 144 lay a strip of ground about 1,000 yards in depth; but that stretch was under the open fire of the enemy's guns, not only from the stronghold itself, but also from the higher mountains to the rear and south.

About three o'clock in the afternoon of September 14 the flanking columns launched their attack. Within half an hour the troops from the north had gained the foot of the hill and begun to fight their way upwards with bomb and bayonet. Simultaneously the southern column advanced, driving the Austrians

THE ITALIAN FRONT

from the roadway at the point of the bayonet and entering the wood on the southern slope. The central columns then began to move. Before them lay the descending slope on the eastern side of Monte Debeli, the valley beneath, the roadway, and the western glaxis of the stronghold. They set forward at full sprint, covering a distance of nearly 1,000 yards within 10 minutes.

Then the gruelling work commenced. The lateral columns suffered under the raking fire from Medeazza on the south and Hill 238 on the north. The centre toiled forward through the tree trunks and caverns and rock-built barricades. The machine guns of the enemy opened great gaps in the advancing files. Volleys of hand grenades burst against the stony crust of the hill, scattering showers of splintered rock, denser and deadlier than shrapnel. But the Italian line held firm. Night came on—a night of terrific wind and rain. Under cover of the darkness and blinding storm the Italians were enabled to move up reinforcements. Morning found the troops holding a stronger footing on the ground they had won the day before. The Austrians now launched several counter-strokes. Six times they came on in dense waves; six times they were hurled back. Throughout the day the Italians were repairing the damage; when night came on the whole series of positions had been consolidated.

The morning of the 16th dawned clear and calm. About eight o'clock the infantry columns were in motion; at 10 o'clock the Bersaglieri were over the parapet, and about 300 Austrian survivors were captured. But the conquest of the hill was not yet completed, for the defenders still held to the topmost part and the concealed communication trenches. After two hours' further fighting, man-to-man and hand-to-hand, the enemy were routed from the summit. About 1,000 prisoners had fallen into the hands of the victors.

Though the advance on the wings, for the purpose of gaining freedom of movement for the main offensive against the Carso, was the primary objective of the September attack, the centre also bettered its position. Here, however, the advantages could not be fully maintained, for several battalions which had gained a footing east of Loquizza and Oppacchiasella had to be withdrawn in order to save them from the enemy's artillery on the flanks. Still, the gains were important. West of Loquizza, amongst the outlying houses of the village fortress, a number of trenches were taken and held. East of Oppacchiasella

THE SECOND STAGE

the line moved forward on the fortified Castagnevizza road. Farther south, between Nova Villa and the lake of Doberdo, one of the twin "202" hills had been conquered and the second partially outflanked. Violent storms and the necessity of consolidating the new positions brought about a pause in the action.

On October 9 the Italians began the second stage of the offensive. From the Vippacco to the sea the whole line was subjected to a violent bombardment. On the afternoon of October 10 the infantry assault was launched. The battlefield was divided into three separate zones—(1) the territory immediately north of the Vippacco, on the lower spurs of the Julian Hills; (2) the ascending ridge on the southern bank of the Vippacco; and (3) the Carso plateau east of the Vallone. We shall follow the course of the action in these zones separately.

On the heights east of Gorizia and north of the Vippacco some units of the 2nd army cooperated with the Treviso and Cuneo brigades of the 3rd army. The object of this movement was to enlarge the manoeuvring ground for the troops which operated on the Vippacco. It would also compel the enemy to keep a mass of reserves here and thus weaken his resistance on the Carso. Besides, every new position gained on the Sober ridge would drive home a little farther the right arm of the forceps, by means of which the Italians were striving to tear the Monte Santo molar from the Austrian jaw.

The outstanding feature of the landscape is the hill of San Marco (750 feet), the southern slope of which runs down to the railroad and the northern bank of the river. For practical strategic purposes it is a low spur of Monte Santo, the importance of which was explained earlier, a sort of bridge-head position shielding the approaches to the main block of hills. In like manner San Marco had several lower spurs, which may also be regarded as bridge-head positions in relation to the summit of the hill. The obvious Italian plan, subsequent to the capture of Gorizia, was to lay siege to San Marco, as a first step towards the encirclement of Monte Santo.

Owing to the advantageous positions which the Italians occupied to the south of Gorizia, it was possible to open a devastating fire against San Marco and its surroundings. So violent and precise was the bombardment that, even before the infantry advanced, the defenders had already lost 60 per cent of their effectives. At half past three in the afternoon of the 10th the

THE ITALIAN FRONT

infantry attack was launched. As the Italians entered the wooded terrain on the southern slope of the hill, the Austrians took shelter in the parks behind the ruins of the once princely villas. Through the night of the 11th and the morning of the 12th the struggle continued. The Italian artillery had succeeded in gaining control of the Austrian approaches, so that no further reinforcements could be sent. Again and again the defending commander signalled for help, but received none. Still he defended every yard of his ground. Prisoners yielded only in twos and threes. About midday the main redoubts had fallen and two Austrian regiments had been practically exterminated in addition to other losses.

A rich booty in machine guns and bomb-throwers fell to the Italians. Towards evening the remaining subsidiary spurs of San Marco had been taken, but the Austrians still held the summit. Several times they counter-attacked, but failed on each occasion. Though unable to press the attack as far as the summit of the hill, the victors held all the ground that had been gained, and were firmly consolidated when the fury of the battle began to wane. The winning of these spurs was a very important success, for it robbed the enemy of valuable tactical supports and rendered his position on the summit extremely difficult. From that day onward San Marco remained isolated on two sides and a part of the third, with the result that the bringing up of supplies became difficult and dangerous.

While these successes were being gained by the left wing, the centre was pushing forward against the Carso Pentagon. At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th the assault was launched against the powerful line which ran from the northern ridge of the Carso to the Oppacchiasella-Castagnevizza road, a distance of about three miles. On this front the Austrians had built their trenches, protecting them by walls of rocks and sand-bags covered with metal shields. Deep layers of entanglements lay in front of each line, so cleverly concealed in parts as to make it impossible for the Italian gunners to sight them.

In occupying the front line little difficulty was experienced, for the preparatory artillery fire had demolished the parapets and strewn the ditches with dead and wounded. Within a few hours the northern section of the line had fallen; but to the south, around Point 201, the resistance was more stubborn, for this blocked the road to Castagnevizza. Here the Austrians had

FORTIFIED RUINS

constructed a series of trenches in quadrangular formation, protected by dense rows of barbed wire and connected with one another by a labyrinth of underground channels. A new brigade, which was to experience its first battle, attacked the position. After several hours of desperate fighting with bomb and bayonet the defenders surrendered. When night came the village of Loquizza had been reached.

Next morning the attack was renewed. The Italians commenced to ascend the mammoth staircase. On Veliki Hriback the Austrians contended every yard of ground. This terrain was more difficult than that over which the battle of the previous day had been fought. Advancing upwards, the leading columns found in their path a thickly wooded crater which had not been mapped by the aeroplane observers. Here the Austrians had employed every means at their disposal to make the ground impassable. Any attempt to encircle the hollow would have exposed the troops to the enemy's artillery on the flanks. The only hope was to advance cautiously and clear the ground yard by yard. After two days' terrific struggle a firm footing had been gained in the centre and on the rim of the crater. But it was impossible to proceed farther until the ground had been subjected to an artillery bombardment.

South of the Castagnevizza road the fortified ruins of Nova Villa were the main storm-centre, standing south of Oppacchia-sella, at a distance of about 1,000 yards. Through the western outskirts the Austrians had built a deep trench, and another through the heart of the village. The strong point of the latter was the piazza and campanile of the church, which had offered a good opportunity for the emplacement of artillery. Both these trenches ran to the foot of the neighbouring Hill 208, outside the south-western corner of the village, whence they branched into a deep causeway that encircled the hill-top.

The iron brigade of Calabria had been entrusted with the task of conquering Hill 208. The first onslaught brought them astride the front line of trenches between the village and the hill, but the Austrians now pivoted their defence of the hill on a system of irregularly grouped redoubts which was very difficult to reduce. During the first day's fighting 1,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Italians. On the third day of the struggle the village fell and the hill was carried by the force of a terrific simultaneous attack on left, right and centre. By the

THE ITALIAN FRONT

evening of the 14th the position was solidly held, and the advancing troops had entrenched amid the outlying houses of the village of Hudilog.

For the moment the offensive was over. It had succeeded in pressing forward the line over a distance of 500 yards at some points and nearly two miles at others; and, more important than mere territorial advance, it had also taken from the enemy several strongly fortified positions of great strategic value. During the whole of the action the Italians had taken 8,219 prisoners (including 254 officers), 31 trench mortars, 82 cases of cartridges, and a rich booty in general war material.

On several occasions towards the end of October attempts were made to prepare the ground for a new offensive, but the heavy rains and fogs prevented their continuance. Warned of the forthcoming onslaught, the Austrians spared no pains in strengthening themselves against it. During the latter half of October, Italian airmen reported an incessant stream of daily and nightly traffic through the railway stations of Opicina, Nabresina and Duttolo Duttagliano. This meant that the Austrians were bringing up their reserves from the home bases and effectives from the eastern front in order to make the road to Trieste impassable.

On October 31 the weather improved and the demolition fire of the artillery began. It was sustained throughout the night and intensified on the following morning. Scouting parties having ascertained that great gaps had been opened in the enemy's line, the order to advance was given. The immediate objective of the attack was the second line on the Carso plateau from the Vippacco to the Hermada mountains. The strong points of this were the summits of Veliki Hriback and Monte Pecinka.

On the morning of November 1 the curtain fire lifted and the batteries lengthened the range. At 11 o'clock the infantry left their trenches and against all the strongholds along the front—Veliki Hriback, Pecinka, the village of Loquizza, and the southern flank of the Castagnevizza road—a simultaneous onslaught was launched. At 11.30 four dense columns on the extreme right of the attack had already driven the enemy from his main positions to the south of the road. In one wild rush the Spezia brigade, with the Cremona brigade on the left, carried every obstacle in its path. So sudden was the avalanche and so fierce the driving force that it dazed and bewildered the enemy. Within half an hour the Italians were in the Austrian second line

FORWARD, BERSAGLIERI !

of defence, without having halted to clear the battlefield or send back prisoners. Lukatic was swiftly encircled and before midday the victors were entrenching amid its ruins.

Then the famous *dolina* (the *dolina* of the brigands) beyond the village became the scene of a desperate conflict. This cavern was about 150 yards in length and an average of 40 yards in depth. At one o'clock in the afternoon the defenders were already giving way, and an hour later the cavern had been fully cleared. The Latin troops were now beyond Segeti. So swift had been their onrush that they were already on the fringe of their curtain fire.

On the immediate left of this thrust another force, composed of the 6th and 12th Bersaglieri, pushed forward on the southern slope of Monte Pecinka. There the rush was also like that of a pent-up torrent suddenly let loose. Before the gunners on the summit of the hill could realize the precise direction of the attack the Italians had pounced upon them. The surprise was largely due to the fact that the Austrian gunners had expected the full blow to come on the ridge between Veliki Hriback and Pecinka. Now they were suddenly seized from the south, while the north remained quiet. But as they were reorganizing their plans of defence a swift blow was struck in the north. Both attacks had been carried out by young Bersaglieri regiments, a force trained to swift and impetuous advance. Finding themselves so suddenly encircled, the Austrians surrendered the two batteries, containing six 4.13 in. guns, which had defended the position, together with large supplies of ammunition and food stores.

The Italian command had planned this thrust with the object of clearing the ground for an attack on Veliki Hriback. Thus supported from the south, the blow against the summit of Veliki was now guaranteed its full striking force. The deep cavern and heavily fortified wood which had so stubbornly held back the advance in October were carried in the first rush. But the struggle for the summit turned out to be an arduous task. Here the terrain was a barren patch of rocky hill, cleft in twain by a deep semicircular fosse.

Suddenly a wave of excitement passed along the groups of onlookers who crouched in the Italian observatories. "Ecco! Ecco! Savoia! Avanti, Savoia!" they shouted frantically. Triumphant a row of hands was pointed towards the southern slopes of Veliki, where nobody—except those in the official secret—had expected an attack. Out from the heavy wreaths of fog

THE ITALIAN FRONT

and smoke wave after wave of Bersaglieri sprang upwards. The Austrians had not expected or prepared for this charge. Within half an hour the foremost Bersaglieri were already on the summit. The Austrian gunners were attacked at close quarters before they had time to organize a defence. The observatories telephoned to the batteries on the surrounding hills, but it was too late. The Bersaglieri waved a tricolour in the sun. The Tuscans, who had been toiling up the western slope, now came forward. At midday the position was won.

Throughout that night, the night of November 1, tremendous difficulty was experienced in holding the positions which had been won. The Italians were clinging to the lower flight of steps on the mountain staircase, while the Austrians held the main landing, from which their guns mercilessly swept the positions beneath. For the aggressors the attack could have no halt until the enemy had been driven from his post of vantage. The principal position which he held was the towering hill beyond Veliki Hriback overlooking the Carso plateau to the south and the Vippacco to the north. Beyond Veliki, at a distance of about one and a half miles, the summit of Faiti Hrib (1,247 feet) was now the immediate and indispensable objective of the attack. The conquest of Faiti occupied four hours.

On November 2, as on the previous day, the troops advanced in three separate columns, a heavy central column making the frontal attack and a column on each wing moving somewhat ahead, with the idea of encircling the Austrian position. As the central column advanced it soon found itself exchanging shots with the advance guards of an Austrian column, counter-attacking along the ridge which runs directly westwards from Faiti Hrib. Realizing the meaning of the situation, the Italian commander made a bold decision on the spur of the moment. Wheeling suddenly to the right, he detached the main body of his forces from the impact of the counter-attack and threw them into the line of advance along the right wing. This lightning stroke immensely strengthened the impetus of the advance.

The Austrians on the summit were taken unawares, but made a desperate resistance. Machine guns opened gaps in the advancing troops; the hail of bombs was terrific. For the Italians the main hope was in the force of numbers and the lightning speed at which their troops could work. The Austrians were magnificently fortified behind stout rows of rocks and sand bags

A NOTABLE VICTORY

which had been protected by iron shields. The communication trenches led into roomy caverns where whole companies could shelter at a time. From these communication trenches and caverns they had to be driven at the point of the bayonet. The defenders, who were mostly Hungarians and Croats, fought like wild animals, but at six o'clock in the evening the position was safely in Italian hands. Waves of reinforcements and military labourers, for the work of consolidation, were already surging upwards along the western and southern slopes of the hill.

During the struggle the Italians came upon a group of huts screened from the view of the airmen by layers of thick foliage. From the roof of one hut a number of telephone wires radiated. Here was big game. On all fours the Italians began to creep stealthily towards the sheds. They saw an officer come out and put up his binoculars for a scrutiny of the surroundings. Soon the group of buildings was surrounded. The Austrians rushed out. "Siamo Italiani! Arrendetevi!" ("We are Italians! Surrender!") The commander and officers laid down their arms and surrendered all their material—maps, documents, etc.—to the conquerors.

Before the morning of November 3 all the outlying positions between Falti and the Vippacco had been taken, and on the Carso plateau the troops had brought forward their line to a depth of about a mile between Falti Hrib and the Castagnevizza road. During November 3 a vigorous push south of the road sent the line forward in that section another 400 yards, so that the Italian entrenchments now ran through the western outskirts of Castagnevizza. The Austrian strategic centre on the eastern Carso had been reached. The enemy had been forced to evacuate a position which he had deemed impregnable.

Thus ended the second phase of the battle of the Carso. Realizing that no other great advance could take place during the close of the year, the Italians settled down to the winter war work of organizing the positions and strengthening their ranks so as to be ready, when the weather conditions would be suitable once more, for the great thrust which should bring them to the gates of Trieste.

CHAPTER 16

Rumania Enters the War

At the outbreak of war Rumania as a monarchy had been in existence for a comparatively short time. Many people were still alive who could remember when that name was conferred on the state which arose from the union of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, for its public proclamation at Bukarest dated no farther back than December 23, 1861.

In King Ferdinand's phrase, at the beginning of the war Rumania did not sympathize with Germany, but was not instantly hostile to her; indeed, Germany had helped in the past to develop Rumanian industries, and therefore Rumania had been friendly to her rather than otherwise. But after a time there appeared a moral issue which Rumania could not but appreciate. As the war developed, the enemy's theory of frightfulness and lawlessness, which he had attempted to write into international law as a legitimate method of conducting war, came to affect opinion deeply. The principles that might is right, and that the end justifies the means, did not commend themselves to the Rumanians. These ideas were repulsive to them, but as they did not in their application touch the national life, the Rumanians stood outside the struggle. But with the progress of the war Rumania began to feel the subtle force of enemy intrigue endeavouring in every way to force them into the war against their own real interests, using every argument to make the worse appear the better cause.

German pressure on Rumania was very severe during the whole of 1915. The general situation in that period did not look well for the Allies. It spoke eloquently of the stability and worth of Rumanian character that, with Russia apparently beaten, with Britain and France at a standstill, and with Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria backed by German battalions, operating successfully in the Balkans, the Rumanians remained true to their better instincts, and would not permit themselves to be seduced from their neutrality. They were neither to be bought with bribes nor intimidated by threats, to both of which they were frequently subjected, according to circumstances, by Germany. On the



A NEW ELEMENT IN WARFARE. The Germans designed the flame projector, or flammenwerfer, to cut through barbed wire entanglements by melting the strands. They first made use of it in the first battle of the Somme



BRITISH HOWITZERS ON THE SOMME. In the Somme offensive the British artillery preparations were insufficient. Shells began to run short, and there was a lack of heavy guns for counter-battery work. This shows the 37th siege battery of 8 in howitzers between Fricourt and Mametz in August, 1916.



Imperial War Museum

DESOLATION AFTER TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING. Neuve Chapelle had been preceded by a surprise bombardment; Loos by a methodical one. Similarly the tactical element, discernible in the dual attack with unlimited objectives of Loos-Champagne, vanished and was followed in 1916 by vast single battles of attrition. The desolation caused by such artillery battles is seen in this view of the 8th Seaforth Highlanders holding a front-line trench in front of Martinpuich on August 25.



THE COMING OF THE TANKS. The tank first saw action on September 15, 1916. There were two types of this machine the male, equipped with two 6-pounder guns and a machine gun, and the female, armed with machine guns only. Above is shown a Mark I male tank on the Somme battlefield.

Imperial War Museum

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE COUNTRY

other hand, there was some disposition among the Allies, and even among certain of the Rumanians, to criticize Rumania for her inactivity on behalf of the entente Powers during that period.

Geographically, Rumania occupied a vitally important position with respect to the war and its strategy. On the north she had Russia, her ally, and Austria-Hungary, her bitter enemy, on the frontier. A peculiarity of her configuration in this direction was that her province of Moldavia was thrust up like a huge horn between Russian Bessarabia on the east and Austrian Bukovina and Hungarian Transylvania on the west. She was fronted on her western boundary by Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria, all practically German ground in 1916. On the south, along the Danube and below her area of the Dobruja, lay Bulgaria. On the east was the Black Sea, for the defence of whose littoral she could rely to some extent on the Russian Black Sea fleet, her own navy being so inconsiderable as to be nearly negligible. On by far the greater portion of her frontiers she was encompassed by enemies when she opened hostilities. As against that, these frontiers were very strong by nature, except on the Dobruja line.

Immediately on hearing of Rumania's declaration of war on Austria, August 27, 1916, Germany declared war on Rumania, and at once set about organizing a "punitive expedition" for the chastisement of the small state which had defied her; but she had something far deeper in her mind, and that was to destroy this salient with its threat to her ambitions. Once having succeeded in this effort, she not only would have consolidated her whole eastern front and rendered any change in it to her disadvantage extremely difficult, if not impossible, but she also would have gained a flanking position with respect to Russia. So far as Russia was immediately concerned, the Rumanian frontier became to all intents and purposes an enormous extension of her own front from the moment that Rumania began hostilities. The new front in Transylvania formed the southern flank of the whole Allied line from the Dvina to the Danube.

There was another reason why Germany was anxious, and in fact determined, to get into and occupy Rumania, and it was economic. Before the intervention of Rumania both Germany and Austria had drawn from the Danubian kingdom large supplies of wheat, maize and petroleum. The blockade of the German coast maintained by the British navy was for a long time much less rigorous than it might and should have been, yet it produced

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

a considerable effect, which was rendered all the greater by poor crops in Germany, with the result that "bread tickets" and other devices for husbanding the resources of that empire had to be resorted to. But had it not been for the food and oil that Germany was able to procure from Rumania, her plight would have been far worse. For her size Rumania was a rich country agriculturally. The great bulk of the population was engaged on the land; the nobles had their estates cultivated by peasants, while thousands of other peasants tilled their own holdings, usually of from 10 to 20 acres.

Rumania had always exported wheat and maize, but for some years past the working of the petroleum wells had been the chief industry, nearly £20,000,000 having been invested in it, and her output of the oil was not far short of 2,000,000 tons annually. The Central Powers needed the oil; one of their main sources of supply had been cut off by the destruction of the wells in Galicia by the Russians, and with Rumania at war with them another channel was closed.

But there was more than this at stake. German finance and financiers had got such a grip on the commerce of the country that in that field Rumania was almost a dependency of Germany. The state had borrowed from the Germans nearly £8,000,000, and nearly half as much again had been invested by Germans in Rumanian banks and businesses. About 90 per cent of the imports of Rumania were of Austro-German manufacture, nearly all her trade was in German or Austrian hands, and, in a word, practically the whole economic life of the nation had been directed and governed by Germans and Austrians. Germany, therefore, could desire nothing less than to see this rich little country slip out of her clutches; on the contrary, it was her intention to gain through the war entire possession of it. One of the first measures taken by Rumania after war was declared was the sequestration of all enemy businesses within her borders.

Political as well as economic and military considerations urged Germany on. Just as Rumania knew that because of Austria she could never hope to realize her national aspirations through the Central Powers, so did Germany know that a victorious Rumania meant such loss to Austria-Hungary, especially when coupled with the restoration of Serbia, that Austria would be seriously crippled and be of vastly reduced value to Germany as a political asset. And there was the further point, springing out of

THE RUMANIAN ARMY

the defeat of the Dual Monarchy if it came to pass, that the disintegration of Austria would lay Germany open to the attack of the Allies from the south, and would eventually lead to the defeat of Germany herself.

In 1916 the field army of Rumania consisted of five army corps. Each army corps comprised two divisions and a first line reserve division of infantry, with a cavalry brigade of two regiments; and each infantry division had two brigades of two regiments, each of three battalions. With each division went a battalion of chasseurs, an artillery brigade of two regiments with six batteries apiece, three squadrons of cavalry, and a company of engineers. The regular army, in addition to the five army corps, had two divisions of cavalry, each of two brigades, both having two regiments; with each cavalry division went two batteries of horse artillery. In all there were 120 battalions, nine rifle battalions, 20 cavalry regiments, 20 regiments of field artillery with six batteries (four guns) apiece, five howitzer divisions, three horse artillery batteries, 22 companies of fortress artillery, and eight engineering battalions, including a railway battalion.

It was a well-trained army, but lacked experience of actual campaigning. Not since Plevna, almost 40 years back, had it been engaged in war, for its invasion of Bulgaria in 1913 was very little more than a military promenade. And while its artillery and other "machinery" were perfectly adequate for the army on a peace footing and for a good deal more than that, they were not sufficient for a force of the size eventually mobilized. There was a marked shortage of really powerful guns. The horse and field artillery were armed with Krupp quick-firers of 3 in. calibre, and the heavy and mountain guns had come from the Creusot works in France. The infantry was armed for the most part with Mannlicher rifles, but Rumania possessed hardly enough for 600,000 men, much less for the 1,000,000 soldiers and more she could summon to her standards.

At the head of the Rumanian army stood the king, whose early training, as of all German princes, was that of a soldier. M. Bratiano, the prime minister, was himself minister of war. By profession an engineer, he first was connected with the Rumanian state railways, but soon gave his whole attention to politics, joining the Liberal party, which had so long been led by his father, the eminent statesman—called, like his son, Ion Bratiano—who induced King Carol to join forces with Russia against

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

Turkey in 1877. M. Bratiano had held the rank of captain in the Rumanian army which invaded Bulgaria in 1913. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities he resigned the portfolio of war, and was succeeded by his brother, Vintila Bratiano.

General Zottu was chief of the general staff, with, as his deputy chief, General Iliescu, who formerly had been secretary of the war office. The five army corps were commanded respectively by Generals Averescu, Cotescu, Aslan, Presan and Georgescu, but the most famous of them was General Averescu. He belonged to the cavalry branch, and all the four others were artillery officers. As the campaign proceeded through its early stages, changes were made in the various high commands, but the name of Averescu was prominent throughout.

In making their advance into Transylvania, the Rumanians looked for support on the right wing from the operations of the Russians under Lechitsky in Galicia and especially in Bukovina, where the two Allied armies could effect a junction and undertake combined movements which would have a promising prospect of outflanking the enemy in that quarter. Inside of a few hours after the declaration of war the Rumanians had forced the passes all along the frontier, and for several days their campaign went with a rush, town after town and village after village passing into their hands.

But while they were making this rapid progress in the north, things were very different with them in the south, and it soon, unfortunately, was evident that their plan of operations suffered from a defect of a grave character. This was that they had made a serious miscalculation with respect to the attitude of Bulgaria, and hence had not concentrated forces sufficient to protect their Dobruja frontier, much less to take the offensive from that direction. It was easy, as usual, to be wise after the event—to say that Rumania was wrong, and state that she should have declared war on Bulgaria and attacked her at once, even in preference to invading Transylvania. But the truth was that Rumania was misled by Bulgaria of deliberate purpose; though with the experience of the treachery of that country fresh in the Allies' mind, it was strange that Rumania was so blind to the perils inherent in the situation. Everything was done to deceive her. She was assured that the Bulgarians sympathized with her efforts to set free the Rumanians of Transylvania from the Magyar yoke. Bulgaria did not immediately declare war

A NOTE FROM BULGARIA



upon her; for two or three days all seemed to be well, and doubt was everywhere expressed whether, in view of the great cosmopolitan army of the entente Powers at Salonica, Bulgaria would dare to do anything against Rumania. One British expert took the view that Bulgaria, thanks to the menace of Sarraïl, would be only too glad to remain neutral. Germany, who in reality knew perfectly what was going on, pretended not to be sure, and frantically besought her to be loyal and stand by her friends.

Bulgaria revealed her true attitude by declaring war on Rumania on September 1. On that day M. Radoslovoff, the prime minister, addressed a note to the Rumanian minister in Sofia, containing a string of allegations regarding injurious incidents on the Rumanian-Bulgarian frontier, which he maintained had occurred during the previous months, and all of which he declared were caused or provoked by Rumania. The document concluded with the announcement of the existence of a state of war between the two countries. The Rumanian minister duly received the note, but he was not allowed to communicate it by telegram to Bukarest, nor otherwise to

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

acquaint his government with what had taken place until a week had elapsed. Before then, as a matter of course, the information had reached Rumania through other channels, but Bulgarian duplicity and bad faith were apparent in the entire transaction. And all the while Bulgaria had been quietly but effectively accumulating troops for an attack on Rumania's Dobruja front, and besides concentrating a considerable army of her own, had brought up strong contingents of Turks, the whole under German direction and supported by German soldiers.

No suspicion of the part Bulgaria was playing was entertained when the main forces of Rumania were set, essayed, and succeeded in the task of forcing the passes of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps on the night of August 27, 1916. The mountains, which locally have distinct names besides those by which the giant ranges are generally known, rise from 3,000 to 9,000 feet above the sea level, and the passes across them are of varying degrees of importance. Those over the Carpathians, from north to south, are in their order the Tolgyes, Bekas, Gyimes and Oitoz passes, the third being the best of them, as it had railway communication from Targu Ocna in Rumania to Csikszereda in Transylvania, the line there linking up with the circular strategic railway running from Brasso (Kronstadt) north to Toplicza and then down the valley of the river Maros.

An Austrian communiqué, dated August 18, gave the earliest news of the Rumanian offensive by announcing that during the preceding night the Roter Turm pass and the passes leading to Brasso had been suddenly attacked by the Rumanians. Next day Vienna stated that Austro-Hungarian troops were engaged at all the crossings of the mountains on the whole frontier; that the Rumanians everywhere had been repulsed, their losses being heaviest near Orsova, in the Roter Turm, and in the passes south of Brasso; but that the far-reaching enveloping movements of strong Rumanian forces had necessitated the withdrawal of all the Austrian advanced detachments to a position prepared in the rear, according to plans which had been made long beforehand in view of such an eventuality. The enemy had been taken by surprise. A Rumanian communiqué gave a long list of places captured by King Ferdinand's soldiers, and mentioned that the 4th army corps had taken over 740 men.

By the last day of the month the Rumanians under Averescu had progressed so rapidly with their invasion that they were in

THE RUSSIANS CROSS THE DANUBE

possession of Petroseny, north of the Vulkan pass, and of Brasso, beyond the Predeal; their troops were pouring through the Tolgyes and Bekas passes in the far north, and were threatening Maros Vasarhely, one of the principal towns of central Transylvania and a military base; while their victorious advance by the way of the Gyimes had compelled the enemy to retreat to the heights east of Csikszereda, a town situated about 23 miles within the frontier. At the same time a sharp struggle, with fortune turning to the Rumanians, was going on for the Varciorova pass on the Danube.

As the month closed Bukarest chronicled the significant fact that the Russian troops had crossed the Danube into the Dobruja, where they were enthusiastically welcomed by the population, and that units of the Black Sea fleet had arrived at Constantza to help to defend the Rumanian littoral. On August 31, General Zaionchovsky, commanding the Russian forces in this area, and his staff were in the Rumanian capital, and were received by the king.

General Zaionchovsky issued an order, in which he spoke of the Russian expedition's purpose and aims, and exhorted his men to win the good opinion of the Rumanians by showing that their conduct was above reproach. Serbians, who had succeeded in escaping from the clutches of the Bulgarians in 1915, had been formed into a brigade, which was incorporated with the Russian force. But in the north-western area the Russians already stood by the side of the Rumanians. On August 29 a Berlin official message announced that Austro-German forces had had encounters with Russo-Rumanian advanced detachments in the Carpathians.

Apart from the fighting in and beyond the passes, nothing of very special moment took place till September. Austrian monitors shelled Varciorova, Turnu Severin and Giurgevo on the Danube, and captured some small craft at Zimnita, while the Rumanians were reported to have bombarded Ruschuk, the chief Bulgarian port on the river. On the night of August 28 Bukarest had its first experience of an air raid, a Zeppelin and an aeroplane dropping several bombs on the city. Other raids of a most formidable character took place daily during the following month.

September opened well for Rumania. Her advance into Hungary still continued, with much the same rapidity, the enemy

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

retiring with some precipitancy, and nowhere offering a really serious resistance. On the first of the month the Rumanians won a striking victory in the taking of Orsova, after a bitter struggle which had gone on without cessation for five days. For the first day or two of the battle the Austrians claimed that they were entirely successful, and alleged that their opponents had been completely repulsed; but the event proved that their statements were fallacious. The Rumanians persisted in their assaults on the strong Austrian positions with the most desperate bravery, took two heights, the Allion and the Drenek, each over 1,000 feet, respectively east and north of the town, and finally drove the defeated enemy across the river Cserna, a northern tributary of the Danube. The way seemed to lie open for that offensive movement of the Allies across the south of Hungary which should cut the railway from Vienna to Sofia and separate Germany and Austria from Bulgaria and Turkey. In the entente countries the most sanguine expectations were aroused, but the chief enemy was fully alive to his danger, and had taken steps to obviate it.

Hungary was calling loudly on Germany for help, and at the same time was spurred on to renewed efforts. Brusiloff's great campaign in Galicia and Bukovina, in which many Hungarian regiments had suffered most heavily, had depressed her spirit, and there had been much talk of the probability of her making a separate peace with the Allies; but the Rumanian invasion, which filled the Magyars with furious rage, put new life into her. Profiting by Rumania's illusions with respect to Bulgaria, Germany was ready to strike in the quarter where a blow had been least anticipated, and on September 2 a strong composite force of Bulgars, Turks and Germans, which had been quietly concentrated behind the Bulgarian frontier, crossed the Dobruja line, and, driving on the weak Rumanian guards, achieved instant success. Presently it appeared that this army was commanded by Marshal Mackensen.

Lying to the east of the Danube, and between it and the Black Sea, the Dobruja formed a four-sided tract, about 100 miles long by 60 broad, and comprised an area of about 6,000 square miles. A considerable portion of it consisted of lagoon, marsh and sandy plains, the central part being similar to the Russian steppes. Its most important feature was the delta of the Danube on the north—an immense triangular, reed-covered flat, with many lakelets and morasses, through which flowed the

THE BULGARIANS TAKE DOBRIC

three streams into which the great river divides as it nears the sea. Only one of these branches, that known as the Sulina, was easily navigable. Roads were not numerous, and few were good in the Dobruja; but here were two railways, one from Bukarest to Constantza, and another running from this line, south of Medgidia to Dobric, and then into Bulgaria. The former line was of great importance, as it gave access to Rumania's chief port. The line crossed the Danube by a bridge over 11 miles in length, its western end being at Fetesti and its eastern in Cerna Voda. It consisted of a bridge of three spans, 500 yards in length, then of a viaduct eight miles long, on piers built on islands, and finally of a bridge 850 yards in length, of five spans, over the main channel of the river, which reached a depth there of 100 feet. At its highest point the Cerna Voda bridge was 120 feet above the low-water level of the Danube. It was to gain possession of the railway and capture the bridge-head if possible that Mackensen directed his offensive.

Without any natural line of defence, and having no fortified positions to guard it, the Dobruja frontier was easily penetrated. On September 3 a Rumanian dispatch announced that the enemy had attacked along its whole front south of Dobric, but had been repulsed. Next day, however, it was clear that the enemy was still advancing, as he had reached by then a point eight miles north-west of Dobric, and everywhere was some distance within the frontier. On the 4th the Bulgarians captured Dobric, and German and Bulgarian forces stormed the fortified advanced positions of the Rumanians at Tutrakan (Turtukai) on the Danube. Severe fighting developed at both of these places. Reinforced by the Russians, the Rumanians held up the Bulgarians for some time in the neighbourhood of Dobric, but eventually were pushed back, though without much loss, while at Tutrakan they suffered a serious defeat. The enemy was in greatly superior strength both in men and artillery at Tutrakan, and his heavy guns battered to pieces its fortifications. Ten times did the Rumanians repel his assaults, but in the issue were unable to achieve victory, and the place fell into Mackensen's hands on September 6.

An attempt at assistance by the garrison at Silistra failed. Both the German and the Bulgarian communiqués spoke boastfully of the fall of Tutrakan, and claimed the capture of upwards of 20,000 Rumanians, but the figure was probably exaggerated.

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

Following the fall of Tutrakan the Allied forces, commanded by General Aslan, retired northward, evacuating Silistra on September 8. The news of these reverses and of the withdrawal was received with calm in Bukarest, where it was declared that the capture of Orsova from the Austrians completely offset it, and it was pointed out that meanwhile the invasion of Transylvania was pursuing its victorious course.

On the northern frontier the Rumanians made further advances in the face of increasing opposition in the early part of September. They entirely occupied Czekely, in the Haromszek, the district lying north-east of Brasso, captured Sepsiszentgyorgy, a town 30 miles within the Transylvanian south-eastern frontier, forced the Austrians to retreat west of Csikszereda, and on the 8th were in possession, according to their communiqué of that date, of Toplicza, San Milai, Delne and Gyergyoszentmiklos. They were pressing the Austrians heavily in the Petroseny-Hatszég sector. But while they were meeting with a growing resistance, it still was not very energetic, as the Austrians were in weak force. The policy of the latter was to withdraw under cover of rearguard actions in the direction of the Maros and Oltu valleys.

The Rumanians continued to progress in all sectors, especially towards Hermannstadt, capturing several places on the way, among them being Schellenberg, where Michael the Brave defeated a Hungarian army in 1599. But now the reinforcements for which the Austrians had looked began to arrive. On September 13 Berlin announced that German troops were in contact with the Rumanians south-east of Hatszeg, near Hermannstadt. Within a few days the contest in the whole area north of the passes began to undergo fluctuations, the advantage, however, continuing generally with the Rumanians for some time longer.

In the meantime a bitter struggle had been proceeding in the Dobruja. On September 12 the Bulgarians attacked Lipnitsa, 15 miles east of Silistra, but were vigorously counter-attacked, and after an engagement lasting all night were heavily defeated by the Rumanians, who captured eight German guns. Fighting went on along this whole front on the line to which the Allied troops had retired, but it was regarded as unimportant, though the Bulgarians, whose veracity was not above suspicion, said they were advancing triumphantly. Then, suddenly, the

A DESPERATE ATTACK

world was astonished by hearing it officially stated that the German kaiser had sent a telegram to his consort, in which he said that Mackensen had informed him that the Bulgarian, Turkish and German forces had won a decisive victory in the Dobruja. The victory turned out to be by no means as decisive as the emperor had hoped, but it led to a further withdrawal northward of the Allied line.

All such reports were discounted by the peoples of the Allies at the time, because it was strongly suspected that inflated accounts of enemy successes were being published with a view to influencing subscriptions to a new German loan which was then being floated. But there could no longer be any doubt of the advance of Mackensen when Bukarest announced on September 17 that the Russo-Rumanian troops had fallen back to strong positions on the line Rasova, 10 miles south of Cerna Voda, to Tuzla, 12 miles south of Constantza. As the last-named was not fortified, the menace to it appeared to be serious.

Some days earlier the situation in the Dobruja had seemed sufficiently grave for Rumania, to transfer General Averescu from the Transylvanian theatre, where he had been conducting highly successful operations, to this threatened area. He arrived at this front on September 16, and made a thorough review of the position. Rumanian forces had been brought from the north-west, and further Russian reinforcements had come marching from across the Danube into this district. On the very same day a great battle began between the rival armies.

Numbers of Bulgarians, Turks and Germans, supported by powerful artillery, made the most desperate efforts to break through the Allied line, but it stood firm, and all the violent assaults of the enemy were foiled. His attack was most persistent and determined on the right near Rasova, on the Danube, his intention, no doubt, being to pierce the line in this sector and capture Cerna Voda, thereby cutting the Allied communications with the rest of Rumania. On the 18th the issue of the battle was still uncertain, but next day Averescu received fresh reinforcements, and then being in a position to take the offensive, succeeded in driving the hostile forces back in confusion with heavy losses. Severe fighting raged through the night, but developed into a complete triumph for the Allies. In the morning Mackensen began a general retreat, his troops setting fire to all the villages en route. Mackensen drew back for some

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

railes, and organized a strong line of defence from the Danube about Oltina to a point south-west of Toprosari, and thence to the Black Sea, south of Tuzla.

Interest now passed again from the Dobruja to Transylvania, where the struggle was beginning to assume an appearance that was somewhat less favourable to the invaders. In the third week of September the Rumanians continued to progress westward, occupying, after brief engagements, Homorod Almas, south-east of Szekelyudvarhely, Köhalom, north-east of Fogaras, and Fogaras itself, a town of some note situated midway between Brasso and Hermannstadt. At Barot, an important strategic point dominating the railway from Brasso to Foeldvar, the Rumanians registered on the 16th the farthest reach of their advance in that district up to that date—they were 30 miles across the frontier.

Germany, however, had now come in some force to the assistance of the Austro-Hungarians; her soldiers were fighting fiercely in the valley of the Streiu near Hatszeg, and the Rumanians were holding the conquered ground only with difficulty. On the 14th and 15th a two days' battle took place in the defile of Merisor with Hungarian forces, which, after bitter fighting, were defeated. Merisor, from which the defile got its name, was a little town about a dozen miles west of Petroseny, in the same region as Hatszeg, all being north of the Vulkan pass. On the 18th, German troops, under General von Staabs, thrust back the Rumanians in the Hatszeg sector after a very stubborn resistance, while in the north, in the Gyergyoi Havasok and Kelemen Hegyseg ranges of the Carpathians, enemy forces, predominantly German, began to oppose the invaders with much more resolution than before.

An Austrian communiqué of the 20th announced the complete repulse of the Rumanians south of Hatszeg, and the reoccupation of Petroseny, while a Berlin telegram of the following day stated that both sides of the Vulkan pass had been carried. But on the 22nd the Rumanians renewed the contest for this pass, and by a successful encircling movement forced the enemy to evacuate it and the contiguous Szurduk pass. By the 28th they had progressed 10 miles beyond the frontier, encountering and overcoming a formidable opposition on the part of the Germans, but they were not able to regain Petroseny.

A month had elapsed since their swift surprise attacks had resulted in the capture of the pass, and during that period the

FALKENHAYN IN COMMAND

Rumanian army had succeeded in occupying nearly one-third of Transylvania, or rather more than 7,000 square miles.

The "Transylvanian Gazette," the organ of the Rumanes, issued at Brasso, published an article, shortly after the occupation of the town, in which it said: "Awake, Rumanians! The glorious army of the great King Ferdinand is among us. Our brothers, our liberators, have arrived, for the hour has struck. You carry on the points of your bayonets the future of Rumania from the Theiss to the Black Sea." There was much to encourage such glowing and confident language—but the near future held deep disappointment. On the one hand, the territory occupied by the Rumanian army stretched from Orsova north-easterly to a little south of Hermannstadt, went on a few miles to the north of Fogaras, thence passed west of Szekegyudvarhely, which had been captured on September 16, and then ran on north in the Kelemen Hegyseg mountains, and up towards Dorna Watra to join the Russian line in that neighbourhood. It was an impressive extent of territory to have won, and though there was an offset in the Dobruja, where the enemy was still in possession of Rumanian soil, there was the outstanding fact that he had been defeated in his main effort in that district. Over 7,000 prisoners had been captured in Transylvania by the Rumanians up to this time. But, on the other hand, there was the ever-increasing pressure of Germany, who, in spite of her heavy pre-occupations both west and east, had been able, in conjunction with her Allies, to concentrate great forces with abundant artillery against Rumania, placing these armies under the leadership of General von Falkenhayn.

Already this pressure by Germany had been experienced in Transylvania in the Vulkan pass, and in the last week of September it made itself felt severely in the vicinity of Hermannstadt, some 50 miles north-east of that pass, and on the north side of the Roter Turm, from which the Rumanians had advanced from 15 to 20 miles. Near Hermannstadt, on September 26-27, the Germans began a formidable attack on the Rumanian positions which was held up for a while by brave and determined counter-attacks, but the enemy was in vastly superior numerical force and supported by heavier guns.

The fighting lasted three days, and ended in a somewhat serious reverse for the Rumanians, who were enveloped on all sides, and lost, according to the German account, over 3,000

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

men, 13 guns, 10 locomotives, and much other material. Their retreat through the Roter Turm had been cut off by a column of Bavarian Alpine troops, who had made a daring march across the mountain heights and occupied the pass well in their rear. The surrounded Rumanians defended themselves with courage, and tried to break through the ring that encircled them, but only a comparatively small number succeeded in escaping towards Fogaras, from which town another force of their own had tried to make a diversion. This battle, called by the Germans the battle of Hermannstadt, resulted in the re-occupation of the Roter Turm by the enemy, and on October 1 he was attacking a Rumanian force south of it near Caineni, thus having for the second time got a foothold within Rumania.

As October came in the struggle was renewed in the Dobruja, a Turkish and Bulgarian division being repulsed near Toprosari, south of Tuzla, by Russo-Rumanian troops. The Allies made an assault on the whole of the line to which Mackensen had retreated after his defeat of September 16-20, but though they inflicted heavy losses on him and captured 13 of his guns, they did not succeed in causing him to retire farther. It was probably to assist this offensive movement that a Rumanian force, several battalions strong, crossed the Danube and landed on October 2 at Rjahovo, a village on the south side of the river about midway between Ruschuk and Tutrakan, and in rear of Mackensen's defences. A pontoon bridge of boats had been cleverly got into position under cover of night, and the landing was made without any trouble, as the Bulgarian guards on the bank were taken completely by surprise and killed or captured. The Rumanians seized the neighbouring villages, but on October 3 retired across the river again.

While this indecisive fighting was continuing on the southern front of the Rumanian army, Falkenhayn's offensive in the north showed increasing power and momentum. It was now extending farther east in Transylvania, his chief objective being Brasso and the passes leading south from it into Rumania; but it also pressed with increasing severity on the Rumanian forces in the whole north-west of the country. In the district of Brasso, the most distinctively Rumanian town in all Transylvania, which the Austrians had evacuated and the Rumanians had occupied in the first days of the campaign, the German concentration in superior strength had the same effect as at Hermannstadt. Whereas

THE FALL OF BRASSO

Falkenhayn had gathered together a large army, probably of from 12 to 14 divisions—or about 250,000 men—for his offensive, the Rumanians had reduced the number of their effectives in all this area in order to counter Mackensen in the Dobruja. Their mobilization was still incomplete, they were fighting hard at this time in and about the Vulkan and Roter Turm passes, in which they were regaining some of the ground they had lost, and also were meeting fresh attacks farther north in the mountains. Unable to offer a successful resistance to Falkenhayn's main movement, they put up a stubborn fight in the sector of Sinka, north-west of Brasso; but he was too strong for them, and forced them to withdraw from their trenches. Driven back on both wings, the main body retreated through the Geister Wald, and Brasso fell to the enemy on October 8.

On October 7 a semi-official statement, issued in Bukarest, thus described the situation which had been brought about by the German general's advance: "In the valley of the Oltu, in the Transylvanian plain, and in the region of Hermannstadt-Fogaras-Brasso the Rumanian troops, faced by much superior enemy forces, mostly Germans, have been skilfully withdrawn to strategic positions on the Carpathian (Transylvanian Alps) frontier in order to ensure a strong defence of the four passes from Brasso into Rumania." It added that the Austro-Germans were plainly endeavouring to strike a crushing blow, and were bringing up troops from all the other fronts for this purpose. The retirement of the Rumanians in this district had been well organized, as was evidenced by the fact that the enemy claimed the capture of not more than a few hundred prisoners, in addition to over 1,000 taken at Brasso, while it was a fact that he himself had lost 600 prisoners at Henndorf, 50 miles from Brasso, and 800 at another point. Fogaras, between Brasso and Hermannstadt, had been evacuated on October 6. North and east of Brasso the Rumanians also were in retreat, Szekelyudvarhely being abandoned on the 8th, when it was occupied by Hungarian Landsturm hussars. On the same day Berlin announced that the Rumanians were withdrawing.

They were, in truth, retiring everywhere in central Transylvania, but in the valley of the Maros still held their positions for some time longer. Besides being in superior force, Falkenhayn enjoyed a distinct advantage over the Rumanians in having a lateral railway close to the frontier, for by means of it he was

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

enabled to transfer troops very rapidly from point to point, and to send reinforcements where most required. By October 11 the retirement of the Rumanians from all their advanced lines in the country was general. Next day Falkenhayn was making a strong bid for the passes, the heaviest fighting going on in the Törzburg, Predeal, and Busau passes. At last the Rumanians had to withdraw towards Crasna, a customs station on the frontier. The situation was now becoming dangerous, and falling back on her best soldier, Rumania sent General Averescu from the Dobruja, where he had done so magnificently, to the north, to take command of the 2nd army, which was defending the passes after its withdrawal from Brasso.

Bukarest was hopeful about the campaign, although the enemy progressed in the northern area, and was known to be increasing his strength in the southern area by bringing up large contingents of Bulgarian and Turkish troops. The situation was not really such as to make for cheerfulness. By the middle of the second week of October, Falkenhayn's offensive, which had dislodged the Rumanians from nearly the whole of the ground they had occupied in Transylvania except in the north-east, was becoming more and more formidable. In the main it was directed on two areas—the region of the passes leading south from Brasso to Bukarest, and the region of the Gyimes pass in the north-east. In the latter district the Rumanians, about October 11, had withdrawn from Csikszereda and adjacent positions, as well as those higher up on the circular strategic railway in the valley of the Maros, because they were threatened with envelopment in all this quarter.

Near the Oitoz pass there was fighting of an intense kind in which the Rumanians barely held their own, and this reflected on the stability of the defence higher up at the Gyimes. Falkenhayn's weight fell most heavily on the vital passes from Brasso to Bukarest, and that it was telling was evident from an official Rumanian communiqué of October 12, which stated that "from Mount Buksoi as far as Bran," or the entire frontier crossed by the four chief roads, several enemy attacks had been repulsed—the mention of Bran implying that Falkenhayn had carried Mocciu, the point in the Bran or Törzburg pass that he had been assaulting on the previous day.

Averescu and the Rumanian 2nd army fought with supreme valour to hold Falkenhayn, and on October 13 their magnificent

AID FROM THE WEST

efforts were crowned with success at the Buzau and the Predeal passes, the Germans being checked and thrown back. The victory of the Rumanians in the Predeal was important, as this pass was nearest to Bukarest, had a railway and a good road, crossing the mountains almost due south of Brasso at a height of a little over 3,000 feet. But on the following day the Rumanians were driven out of the Törzburg pass and had to withdraw to Rucaru, a small town six or seven miles within their own territory. It was against this pass that Falkenhayn had first flung his forces after the capture of Brasso, and after a bitter struggle had gained an entrance to it a week before. At Rucaru he was in the foothills, and well below the top of the Törzburg.

From Rucaru the road went over high, rolling ground to Campu Lung, 10 miles farther south, where was the terminus of a railway running south-eastward to Bukarest, some 90 miles away. On the other passes he made no advance that day, and was defeated on his flanks, on his left in the Oitoz pass, and on his right in the Vulkan pass. The fight for the passes raged all through the 15th and 16th, the struggle being most violent and obstinate at Rucaru, while about the same time the Russians in the Dorna Watra district, where the troops of the two Allies met, began a strong offensive, with a view to taking off the pressure on the Rumanians lower down, but were countered by "great forces," as the Petrograd official message stated. On the 17th Falkenhayn forced his way across the Gyimes pass and reached Agas, seven miles beyond the frontier. On the whole Carpathian and Transylvanian Alps frontier the enemy was attacking with great determination, and it had become still plainer that Germany was resolved to deliver with all her strength that desperate blow which Bukarest earlier had announced was impending.

The success so far of Falkenhayn had created anxiety and apprehension in the west. In order to assist the Rumanians, France sent a military mission, headed by General Berthelot, and it arrived in Bukarest in the third week of October. It was known that France was sending huge quantities of munitions, that Britain was also doing a great deal in the same way, and that Russia was strongly supporting Rumania. And as the Rumanians under Averescu continued to resist with persistence Falkenhayn's attacks, even inflicting heavy defeats on him in some of the passes, confidence in the ability of the Rumanian

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR

army to hold him off was to some extent restored. On October 18, in the Gyimes pass, the Rumanians won a victory over the Germans that cost them 900 prisoners and 12 guns, and at Agas, in the Oitoz region, surprised a German detachment, capturing 300 prisoners and some machine guns, while their strenuous opposition in the Brasso passes prevented the Germans from advancing. Yet the general situation on the northern front was still very serious; nor was it rendered less so by Mackensen's fresh offensive in the Dobruja, which started on October 19.

As has been seen, the Russo-Rumanian forces in the Dobruja, now commanded by General Christescu—who had been Averescu's chief of staff before that general's transference to the northern front—had been unable to make any real impression on the line to which Mackensen had retreated after his defeat on September 20. During the second and part of the third week of October there were encounters between the respective combatants, and an artillery duel was maintained most of the time, but nothing of vital importance happened. Judging, perhaps, that the enemy's menace in this quarter had passed away, or if renewed could be thwarted, the Rumanian high command probably had sent Rumanian regiments across the Danube to the assistance of Averescu in the fight for the passes.

According to one report, the Russo-Rumanian army began an offensive against Mackensen about October 17. A great battle was joined two days later, and the German commander launched his superior forces in waves of assault on the Allied positions after an intense artillery preparation which destroyed the Russo-Rumanian lines of trenches at several points from south of Rasova on the Danube, through Agemler, near the Bulgaro-Rumanian railway, south of Cobadin, to Tuzla on the Black Sea. On October 21 it was announced from Bukarest that the Allied troops had been compelled to retire in the centre and on the right wing, and a Russian official telegram of the same date stated that the enemy had taken Cokarja, a village lying north-west of Cobadin. The Germans claimed to have captured, after stubborn fighting, Tuzla and the heights north-west of Toprosari and west of the former, as well as the heights near Mulciova, south-east of Rasova, and declared that they had taken many prisoners, including 3,000 Russians, and some machine guns. This success of Mackensen now threatened in a very direct manner the railway from Cerna Voda to Constantza.

GERMAN SUCCESSES

This railway had been Mackensen's objective from the outset, but his first attempt to seize it had failed; that he was succeeding was clear on October 23, when it was announced from the Rumanian headquarters that the Allies had retired immediately to the south of the track. Having taken Toprosari and Cobadin, the Bulgarians pushed on to attack Constantza, which fell into their hands on October 22 after a fierce struggle. Under cover of rearguard actions and the fire of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the authorities of the town contrived to get away most of the stores, burning what they were unable to remove. The Russian ships did not leave the port until everything that might have been of use to the enemy was destroyed or in flames. By far the greater part of the population made good their escape, and the Allied troops retired to Caramurat.

On October 23 Mackensen stormed Medgidia, on the railway about 25 miles west of Constantza, and also captured Rasova, in spite of the bravest efforts of the Russo-Rumanians to hold them. The German report affirmed that in these and other operations on this line the Allies lost 7,000 men in prisoners, besides 12 guns, and the capture of Constantza was in itself a heavy blow to them. The Rumanians made a determined attempt to hold the eastern end of the railway at Cerna Voda, where the great bridge crossed the Danube; but the pressure of Mackensen was too overwhelming, and early in the morning of the 25th they had to abandon the bridge-head and withdraw by the bridge, which they afterwards blew up. The railway was in the possession of the enemy.

Mackensen had taken the railway, but he was still on the wrong side of the Danube, and its crossing had to be made if he was to cooperate effectively with the Germans in their efforts to penetrate into Rumania from the north. In that theatre the position fluctuated from hour to hour. The north-eastern passes showed some improvement for the Rumanians, but in the northern passes—from Hatszeg, Hermannstadt and Brasso—where the fiercest fighting continued and the enemy struck with far heavier weight, he was able to report progress, capturing the Vulkan pass on October 25, and advancing farther south by the exits of the Roter Turm, the Törzburg and the Predeal passes. The situation had an ominous look for the Rumanians.

CHAPTER 17

Smuts' Campaign in East Africa—(I)

THE year 1916 was to witness a remarkable change in the situation in East Africa. February saw the final conquest of the Cameroons, and East Africa became the only one of Germany's oversea possessions which still remained to her.

It will be remembered that Lettow-Vorbeck had held his own and more than his own until the closing months of 1915, in spite of the rigorous blockade which had been maintained along his coasts. He had partially lost the command of Lake Victoria, and one of the chief ports, Bukoba, had fallen to the Allies. This port was subsequently recaptured by the Germans. On the west and south-west, the British and Belgians had barely succeeded in holding in check the skilfully executed German raids. This theatre of operations was never more than subsidiary to the main campaign which was conducted along the Germano-British frontier to the north. But the Allied plans for the reduction of the German colony involved an advance along the whole of the western boundary, and the beginning of 1916 saw the formation of a British force and a Belgian force in this area, which were destined to play important rôles in the coming struggle.

The position in the north was still bad for the Allies. Lettow-Vorbeck retained his hold on Taveta and his raids upon the Uganda railway were continuing. But the long period of preparation was almost at an end. General Tighe, the commander of the British forces, had laboured with skill and foresight to prepare for an effective invasion of the German colony, and at last was almost ready to commence operations. In conjunction with the British forces in the south-west and the Belgians in the north-west he had planned a concerted advance which should drive the Germans south and east and finally pen them against the Portuguese border.

The difficulties of a campaign in a tropical country like German East Africa were never fully appreciated either in England or South Africa, and the growing outcry which the delay in effecting its conquest gave rise to in those places was as unjustified as

THE FORCES REORGANIZED

it was unfair. But as has already been told, this outcry did produce definite results. A recruiting campaign was begun in the Cape, and over 35,000 volunteers joined up for service in East Africa. General Smuts was asked to command the expedition, but refused, and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was ordered from England to Africa. On his arrival at the Cape, unfortunately, he contracted pneumonia, and was, in consequence, compelled to resign his post. The command was once again offered to General Smuts, and this time, to the delight of everyone, he accepted.

Prior to Smuts' arrival, the reorganization of the forces on the western boundary had been completed. Brigadier General Northey had been appointed to the command of the troops gathered on the Rhodesian-Nyasa border in January. He had under his command a mixed force of approximately 5,000 men. But the difficulties he encountered were enormous, and the authorities of Nyasaland and Rhodesia, who were responsible for his provisioning, were compelled to employ almost the whole of the able-bodied native population at their disposal as carriers in order to provide him with necessary stores and food as he advanced. These supplies had to be carried on foot or by canoe over great distances. The country was always extremely difficult for transport, and as his base was sometimes over 600 miles behind him, it is not surprising that General Northey's carriers numbered over 395,000. The significance of this figure is better appreciated when it is realized that the entire native population of the two territories totalled under 2,000,000.

The reorganization of the Belgian forces was also completed by the end of 1915. Major General Tombour was appointed to the command, and his troops were arranged in two columns under Lieutenant Colonel Olsen and Colonel Molitor respectively. The total number of men was 10,000, all natives recruited from the Congo, but the force was officered throughout by Europeans. The southern brigade under Olsen was stationed along the Rusizi river between Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika. The northern brigade under Molitor was farther to the north, partly in Uganda. Here again the problem of supplies presented great difficulties, but the Belgians were aided in this by the completion, in September, 1915, of the railway from the upper Congo to Albertville on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika.

This reorganization of the Allied forces much more than redressed the balance which had previously been in favour of

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

the Germans. Lettow-Vorbeck had made remarkable efforts to increase the number of his troops, and had succeeded in producing a magnificent force of some 20,000 men, 4,000 of whom were Europeans. But he was now hopelessly outnumbered and his days of offensive were over. The eventual conquest of his territories was only a question of time, and all that remained for him to do was to prolong his defence for as great a time as possible. Several advantages he still enjoyed. He had interior lines, he knew his country very much better than his opponents, his force was well trained and very compact, and he was relying upon native troops who were better suited to the climate and more adapted to the type of warfare in which he was engaged than the white troops of the British; but his greatest strength lay in the natural defences of the country itself with its high mountains and low-lying swamps, sandy wastes and fever-stricken jungles, and, worse than these, the myriads of insects that make life intolerable for white troops.

Shortly before the appearance of General Smuts in East Africa, the British in the northern section had been successful in repulsing attacks at several points, and the recapture of the Serengeti-Camp and of Longido was auspicious in the last week of January. A prominent feature of the fighting in these affairs was the work done by the naval armoured cars, which the natives called the "rhinoceroses that spit bullets," an armoured car in motion somewhat suggesting a charging rhino. Early in February the Germans evacuated Kasigau, having held it for about 60 days, but they still retained Taveta. A British assault on Salaita on the 12th of that month was repulsed with heavy losses.

General Tighe explained to General Smuts, after his arrival, the position of the opposing forces in the northern area, and detailed the preparations he had made for an offensive. Smuts himself reconnoitred the proposed line of advance, and this personal reconnaissance determined him to attempt the conquest of this portion of East Africa at once. So complete had been the organization and preparation for the campaign by Tighe, that Smuts, who cordially recognized the excellence of the measures which had been taken, was able from the start to devote his whole energy to active operations.

Smuts arrived at headquarters at Nairobi on February 23, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener his belief that the occupation of the Kilima-Njaro district before the rains was a feasible

HASTE ESSENTIAL

operation, and two days later received the sanction of the British government to undertake it. No time was lost in putting matters into shape for the advance, and by March 4 all was ready. His army was disposed in two divisions—the 1st division at Longido, and the 2nd division at Mbuyuni and Serengeti. The army artillery was with the 2nd division. He now transferred his headquarters to the field at Mbuyuni, retaining with himself as a reserve force the 2nd South African brigade, and one field and one howitzer battery.

There was reason for haste. The rainy season was due the following month, and operations would then be temporarily brought to an end. Smuts was convinced, nevertheless, that a decisive blow could be struck before he was compelled to suspend activities, and to this end adopted, with but few modifications, the general plan prepared by Tighe. In essence this consisted of an advance by two columns, the first from Longido, the second from Serengeti. While the first under General Stewart should work round the western face of Mount Kilima-Njaro and strike at the Usambara railway from the rear, thus cutting off the German forces defending the Taveta gap, the second column under General Tighe was to fight its way through the gap towards Moshi, and so pin the Germans between two forces.

The objective of both columns was Kahe, a small station on the Tanga railway some miles south of Moshi, but as the distance to be covered by General Stewart and the 1st division was considerably longer than that to be covered by the 2nd division, the former were given two days' start, and set out on March 5. Two days later, the 2nd division moved against Salaita.

Lettow-Vorbeck knew quite well the preparations which had been made by his enemy, and, realizing that in face of energetic attack from several sides he could not hope to hold the Usambara region or even much of the region north of the Central railway, had taken steps to prepare his retreat from three areas. For this purpose he had built a light railway from Mombo, on the Tanga line, to Handeni, some 40 miles to the south-west, whence a good road ran to Kimamba, on the Central railway. Along this route he had removed all his military stores, and everything which might be of service to him in the event of his having to evacuate the Usambara region. At this time he was fearing an attack on Dar-es-Salaam, and it is, perhaps, a little difficult to see why such an attack was not made. But when he realized

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

that the attack was coming from the old quarter, that is, through the northern frontier, he made energetic preparations to meet it. His position on the eastern side of the gap was remarkably strong, as it was difficult, if not impossible, to deliver a flank attack upon it. Calculating that the British 1st division which, he was informed, would be attacking round the western side of Kilima-Njaro would be fully occupied with the difficulties of its march and would not represent for some days a serious menace to his rear, he decided to place only about 1,000 troops in opposition to its advance, and disposed his major force of 6,000 rifles, 16 naval and field guns, and 37 machine guns to resist the advance of the British 2nd division through the Taveta gap.

Lettow-Vorbeck was perfectly correct in his estimate of the difficulties in the way of an advance from Longido, and the timetable which had been prepared was never kept to with any exactitude. Leaving Longido on March 5 the 1st division crossed with great difficulty a tract of waterless desert 35 miles wide and three days later reached Geraragua. But so exhausted was its transport that 24 hours' rest was imperative. The resistance of the few Germans was at no time very severe, but progress was further delayed by the trouble of finding a road. Not until the 10th was a track found. The division then moved forward again, but the resistance of the Germans stiffened and progress became painfully slow. On the 12th, however, the Germans retired hurriedly, and the advance was pressed forward. But it was not until the 13th that General Stewart reached Boma Jangombe, to be informed by telegram that the 2nd division had already reached New Moshi.

The purpose behind the advance of the division, namely the cutting off of the retreat of the Germans, had not been achieved, but the success of the 2nd division was sufficient to atone for this partial failure. General Stewart was directed to link up his force with the main body at New Moshi, and this was done on the 14th. Subsequent discoveries proved conclusively that an outflanking march round Kilima-Njaro was a much more difficult undertaking than had at first been realized. The two days' start that had been given to General Stewart was quite insufficient in the circumstances. A second factor had also intervened to prevent exact co-ordination. The 1st division had succeeded in forcing its way through the gap with unexpected rapidity. It was in this respect slightly in advance of its schedule.

DEVENTER MAKES PROGRESS

Setting out from Mbuyuni and Serengeti on the evening of March 7, Deventer, who was cooperating with the 1st division in the advance on Taveta, marched northwards all night. Early next morning he reached the Lumi river at two points, one, with the 1st South African mounted brigade, at the south end of the Ziwani swamp, and the other, with the 3rd South African infantry brigade, at the crossing of the stream east of Lake Chala. The ford was seized swiftly and with insignificant loss. Next, having made good the plateau lying between Chala and Rombo, he directed a converging advance on the position of the Germans at Chala, meanwhile sending out patrols to cut off retreat to the south. Thus threatened, the Germans, who were taken completely by surprise, fell back on their chief supports at Taveta, pursued by the South Africans, who, when they found their opponents in considerable force, halted before nightfall and retired to concentrate near Chala.

While this was going on, the 2nd division, under General Tighe, was bombarding Salaita, and the men of the 1st East African brigade advanced against the place, and dug themselves in to be ready for the assault next day, March 9. But at dawn Deventer with his mounted troops occupied the road between Taveta and Moshi, with the immediate result that the enemy evacuated the former town. Later in the day he gained possession of the bridge over the Lumi east of Taveta, and the Germans, taken on both flanks, forthwith retired from Salaita. On the morning of March 10 Deventer entered Taveta, forestalling a strong German detachment which had evidently been dispatched with the intention of reoccupying it. After a fight, this German force was driven back towards the Latema-Reata nek, west of the town. The 2nd division marched to Taveta on the same day. The initial moves of Smuts' campaign here had been most successful in strategy and inexpensive in casualties, notwithstanding the difficult country. Within three days the Germans were forced from their strong position behind the Lumi, though it was covered by miles of jungle, and turned out of their entrenchments at Taveta and Salaita at very slight cost to the attacking force.

Lettow-Vorbeck alleges that "want of artillery obliged us to look on quietly while the enemy executed unskilful movements at no great distance from our front." But, although he is entitled to his opinion, it can scarcely be doubted that

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

Deventer's turning movement found the Germans quite unprepared, and compelled their retirement from a carefully fortified position which could have resisted a frontal attack for several days. Lettow-Vorbeck with the main body of his troops was at Himo some five miles behind the front, but Major Kraut, after his retreat from Salaita, had taken up a position astride the road to Kahe, where it cut between two ridges known as Latema and Reata. This nek was strongly fortified and possessed the further advantage of presenting great obstacles to a turning movement.

On the morning of the 11th the British made a general advance, in the course of which the 4th South African Horse and the 12th South African infantry captured East Kitovo Hill after a brisk skirmish, while the mounted troops of the 2nd division reconnoitred the nek, where they found the enemy in force. The 2nd South African infantry brigade, with artillery, was then being brought up from Chala to Taveta. General Smuts determined to take the Latema-Reata nek, and for this purpose sent forward, under General Malleeson, a mixed force consisting of the 3rd King's African Rifles, the 130th Baluchis, the 2nd Rhodesians, Belfield's Scouts, the Mounted Infantry company, and field and howitzer batteries, besides machine guns, including those of the Loyal North Lancashires. About noon General Malleeson advanced to attack the spur of Latema, which commanded the nek from the north, but made little headway.

In the middle of the afternoon General Tighe took command of the operating force, as General Malleeson had become seriously ill. About the same time the 2nd South African infantry brigade reached Taveta, and Smuts ordered its 5th battalion forward to reinforce the fighting line. On its arrival Tighe assaulted the Latema ridge with the Rhodesians and the King's African Rifles, the Baluchis cooperating on the right. This attack was, in the words of General Smuts, "gallantly pressed home, especially by the Rhodesians, but failed to make good the ridge." The King's African Rifles were hotly engaged, and had the misfortune to lose their leader, Lieutenant Colonel Graham, and several other officers. The Baluchis, heavily pressed, had to be strengthened with half of the 5th South Africans. At eight o'clock in the evening the 7th South African infantry came up as a fresh reinforcement. Tighe now determined to try to carry the nek by sending up the two South African battalions to attack by night with the bayonet.

THE SOUTH AFRICANS' ADVANCE

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Byron, the 7th South Africans advanced in the first line, with the 5th in support. Attacking with great dash through the dense thorn bush, which was partially illuminated by a young moon, they steadily drove the Germans to the crest, where, however, they were checked. It was about midnight when Colonel Byron, with only twenty men, reached the nek within thirty yards of the Germans' main position. Some of his men had got lost in the scrub, and he had encountered fierce opposition. At one point the brigade major, Major Mainprise, R.E., and 22 men had been killed by the concentrated fire of three machine guns. Being unable to advance or even hold the ground he had won, Byron was reluctantly compelled to withdraw. He had given orders that when the crest was reached, Lieutenant Colonel Freeth, commanding the 7th, and Major Thompson, of the same battalion, should occupy the heights north and south of the nek respectively, the hills Latema and Reata. Freeth fought his way up the steep sides of the former till only 18 of his men remained, but being joined by some Rhodesians and King's African Rifles, who had clung on to the top of the hill since the earlier assault, he held on till daylight. Major Thompson, with 170 men, secured an advantageous position on Reata, where he dug himself in.

With the fighting so much scattered in a night that now had become dark, General Tighe found it almost impossible to keep in touch with his attacking troops, but, getting requests for reinforcements, he sent up the Baluchis, who fell in with Colonel Byron and his small force retreating. Tighe thereupon entrenched astride the road to await daylight. Hearing from him of what appeared to be the unpromising position of the battle, General Smuts considered it to be prudent not to press the attack farther, preferring to see what would be the result of a turning movement which he had ordered for the next morning. He accordingly directed General Tighe to withdraw before daybreak to a line more distant from the nek. This retirement was actually in progress when it was reported by scouts that both Latema and Reata were in the possession of the British and, more important still, that the enemy was in full retreat from the nek towards Kahe to the south.

Lettow-Vorbeck has provided the explanation of this surprising withdrawal. About 11 p.m. he was informed by telephone that the British had broken his line at Reata, and were rapidly

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

pushing on. If the news were true, his position was turned, and to avoid the danger to his communications which such an attack represented, he ordered Kraut to withdraw with all speed from the left wing and to fall back on Kahe. This order was carried out and the whole of the nek was evacuated. Not until it was too late did Lettow-Vorbeck learn that the message was a mistake. He was, however, committed to continue his retirement and fell back to his main position at Kahe.

Kahe was Smuts' next objective. From March 13-18 was spent in reconnoitring towards it, in bringing up supplies, re-organizing transport, and in mending roads. So far, General Smuts had succeeded in driving the Germans out of British territory, and in taking from them the greater part of the important districts of Kilima-Njaro and Meru. As the 1st division, under General Stewart, had now joined up, his whole army was available for operations. But he had to negotiate formidable natural obstacles in the Ruwu river, the upper part of the Pangani, and the dense tropical forest lying north of it.

On March 18 Stewart ordered a general advance towards this river, and that day his infantry occupied the line Euphorbien Hill-Unterer Himo without difficulty, while some of his cavalry marched from Mue along the road towards Kahe. The advance was continued on the 19th, but little progress was made through the thick and well-nigh impenetrable bush which fronted the German position on the Himo about Rasthaus. On the following day he directed Deventer, with the 1st South African brigade, the 4th South African Horse, and two field batteries, to march from Moshi, cross the Pangani, and get in rear of the enemy at Kahe. Deventer found the crossing of the Pangani far from easy, but by noon of the 21st he had taken both Kahe Hill and Kahe Station with slight loss. Kahe Hill was the key of the Ruwu position, and the Germans made several determined efforts to recapture it, all of which failed.

As soon as General Smuts knew that Deventer was nearing Kahe he ordered General Sheppard, of the 1st division, to advance. Sheppard's march lay along the road from Masai Kraal, south of Mue, to Kahe. But he had gone on only a short distance when he was checked by a German force in a strong position between the Soko Nassai and the Defu rivers. His attempts to advance were met and repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire in front and on the flanks. A turning movement made

A RICH DISTRICT

by the Baluchis, across the Soko Nassai, was unsuccessful. Sheppard dug himself in, purposing to renew the attack next morning; but at dawn his scouts discovered that the Germans had retreated under cover of the night across the Ruwu and were falling back along the road to Lembeni. Such had been the effect of Deventer's turning movement from the right; but the difficulties of bringing his force across the Pangani river had prevented him from cutting off the retreat of the Germans, and once again von Lettow-Vorbeck, seizing upon the exact moment for retreat, had made good his escape.

Arusha, west of Moshi, and an important centre, was occupied by some of Smuts' mounted scouts on March 20, the German force which had held it being dislodged and driven in a southerly direction. This completed the conquest of the Kilima-Njaro-Meru country, "probably," as the general stated, "the richest and most desirable district of German East Africa." Having transferred his headquarters to Moshi, and placed a chain of outposts along the Ruwu, he set to work to reorganize his forces for the next move, concentrating the troops as far as possible in healthy localities. Meanwhile, the rainy season supervened, and it was not till towards the end of May that General Smuts began his second advance, which ended in the occupation of the Usambara railway.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck had realized that he could not hope to hold his positions round Kilima-Njaro indefinitely; and his plan of campaign was based upon a gradual retreat before General Smuts' advancing forces. His problem was, from a military point of view, straightforward. With his inferior forces he was unable to prevent his enemy from enlarging his offensive as he chose. But Lettow-Vorbeck occupied interior lines and his whole force was considerably more mobile than that of his opponents. In the result he was able to adapt himself to all attacks made against him with ease. The heavy fighting, however, had once again made serious inroads on his ammunition, but as on a former occasion his anxieties on this score were set at rest just when the moment was most critical.

A German ship, the *Maria*, had set out from Germany some weeks before, and after an adventurous voyage via South America, the East Indies and Madagascar, had succeeded in eluding the British cruisers and had entered Sudi Bay, near Lindi, far to the south. She arrived there in the middle of

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

March, but was discovered in April. Although damaged by the fire of the British warships, she managed to complete the discharge of her cargo and got away.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of this exploit to Lettow-Vorbeck. She had brought in her hold not only four field howitzers and ammunition for the guns of the Königsberg, but also 12 machine guns, medical stores, food and clothing. Most priceless of all she carried 5,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and so solved the problem of shortage.

Having secured his road of advance, Smuts had several courses open to him. He could follow Lettow-Vorbeck down the Tanga railway where he had retreated. This would be playing the enemy's game and attacking him on ground of his own choosing. He could strike south-west at Tabora in the centre of the country. But the Belgians could be safely left to secure the country in that region. He could strike at Dar-es-Salaam from the sea and advance up the Central railway. By doing so he would divide the German forces in two and pin Lettow-Vorbeck in the Usambara region. An advance along the railway would also materially aid the British and Belgian forces operating in the west. Such a plan had much to recommend it, and it is questionable whether Smuts was right in rejecting it as he did in favour of an advance due south from Kilima-Njaro. He decided in favour of a direct advance inland because Lettow-Vorbeck having retired along the Tanga railway, had left the way "wide open and unguarded" and had exposed himself to envelopment.

In order to lessen the problem of transport General Smuts carried the railway line from Voi through the Taveta gap and joined it to the Usambara railway. This was completed by April 25, and he concentrated on equipping a fleet of motor-lorries with which he could continue his advance. His plan was admirably conceived and brilliantly carried out. Deventer and his mounted force were ordered to strike inland with all possible speed even though the rainy season was about to break. Smuts himself, meanwhile, was to move slowly down the Tanga railway, gradually penning the Germans along the coast. Deventer's objective was Dodoma on the Central railway. Having taken it he was to turn east along the railway to Mrogoro. Smuts having cleared his own path, would then strike south and unite with Deventer, west of Dar-es-Salaam. Unfortunately, the rainy season and the skill with which Lettow-Vorbeck used his

DEVENTER'S MARCH

forces in resisting the British advance delayed the achievement of those objectives for several months. Yet great progress was made by the middle of the year.

Moving from Moshi to Arusha, Deventer concentrated at the latter place, at the end of March, a considerable body of mounted troops, with the infantry and artillery of the 2nd division, mainly drawn from the South Africans. Advancing with great rapidity, his mounted forces defeated the Germans at Kissale on April 4 and 5, and marching south-westerly occupied Köthersheim, or Umbugwe, as the natives called it, on April 12, and Salanga on April 14, capturing many prisoners and driving the rest of the German forces southwards. On the 17th he was in the neighbourhood of Kondoa Irangi, 125 miles from Arusha, and 100 miles from the Central railway. At this point, which was the centre of several main roads, the Germans had recovered from their surprise and began to offer a stubborn opposition, but Deventer overcame it, and took Kondoa Irangi on the 19th.

His 200-mile march had been conducted with lightning speed, and had succeeded in taking Lettow-Vorbeck completely by surprise. The march was astonishing not only for its speed but also for the skill with which Deventer had overcome all opposition. But Lettow-Vorbeck was equal to the emergency. Hastily summoning reinforcements from the south and west, he set off himself with 17 companies from Korogwe on the Tanga railway, leaving Major Kraut to oppose General Smuts. In spite of the fact that the rains began while he was on the march, Lettow-Vorbeck covered the 125 miles to Kimamba on the Central railway by the beginning of May, and at once made energetic preparations to resist Deventer's further advance. A strong position was found south of Kondoa Irangi, and the Germans proceeded to fortify it.

Deventer was in no condition to go farther. He had lost hundreds of transport animals, his troops were exhausted and many of them fever-stricken. To cover the last 100 miles to the Central railway without a period of rest and reorganization was quite impossible. It became doubtful whether he could even hold his position, for the Germans were attacking him heavily. A severe bombardment on May 9 preceded a fierce attack, but Deventer repulsed it with heavy loss. For the next two days Lettow-Vorbeck persistently attacked his position, and after sunset on May 11 made a final effort against his left wing. The

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

South Africans fought stubbornly, and although the issue was in doubt for a time, succeeded in compelling the Germans to retire.

This marked the end of the serious fighting for some two months, the rains making anything beyond a skirmish an impossibility. Privations had reduced Deventer's force to under 3,000 and Lettow-Vorbeck outnumbered him dangerously. During May and June Smuts made heroic efforts to reinforce his subordinate. Some idea of the difficulties that confronted him can be gathered from the fact that an armoured car detachment which he sent to Deventer's assistance took 35 days to cover a distance of 75 miles—a journey which in the dry season could be covered easily in three days.

By the end of June the advance of the Belgians in the west was beginning to make itself felt on Lettow-Vorbeck's own position, and Smuts' advance was also beginning to have an effect. The German commander began to withdraw his forces and concentrate them in the Nguru hills; and when, on June 24, Deventer resumed his advance he was not strongly opposed.

As the rainy season came to an end in May, General Smuts, who meanwhile had rested and reorganized his troops in the Moshi-Kahe area, resumed his offensive for the occupation of the northern railway. Despite the torrential rains and the flooding of the rivers, there had been no failure in supplies, and thorough preparation had been made for the energetic prosecution of this part of the general campaign. As has been told, he had now a distinct advantage in having railway communication all the way from the Uganda railway, the branch line from Voi being completed by the beginning of May to Moshi, where it was linked up with the rail-head of the Usambara railway.

For this fresh advance against the Usambara railway Smuts had at his disposal the 1st division, now commanded by Major General A. R. Hoskins (General Tighe had gone back to India), with Generals Sheppard and Hannington as brigade commanders, as well as other forces, including South Africans. By May 25 his advanced troops had moved along the line and occupied Lembeni, 20 miles south of Kahe, and Ruwu Lager, on the Pangani river, 26 miles south-west of Kahe. By the same date he was at Ngulu, in the Ngulu pass, lying between the northern and central Pare ranges, eight miles south-east of Lembeni. He entered all three places without opposition. East of the railway his line of march led through a region of hills rising in places to



LATER SOMME FIGHTING. This photograph shows supports moving up near Ginchy on September 25. The battle, which began on July 1, continued for several months, and Ginchy was prominent throughout the fighting.

Imperial War Museum



IN A TRENCH AT OVILLERS. A British soldier on the look out while his comrades rest
of Ovillers was completed about the middle of July, 1916

THE GERMANS PURSUED

a height of 3,000 feet, and covered with forests, and still farther on he had to negotiate the Usambara Highlands. On May 25 he reached Zame, on the railway, and with another column moved down the Pangani river, by way of Marago Opuni, 18 miles north-west of Zame, to Le Zará. Major Kraut had retreated southwards to Mikocheni, a fine defensive position at the southern end of the Pare mountains which lay between them and the river, with the railway in the middle. The Germans had entrenched, and were strongly placed to defend the bridge over the Pangani; the thickness of the bush was also in their favour. But although Kraut had chosen his position with skill, he was unprepared for the flanking movement down the Pangani river. He appears to have thought that an advance through the fever-stricken swamps of the river valley was impossible and had taken no steps to prevent it. The result was that his flank was turned and he had no option but to retreat hurriedly.

Smuts gave the Germans no rest. Pressing on, he arrived at Mkomazi, and marched on to Bwiko, a station midway between the Pare mountains and the Usambara Highlands, which gave the name to the district. On the morning of May 31 his left column, which had advanced through the Gonya gap from Zame, reached the Sfigulu bridge over the large tributary of the Pangani called the Mkomazi, 10 miles north of Mkomazi station, and progressed southward along that stream.

After halting for a few days, during which he bridged the Pangani at Mikocheni, he again had his forces in rapid motion. General Hannington, whose troops were operating along the railway, was at Mazinde, 20 miles south of Mikocheni, on June 8, and on the following day he captured Mombo, 8 miles farther on, dislodging the Germans who had tried to hold it.

Crossing to the right bank of the Pangani, at Mikocheni, General Hoskins' forces marched down to Mkaramo, where the light railway from Mombo to Handeni passed over the river 14 miles south-west of the junction, and there had a sharp fight with some Germans who were eventually driven off to the south, while Mkaramo was occupied. Both here and at Mombo, the enemy suffered severe losses. By June 13 Hannington was at Makayuni, eight miles from Mombo, and two or three days later, by gaining Korogwe, only 40 miles distant from Tanga, he made Smuts practically master of the whole of the Usambara Highlands. It had been a quick and inexpensive conquest.

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

Smuts was now able to concentrate for an advance due south. Postponing for the moment the conquest of the coastal strip of territory between Tanga and Korogwe, where the railway entered the highlands, he made preparations to strike down at the Central railway.

When General Hoskins forced them out of Mkaramo on June 10, the Germans had retreated along the light railway towards its rail-head at Handeni, 45 miles away, and there had thrown up entrenchments. Between the two places the country was dense jungle, and movement through it was almost impossible. Besides, water was very scarce. Yet on June 15 the part of Hoskins' division which was commanded by General Sheppard succeeded in arriving at Kwedizwa, only six miles from Handeni, and on the following day pushed through the bush to the village of Kilima-Njaro, close to the German camp.

Handeni was a settlement which contained several German plantations, and from it a good road went east to the port of Pangani, at the mouth of the river of the same name. It also had a water supply, and the German forces were entrenched in its vicinity. Other troops belonging to General Hoskins came up, and on the 19th the place was taken, the enemy retreating south to the Lukigura river, after incurring some losses in a rearguard action. Four days later the British made a determined effort to surround Kraut's force, and on the 24th a battle developed. The Germans were attacked by three columns. One, under the personal command of General Hoskins, by an arduous night march, enveloped them on the flank. The second, led by General Sheppard, made for and held the bridge across the river, attacking frontally. The third, composed of South Africans, engaged them on the other wing. The Germans were almost trapped, but fought so well that Major Kraut was able to draw his men off with only a small loss of men and guns. This retreat proved the value of the training which Lettow-Vorbeck had given his troops; for when they were almost surrounded, they had, at a given signal, split up into small parties and simply disappeared in the dense bush. Reuniting again at a prearranged point, they retired to a strong position in the Nguru hills.

While this second advance in the direction of the Central railway was successfully going forward, General Smuts completed and consolidated his conquest of the Usambara railway. As far back as June 13 it had been reported that the Germans had

THE NEED FOR BLACK TROOPS

evacuated Tanga, the terminus on the coast. From Korogwe, occupied by Hannington on the 15th, the British marched along the line down to the sea, but found that the statement of the evacuation of Tanga was incorrect. The port, however, was captured on July 7 after a brief resistance by the Germans, who destroyed the waterworks before retreating.

The country in the neighbourhood was not yet cleared of all enemy bands, and these gave some trouble by endeavouring to cut the communications between Korogwe and Tanga ; but they were driven down the Pangani, with the loss of a field gun, and then forced south of that river. On July 21 General Smuts announced the occupation of Amani and Muhesa, the former some miles north of the line, and the latter a little south of it, and stated that he had taken effective possession of the whole of the Usambara railway, which was being repaired by his engineers. General Smuts, because his men were by now exhausted, formed a large standing camp on the Msiha river, about eight miles beyond the Lukigura, and rested and refitted his troops, who remained there until the end of the first week in August. Here was assembled the larger part of the army of invasion, which was more directly under the command of General Smuts.

By this time he was convinced that white troops were ill-suited to a campaign in tropical Africa, and although several new units from South Africa had joined his forces the need for trained black troops was urgent. The Gold Coast regiment, fresh from its conquest of the Cameroons, volunteered for service, and by the end of July had reached East Africa. Besides these reinforcements, his army consisted of three divisions, together with the troops on the lines of communications, under Brigadier General W. F. S. Edwards, D.S.O. Of these divisions the 1st and 3rd were at Msiha. The former, under Major General Hoskins, comprised the 1st East African brigade, under Brigadier General Sheppard, and the 2nd East African brigade, under Brigadier General Hannington, as previously stated. But to this division was now joined the 3rd division, under Major General Coen Brits, which was made up of the 2nd South African mounted brigade, under Brigadier General B. Enslin, and the 2nd South African infantry brigade, under Brigadier General P. S. Beves. General Enslin's brigade had arrived in East Africa in May, and was ready to take the field in the latter half of June. The 2nd division, which was with Deventer, consisted of the

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

1st South African mounted brigade, under Brigadier General Manie Botha, and the 3rd South African infantry brigade, under Brigadier General C. A. L. Berrange. Among the reinforcements sent to Deventer in May were two South African infantry regiments that had been taken from the 3rd division.

In addition to these forces, which were the mainstay of the general campaign of the Allies in German East Africa, there were, both in the west and in the south-west, other forces of considerable importance that at this time were converging, or about to converge, on the Central railway. The first of these was what was designated the "Lake Detachment," and it consisted of the 98th infantry, the 4th battalion of the famous King's African Rifles, the Baganda Rifles, the Nandi Scouts, and some small irregular units. The initial task of this detachment had been the defence of the frontier on both sides of Victoria Nyanza—a stretch in all of about 300 miles; and this it had performed with success throughout 1915. During April, May, and June, 1916, the troops of the Lake detachment on the west side of Victoria Nyanza were reinforced, and gradually pushed the Germans from their advanced posts on the Kagera river, south of the Uganda Protectorate. On June 9, Ukerewe, the largest island in the lake, and only a few hours' distance from Mwanza, the fortified German port on the southern shore, was occupied, the capture being skilfully effected by surprise by Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Adye, then commanding the detachment, and the naval flotilla under Commander Thornley, R.N.

In the middle of June, Brigadier General Sir Charles Crewe, K.C.M.G., who was a member of General Smuts' staff, was appointed to the Lake command, to which a particular significance was beginning to be attached. Prior to taking over his new command Sir Charles had been for some time in the Victoria Nyanza region, acting as chief representative of General Smuts in the making of various arrangements for facilitating the movements of the Belgians in the north-west corner of the colony. As the Lake detachment formed the first of the forces (apart from the three divisions in the east), which, with the others, were to converge on the Central railway, so these Belgians were the second. The Belgian troops had as their commander-in-chief a distinguished Colonial soldier in Major General Tombeur, with headquarters at Kibati, north of Lake Kivu. An advance from Kibati direct on the German positions in that quarter being

BELGIAN SUCCESSES

impracticable on account of the barren, volcanic country which lay between, it had earlier been agreed that Tombeur's force was to move north-east to Lutobo, from which it was to descend in a southerly direction on Kigali, the chief town of the rich and prosperous German province of Ruanda, and that a base for it should be established at Bukakata, on Victoria Nyanza, 150 miles farther east, the British making themselves responsible for the transport and supply arrangements there. The carrying out, however, of those arrangements proved a difficult matter, and it was to overcome it that Crewe was sent by General Smuts.

Along the Congo frontier there had been lively fighting between the Belgians and the Germans ever since the outbreak of the war, both in the plain north of Lake Tanganyika and on the northern slope of Lake Kivu. In the former region the Germans made a strong attack on the Belgian post of Luvugu on September 29, 1915; but, after what seemed an inconclusive battle, suffered such heavy casualties that they withdrew overnight. In the latter region there was a protracted struggle of intense bitterness around Ngoma and Kissengi, fortified posts on the boundary, the one Belgian, the other German, but after various changes of fortune Kissengi passed finally into the hands of the Belgians in May, 1915, thanks to a successful surprise organized by Lieutenant Puck-Chaudoir, the commandant at Ngoma. In 1916 the Belgians were planted firmly on German soil in the two areas, and ready to advance.

The forces of the German commander in this area, Major General Wahle, had been weakened by the withdrawals that Lettow-Vorbeck had made in order to assist in opposing Deventer and Smuts. Wahle had been ordered not to fight any major engagement but to fall back slowly to join his commander at the Mahenge plateau. His two subordinates, Captains Wintgens and Godovius, had been waging a guerrilla warfare with the Belgian and British forces round the northern end of Lake Tanganyika and on both sides of Lake Victoria respectively.

All difficulties having been met and overcome by General Tombeur and General Crewe in combination, the Belgian column, under Colonel Molitor, was sent forward, and about the end of April it arrived at Kamwezi, 10 miles south-east of Lutobo. Rapid progress and sharp fighting gave Kigali to the Belgians on May 6, the effect of which gain was to threaten the rear flank of the Germans farther west on the border, and consequently to

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(I)

enable Tombeur to advance his troops from the north and the south of Kivu. Molitor's column reached the Kagera river on June 24, and, as that month closed, his advanced guards occupied Namirembe, in the south-west corner of Victoria Nyanza, while his main body was engaged with the retreating Germans.

Meanwhile, the men of the scattered posts in the Lake command had been formed into a mobile fighting force by Sir Charles Crewe, who proceeded to get possession of Bukoba, which had previously been held by the British for a short time and subsequently recaptured by the Germans. After he had taken it he occupied the district of Karagwe, between the lake and the Kagera river. He thereupon went south to arrange a combined forward movement with Tombeur's forces. On July 3 the strong German force which Crewe had dislodged found its retreat barred at Busirayambo by Belgian troops. A violent effort was made to break through, but proved unsuccessful. Many of the German Europeans were killed or captured, while the remnant fled, closely pursued, towards Maria-hilf, in the direction of Tabora. Among the prisoners was Godovius, the German commander. Wintgen's force by desperate fighting managed to evade the Belgian cordon, and escaped to Tabora, but suffered heavy losses.

General Crewe's next achievement was the taking of Mwanza, the occupation of which would furnish an excellent base at the south of Victoria Nyanza for the advance of the combined British and Belgian columns to the Central railway at Tabora. "Accordingly," added General Smuts, in his description of the event, "on July 9, 10, and 11 he embarked his force, consisting of about 1,800 rifles, at Namirembe and Ukerewe Island, and on the night of the 11th landed a column, under Lieutenant Colonel C. R. Burgess, at Kongoro Point, east of Mwanza, and the following day another column, under Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Towse, farther north at Senga Point. By his skilful disposition and movement of both columns—the one from the east, the other from the north-east—on Mwanza, he made it impossible for the enemy to withstand his advance; and the threat to the enemy's retreat from Burgess's column made the enemy evacuate the town on July 14."

The Germans were thus ousted from one of their principal strongholds in East Africa with quite insignificant loss to their assailants. Most of the German Europeans, after destroying the powerful wireless station, made good their escape in the steamers

THE RESULTS SUMMARIZED

Mwanza, Heinrich Otto, and Schwaben, while some 500 askaris got away down the main road to Tabora.

General Tombeur's second force, which had marched rapidly from the south of Lake Kivu under the command of Colonel Olsen, had defeated the Germans at Kitwitawe on June 6, and again on the road to Kitega. Making good progress in the direction of Lake Tanganyika and east of that lake, it swiftly advanced during June and July towards the western end of the Central railway at Ujiji and Kigoma, while a Belgian flotilla cooperated on Tanganyika itself. Kigoma was occupied on July 28 and Ujiji on August 2. In the harbour were found three steamers, including the Adjudant, the largest vessel ever seen on the lake, that had been brought across the country from the Rufiji river. The German forces had retired along the railway to Tabora some 200 miles to the east.

As the general result of all these operations of Crewe and Tombeur, the Germans had been swept out of their provinces of Ruanda and Urundi, and the menace to the Central railway had become very pronounced both at Tabora and at Ujiji and Kigoma. The rapidity with which the enemy had quitted his valuable lake provinces and Mwanza persuaded General Smuts that the German retreat would not be towards Tabora, as he had at first supposed, but farther east towards Dar-es-Salaam, or south to Mahenge, the plateau lying about half-way between the Central railway and the Portuguese frontier. The latter idea involved the conclusion that the Germans would make their last stand not on the railway, but in the vast and almost roadless region south of it. In any case, however, the capture of the railway was of predominant importance.

In the south-west area of the colony a second British offensive was striking up towards the north-eastward. The British forces, which had been concentrated at various points along the northern borders of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, under Brigadier General E. Northey, advanced into German territory on May 25 to a distance of 20 miles between Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika. Prior to this much fighting had occurred in this frontier district, but until May, 1916, no offensive had been possible.

Before the month closed he took New Langenburg, and within a little more than a fortnight captured Old Langenburg, in the Nyasa district, while in the Tanganyika district he occupied Bismarckburg on June 8. From New Langenburg and Bismarckburg

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

respectively, roads ran north-westerly toward Kilimatinde and Kilosa, on the Central railway, the more important being that from New Langenburg to Kilosa through Iringa, and it was by this route that the main body of the Germans in the south-west retreated, with Northey in pursuit. On June 30 he drove them out of Ubena, and in July was advancing towards Iringa.

To complete the picture presented in the preceding narrative of the situation in German East Africa, as it stood at the end of June and in the first weeks of July, 1916, it must be noted that in March of that year Portugal threw in her lot with the entente Powers, and Portuguese troops were engaging the Germans on the southern frontier of the colony. During April, May and June a number of small skirmishes occurred on the frontier, but the chief significance of the entry of Portugal into the war was that the military encirclement of the sole remaining oversea possession of Germany had been completed.

CHAPTER 18

Smuts' Campaign in East Africa—(II)

OF the various offensive movements by the Allies in East Africa that were on foot by the end of July, 1916, two attained their objectives, but at wide distances apart, on the same day, July 29. On that date one of Deventer's columns occupied Dodoma, and the Belgians reached Ujiji and Kigoma.

After extensive preparation, Deventer resumed his advance south of Kondoa Irangi in the middle of July. Throwing off a column, under Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Taylor, to take Singida, 80 miles west of Kondoa, he dispatched on July 14 another column, under Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Kirkpatrick, towards Saranda, the station on the railway for Kilimatinde. Singida was captured on August 2. Kirkpatrick encountered little opposition on his line of march until he arrived before Mpondi, some 24 miles north of the station. There he found himself confronted by a strong body of Germans. Making a frontal attack, he routed them, and took Mpondi within a few hours. Continuing his progress, he was in Saranda on July 31, and also

A SUCCESSFUL PLAN

on the same day occupied Kilimatinde, seven miles farther south, and one of the chief points on the railway.

In the meantime, however, Deventer's main force had already got astride of the Central railway. Marching south from Kondoa along the Dodoma road, Deventer entered Champalla (otherwise Jambalo) on July 18, and Anet on the following day, without fighting. Hearing that the route farther south was destitute of water, and that the Germans were entrenched at the waterholes at Tisu Kwa Meda and Tschenene, he divided his men into two forces. One, consisting of the 1st mounted brigade, he placed on the road which went through Tisu Kwa Meda and Kwa Nyangalo, with orders to its commander, General Manie Botha, to advance towards Kikombo station. The other, under General Berrange, he ordered to move along the road through Tschenene and Meia Meia towards the station at Dodoma. Berrange was the first to gain his objective. On July 25 he took Tschenene, in spite of its being well fortified, largely owing to the work of the armoured motor battery. Two days afterwards he was in occupation of Meia Meia, capturing part of a mounted detachment, and on July 29 he took possession of Dodoma.

General Manie Botha's column, which was marching on the line by the road farther east, had to face a more determined opposition. On July 22 Botha took Tisu Kwa Meda, but only after a sharp engagement. Brigadier General A. H. M. Nussey, D.S.O., who succeeded him, pushed on to Nanyu and Membe, and on July 28 came upon the Germans in a strong position at Nyangalo. After spirited fighting he defeated and drove them on, and by July 30 reached Kikombo station, a few miles east of Dodoma, where Berrange had already established himself. As Saranda and Kilimatinde were next day in the hands of Kirkpatrick, something like 100 continuous miles of the Central railway passed under Deventer's control by the end of July.

An integral part of the plan of General Smuts was that Deventer, after occupying the railway at Dodoma, should advance with his troops eastward along the track so as to take in flank and rear the main forces of the Germans in their retreat from the Nguru mountains. To effect this object, van Deventer spent the first week of August in completing his concentration. He commenced his advance westward from Nyangalo on August 9. His immediate objective was Tschunjo, in the pass of the

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

same name, the road to which lay across a waterless district. The Germans were holding the pass, their left being at Gulwe and their right at Kongoa. Having disposed his troops so as to assault them on the centre and to envelop them on the flanks, Deventer reached the pass, after a most trying march, on the afternoon of the 11th. Without resting, he attacked at once, and fighting continued during the remainder of the day and nearly all the following night. Owing to the difficulty of the country the flanking movements he had ordered were delayed, but his frontal operations were successful. On the morning of the 12th it was found that the Germans had evacuated their positions and withdrawn towards Mpapwa. Hurrying in pursuit, Deventer came up with them on the same day at that place, and, before night fell, defeated them, though he had been marching and fighting without rest for 42 hours.

Having occupied Mpapwa, Deventer next moved on Kidete, a station on the railway where the Germans held another strong position. Fighting began on August 15, and went on without intermission until late next day, but finally a flanking movement by mounted troops, who worked round to the rear of the Germans, compelled them to retire. During the ensuing week Deventer gradually drove the Germans from Kidete along the railway to Kilosa and Kimamba, occupying both on August 22.

With the occupation of Kilosa, Deventer now held upwards of 200 miles of the Central railway, or more than a quarter of its entire extent. His troops, strained by incessant marching and fighting under such hard conditions, imperatively needed rest, but the necessities of the situation at the moment even more imperatively forbade it. The 1st and 3rd divisions had moved south from the Mziha camp, and were pressing the Germans down from the Nguru mountains, Smuts being determined to encircle Lettow-Vorbeck in Mrogoro. Deventer's mounted brigade, less one regiment, was sent on August 25 to Mlali, farther east, to cooperate. But there was no rest for the balance of his sorely-tried men. On August 26 he received a message from General Smuts ordering him to advance from Kilosa to Ulaia, 20 miles south, on the main road to Iringa, and despite the exhausted state of his force the command was obeyed, the place being taken before the day was over. The Germans had held it in strength, and were being reinforced by detachments who had been opposing General Northey's march towards Iringa.

A CRITICAL POSITION

The southward drive of the 1st and 3rd divisions, under Smuts himself, from the Mziha camp to the Central railway on the east was begun at the beginning of August. But, before this operation started, General Smuts saw to the clearing of his flank to the Indian Ocean by the occupation of the coastal area from Tanga, the terminus of the Usambarā railway, to Saadani Bay, which was taken by the navy on August 1, Pangani having been captured by it a week previously. A detachment of the West India Regiment was landed at Saadani, and in union with a contingent of the 40th Pathans drove the enemy from the Lower Wami river. The combined force marched south-east to Bagamoyo, which was captured by the navy on August 15. Dar-es-Salaam lay a short distance south, and it was evident that no long time could elapse before the British would close in and seize the capital of the colony.

With the area on his extreme left thus in his possession, General Smuts began the advance from Mziha through the Nguru mountains to the railway, his hope then being that if he failed to corner the Germans in those mountains, he, in conjunction with Deventer from Dodoma, would bring them to bay somewhere about Kilosa station.

The German position was by this time critical. The Belgian advance on Tabora and the cutting of the railway by Deventer had isolated Lettow-Vorbeck from his western forces, and now the operations on the coast and the combined advance of Smuts threatened his own position seriously. Communications with his western commander, Wahle, were difficult and doubtful, and he was forced to leave him to fend for himself. The bulk of his forces had already been concentrated at Mrogoro, having been drawn there from Kondoa Frangi and from the Nguru mountains. He realized that unless he acted quickly he was in danger of being trapped. Accordingly, he withdrew Major Kraut and the bulk of his men to Kilosa, and left Captain Schulz and a small force to oppose Smuts' further advance. Energetic measures were taken to prepare for retreat south of the Central railway, and all stores were carried to the Mahenge plateau, where was a military station, some 150 miles south of Kilosa.

But Smuts' task was by no means easy. The main road to the Central railway for about 45 miles passed close under the Nguru mountains and Mount Kanga. If he forced his way by

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

frontal attacks along the road, or moved by his left through the scrub and high elephant grass, there was more than a chance that the Germans on his right would get behind him, and at the very least put his communications in serious danger. In these circumstances he considered it of paramount importance to advance through the mountains themselves, and to clear them of the enemy. He decided that the most effective strategy for carrying out this aim was to institute a series of turning movements, which would threaten the retreat of the Germans, or with the cutting off of their retirement if it was delayed too long.

A mass of the Nguru mountains lay on the west, while the lower hills and spurs of the range, with lofty Mount Kanga, stretched to the east, the division between them being the rugged valley of the Mjonga river, which flowed from Mahazi on the north almost due south towards Turiani, where the road round Kanga crossed it. Above Turiani two streams ran from the north-west through gaps in the Ngurus into the Mjonga; one entered the valley near Matamondo, under the shadow of Kanga, and the other, some miles south, came along into it past Mhonda Mission, not far from Turiani itself. General Smuts' design was threefold. First, General Sheppard's brigade was to make a feint from Mziha directly against the German position at Ruhungu, on the main road to the railway, while in reality he was moving the bulk of his men by the left so as to gain the Russongo river, six miles in rear of Ruhungu. Secondly, General Hannington was previously to have marched to Mahazi, and from there, accompanied by General Hoskins, was to drive the Germans along the valley of the Mjonga. Thirdly, the 3rd division, under General Brits, was simultaneously to make a detour northward to the Lukigura, and then westerly through Kimbe to enter the Ngurus farther west of Mahazi, emerging from them through the Mhonda gap in the rear of the forces of the Germans on the slopes of Kanga and the Mjonga valley.

On August 5 General Enslin, with the 2nd South African mounted brigade, 3rd division, marched from the Lukigura via Kimbe, and struck the Nguru mountains eight miles west of Mahazi on the following day. Making rapid progress, he arrived at the Mhonda gap, and occupied Mhonda on August 8. But as he sent back word that the route through the mountains was entirely impracticable for wheeled traffic, his transport had to return to the Lukigura. On August 6 the 2nd South African

THE ENCIRCLEMENT FAILS

brigade, with General Beves in command, set out by the same way, while General Hannington, with the 2nd East African brigade, advanced by the mountain footpaths direct from the Lukigura to Mahazi, and working steadily down the valley of the Mjonga encountered little opposition until he reached Matamondo on the 9th. Two days previously General Sheppard and the 1st East African brigade left the Mziha camp, and progressing slowly through the dense bush which enveloped the sides of Mount Kanga, gained the Russongo on August 11. But by this time it was clear that the scheme of General Smuts for the encirclement of the Germans was not destined to be a success.

According to his plan the whole of the 3rd division was to have proceeded to Mhonda, but the difficulty of the country, with its absence of anything like a road, defeated it. Had it not been for the impossibility of transport, the idea would not have proved impracticable; but, as things were, General Smuts, baffled by the nature of the country so far as wheeled transport was concerned, was compelled to tell General Brits to divert the 2nd South African infantry brigade, under Beves, down the footpath to Matamondo, where Hannington was having heavy fighting. One of Enslin's mounted regiments, as it happened, had lost its way in these trackless hills, but finally emerged also at this place.

Yet a vigorous attempt to carry out the original plan was made by Enslin. Passing through the Mhonda gap, he endeavoured to cut off the enemy by seizing a series of positions by which the retreating Germans must go. But Captain Schulz had realized his danger, and by skilful manœuvring and energetic fighting drove Enslin from all the positions he had occupied except one, the Mhonda Mission, whence his continued threat was so strong that Schulz had to abandon his whole defence in the mountains and hurry the retirement he had already begun.

After sharp engagements lasting over two days Hannington drove the enemy south from Matamondo on August 11. On the 12th and 13th Hannington's brigade and the brigades of Brits reached Turiani, at the end of the Mjonga valley through the mountains, the Germans having withdrawn some miles farther south. It was, however, becoming clear to General Smuts that he now was dealing with part only of Lettow-Vorbeck's force, and that the balance was streaming southward towards the Central railway, making for Mrogoro or Kilosa. He moved on at once, though he was much hampered by the numerous rivers

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

flowing across his path from the Nguru and Kanga mountains. On August 13 Enslin's mounted brigade proceeded round the left flank along the Lwale river to Ngula, where he was joined by the 130th Baluchis from Kipera, at which place Sheppard's brigade had arrived by way of Mafeta, after driving off a small body of Germans. Hannington worked his way south along the main road. On the 15th Enslin and Hannington were at Kwedi-boma and Mwomoro, where the roads to Mrogoro and Kilosa respectively left the Ngurus. Both of the former points were occupied with little fighting. The larger number of the Germans retired along the road to Mrogoro, their immediate objective being Dakawa, on the Wami, while the smaller, consisting of a few companies, made off along the road to Kilosa. General Smuts pressed on in pursuit.

General Hannington marched from Mwomoro along the Kilosa road to the Mkundi river, while General Enslin moved in the direction of Dakawa. General Sheppard had been ordered to cross the Wami river from Kipera, and to advance along the right or southern bank of that stream to Dakawa Crossing. This meant that the British would be on both sides of the river at Dakawa. Sheppard and Enslin arrived on opposite banks on August 16, but the Germans knew they were lost if the British forced the river before their main body had withdrawn, and they fought with resolution and courage, although heavily outnumbered. They managed to hold Sheppard at bay two miles on the north and, at the same time, to prevent Enslin from attempting to get across the stream, which there was both wide and deep. Enslin succeeded next day in crossing the Wami higher up, but by this time all but the German rearguard had withdrawn. Dakawa Crossing was occupied on the 18th. A halt was made at Dakawa to bridge the Wami, and this involved a delay of several days.

General Smuts had been under the impression that the Germans would retreat to Kilosa, and then, having lost the railway there, that they would withdraw to the Mahenge plateau. Kilosa was the most convenient point of departure for this proceeding, for a good road led thence to Mahenge; but he discovered that only a small body of Germans were on the road to Kilosa, and that the main force was retiring to Mrogoro, a considerable distance farther east. The reason for this choice of the alternative routes was most probably the rapid advance towards Kilosa of Deventer, who, as previously mentioned, was moving eastward along the

A FATAL FLAW

railway from Kidete, and on August 18, the date on which Dakawa Crossing was occupied, was only four days away from his objective. The next effort of General Smuts was to try to bring the Germans to a stand, if it were possible, at Mrogoro. For this purpose he dispatched Enslin with the mounted troops to the Central railway on August 21, and Mkata station was occupied two days later. Enslin, without halting, pushed on to Mlali, which lay about 15 miles south-west of Mrogoro, on the road to Kisaki, round the west of the Uluguru mountains, and the place was in his hands on August 24. Deventer then sent the 1st South African mounted brigade to reinforce Enslin.

But Lettow-Vorbeck had foreseen the possibility of an attempt being made to turn his flank from Mlali, and although he had no intention of breaking out from Mrogoro in that direction, he had posted a strong force to oppose any flanking column and to screen his movements from his enemy. As Enslin advanced on Mlali, Smuts arranged that his other troops from Dakawa should advance so as to block also the road through Kiroka, round the eastern slopes of the Uluguru range, and complete the "bottling up" of the German forces. Unfortunately there was a fatal flaw in this scheme. "I was not then aware that a track went due south from Mrogoro through the mountains to Kisaki," General Smuts recorded in his dispatch, "and that the capture of the flanks of the mountains would not achieve the end in view."

On the morning of August 23 the rest of the forces crossed the Wami river at Dakawa by the new bridge which had been completed; but instead of marching on Mrogoro direct by the road, which ran nearly due south, General Smuts moved backward down the right bank of the river for some nine miles, and from the point thus reached struck east to the Ngerengere river, in the vicinity of Msungulu, north-east of Mrogoro. He had to traverse a desert belt about 25 miles wide, and owing to the denseness of the scrub, the heat and the lack of water, this movement, which was spread over two days, proved one of the most trying of the whole campaign. However, on the night of the 24th General Smuts encamped on the Ngerengere, 18 miles from his objective. Earlier on that day a mounted contingent under Colonel Brink had gone on in front and seized Mkogwa Hill, three miles farther south-east, and on the south side of the river.

Owing to the exhaustion of man and beast, General Smuts had to halt for a day, but he employed the time in reconnoitring the

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

country. His forces were again in motion on August 26. Hannington with his brigade advanced towards Kikese, on the Central railway, 20 miles east of Mrogoro, and on the same day occupied that station. Meanwhile, Sheppard and Beves, with their respective troops, marched up the Ngerengere on Mrogoro, which was taken on August 26. Then it was discovered that the Germans had succeeded in escaping the enveloping net. One lot had got away by the eastern route through Kiroka, another was struggling with Enslin at Mlali; but Lettow-Vorbeck, with Dr. Schnee, the governor of German East Africa, and the bulk of their men, had made off by the track—of whose existence General Smuts had been ignorant—that passed from Mrogoro south into the mountains.

The march of General Smuts' main forces across the desert had taken Lettow-Vorbeck quite by surprise, as he was convinced such a march was impossible for a large force. His retreat from Mrogoro was very precipitate, and as he had left so many proofs of his hurry behind him, General Smuts resolved to continue the pursuit, notwithstanding the fact that his troops and animals were worn out with the exertions of the past three weeks, and that his transport had reached ~~its~~ extreme radius of action. Nearly half of the Central railway was in British possession by this time, but the principal forces of the Germans were still in being. There seemed to be a fair chance that they might be rounded up in the Uluguru mountains, and he devoted himself to the effort. In any case he had to secure his hold on the railway by driving the enemy well to the south of it.

The 1st division operated on the eastern slopes of the Ulugurus. Sheppard occupied Kiroka, east of Mrogoro, on August 26, and Hannington advanced southward. By the end of the month, after continuous fighting from the 27th, Lettow-Vorbeck was pressed to the other side of the Ruvu river. Then several days had to be spent in throwing a bridge across that stream. The terrain to be negotiated was extremely difficult, the road passing through numerous broken foothills covered with bush or grass from six to 12 feet high, so that progress was slow, painful and dangerous. The country there, as in so many other parts of the colony, was particularly well suited to defensive tactics, and the Germans, fighting with great resolution, held up the British at every convenient place, retiring after as long a delaying action as was possible in the circumstances. From the Ruvu the road

FORWARD AGAIN

for some distance went along the face of precipitous rocks, round which they had constructed a gallery on piles as a track for their transport; but as this structure was not sufficiently strong to carry the mechanical transport of the British 1st division, a path was made by blasting away the mountain-side.

When the new path was ready and the forward movement was resumed, the 1st division marched towards the Mvuha river by three routes. The first led by the main road to Tulo, the second, by a track west of the first, to Kassanga, and the third, by a track on the east side, to the Tunungo Mission. Brisk fighting took place every day, and road-making with bridge-building employed not only the pioneers, but also a large portion of the troops. Swampy tracts as well as rocky stretches abounded between the Ruvu and the Mvuha. A way had to be cut down the precipitous face of a spur of the Ulugurus, and this took the technical corps and most of Sheppard's brigade several weeks, but the result was a notable feat of engineering. The advance could not be rapid in such conditions, but Tulo was occupied on September 10 and Dutumi taken three days later.

While these operations were proceeding on the eastern side of the Uluguru range, the South African brigades, under General Brits, and Enslin's brigade were busy in the interior and on the western side of it. Enslin's men had reached Mlali on August 24, and early in the morning his advanced scouts rushed Kisagale, a small, isolated hill on the road to the south. At the same time one of his regiments galloped up the valley to the north of this eminence and took up positions among the foothills in the vicinity, at the very moment when the force dispatched by Lettow-Vorbeck to hold a British advance in this direction appeared on the road. A severe engagement ensued, and the South African soldiers, finding that they were being gradually outflanked with a heavy fire converging on them, withdrew a short distance, but retained effective possession of the road on the south during that day and the next.

With the general retreat to Kisaki this German force was compelled to retire in the direction of Mgeta Mission. Leaving their horses behind, Enslin and his troopers footed their way into the hills, but farther to the south, with the intention of cutting off the Germans' retreat. In the meantime, General Nussey's brigade had come up, and on August 27 it occupied Mgeta Mission; thereafter it followed the Germans along the Mgeta river. Enslin

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

then marched back to the trail which went round the west of the Ulugurus by the Msongosi river and Mahalaka, emerging at Kisaki, on the southern edge of the range.

From all points in the Uluguru mountains the Germans were retreating on Kisaki. General Smuts had been too quick for them. They had planned a protracted and elaborate defence of the mountains, but the unexpected arrival of Enslin at Mlali, and the audacious and successful pursuit which thereafter took place, combined with the operations of the 1st division, compelled them to abandon their scheme and retire to Kisaki.

Converging on Kisaki, Nussey marched south along the Mgeta with porter transport only, and Brits, in command of Enslin's and Beves' brigades, moved to the Msongosi river, but found it impracticable to take his guns or wagons beyond it, and had to send them back to Mrogoro. From Mahalaka, Brits advanced, however, in light order by the elephant track along which Burton and Speke had travelled into the interior in 1857, and on September 5 he reached the neighbourhood of Kisaki after slight opposition. Nussey, however, had not yet come up; and, owing to an accident to his wireless, was not able to get into communication with Brits; but the latter decided to attack the enemy on the 7th. This decision was, in the circumstances, rather dangerous. The morale of the Germans was still high, and Lettow-Vorbeck, as always, was a force to be reckoned with. Moreover, the troops at his disposal outnumbered those at the command of General Brits.

The result was unfortunate for the British. Kisaki was strongly held, the bulk of the Germans being on the right bank of the Mgeta in front of Enslin, while dense bush prevented Beves on the other side of the stream from giving him effective assistance. In danger of envelopment on his left and then on his right, Enslin was compelled to retire at night. Beves was also forced back and the joint forces, rather badly mauled, retired six miles north of Kisaki to await the arrival of Nussey. That general, not knowing what had occurred or where Brits was, reached Kisaki early next day, and, gallantly going into action at once, was himself driven back with some loss. In the evening Brits' messenger reached him with an order to proceed to Little Whigu, the place to which Enslin and Beves had withdrawn.

This unfortunate affair would hardly have happened if Brits had been in touch with Nussey. It was not till a week later that

PROGRESS POSTPONED

Kisaki was captured as the result of flanking movements round the north-east; but once again the Germans slipped through the British net. They left behind them a hospital of sick and some 70 Europeans, but all supplies had been removed or destroyed.

Driven everywhere from the Uluguru mountains, they took up a line of defence along the Mgeta, south of Dutunii, and farther to the west, across the road, from Kisaki to the Rufiji river. As his men were thoroughly spent after their hard march through this most difficult region, generally on half rations or less, and needed a complete rest on medical as well as military grounds, General Smuts was compelled to postpone further attack, and for a short period something approaching trench warfare supervened. Writing of his men, Smuts said:

The plain tale of their achievements bears the most convincing testimony to the spirit, determination, and prodigious efforts of all. Their work has been done under tropical conditions, which not only produce bodily weariness and unfitness, but which create mental languor and depression and finally appal the stoutest hearts. To march day by day and week by week through the African jungle or high grass, in which vision is limited to a few yards, in which danger always lurks near but seldom becomes visible even when experienced, supplies a test to human nature often in the long run beyond the limits of human endurance. And what is true of the fighting troops applies in one degree or another to all the subsidiary and administrative services. The efforts of all have been beyond praise; the strain on all has been overwhelming.

Lettow-Vorbeck put it on record that in his view the British had failed. "General Smuts," he wrote, "sent me a letter calling on me to surrender, by which he showed that he had reached the end of his resources." In a sense this was true, but only the masterly manner in which Lettow-Vorbeck had exploited the natural advantages of the country had saved him from the skilful casts which Smuts had made to snare him. Smuts' achievement was none the less remarkable. In a period of something under seven months Allied forces operating from the north, west and south had cleared the Germans from both their railway lines, had penned them in the inhospitable and swampy country in the south and conquered over two thirds of the German colony. Lettow-Vorbeck's opinion does not alter the fact that the end of September found Smuts so safely master of the situation that he was able to set up a civil and not a military administration in all the country he had conquered.

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

To complete the picture of operations along the eastern side of the colony, it is necessary to add that Dar-es-Salaam fell to the British on September 4; but the Germans had carried out the work of demolition and destruction so efficiently before retiring that it was three months before the port could be repaired for use as an advanced base, although by energetic work the railway was opened to Dodoma by October 6.

The conquest of the remainder of the coast ports was completed before the end of the month by the occupation of Lindi, Kilwa Kivinge and Kilwa Kisiwani, together with the smaller harbours at Mikindani and Sudi Bay. The result of these operations was to complete the encirclement of the Germans and to cut them off from any assistance from overseas.

In the west and south-west of the colony the early successes attending the advance of the Belgian forces and those of General Northey had been continued. In the first weeks of August Olsen's column was moving steadily eastward on Tabora, the largest and most important town in the interior of German East Africa, towards which also the Lake force, under Sir Charles Crewe, and Colonel Molitor's Belgians were marching from the north-west, the one from Misungi, south of Mwanza, and the other from Biamulo and Niemriambe, in the southern Victoria Nyanza region.

General Crewe had arranged with General Tombour that their forces should advance simultaneously from Victoria Nyanza along two roads that converge on Tabora, the British taking the eastern route through Ivingo and the Belgians the western through St. Michael. But transport difficulties caused delay, and Crewe did not reach Ivingo till August 7, while Molitor, though he captured St. Michael on August 12, and got into touch with Crewe, was not able to concentrate there before the 22nd. The Germans, under Wahle, had taken up strong positions in the Kahama mountains, south of St. Michael, and for a while stoutly opposed the Belgians, but were driven out, and compelled to withdraw towards Tabora by the end of August. The British arrived at Shinyanga on the 30th.

In the meantime, Olsen's column from Ujiji, having gained Ugaga on the railway on August 14, was also approaching Tabora. The Belgians had transported railway material across Tanganyika from Lukugu to the Central railway, and on the 25th ran their first train along the track to supply their

THE BELGIANS ACTIVE

troops, then in contact with the Germans on the east. Brisk actions took place on September 1 and 2, some 20 miles west and south-west of Tabora. Tombour thereupon pushed forward Molitor's force from the north with all speed, so as to cooperate with Olsen, and the fall of Tabora became only a matter of days. Although the loss of the town would be a severe blow to German prestige in the eyes of the Greek, Arab and Genoese traders who lived there, the Germans had foreseen that they would have no option but to withdraw. In preparation they had built a road leading south and east towards Mahenge, and had established food depôts along its length. Wahle was not prepared to abandon the place without a struggle and continued a desperate resistance; but the progress of Crewe's force on his right flank threatened his envelopment, and on September 18 he withdrew his troops from Tabora. The town had been used as an internment camp for civilian and military prisoners; and over 200 Europeans, many of whom were women missionaries, were released when the Belgians entered Tabora on September 19.

East of Tabora General Crewe's advanced guards occupied the railway at Igalulu, about a week after the fall of Tabora, just too late to cut off the retreat of the Germans, and gradually the British linked up all along the line eastward. General Wahle had arranged his withdrawal in two columns; the first retired southward into the Itumba mountains, while the remainder withdrew to the south by way of Sikonge. From their headquarters at Tabora the Belgians harried the retreat of both German columns which were making off in the direction of the Great Ruaha river in order eventually to form a junction with the main German forces on the Mahenge plateau. With their disappearance the Central railway from end to end was in the possession of the Allies in less than three months from the capture of the Usambara railway.

In July, as was noted, General Northey was marching from the south-west of the colony towards the Central railway via Iringa. Northey fought a considerable action on the 24th of that month at Malangali, and routed the Germans, who retreated to Madibira and to Iringa. In the following month Northey occupied Lupembe on the 19th and Iringa 10 days afterwards. The latter town might have been taken much earlier had it not been that General Smuts advised him to slow down while the line of retreat of the Germans from the railway was still

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

uncertain. It was towards Malangali and Iringa that the Germans retired when they had been forced out of Tabora, and had definitely lost the railway. The part of Northey's command which had taken Lupembe moved on to the Ruhudje river south-west of Mahenge, and that which had captured Iringa remained there and near the Ulanga river, north-west of Mahenge. Up till the end of December, when General Smuts began a general offensive, interest almost wholly centred in the western area from September, 1916. In this quarter the scene of the fighting was the main road from Lake Nyassa to Kilosa, or on ground in its vicinity. To van Deventer and Northey had been assigned the difficult task of preventing the Germans, who had retreated from Tabora, from joining up with Lettow-Vorbeck on the Mahenge plateau. The task, in fact, proved to be impossible.

Under General Wahle and Major Wintgens, the Germans from Tabora, mustering about 1,600 rifles, had reached the neighbourhood of Iringa and Malangali in the third week of October. To prevent the Germans breaking through General van Deventer pushed forward to Iringa the 7th South African infantry and a cyclist battalion as well as a portion of General Northey's force already there under Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Rodger. The 7th arrived at Iringa on October 23 and the cyclists next day.

Before the troops from the 2nd division had reached Iringa the major part of the Germans from Tabora had broken through southwards between Alt Iringa and Ngominyi. They attacked Colonel Rodger's small force on the night of October 22-23, and one of the results was to cut all communication with General Northey, who for some time remained without any means of issuing orders to his troops at Iringa. Smuts thereupon placed General van Deventer in charge of the situation, and gave him control over Colonel Rodger's men. Besides the major German force, many small parties got across the road in the darkness. The passage of the Germans through the British lines occupied some three weeks, and was marked by much fighting.

Meanwhile, the Germans from Mahenge took the offensive in the south against Northey's troops under Colonels Hawthorn and Murray. At the time it was thought that this operation was undertaken to aid the break through of Wahle's forces farther west; but Lettow-Vorbeck stated later that he was ignorant of Wahle's movements. The Germans were commanded by Major Kraut, and during the night of October 21-22 he crossed the

A GERMAN OFFENSIVE

Ruhudje river with about 1,600 men, some of whom were mounted. His force included the 10th field company, 200 strong, and said to be the best company which the Germans possessed in East Africa. Having dispatched a company to block the road to Lupembe, through which Northey obtained his supplies, he proceeded to invest the British at Mkapira, and for three days bombarded them with a 2.4 in. gun. On the fourth day this gun was put out of action by a direct hit from one of the British guns. All the while the besieged force had managed to keep in touch with a detachment under Captain Galbraith some distance away to the west. On the 30th, Colonel Hawthorn, leaving his trenches, at dawn attacked Kraut's main position, while a diversion was made by Galbraith. Soon the Germans were in retreat, and hastily crossed the Ruhudje.

It was discovered that one part of the German forces from Tabora was at a point west of Madibira, either having not tried or having failed to break through to the east. On November 21 it was definitely ascertained that this body had occupied Ilembule Mission, which lay north-west of Ukena, on the previous day, and was about to move eastward. Northey arranged to send a force under Colonel Murray by motors to attack the Germans, while van Deventer was instructed to cooperate from Iringa.

It was anticipated that it might be a costly operation, for the Germans held the mission buildings which they had fortified, but the upshot was as satisfactory for the British as it was unexpected. By noon on the 24th Murray had drawn a circle round the place, and there was some fighting next day. On the following morning the British lines were moved in closer, and at two o'clock in the afternoon a parlementaire was sent to Colonel Huebener, the German commander, telling him that his water supply was cut off, that he was surrounded without hope of relief, and demanding his surrender. Thereupon Huebener capitulated, with all his stores, guns and ammunition intact, and about 100 prisoners were taken. The British casualties were only seven men wounded.

General Smuts had been busily engaged, while these operations were going on in the west, on the task of reorganizing and re-equipping his forces. Many thousands of South Africans were invalided home, their places being taken by Nigerian and other black troops who had been recruited on the west coast of Africa.

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(11)

Brigadier General Cunliffe, who had played such an important part in the conquest of Cameroons, also arrived, and took over the command of the native soldiers. General Smuts' army now consisted of two divisions—one under Major General Hoskins, and the other under Major General van Deventer—in addition to Beves' infantry in his own hands. Further, there was the Nyasaland-Rhodesian force under Brigadier General Northey, which was working in combination with van Deventer. The Lake detachment, under Sir Charles Crewe, had been abolished as a separate force; some of its units were added to the 2nd division, and one battalion remained in occupation of a portion of the Central railway eastwards from Tabora.

After the repulse of Major Kraut's surprise attack, for a week the Germans remained quiet. They had left behind considerable numbers of their sick and wounded at different camps, and also had released many of the prisoners they had taken. In the meantime a British column, under Colonel A. J. Taylor, was being concentrated at Dodoma, on the Central railway, with a view of its being sent to reinforce the troops at Iringa, and the mounted brigade of the 2nd division, which, after the operations in the Uluguru mountains in August had been resting and refitting at Mrogoro, was dispatched to the same point. How striking was the wastage of the campaign was emphasized by Smuts' statement that this brigade had been reduced to 1,000 rifles approximately. These movements were preparatory to a concentration of Northey's men at Lupembe, to which Colonel Hawthorn's detachment had been ordered to withdraw.

The Germans now made a fresh move by investing Malangali, this being the supply depot on the high road lying north-west of that place. From November 8 to 12, Malangali, which was held by a company of the newly raised Rhodesian native regiment under Captain F. Marriott, suffered serious assaults, three of which were repulsed only after fierce fighting at close quarters. Led by Marriott, the Rhodesian askaris, in spite of their rawness, put up a wonderful defence against considerable odds, even though faced by the depressing facts that on the first day of the attack all their stores had been set on fire by a German shell, that food was short, and that the water was bad. On the 12th a relieving force of 400 rifles under Colonel Murray suddenly arrived on the scene in motor-cars, and drove off the Germans, who next attacked Sonoga, on the 14th-15th, and

ON THE MGETA RIVER

Lupembe on the 17th, both without success. They then abandoned further offensive action.

In the central area—the Mgeta river front—the conditions were of the nature of trench warfare, and operations were practically at a standstill until Smuts initiated a general offensive at the end of December. The British front line was held by General Shepard's brigade, while in reserve was the brigade which formerly had been commanded by General Hannington, whose place had been taken by Colonel (afterwards Brigadier General) H. de C. O'Grady. Smuts decided to move O'Grady's brigade to Kilwa. The troops already there were formed into the 3rd East African brigade, under General Hannington, and a new 1st division was made by the addition of General O'Grady's brigade, the division being commanded by General Hoskins, who, for the purpose, came over from the Mgeta front, arriving at Kilwa on November 15. By the 29th the whole of O'Grady's force had reached the same base. In this eastern, or Kilwa, area, little happened at first, but during November and December there was some sharp fighting at Kibata, which Hannington had occupied in October.

General Smuts planned a great encircling move south of the Rufiji river, and his intention was, as regarded the eastern end of it, to march towards Liwale, on the road from Kilwa to Songea and Wiedhafen. But information derived from the statements of prisoners and from captured documents, to the effect that the Germans purposed an offensive and an attack on Kabati, induced him temporarily to modify his scheme. In this eastern area the Germans were commanded by Lettow-Vorbeck, and it was here that their main strength was now to be found. An assault on Kabati on the second week of November was easily repulsed, but a determined attempt to invest the place was made in December. On the afternoon of December 6 the Germans began an attack, which was intensified on the following day, when they brought several naval as well as field guns into action. Various heavy assaults were delivered on the 7th and 8th, but were repulsed. A move of Hannington from the west, in cooperation with O'Grady from Kilwa, checked the Germans, and by the 16th the fighting died down.

On December 21 General Hoskins reported to General Smuts, then on the eve of launching his offensive, that he believed he would be able to prevent the Germans from retreating to the south by the route from the Matumbi hills, which lay north-west

SMUTS' CAMPAIGN IN EAST AFRICA—(II)

of Kabati. At this stage Smuts ordered Hoskins to hold some battalions ready to move north-west when the execution of the general plan was undertaken, and advised him of his (Smuts') intention to proceed to the Mgeta front on the following day to direct operations. By December 22 everything was in readiness.

Notwithstanding the weather, Generals van Deventer and Northey in the western area began their advance on December 24 in a combined offensive to drive the forces of the Germans which, under General Wahle, had reached the Mahenge plateau, over the Ulanga and Ruhudje rivers. Between Iringa and the Ulanga, where the former general operated, the terrain was very mountainous, and covered with dense bush, while all the streams were swollen by the rains. On Christmas day the troops of the 2nd division encountered the Germans east of the pass known as Magoma, or Lukegeta, Nek. While this frontal attack was proceeding the mounted brigade was sent to cut off their retreat, and a column under Colonel Taylor moved east of Muhenga to join hands with the mounted brigade. Fierce fighting continued at the pass on the 26th.

The Germans were attacked front and rear, and their position was critical. The threat of the British movements was to be gauged from the fierceness with which the Germans attacked the lines which encircled them at various points in a desperate attempt to break through. But the dense bush favoured defensive operations, and eventually the Germans managed to elude envelopment by splitting into small parties and taking to the bush. There was still a chance, however, that they might be surrounded at Muhanga, and for a time it seemed as though they actually were trapped. On the 27th, Wahle launched a heavy attack on that place, and although repulsed that day, continued his attacks on the next. In the end, however, his force, as General Smuts reported, "escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness and eluded pursuit."

Thus by the end of the year the German forces were still not rounded up. Lettow-Vorbeck and Wahle, the former on the Rufiji river and the latter at the southern end of the Mahenge plateau, still maintained themselves. But they were almost isolated the one from the other, and it was obvious, by January, 1917, when the heavy rains again forced the suspension of operations, that the final clearing of all German forces from East Africa could not be much longer delayed.

CHAPTER 19

The Salonica Expedition

ON October 2, 1915, M. Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, had given his consent to the landing of the Franco-British forces at Salonica, and on October 4 he stated in the Greek chamber that his country would not take material measures to prevent the passage of Franco-British armies which were hastening to the assistance of the Serbians. But on the day on which the landing began M. Venizelos retired from office owing to King Constantine's refusal to endorse his policy.

Speaking in the House of Commons on April 18, 1916, Sir Edward Grey, in reply to a question whether any protest had been made by the Greek government in connexion with the recent occupation of Greek territory by the Allies, said that certain protests had been received from the Greek government to the measures which the entente Powers had been obliged to take in Greece or in Greek territorial waters. He added that the circumstances which had rendered these measures necessary were that the French and British governments in the beginning decided to send troops to Salonica on the invitation of the then Greek prime minister, and though shortly afterwards there was a change of government in Greece, accompanied by a change in her policy, the Allies could not then recede from the undertaking to which they had committed themselves. M. Venizelos had a majority in the Greek Parliament, and all the subsequent troubles of Greece arose from the determination of King Constantine to maintain what he called neutrality, in defiance of the Greek constitution which placed him under it, and in disregard of the wishes of many of his people. But instead of the 150,000 men for whom M. Venizelos had asked, only some 40,000 men were disembarked by the Allies in the first and second weeks of October, 1915.

The British troops were under the command of Sir Bryan Mahon and the French were commanded by General Sarrail. The original purpose of the expedition—to help the Serbians to repel the Bulgarian invasion—having failed, the Allies decided to hold Salonica as a base for future operations, and the Franco-British

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

troops which had retired from Serbia were used as a covering force for those landing at Salonica. The original army was increased to eight divisions, three being French (the army of the Orient) and five British, the 16th, 22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th, known as the Salonica Expeditionary Force.

The fortification of the advanced defensive line and of Salonica itself was pushed forward by the Allies with feverish haste, for their first object was to see that enough territory was included within the fortified zone to prevent any enveloping movement on the flanks and keep hostile guns at a distance. Favoured by fine weather, the fortifying of Salonica was nearly completed by the end of December. The Serbian army, after its final retreat, was at Durazzo and it was the intention of the Allies to remove it to Corfu to recuperate and refit. Before this could be done it was necessary that the seas should be cleared of enemy submarines which were operating from Greek bases, and during January the Allies occupied all the island ports. Stores and food had already been taken to the Serbians, and the steps taken against submarines having proved effective, 250 Italian transports succeeded in embarking the whole of the Serbian army and landing it at Corfu without the loss of a single man. This difficult operation which was covered by Italian warships with some French and British units redounded greatly to the credit of the Italian navy.

Having solved the problem of transporting the Serbian army to Corfu, the Allies next had to solve the further problem of conveying it to Salonica, a much more difficult undertaking, as the far longer passage by sea gave the enemy submarines more scope, but during May this also was accomplished without loss.

An alteration in the British command was notified by the War Office on May 20. General Mahon was transferred to Egypt, and his place at Salonica was taken by General Sir George F. Milne. In the last week of May the political—and to some extent the military—situation in Greece took a turn for the worse, which led the Allies to take a stronger line with the government of the country. On May 26 a large force of Bulgarians, estimated at 25,000 men, accompanied by German officers and a few German troops, advanced from Petrich, appeared before Fort Rupel, and summoned its garrison to surrender, giving it two hours in which to evacuate the position. The commander of the garrison opened fire on the enemy, but after a few rounds held a parley

GREECE BLOCKADED

under a white flag with a German officer, and shortly after surrendered the fort to the invaders. He had received orders from the Greek government to hand it over.

To a large number of Greeks this surrender was highly distasteful, and M. Venizelos made an impassioned protest against it, but the Greek government justified its action by stating that resistance would have been useless and that to offer it would have been inconsistent with its policy of neutrality. The Allies, however, could not view these proceedings with indifference; and M. Briand, the French prime minister, declared that France, in conjunction with Great Britain, would begin energetic measures as a result of the Bulgarian invasion of Greek territory. On June 3 Sarraïl proclaimed a state of siege in the area occupied by the Salonica army. On June 6 the Allies began to blockade the Greek coast. The blockade was a "pacific" one, but that it was sufficiently powerful was demonstrated by a Greek statement which said that "this virtual blockade of Greek ports threatened the starvation of the entire population of the kingdom and the ruin of Greek commerce." The Greek government declared that it was unable to understand why such a measure should be thought necessary; but on June 8 it ordered a partial demobilization of the army, stating that this was done so that the presence of Greek troops should not interfere with the operations of the belligerents, and to reduce the financial pressure on the country, as the budget showed a revenue of less than 10 millions and an expenditure of over 20 millions.

Demonstrations against the entente occurred at Athens on June 12, and threats against Great Britain and the other Allies were openly made by government supporters. The Greek prime minister, M. Skouloudis, appeared to be resolved on resisting the blockade to the utmost, and the Allies were compelled, after relaxing it somewhat, to enforce it with much greater rigour than before. The entente ministers, who had been preparing a note to Greece, revised it, and made its terms more drastic. They presented it to the Greek government on June 21, and the crisis was brought to an end forthwith by the resignation of the Skouloudis cabinet and the appointment of M. Zaimis to be prime minister. He accepted, in the name of King Constantine, all the demands of the Allies.

At the beginning of August the front of the Allies stretched from Lake Prespa on the west to the Struma on the east, a

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

distance of about 200 miles. Reinforcements were still coming forward. Russian and Italian troops had landed at Salonica in some strength to join the British, the French, and the Serbians in the prosecution of the campaign. The first detachment of the Russians disembarked on July 30 and the Italians arrived on August 10.

British troops came into contact with the Bulgarians in the first week of August near Lake Doiran, and under cover of a dark, rainy night they rushed into the village of Doljeli, a short distance west of Doiran town, drove the enemy out of it, and returned to their lines. On the 9th the French bombarded Doiran, which lay on the south-west shore of the lake, and about 35 miles north-north-west of Salonica. Columns of smoke were seen to arise from the town, and following up the artillery preparation French infantry advanced, captured Height 227, two miles to the south-east, and took the railway station, thus gaining possession of the line from Salonica as far as Poroi. On August 10 another change in the Allied commands was announced, by which General Sarrail became commander-in-chief of all the entente forces in the Balkans, his place at the head of the French divisions being taken by General Cordonnier.

In the middle of August the forces of the Allies were advancing northward, though gradually and slowly, and, on the 15th, Doljeli was occupied by the French without opposition. But this capture appeared to be the signal for the onset of a powerful Bulgarian offensive, which next day developed along the whole battle line. At Doljeli the enemy, marching out from their permanent entrenchments close to that village, attacked the French in superior numbers and expelled them from it. Having been reinforced, the French vigorously assaulted the place and retook it. But the Bulgarians counter-attacked with energy and success, and it changed hands several times amid fierce fighting, in which the British participated. On the night of August 17 a British battalion had its first experience of hand-to-hand fighting in an assault of Horseshoe Hill, an eminence which commanded the village, and with bayonets and bombs drove the enemy off it, subsequently repulsing all his efforts to regain the lost ground. On August 22 the Bulgarians attacked the Allied positions west of Horseshoe Hill, but were driven back.

While thus active in the centre, or the Gevgeli-Doiran sector, of the front of the Allies, the Bulgarians showed still more

THE SERBIANS ATTACKED

activity on its flanks. Over against the Allied left wing, or western part of the line, the Bulgarians had concentrated large forces under General Bojadieff at Monastir and Kenali, on the Monastir-Salonica railway, and on August 16 they suddenly launched a strong offensive against the front from Lake Prespa to Lake Ostrovo, which was held by the Serbians, but towards its western extremity in weak force only.

At Florina, 16 miles south of Monastir, there were only some Serbian advanced guards, which, after an exchange of shots, withdrew as the Bulgarians came on in overwhelming numbers, and the enemy thereupon occupied the place and its railway station. Debouching from Florina, the Bulgarians in the next two days entered Biklishta, south of Lake Prespa, and took Banitsa, a station some miles farther on upon the railway to Salonica, and close to Lake Ostrovo. On August 18 the enemy, six battalions strong, attacked the Serbians along the front to the east and north of the railway, starting from Moglena, in the Karadjova mountains, and ending above the villages of Strupino and Pojar, the sector in which the Serbians had been victorious in July, and though he fought with the utmost fury he was thrown back on his original position with a loss of over 1,000 men. On the following day the Serbians in this district counter-attacked the Bulgarians, and drove them across the frontier at Kukuruz, occupying the spurs of that mountain as well as those of another, Kaymakchalan.

Farther to the west the enemy continued his advance from Banitsa along the railway in an attempt to gain Vodena, and so to get in rear of the Serbians. The Serbians, still outnumbered, held them up for a while on the Malka Nidje Planina, but, giving way before the vastly superior strength of the invaders, slowly retired to Lake Ostrovo, where very heavy fighting took place. They occupied a defensive position between that lake and the little lake called Petrsko, and from midnight to five o'clock in the morning of August 22 they maintained themselves in it, notwithstanding repeated and violent Bulgarian onslaughts. The progress of the enemy in this sector was completely checked, while all the time the Serbians in the Karadjova district were storming one peak after another, and threatening a descent into the valley of the Cherna (Tserna) which lay beyond.

Kastoria, a town on the high road from Florina, which eventually reached the Aegean through Larisa at Volo, was occupied

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

by the Bulgarians on August 22, the Greek local authorities retiring and leaving it in the hands of the enemy, as they had done when he appeared at Florina. The Bulgarians tried to resume their advance at Lake Ostrovo, and their official communiqué 'announced various victorious encounters with the Serbian forces, but the latter strengthened their front by recapturing Hill 1,506, three miles north-west of the lake, which they had previously lost. By August 25 the Serbians were counter-attacking in their turn in this region, and had pushed back the Bulgarians for a considerable distance. Reinforcements were constantly coming up for the Serbians, and though on August 27 the Bulgarians brought new heavy guns to bear on the Ostrovo sector, and under their cover made three violent assaults, they were successfully repulsed. On the other hand, the Serbians in the mountains to the north conquered fresh positions on the slopes of Vetrenik, west of Kukuruz.

On the Allies' right, lying along the Struma, east of Salonica, the Bulgarian offensive was launched both from the north and the east. The enemy's first object was to occupy the entire extent of Greek territory east of the Struma, a region which he knew was not held in any strength by the troops of the entente Powers, and therefore could be easily seized—provided the Greeks made no resistance. As soon as his march southward began it was evident that he was acting in collusion—or, at all events, in agreement—with the Greek government. For at the outset the authorities at Athens ordered the withdrawal of the Greek forces which had stood in his path, and thus permitted him to descend into the plains of Seres and Drama.

On August 17-18 Krushevo, Starchista and Lise—three fortified places situated immediately south of the frontier, east of Fort Rupel—were surrendered to him. Not a few of the Greek soldiers, indignant at this betrayal of the interests of their country, were very unwilling to quit these strategic points, and they offered some resistance at Krushevo and Starchista; but the Bulgarians captured all three practically without an effort. The garrison of Fort Pheapetra, near Krushevo, fought more stoutly, but its action had no real influence. At the same time the enemy crossed the mouth of the Mesta and sent forward patrols towards Kavalla, many of whose inhabitants straightway fled for refuge to the island of Thasos, which had been in the hands of the Allies for some little time.



THE WIRING PARTY. British soldiers setting out to consolidate terrain newly-won in the battle of the Somme. The barbed wire was very portable and little injured by fire of the ordinary type of field gun.



MEN OF THE LONDON SCOTTISH MARCHING TO THE TRENCHES IN THE SOMME BATTLEFIELD

FIGHTING AT KAVALLA

On August 24 the Bulgarians were in Kavalla, and with one exception occupied all its forts, which were armed with many heavy guns. On August 25 the place was bombarded by two British monitors and a cruiser. Though the enemy was now in possession of nearly the whole of eastern Greek Macedonia, he had not gained it without encountering an increasing amount of opposition from certain portions of the Greek army. But it was at Seres that a part of the Greek forces made the most important stand. As the troops of the enemy had closed in on the Greek guard at Demirhissar, one man, who slew a Bulgar to prevent his escape, succeeded in reaching Seres, and gave the alarm to Colonel Christodoulos, the temporary commander of the demobilized 6th division, which, about 5,000 strong, was stationed there.

The general in command was on leave, and Christodoulos on his own responsibility immediately took up a defensive position outside the town, summoned the disbanded local reservists to rejoin him, and prepared to oppose the Bulgarians with all the energy that was possible in the circumstances. When two regiments of the enemy approached him and demanded the surrender of the town, with its arms and munitions, he refused to comply. The Bulgarians began to shell the place, and a struggle ensued; but the odds were too great, and Christodoulos was compelled to withdraw his men. However, in the first week of September he arrived at Kavalla, where he drove the Bulgarians out of some of the forts which they had taken.

If the seizure by Bulgaria of Fort Rupel in May had caused considerable uneasiness throughout Greece, the news of the further Bulgarian invasion of Greek Macedonia, east of the Struma, produced a much greater and more painful sensation among the Greek people. The Greek government announced that it had received assurances from the Central Powers and Bulgaria that Greek sovereignty and the rights and liberties of the inhabitants would be respected in the occupied districts, and that the whole region would be evacuated after the war. But these promises were insufficient for Greek patriots, and when it became known that Christodoulos and others were resisting the Bulgarians, the sympathies of the vast majority flowed out rather to these men than to the government. At Salonica a great meeting was convened to protest against any abandonment of national territory, and recruiting commissions were formed which called on the disbanded reservists to enlist.

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

As September opened there was a lull, but in the second week of the month the battle was joined along the whole front. It continued with short intervals well into the following December, when the Greek menace and German reinforcements for the Bulgarians, combined with incessant bad weather, called a halt. On September 10 the British made raids across the Struma and took a number of enemy positions, the Northumberland Fusiliers particularly distinguishing themselves. There was a similar operation by General Milne's army five days later, and these raids, besides harassing the enemy, yielded much information.

On the front immediately west of the Vardar the French maintained a heavy bombardment in the region of Mayadag, which pinned the enemy to his positions in that sector. It was still farther to the west that the weight of Sarrail's main offensive was felt, from the Moglena (Karadjova) mountains on the north to Lake Ostrovo on the south, the line then forming the left wing of the forces of the entente. At the outset the bulk of the fighting fell to the Serbians on the north, but they were soon supported on the south by large bodies of French and Russian troops, who, advancing below Ostrovo, speedily began a great turning movement in the direction of Florina.


Upon the rocky slopes and among the barren peaks of the Moglena range the struggle became more intense when the Serbians appeared on the scene. North-west of Kovil the Serbians occupied an important position, after an action which cost the Bulgarians heavy losses, and later carried by the bayonet several lines of entrenchments between Kovil and Vetrenik. Here they were about 30 miles north of Ostrovo. South-west of this region stood the mass of mountains, at the southern end of the Moglena range, of which the highest peak was Kaymakchalan, 8,284 feet above the sea, and a few miles north of Ostrovo. The Bulgarians held Kaymakchalan, and its capture by the Serbians was highly to be desired.

On September 12 Serbian advanced detachments were fighting hard, and, notwithstanding stubborn opposition, were making some advance towards Kaymakchalan, the position which was essential for the defence of Monastir. It had been strongly fortified, and instructions had been issued by the Bulgarian command that it was to be held at all costs. After a series of fiercely contested actions the Serbs of the Drina division forced a way to the immediate border of the mountain three days later, but it

A SEPTEMBER NIGHT

was not till the 18th that, as a result of several desperate attacks during the preceding night, they occupied the loftiest summit of the mass. The peak had been entrenched and parapeted with stone, and was well provided with guns which had been brought up by a good road from the Bulgarian side, whereas the Serbians had to face enormous transport difficulties, dragging their light guns up the steep, rugged hillsides, and all the while being short of supplies.

When the crisis came the contest for hours was between man and man. The Bulgarians still clung on to a shoulder of the mass, and they made many great efforts to recapture the lost peak, the greatest of all taking place on the night of September 26-27, when, having received large reinforcements, they made a formidable thrust, four times repeated, at the Serbian trenches, and a ferocious fight resulted. On September 28-29 the Bulgarians made a last effort, but it was met with the same



THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

valour and success as before, and it ended in a failure so complete that after a Serbian assault they retreated finally from Kaymakchalan. At the beginning of October a Bulgarian communiqué stated that "owing to heavy artillery firing upon the peak and Hill 2,368" the Bulgarians received orders to withdraw to their main positions "in order to avoid unnecessary losses."

While these victorious combats were taking place in the mountains the Serbians, in the region of Ostrovo, had pressed on with their offensive, which made distinct progress. After adequate artillery preparation they assailed the Bulgarians west and north-west of the lake, and expelled them from their advanced positions. On the south-west they captured Sorovichovo on September 13, and next day, at the point of the bayonet, carried Gornichevo, a village midway between the northern end of Ostrovo and the railway to Florina. At the same time they drove the enemy from the major part of the Malka Nidje range, which extended north and south of Gornichevo. Nor was this all. Serbian cavalry pursued the Bulgarians and seized the village of Ekshisu, having compelled the enemy to retreat precipitately for a distance of more than 10 miles. On September 15 the whole of the Malka Nidje ridge had been lost by the enemy. In the meantime, Franco-Russian forces sweeping south-westward of Ostrovo had completely cleared the region south of the lake, for a distance of upwards of 30 miles, of the Bulgarian irregulars and comitadjis. Sarrail was in course of executing his turning movement towards the west, the first objective of which was Florina, and the second, the more important of the two, Monastir.

Having taken 36 guns and much other valuable spoil from the Bulgarians, who continued to fall back in all directions, the Serbians drove forward on the right flank and the centre, and on September 15, a few miles west by south of Kaymakchalan, were crossing the Brod, a tributary of the Cherna rising in the Cheganska Planina, and flowing westward above the village of the same name. On the left the Allied forces, on the 16th, marched across the passes of the Malareka range, lying north-west of Ekshisu and some 10 miles from Florina, and advancing rapidly, in spite of the natural obstacles of the region, gained access to the broad valley in which stood Florina and, higher up, Monastir. Not till after a considerable battle had been fought was Florina taken.

FLORINA AND MONASTIR

Determined to make a stand, the Bulgarian general had rallied his men for the defence of Florina, and held a line which stretched west from Rosna across the railway. The Franco-Russian forces attacked him early on the 17th, and a most bitter struggle ensued that lasted the whole day. The Bulgarians resisted stubbornly, delivering repeated counter-attacks and making several cavalry charges, but without success. Still, they would not accept defeat, and the battle raged through the following night, and it was not till 10 o'clock in the morning of September 18 that the entente troops could claim that their triumph was complete.

But the Allies had conquered only after a desperate conflict. The main body of the enemy retreated in confusion towards Monastir, 15 miles away to the north. Bulgarian stragglers left behind in the town kept up a vain fight in a few of the houses in Florina for some time, but such as were left alive were finally rounded up and made prisoners. As a result of his defeat Bojadieff was cashiered, and his command was handed over to a German soldier, General von Winckler, who forthwith strengthened the already strong defensive line through Kenali across the valley to the north, which Mackensen himself had selected during the preceding winter for the protection of Monastir against an attack from the south. Florina had been in the occupation of the enemy for exactly a month.

As a result of the capture of Florina rumour asserted that the Bulgarians were on the point of evacuating Monastir, but this was far from being correct. Strong fortified positions gave them a breathing space and time to concentrate fresh troops. In their retreat the enemy had destroyed the bridges on the railway, and the Allies lacked other means of transport. Further movement in force needed time, but meanwhile Sarraïl was extending his left towards Lake Prespa, on the other side of which, in Albania, the Italians were making progress, and coming in his direction from the Adriatic. The advance of the Allies from Florina was not an easy matter unless very strongly supported. Both sides of the valley were walled in by hills from which the Bulgarians swept it with their fire. Yet Sarraïl pressed forward, meeting with considerable resistance on the heights north of Pisoderi, midway between Florina and Lake Prespa, and in the direction of the monastery of San Marco, north of the town. East of Florina, in the river Brod district, a Bulgarian counter-attack,

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

in which cavalry took part, was dispersed towards Boreshnitsa by French "75's" before reaching the Serbian lines. But next day, September 20, the enemy, renewing his attempts in this sector, succeeded after several fruitless assaults in setting foot in the village, and was then driven out of the place by the Serbians. On the same date the Allied troops, in spite of an intense fog, advanced as far as Hill 1,550, about 5,000 yards north-west of Pisoderi, and took many prisoners. By September 22 the Serbs had reached the outskirts of Vrbeni, north-east of Florina, and all the ground north-west of Armensko, west of Florina, had been cleared. After hard fighting progress was made on the heights dominating the road from Florina to Popli, on Lake Prespa. Bad weather interfered with the operations, but two days later they resulted in the repulse of assaults near Hill 1,550, with heavy loss to the enemy, and a slight advance north-west of Florina.

At noon on September 24 Sarrail launched a general assault of Serbians, French and Russians against the Bulgarian positions north of Florina. The battlefield was a flattish grass plain, bounded on the west by mountains, and on the east by grassy heights, with Krushograd set in the midst of them. For the most part it was a frontal attack. In the advance the Serbians reached the frontier crest north of Krushograd; French infantry, north-east of Florina, carried the first houses of the village of Petorak after a brisk fight, and on the west the Russians stormed Hill 916, which had been strongly fortified.

It was at this time that the British under General Milne began the operations on the Struma-Dorian fronts, to give increased aid to Sarrail's offensive. These were conducted by Lieutenant General C. J. Briggs, and he began by seizing and holding some villages on the left bank of the Struma, for the purpose of enlarging the bridge-head at Orliak, from which he would be able to threaten a further movement on Seres or Demirhissar. The attacking infantry, on the night of September 29, crossed below the Orliak bridge and formed up on the left bank of the river. At dawn next morning the Gloucesters and the Cameron Highlanders, under cover of artillery fire, advanced and took the village of Karadjakeui Bala at eight a.m. Almost immediately the Bulgarians opened a heavy and accurate fire on the British, but the remaining two battalions of the brigade—the Royal Scots and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—pushed on against the village of Karadjakeui Zir.

GENERAL MILNE'S DISPATCH

The Bulgarians put up a stubborn resistance, but the place was taken by half-past five in the afternoon. Attempts to bring up enemy reinforcements during the day were frustrated by the British artillery, but during the night the Bulgarians made strong counter-attacks, all of which failed with heavy losses. Next night they again delivered repeated assaults, but with no better success. The British held their ground firmly, and by the evening of October 2 the position was solidly organized. General Briggs then turned his attention to the capture of Yenikeui.

The assault against Yenikeui was entrusted to the Royal Munster and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. Yenikeui was taken on the morning of October 3. The way had been thoroughly prepared for the attacking troops by the artillery, who had registered on the previous day; there was a pause in the firing, the infantry advanced, and, armoured cars cooperating, Yenikeui was occupied, with few casualties to the British, by seven o'clock. It was after that that the heavy fighting began. In the course of the day the Bulgarians launched three heavy counter-attacks. The first came across the plain from Papalova, and at least 3,000 men took part in it, but it withered under the accurate shooting of the British guns, and the Bulgarians retreated without ever reaching the British line. The second also failed under a punishing fire. The third, which took place in the afternoon, was the most serious. Of it, General Milne, in his dispatch of October 8, said:

At four p.m. the village, the ground in the rear, and the bridges were subjected to an unexpectedly heavy bombardment from several heavy batteries which had hitherto not disclosed their positions. Following on the bombardment was the heaviest attack of the day, six or seven battalions advancing from the direction of Homondos, Kalendra and Papalova with a view to enveloping our positions. This attack was carried forward with great determination, and some detachments succeeded in entering the northern portion of Yenikeui, where hard fighting continued all night until fresh reinforcements succeeded in clearing out such enemy as survived.

On October 4, under cover of their artillery, the British consolidated their new line, which now formed a satisfactory bridge-head. Next day Nevolyen was shelled, but the Bulgarians evacuated it as soon as the British infantry advanced to the attack—whereupon it was occupied. Pushing on, the British further extended their front, and by the evening of the following

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

day it reached from Komarian on the south, through Yenikeui and Nevolyen, to Elishan on the north.

The Bulgarians attempted on the night of October 5 a counter-attack against Nevolyen, but it was easily repulsed. Next day a string of five villages fell into the hands of the British, all lying north of Lake Tahinos to a point within three miles of Prosenik, a station on the railway between Demirhissar and Seres. On the 7th a strong cavalry reconnaissance located the enemy on this railway, with his advanced posts on the little river Belitsa, and a considerable force at Barakli Juma, south-west of Demirhissar. Meeting with little opposition, the British continued to advance, and on October 8 they stood on the front Ago Mah-Homondos-Elishan-Ormanli, with mounted troops at Kalendra, near the railway, about six miles due west of Seres.

September closed with Kaymakchalan in the possession of the Serbians, who early in October advanced a mile and a quarter north of the peak. The capture of the mountain had immediate results. Before dawn on October 3 the Bulgarians evacuated Starkov Grob, a mile west of the mountain, and Floka, three miles north-east. On the same day they abandoned their whole line from the Nidje Planina on the east to Krushograd on the west, and continuing their retirement yielded the region on the side of the Cherna from Floka to Petalino. In the course of the afternoon the Serbians to the south-west crossed the river Sakuleva, and came within 500 yards of Kenali. On the night of October 3 the Allied forces had reached the line Petalino, the bend of the Cherna, Kenali and Negochani, with their left at Pisoderi, at the foot of Mount Chechevo. Sovich, the first of the Serbian villages to be rescued from the foe, was occupied by troops of the Danube division on October 3. Two days later it was calculated that 90 square miles of Serbia had been recovered.

Among the most interesting features of the war, the return to their native land of the Serbians who had lost and endured so much was naturally a subject of cordial congratulation among themselves and the Allies. The reconstruction of the Serbian army had been more than justified. Now began the crossing of the bend of the Cherna, and some very severe fighting.

A few miles east of Kenali the Cherna, which comes down through the Monastir plain in a southerly direction, turns to the east, makes a wide loop, and then flows on almost due north until eventually it falls into the Vardar above Krivolak. About

SARRAIL'S EFFORTS

October 4 the Serbians began to cross the bend in the vicinity of Dobroveni and Brod. Higher up on the east side of the river they advanced to the outskirts of Budimirtsa and Grunishte, north-west of the Nidje Planina. On the 8th they captured Skochivir in the Cherna bend, after rushing two lines of Bulgarian trenches and taking several hundred prisoners, with eight machine guns. More than once the enemy counter-attacked with great violence, but was repulsed on each occasion, and eventually forced back for over half a mile to his third line of entrenchments, which the Serbians began assaulting next day, gaining the position at Slivitsa. On the 10th the Serbians got a footing in the village of Brod, and for many days an intense struggle proceeded, with varying fortunes, between that place and Skochivir. Farther east other Serbian forces—the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies being engaged on the Cherna-Kenali front—took by assault on October 6 the height behind Pojar in the Moglena, and on the 7th carried the Dobropolyc summit, and from it commanded with their guns the solitary road by which the Bulgarians obtained their supplies in the range.

While all this incessant fighting was being maintained on the right of the Allies' left wing by the Serbians, who were supported by French guns and armed with British hand grenades, the entente troops progressed, west of Kenali, on both slopes of the Baba mountains, and reached Buf and Popli. Kenali station was in the occupation of the Allies, and on both sides of the railway they were assaulting the powerful defensive organization north across the plain, which had been brought into existence by Mackensen. On October 5 and 6 lively actions were reported along the whole front, and on the 10th the French announced that the offensive continued with success. But the Kenali line was very strong, and heavy guns were brought to bear upon it in an attempt to batter it down. Besides, the Bulgarians had been reinforced, and fought with the utmost tenacity, trying by all means to keep the Allies out of Monastir.

After artillery preparation Sarraill made an assault with French, Serbian and Russian troops on this main enemy position in the afternoon of October 14; but the guns had not done enough, or were not sufficiently numerous, to ensure success for the infantry attacks, and the effort, though made with determination and pressed for hours, failed to make an impression. As was to be expected, Sofia exulted in this reverse for the entente. But

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

the next few days showed how little reason she had for jubilation. Too strong to be taken by frontal assault, the Kenali line was capable of being turned, and turned it was.

Day after day a fierce struggle had been going on in the bend of the Cherna. At the head of the Serbians was the veteran Marshal Mishich, who was convinced that the desired result was to be obtained there. On the 17th he made a sharp thrust forward, and drove the Bulgarians out of the villages of Gardilovo and Velyeselo and took Brod, on the outskirts of which his troops had been for several days. Two cavalry regiments crossed the river, pressed on through Brod, and turned the defeat of the enemy into a rout. The Serbians had, in fact, outflanked the Kenali line from the east. German reinforcements now arrived for the Bulgarians in this sector, but Mishich went on with his advance, and on the 19th defeated a Bulgaro-German force in the neighbourhood of the village of Baldentsi, some four miles north-west of Brod. Then bad weather interrupted the fighting.

The struggle was resumed on October 22. The German contingents which had been sent to help the Bulgarians in the defence of Monastir attacked the Serbians, and attempted to regain the positions which had been lost on the 18th and 19th. The Bulgaro-Germans attacking on the 22nd were heavily defeated by the Serbians, who thereupon advanced and carried several of the enemy's trenches to a depth of 800 yards, and inflicted heavy losses. During the operations in the bend of the Cherna the Serbians had taken many Bulgarian prisoners. Towards the end of October there was constant fighting in the Cherna bend, but owing to the bad weather no important movements by the troops on either side were possible. At the end of October the position on the left of the Allies was that a good deal of ground, strategically valuable, had been gained on the Cherna and on the north-east, that the line in front of Kenali on both sides of the railway was stationary, and that progress had been made westward in the mountains looking down on Monastir, and, farther west still, there had been an advance on the shores of Lake Prespa. On October 24 connexion had been established between the French and the Italians at Korcha (Koritsa), west of Biklishta and south-west of Prespa, their cavalry detachments having come into touch.

On the right of the Allies the success of General Milne's offensive during the first eight days of October, and of various

THE STRUMA BRIDGED

actions during the rest of the month, of no great individual importance in themselves but cumulatively significant, resulted in the gradual withdrawal of the bulk of the Bulgarians from the valley of the Struma to the mountainous region beyond Demir-hissar and Seres, the enemy retaining only some villages near his old front as advanced outposts. Reconnaissances confirmed that he held Seres in some strength, and his works there were repeatedly shelled by the British guns. West of the place Papalova and Prosenik were occupied, and on October 12 a force of hostile cavalry was driven back two miles south of it.

Constant patrol actions took place during the third week of the month, and Barakli Juma, where the Bulgarians were entrenched, was bombarded. From the sea the fleet cooperated by shelling enemy positions near Neohori and along the coast to the Meshtian; on this part of the front Turkish troops had now come up to reinforce the Bulgarians. During the fourth week heavy storms of rain, which caused the Struma to rise several feet, soaked the ground, and impeded operations. About October 27-28 Bulgarian attacks in some force on Ormanli and Kalendra were repulsed and broken, with considerable losses to the assailants. On the 31st the British took by storm Barakli Juma, which though only a large village was strategically valuable as it stood in front of the Rupel pass, one of the chief roads into Bulgaria.

Before October 31 Barakli Juma had been shelled more than once, but early in the morning of that day a bombardment of increased intensity was opened on the Bulgarian defences—it was so fierce that only half an hour afterwards it was discontinued to allow the infantry to advance to the assault, preparations for which had been very thorough, a new bridge having been built over the Struma and advantageous positions secured beforehand. The British pressed on, and as they approached the village the Bulgarians ran out of their trenches and fled back to the shelter of the houses, out of which they were driven with a loss of over 300 prisoners. The Bulgarian resistance was comparatively feeble, and the British had few casualties. The Bulgarians attempted no counter-attack, and the ground taken was easily consolidated. On the same day the British moved from Prosenik to Kumli, another village in the same district. On the Doiran front, where Italian contingents were fighting near Lake Butkova, the Allies undertook no operations of importance

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

during October beyond subjecting the enemy's entrenchments to constant artillery fire. A strong Bulgarian assault near Doiran in the middle of the month was repulsed. The Allies made some raids which were successful, but the respective lines remained practically the same as in September.

Nor was there much change in November on the Struma-Doiran lines, but, continuing to aid the offensive of Sarraill against Monastir, General Milne maintained his pressure on the enemy on both fronts. Having carried by storm the village of Ali Pasha, south-west of Demirhissar, the British ambushed Bulgarian patrols near Salmah, south of Seres, and made repeated raids elsewhere, keeping the enemy occupied and anxious. On November 14 a Bulgarian concentration at Krastali, on the Doiran front, was shelled and dispersed, and about the same date Kakaraska, a village south of Seres on the eastern shore of Lake Tahinos, was carried after a brilliant action. Two or three days later the British captured Barakli, south-west of Demirhissar, and again drove the Bulgarians from Prosenik and Kumli, which had been temporarily evacuated. By this time there had been great developments on the left of the Allies, and the menace to Monastir had become both close and strong.

Bad weather marked the opening of November in the bend of the Cherna and on the Kenali front, artillery duels and slight infantry encounters only taking place. On November 4 the Bulgarians attempted three separate assaults on the Serbian positions south of Budimirtsa and Polog in the Cherna loop, but each of them was easily repulsed. On the 7th the French guns with the Serbians began a bombardment of the enemy positions in the bend, and three days later the battle for Monastir was commenced by a heavy shelling of the whole hostile front from the mountains on the east, on and across the plain, to the mountains on the west. Perhaps this led the enemy to expect a general attack, but an assault on that day was made alone by the Serbians on the right, the object of which was to oust the Bulgarians from their formidable positions on the heights of Chuks, in the Cherna bend north of Skochivir.

After the Allied batteries had concentrated on the Chuks heights, the Serbians made a converging attack, advancing on a two-mile front from the south and a two-mile front from the west. The Bulgarians held on tenaciously, and even repelled the first waves of the assault, but by two o'clock in the afternoon

A HAUL OF PRISONERS

their outlying trenches were taken by storm, and before the evening closed they had lost one height after another until all were gone. The struggle had been one of desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The victorious Serbians pushed on in pursuit and reached Polog, having taken nearly 600 prisoners, eight guns, nine machine guns, and much ammunition and equipment. Next morning the Bulgarians fiercely counter-attacked three times, but were driven back in disorder with substantial losses. North of Velyeselo the Serbs also progressed.

The battle in the Cherna bend continued all next day. Supported by the intense fire of the French artillery the Serbians gained a fresh victory in the loop over the Bulgarian forces, who, after a severe struggle, were compelled to abandon Iyen, 15 miles east of Monastir, and to fall back for nearly two miles to the north. Five counter-attacks were delivered by the enemy, but not one of them checked the advance of the Serbians. Nearer Monastir in the bend Serbo-French troops accelerated their progress north of Velyeselo. Since September 12, the date on which the general offensive began, the enemy had left in the hands of the Allies 6,000 prisoners, 72 guns and 50 machine guns.

Great pressure was brought to bear on the enemy's whole western line on November 14. On that day the Serbians, continuing their flanking movement in the Cherna bend on the east, occupied, after violent fighting, all the Bulgarian positions south of Tepavtsi, among the spoils being over 500 prisoners, and then took Tepavtsi and the neighbouring hamlet of Gules, whence they progressed in the direction of Yarashok. That night the enemy, who had brought up fresh troops, made the most resolute efforts to retrieve his fortunes on the Iyen-Yarashok line. This line the enemy had fortified long before, but on the 15th the Serbians were able to pierce it at several points and drive him out of Chegel, Negochani and the monastery of Yarashok.

During the afternoon of the 14th, Sarrail's French, Russian and Italian troops, operating west of the Cherna, attacked frontally the strong Kenali line, and despite the most strenuous opposition the French captured the whole system of defence of which that town was the centre, as well as Kenali itself. The official French dispatch mentioned that the fighting was desperate at some places, "the men being up to their necks in water and mud." Snow and rain had fallen, and a great part of the fighting occurred during a heavy storm which flooded everything.

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

During the night the Bulgarians made strong counter-attacks, recovering part of their trenches, but in the early hours of the 15th they abandoned under cover of a fog the whole front line and retired on the river Bistritsa, where they had organized a second line of defence in front of Monastir. The retirement was discovered at dawn, when the Russian troops advanced to assault the village of Lajets, where on the previous day the enemy had made a stubborn stand. The Bulgarians retreated for about five miles to the north, Monastir being four miles farther on. At last, after two months of hard work, the Kenali line was in the hands of Sarraïl.

Victory was now within sight, yet there seemed a good deal to be done before it could be realized. The Bulgarian line on the Bistritsa had been prepared for over a month, was well entrenched, and protected by formidable wire entanglements. The weather continued unfavourable, with heavy snow and rain. On the left the Italians fought in the snow, trying to turn the position, while on their right the French at Kanina were held up by machine guns on a narrow road by which alone the attack there could proceed. The Russians, farther east, forded the Viro river breast-high, but were vigorously opposed, and the French, who came next on the front, were held in check by strong German and Bulgarian forces.

The action of the Serbians, in the bend of the Cherna, decided the fate of Monastir. Fighting had been going on daily for possession of the dominating heights north-east of Chegel. On the 15th, Hill 1,212, the central point of the enemy's defence on the Iyen-Chegel-Yarashok front, was captured after prodigious efforts by the Serbians, but was lost again to the enemy. But on the 17th the Serbians once more took the height, and the Germans fled precipitately, abandoning everything. On that day the Serbians carried Grunishte, Brnik and Yarashok, helped at the last-named village by French contingents. They completed their triumph in the Cherna bend by taking by assault all the fortified positions on Hill 1,378, which lay above Hill 1,212, and by driving the enemy out of Makavo. The same day several lines of Bulgarian trenches in the direction of Dobromir, north-east of Monastir, were captured by the Serbian troops. Monastir was now completely outflanked, as the Serbians commanded the Prilep road behind Monastir, and threatened to cut the enemy line of retreat northward.

MONASTIR ENTERED

Early in the morning of November 19, under this compulsion, the Bulgarians and Germans evacuated Monastir. Hard on their heels French troops entered the city at eight o'clock in the morning. With the French were Serbian cavalry and a Russian infantry regiment, and as they marched along the streets the inhabitants of the town, after hesitating reconnaissances from their barred windows, ventured out and offered them garlands of flowers. Later the citizens sent a deputation to headquarters asking if they might fly the French flag, but were told to hoist that of Serbia. Monastir, after being in possession of the enemy for about a year, had been redeemed. It was the first notable success of the entente Powers in the Balkans. Unfortunately for the Allies the gain was more than offset, as events afterwards demonstrated, by what was occurring at the same time in Rumania.

At the moment the Allies congratulated themselves on possessing Monastir, the taking of which had involved so sustained and heavy an effort. General Sarraïl, in an order of the day in which he addressed each nationality of his soldiers in turn, gave the Serbians the place of honour, saying to them: "You were the first to open the road. You first saw our enemy finally in retreat, and your continued attacks have brought about the fall of Monastir." But though the enemy had lost Monastir he was far from being beaten. Large German reinforcements had been hurried down to this front, with the intention of arriving in time to relieve Monastir, but though they came too late to do that, they immediately got into position, offering a most stubborn resistance to the farther advance towards Prilep, some 25 miles to the north-east, and the Allies' next objective.

Having handed over the administration of Monastir to the Serbians, Sarraïl pushed on immediately north of the town and took several villages. On the right the Serbians also captured several villages among the hills, including Novak and Suhodol-Raya, on November 19 and next day defeated German forces north of Suhodol, north-east of Monastir, and occupied Rapesh, north of Brnik and Iyen. On the left the Italians repulsed violent counter-attacks from the mountainous region of Muza, about six miles south-west of Monastir. The weather again interfered with operations, and the enemy was able to strengthen a line of heights which extended from Snegovo, about two and a half miles from Monastir, to Hill 1,050, south-west of Makovo, some

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

10 or 11 miles east-north-east of that town, and there he made ready to offer an energetic resistance.

On November 21 the Allies occupied the villages of Paralovo and Dobromir, and a day or two later the Serbians carried Budimirtsa and held it, notwithstanding German attempts to retake it. Bad weather again intervened, and for a while artillery fire alone was possible, except on the west, where the Italians made further progress, pressing their advance in the vicinity of Mount Peristeri and, moving on in the direction of Trnova, captured the heights south-west of Nijopole. On November 27 the Serbians, assisted by French Zouaves, gained a valuable strategic position by their capture, after a series of fierce assaults, of Hill 1,050. At the same time Sarraill attacked along the rest of this front, but was held up. As the month closed the Germano-Bulgarians were trying in the region north-west of Grunishte to recover the positions which the Serbians had conquered, but met with little success. Then bad weather once more prevailed and hampered the combatants for some days.

While these operations were proceeding the situation in Greece had taken a distinctly unfavourable turn for the entente Powers, and events which took place on December 1 and 2 at Athens made matters much worse by suggesting belligerent action against the Allies on the part of King Constantine and his army, and consequently imperilling Sarraill and his forces in the Balkans, as well as the provisional government at Salonica. On September 9, just after Baron Schenck and other Teutonic intriguers had been deported to Kavalla, the French legation was attacked by Greek reservists, and French bluejackets were landed for its defence. There was much disorder in the Greek capital, caused by these reservists who, under Gounarist influences, had formed themselves into societies in opposition to the Venizelists and the entente, and who vociferously announced their entire devotion to the king. The Allies demanded the suppression of these organizations, but the Greek government, though professing compliance, did not suppress them.

Zaimis tendered his resignation to the king on September 10, but it was not accepted till two or three days later, as Constantine had some difficulty in finding another prime minister. The king in vain tried M. Dimitracopoulos, who had been minister of justice in the Venizelist cabinet of 1911, but had subsequently dissociated himself from his old leader. Zaimis was asked to

POLITICS IN GREECE

withdraw his resignation, but declined to do so. On September 16 a new ministry was formed, the premier being M. Kalogeropoulos. He declared that personally he was in sympathy with the entente, but the composition of his cabinet scarcely accorded with his words, and the diplomatists of the Allies would have nothing to do with him. On the same day the entente ministers took over the control of the posts and telegraphs, a thing which had formed part of their demands in their previous note, presented on September 2. Control of the telephone system was next established, and the services were directed by censors appointed by the French.

The position of Venizelos, who hoped the king might change his mind, was becoming more difficult. He saw that at last the time had arrived to take a strong step, and on September 25 he sailed from the Piræus for Crete, accompanied by Admiral Condorioutis and other leading members of his party. He had come to the justifiable conclusion that it was useless to look any longer to the king for a truly national leadership, yet in a proclamation made after reaching Crete he said it would be a happy event if at the eleventh hour Constantine would decide to place himself at the head of the national forces in the country.

The action of Venizelos created a profound impression in Athens and in Greece generally, and many of the best elements rallied to him. So strongly did the popular tide set in towards him and his policy that for a few days it seemed as if it might carry all before it; a report gained ground that Greece would throw off her "neutrality," and the pro-Germans were in despair. General Danglis, a former war minister, joined Venizelos in Crete. The national movement kept on increasing in strength, but Constantine hardened his heart, and the Gounarists, gradually regaining courage, stirred up the reservist leagues to attack the Venizelists and provoke disorders in some of the larger Greek cities and towns.

On October 4 the ministry of Kalogeropoulos resigned. It had never been recognized by the entente Powers, but before it quitted office several of its members, including the prime minister himself, had come round to think that Greece should abandon neutrality and side with the Allies. They told the king as much, but he replied that the Greek army was not ready to take the field. Constantine next made efforts to set up another cabinet, and, after several unsuccessful attempts, induced M. Lambros, a

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

professor of the university of Athens, to form a government, which came into office on October 9, and was a collection of political nonentities. Next day Venizelos, after a tour among the islands, landed at Salonica, where he was welcomed by General Sarraïl and the provisional government. With himself, Danglis and Condorioutis forming a triumvirate at the head of affairs, the Salonica provisional government soon afterwards was merged in the national provisional government.

No improvement took place in the situation at Athens, but, on the contrary, indications that war material was being transported to Larissa, in Thessaly, suggested hostile action. The Allies, on October 10, through Admiral du Fournet, who was in command of the Allied fleet which had been stationed at the Gulf of Salamis since the beginning of September, presented another note to Greece, which was a virtual ultimatum. In this it was stated that the dispatch of artillery and ammunition into the interior of the country, the movements of Greek ships and the continued activity of the reservist leagues aroused fears that disturbances might occur at points where the Allied fleet was anchored, and might also endanger the security of the troops of the Allies on the Balkan front. Admiral du Fournet therefore demanded the handing over of the Greek fleet and of the naval yard at the Piræus to the entente, as well as control of the railway from the Piræus to Larissa. With respect to the Greek fleet the larger units, such as the *Kilkis*, were to be disarmed, and their complements reduced to one-third, while the smaller units were to be transferred as they were. In addition, two forts commanding the mooring ground of the Allied fleet were to be given to the entente, and other coast batteries were to be dismantled. The admiral said it was imperative that the breech-blocks of the Piræus batteries should be surrendered. The Greek government was given till one o'clock next day to reply, but accepted the demands of the note, though under protest, before the time had expired. The Greek fleet was transferred to the Allies in the course of the afternoon, and towed to the Keratsini Gulf.

On October 12 Admiral du Fournet presented a supplementary note which demanded Allied control of the police in Greece, the prohibition of the dispatch of war material to Thessaly, and the prohibition of the carrying of arms by citizens. The Greek government again assented. It was high time for the entente

EXCITEMENT IN ATHENS

to take drastic measures, for some of the extreme royalists had made no secret of their scheme, which was that, if the Allies should seek to coerce Greece into joining them, or to force Venizelos upon the king, then Constantine was to proceed to the north with his troops, concentrating them at Trikala in Thessaly, and lie entrenched there till the arrival of a German army, in cooperation with which he would strike at the force commanded by General Sarraill.

No sooner were the demands of the entente accepted than attempts to evade some of them were made, efforts to send further munitions into Thessaly being partially successful. It was significant, too, that there arrived in Larissa at this time, on a tour of inspection, General Dousmanis and Colonel Metaxas, ex-chief and ex-sub chief respectively of the Greek general staff, who, with Dr. Georges Streit, formed the inner cabal around King Constantine, and were in such constant and close communication with him that they constituted his private council. All three were hostile to the entente.

Athens continued in a highly excited state, and the reservist leagues still actively fomented disaffection. Admiral du Fournet, on October 16, landed a naval force of French and Italians, numbering with reinforcements sent later about 2,000 men, to police the city and preserve order. The bluejackets occupied the municipal buildings and the railway stations at Athens and the Piræus, though their presence was attended by hostile demonstrations, Admiral du Fournet himself being hooted in the streets. But King Constantine thought it prudent to show a willingness to meet the demands of the Allies to some extent, and he declared his readiness to withdraw half the Greek troops concentrated at Larissa, and to place the Greek army on a peace footing. Four days later the entente ministers demanded the removal of the troops in Thessaly to the Peloponnesus, the dismissal of all effectives, except the 1915 class, and the handing over of all war material to the Allies.

The British and French ministers had audiences with the king, and a satisfactory solution, it was believed, was reached of all outstanding questions. Constantine received assurances from the Allies that they had no animosity against himself, and that they regarded the Venizelist movement as directed entirely against the Bulgarian aggressor. All the same, it had already been announced that the entente had recognized the provisional

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

government in Crete, but in Athens it was asserted by the royalists that Venizelos had not been recognized, except in an unofficial manner, and Venizelist circles in the Greek capital were much disturbed and discouraged.

Among the Allies generally, however, it was thought that the Greek situation had greatly improved, and a statement made in Parliament by Lord Robert Cecil, then under-secretary for foreign affairs, on October 31, took that view. Reports had reached London that the Venizelists were being prevented from supporting the national movement, but Lord Robert doubted them—wherein he was wrong. Assurances had been given by the king that his subjects would be free to join Venizelos without fear of government reprisals, but in the last week of October measures were put in force against all who sympathized with him. Officers and men who were about to go to Salonica were thrown into prison or placed under strict surveillance, and it was intimated that officials, as well as officers of the army and navy, who adhered to Venizelos would be dismissed. Under a relaxed pressure of the Allies, the royalists grew exceedingly bold, loudly denouncing Venizelos and his followers as rebels, and cruelly persecuting the latter at every opportunity. Germanism became rampant in Athens and throughout royalist Greece.

In Greek waters a German submarine, supplied by royalists, torpedoed the *Angeliki*, which was conveying volunteers to Salonica, and sank other vessels. As a protest the seamen of the Piræus went on strike, but the government tamely submitted to the outrages, and damped down the agitation. Admiral du Fournet sent a note on November 6 demanding that the destroyers and other light craft of the Greek fleet in his hands should be used against German submarines, and the king refused compliance—whereupon the admiral next day hoisted the French flag over the ships in question, but found the breech-blocks had been removed from their guns. On November 7 the French troops took possession of the naval arsenal, including the submarine defences and powder magazines, at Salamis.

News had reached England that what had been reported respecting the persecution of the Venizelists was true. King Constantine was then reminded by the entente that he had definitely promised, on being assured that the national movement under Venizelos was not anti-dynastic, that that movement should receive his support, and that part of the Greek mountain

MR. ASQUITH'S SYMPATHY

batteries should be handed over to the Allies. But the persecution of the Venizelists continued, and the batteries were not surrendered. It had come to a duel between the king and the royalists on the one hand and Venizelos and the nationalists on the other. At the end of October a collision, with bloodshed, had occurred between the Venizelists and the royalists at Katerini, on the west shore of the Gulf of Salonica, and to avoid civil war the Allies had garrisoned the town.

In spite of persecution the national movement grew. On November 9 Mr. Asquith, then prime minister, said that the British government was "in hearty sympathy with that great Greek patriot, M. Venizelos," and expressed the pious hope that Greece "might rekindle her lamp and show herself worthy of her immortal past." Royalist Greece had no intention of doing anything of the sort. Matters drifted on without improvement. On November 14 General Roques, the French minister of war, who had been at Salonica, and spoke enthusiastically of the troops of the national army he had seen there, had an interview with King Constantine with the idea of bringing affairs to a head. He demanded the establishment of a neutral zone between the royalists and the Venizelists, complete liberty of action to all desirous of joining Venizelos, and the use of the Greek railways by the Allies.

A neutral zone was delimited on November 16. It was from about two to five miles in length, and extended from south of Litohoros, on the Gulf of Salonica, to Grismuni, towards the Albanian frontier, and from north of Vrontusa, above Litohoros, to Armatovo. Nothing further of a substantial character having come out of the interview of General Roques with King Constantine, Admiral du Fournet presented another note on November 16, demanding the delivery of 18 batteries of field guns, 16 of mountain guns, and other munitions, and the Greek government replied that acceptance would be a breach of neutrality. While this was being further debated Admiral du Fournet succeeded in ridding Athens of the German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian ministers. He wrote them a letter ordering them to leave, as it was impossible, he said, for them to remain on the soil of a nation containing people whom their warships intended to attack. The king offered no opposition, and the enemy ministers and their staffs departed. In the meantime the reservists had been stirring up hostility to the

THE SALONICA EXPEDITION

surrender of the guns, and the government persisted in its refusal. On the 24th the admiral told the Greek government that he must have 10 batteries by December 1 and the rest by the 15th, and threatened to take coercive measures in the event of non-compliance. Two days afterwards the French detachment occupying the Zappeion barracks was reinforced. The situation rapidly became critical. Athens was in a ferment, the royalists prepared to resist, and the Venizelists were menaced with massacre, their houses and shops being marked with circles in red paint.

As King Constantine continued obdurate, Allied troops began landing at the Piræus early in the morning of December 1, and by daylight a French naval force, with British and Italian contingents, about 3,000 men in all, marched from three directions towards Athens. When the troops approached the city they found Greek forces ready to dispute the ground with them, though the king had stated that no opposition would be offered. Fighting began at 10.30 and went on till about two in the afternoon, when du Fournet, at the request of the king, agreed to an armistice.

The strength of the Allied forces had been wholly inadequate to deal with the situation. About 300 British bluejackets took part in the operations, and eight were killed and many wounded. The loss of the French was much heavier, and the Italians also suffered. In the course of the afternoon the king offered to hand over six batteries to the Allies. Meanwhile Athens was given over to anarchy, and the Venizelists were subjected to violent attacks. The Allies had shown that they were powerless to protect their friends; it was a humiliation for the entente. About 100 Venizelists were shot, and on that day and during the ensuing week over 1,800 of them were thrust into prison. The British and other entente colonies retired to the Piræus, and the Greek government, having regained control of the telegraphs, sent out false dispatches to London and Paris saying that all was well again. But such was not the case. How it really stood was shown by the resignation of the Greek ministers in Paris and London, who declined to serve King Constantine any longer. Admiral du Fournet was recalled, and his place was taken by Admiral Gauchet, who had been second in command.

An ultimatum was presented by the entente to the Greek government on December 14 stating that, as events had proved

that neither the king nor the government had sufficient authority over the Greek army, the Allies demanded the withdrawal of the entire Greek force from Thessaly, and that all movements of troops and war material to the north should cease. A blockade had been instituted on the 8th, and it was intimated that this would be maintained until reparation was made for the unprovoked attacks of the Greek forces at Athens, and until adequate guarantees for the future were given. The British and French ministers had withdrawn to the fleet, and though Greece signified her compliance with the ultimatum they remained afloat.

Playing for time, the Greek government—in other words, King Constantine—set forth objections to the note; but on the morning of January 9, 1917, France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy issued an ultimatum requiring, within 48 hours, acceptance in their entirety of its terms. It had been reported that Italy was not in agreement with the other Allies with respect to Greece, but a conference at Rome, in which Great Britain was represented by Mr. Lloyd George, who had succeeded Mr. Asquith as prime minister in December, reaffirmed the solidarity of the alliance. In the ultimatum the name of Italy was a proof of it. On January 10 the Greek government replied to the document in an unsatisfactory manner.

For a day or two it looked as if Constantine, still hoping for the assistance which Germany was said to have promised, would resist. It was reported that fresh German forces had arrived on the Monastir front, and it was stated that the redoubtable Field Marshal Falkenhayn was at Larissa. But the promised help did not materialize, and the blockade pressed more and more heavily on Greece. The king was compelled to submit, and on January 16 the Greek government accepted the demands of the entente in their entirety without reservation. The Venizelists were released from prison, and compensation was to be given to them. General Callaris was cashiered. The Greek troops were to be withdrawn to the Peloponnesus, 15 days being allowed for the completion of the process, and the Allies intimated that the blockade would be maintained till they were satisfied that the withdrawal was sufficiently complete.

CHAPTER 20

Behind the Lines

IN a war of entrenched positions such as existed on the western front in 1916 set battles are rare events, and their result depends almost entirely upon unexciting but gigantic labours of organization and preparation that often go on for months before the thunder of the great guns heralds an infantry attack in force.

At the beginning of April, 1916, the British army that was then lined out from the north of Ypres through Artois towards Albert was reported to consist of 1,000,000 men or more. Opposed to it was the greatest concentration of force that the Germans had ever gathered on a line so short as 83 miles—750,000 men. It is easy to write about 1,000,000 men, but hard to conceive their numbers in a concrete way. If the men under Sir Douglas Haig had been placed shoulder to shoulder in Great Britain the line would have reached from London to Edinburgh and then back again. If one man were to tick off their names on a pay sheet and could do it at the rate of 100 a minute, then, with 12 hours a day off for food and sleep, the task would take him over a fortnight, supposing he could keep up the pace of his work all that time. They were a mass of adults larger than the total male population of Ireland between the ages of 15 and 45. If every man, young and old, were taken from Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, they would not amount to 1,000,000; neither could another group of important industrial centres—Newcastle, Hull, Bradford, Sheffield, Leeds, Nottingham and Bristol—acting together and calling out old and young, put 1,000,000 men into the field.

As a matter of fact, Sir Douglas Haig could not do so either. His 1,000,000 men greatly shrank in number when he regarded them as effectives in battle. During the summer of 1915, Germany, the greatest military Power, only employed 1,000,000 infantrymen to hold the line from the North Sea to Switzerland. And they did not actually and constantly hold the line, for the larger part of them were kept well away from the firing trench,

HEAVY GUNS

in billets out of range of hostile guns, and hundreds of thousands of them were held as reserves round distant railway junctions, ready to be transported to any threatened point.

In the same way the army of 1,000,000 men that Britain placed on one field of battle was used only in fractions and widely scattered behind the front. The work in connexion with the soldiers would have been much easier if they had formed one great war city, in which they were crowded together regularly in underground rooms along the front, with a background of cottages and tent billets in the area beyond the reach of the enemy's siege artillery. As it was, they were a colony of idle men who, regarded from the economic point of view, did not work for their living, but had to be fed, clothed, doctored and bathed, lodged, supplied with ammunition, and kept cheerful.

In all the armies there was an extraordinary number of heavy guns. The artillery was rather an enormous siege train than a manœuvring force, such as all sides employed at the opening of the war. The corps' artillery was almost submerged in the heavy ordnance which often played a most decisive part in a battle. It may be taken that in an army of 1,000,000 there would be more than 250,000 artillerymen, with perhaps fewer than 100,000 cavalry. The men engaged in looking after the combatants would number 150,000. These figures, however, were liable to enormous changes. The Germans, for instance, would sometimes take all the artillery used with an army of 1,000,000 men and employ with it only about 250,000 infantry and no cavalry at all. Over considerable periods cavalry were transformed into foot soldiers and grenadiers, and taught to practise the art of a gunner with trench mortars. At the same time, the number of infantry was often reduced by giving many of them sappers' work to do. In fact, the British army was sometimes formed of nothing but sappers and artillery at night and infantry and artillery by day.

It was the extraordinary power of the German siege artillery that brought about these transformations. For an entire year British cavalry almost ceased to exist, and new recruits were seldom accepted for cavalry regiments. Then, as strength augmented, the mounted arm, which had done such splendid work in the retreat from Mons to the Marne, was restored to a position of distinct power in view of the intended general offensive movement by the Allies. In the meantime, however.

BEHIND THE LINES

the trooper had become more versatile, and while waiting for the guns and infantry to clear a path for his charge against the hostile batteries, he had become practically everything that the infantryman was—bomber, sniper, sapper, gas-dodger, bayonet-fighter and front line burrower. He was really a mounted infantryman, so that he may be added to the effectives, and the actual infantry forces of the army of 1,000,000 may be placed at 600,000 men. On the other hand, this fighting mass was reduced in number and power by the loss of its machine gun sections. The men forming these sections had usually been removed from each battalion and formed into a semi-independent arm that constituted a secondary armament distinct from the guns and rifles.

The idea of detached machine gun forces was a Prussian invention which—like the Prussian use of heavy howitzers in the field—showed that the inheritors of the traditions of Frederick the Great had not lost the remarkable power of making large and successful changes in military organization and tactics. Nevertheless, the great and sometimes enormous increase in secondary, light, and heavy artillery did not diminish the supreme power of the infantry. Tremendous as became the power of the guns, they were still the servants of the men who went forward with the bayonet.

What added to the infantryman's striking power was his use of the petrol engine. In his arduous period of training he was still taught that his feet were more important than even his hands, and by long and frequent route marches he was prepared to wear the enemy down by outwalking him. It was more, however, to increase his general strength of body and to provide for accidents in a future stage of open field warfare that the training of a soldier's legs began before his musketry course and continued through it. For in actual battle practice the petrol engine saved the legs of the soldier and enabled him to come fresh into battle. There were some breakdowns, of course, and in the struggle at Loos two of the new divisions seem to have been almost marched off their feet in order to get them in the firing line, where their condition of fatigue prevented them from doing all that had been expected. This, however, seems to have been the result of a bad piece of staff work. As a rule, there were motor-omnibuses and lorries ready to take the infantry almost within gunshot of the fighting front.

TONS OF PROJECTILES

In the Allied armies in the western theatre of war the motor-lorry, with a range of 100 miles a day, was the most important instrument of victory. On it in many cases depended the issue of a great battle. The railways of France and Germany were excellent. Many of the lines had been designed with a view to use in warfare, and after the outbreak of hostilities an extraordinary amount of material and labour was spent in developing mazes of light railways, starting from the old rail-heads behind the entrenched armies. But railways could not supply the special needs of a manœuvring force. They became almost monopolized in periods of crisis by the service of the heavy guns.

For example, in the first stage of the German attack on Verdun in February, 1916, the enemy employed about 3,000,000 shells. A fifth of these were for heavy guns from 6 in. to 16.8 in., and with the lighter shells of the quick-firers the total weight of the projectiles was 47,000 tons. For the transport of this vast stack of metal and high explosive there were needed 240 long trains, each carrying 200 tons, and afterwards an incalculable line of lesser carriages to carry these shells to the batteries. Then there were needed, besides, trucks for the 1,500 additional pieces of ordnance brought up to the woods around Verdun, and for the material used in building emplacements.

Yet, while using her railways in this manner, Germany was rearranging her infantry forces, and massing them in new groups of 500,000 and 750,000 against Verdun and the British lines. Her railway system could not serve her great guns round Verdun, and also bring up the shells being accumulated from Roulers to St. Quentin, and at the same time remain free to transport the infantry. Potatoes had to be taken from the suffering German people and transformed into alcohol, which the Germans used for much of their motor traffic. They appear also to have employed steam traction. The Allies, on the other hand, had an abundant supply of petrol, and their armies manœuvred largely by means of petrol or paraffin motor-omnibuses and motor-lorries. Behind the great working army of railwaymen in France there grew up a system of motor transport which continually increased in size. Verdun was saved in March, 1916, by a force of 4,000 motor-lorries, which one of the French war committees had been organizing for months. The German guns at the time commanded the railway line from Verdun to Paris, but the

BEHIND THE LINES

French engineers threw a series of new pontoon bridges across the flooded Meuse. Over these bridges, day and night, the 4,000 motor-lorries fed the garrisons of Verdun and Mort Homme with reinforcements of men, guns and shells. Each lorry could make a journey of 100 miles a day with a great load. At first the end of their journey was slow and perilous, for the Germans had 15 in. naval guns, with a range of 20 miles, and ploughed up all the roads behind the French front, making them not only impassable by any vehicle, but very dangerous to approach.

The British army was, on the Allied side, the pioneer of motor transport. It had had most experience in the matter, for it was against the expeditionary force that the Germans launched their motor wing under General von Kluck. It was the speed with which the westernmost German army corps travelled in motor-omnibuses and motor-lorries that made the British retreat so physically exhausting and continually perilous. Sir John French had not been prepared for so immense a use of motor transport concentrated on a small sector of the front. But after escaping from the full force of this surprising and yet finely logical piece of motor tactics, the British became the leaders in military motor work. Some years before the war the government had subsidized the motor-lorry squadrons of large business houses when the vehicles were of a type acceptable to the War Office. But these subventioned lorries were soon found to be insufficient for the needs of the army, and thousands of other motor vehicles were hastily requisitioned. Omnibuses were taken off the streets and converted into ambulances or lorries.

There was certainly "push and go" in the rapid organization of motor transport. Even in the early stages of the war the weekly supply of new lorries for the army ran into three figures, and at last all the private motor-car makers were working for the army or navy. Motor-bicycles, sometimes fitted with machine guns, were needed by scouts and dispatch-riders, while armoured motor-cars, with machine guns or quick-firers, were wanted by the naval wing for raiding the Uhlán and supporting airmen. The gunners wanted ammunition lorries to bring shell from the sea bases to the firing line quicker than the congested French railways could bring them, while the army needed motor transport for nearly everything except a cavalry charge.

France had lost a very considerable quantity of rolling-stock during the enemy's drive towards the Seine. She was, of

MOTOR TRANSPORT

course, ready to share with her allies her diminished power of steam carriage, but as a loyal ally Britain had to do her very best to relieve the heavy burden upon the partly crippled French railway system. This was done by constructing what was probably the finest motor-transport system existing. Nearly all the motor firms enlarged their plant and speeded up their output, but their labours were not sufficient for the needs of the growing army. A golden cloud of prosperity rose above the great centres of motor-lorry making in the United States, from which Britain, with France and Russia, obtained enormous supplies. Meanwhile, the Royal Automobile Club, the Automobile Association, and Motor Union sifted their members and their machines, and placed a remarkably large organized force of cars, drivers, and motor-cyclists at the disposal of the state.

Britain soon had motor fleets concentrated against possible invasion, with motorists guarding the telephone and telegraph lines at home until their work was taken over by military men. Then, in a considerable number of cases, the British motorist converted his car into an ambulance, and worked with it behind the firing line. As a matter of fact, the motor-transport system was rather overdone and not enough attention was paid to the light-railway system, which the Germans were developing with remarkable energy and the French with fine forethought. In important places along the front the Germans ran their rails into the redoubts behind the fire-trench. They were the best military engineers in the world. They must have kept their troops labouring continually in a much harder way than the Allies did theirs. They brought their light railways through narrow cuttings, and even through tunnels, in order to shield them from gun fire, and the toy-like trains used in and just behind the lines were constructed in great quantities in the Westphalian industrial centres. The Germans were occupying practically all the continental coal-fields of Europe, together with the ironfield above Verdun, and all the mineral fields of Belgium. Steam power, therefore, was their main instrument of battle.

The British army, on the other hand, was so absorbed in its motor-transport system that mechanics, skilled in the making of internal-combustion engines, had no time left for attending to the needs of the air services. It was impossible to get a hundredth part of the number of first-rate aero-engines urgently required, because the men who could have made them were

BEHIND THE LINES

engrossed in engine-making for the motor-transport department. It must, however, be borne in mind that the light-railway system went best with a stationary form of defence, and that a force which aimed at breaking the opponent's lines and making progress far behind them would find in motor transport the very best possible means of manœuvring, especially in the months when the ground would be fairly dry. In the western theatre, petrol power signified attack and steam power mainly defence.

The Germans had developed steam traction only when their great blow had failed, and, in spite of their rubber famine that told on the tyres, they still continued to use motor-omnibuses in shifting troops from one sector to the other. The large development of motor transport by the western Allies produced a revolution in one of the fundamental elements of strategy. In the age of Moltke only one army corps could be moved along one road on the same day. If two or three corps were crowded into one road, the rear corps could not be used in a battle at the front. Moreover, if several corps were stationed close together, they could not be fed for more than a day or two. In the opening battle round Mons each marching division extended for five and a half miles along the road, and took two and three-quarter hours to pass through a hamlet on the way. Although the rate of movement since the age of Moltke had been speeded up, as supplies were drawn by motor, yet the marching pace of infantry columns in their full kit still ruled all the Allied strategy.

But when, after 21 months of war, the Allied motor-transport system had been developed, the German staff had to take into consideration the number of motor vehicles at their disposal, and the speed with which they could transport both infantry and guns over many miles of country. Two fairly parallel roads might serve the progress of considerably more than two army corps, if they were filled with motor-lorries going at 10 or 12 miles an hour. Then, in regard to concentration of force, as the Germans themselves showed at Verdun, 16 army corps could be massed on a front of 30 miles or less without the slightest danger of running short of food. The entrenchments, with their machine gun redoubts and the backing of light and heavy artillery, still tended to veil the extraordinary quickening of movement behind the lines.

Meanwhile, concentrations of unusual power could be carried out with increasing rapidity, and with the consequence that less

VEHICLES OF ALL KINDS

strength was needed in holding the trenches. Only so many men with machine guns and bombs were placed in the firing line as would be able to hold out until a fleet of motor-omnibuses reinforced the support trenches and enabled the supporting troops to enter the contest in front of them. Thus the complexion of the battlefield changed, for the army ran almost wholly on wheels. Paris had been saved by its fleet of taxicabs, which transported the Paris garrison into the conflict along the Ourcq, and it seemed as though the motor vehicle would end by becoming, with its assistant railways, the universal instrument of mobility. Parks of motor-lorries were already spoken of as fleets, and it looked as if some of the future battles of manœuvres in the open field would more resemble naval and aerial actions than the old, crawling land battles of August, 1914. Railways were the factor that had concentrated for the conflict 4,500,000 men in Flanders and France, Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes. But with the exception of General von Kluck's motor wing, all these millions of soldiers, on leaving their railheads, had to work forwards and backwards on their feet.

By the spring of 1916 increased motor transport enabled the British army to cover with an intricate net of communications the 2,000 square miles of French territory over which it operated. The stretch of land was about the size of Norfolk, and included the department of Pas-de-Calais and the free part of Nord. Then the Somme department was added and part of Normandy was also included in the British area of communications, for, in addition to the ports of Boulogne and Calais, there was British material at Dieppe and Havre. As the armies increased the volume of Channel traffic grew vaster. By extending their line towards Amiens and relieving the French of the defence of the north-west front the transport arrangements were simplified.

The French had Paris as their northern base, and from it they fed the whole line from Roye to Verdun, drawing supplies from the great French ports of the south and west. Much of the traffic from England and Scotland to Paris still came through the Normandy ports, but on the whole the northerly reach of the Channel, together with Artois, Picardy, and the upper part of Normandy, were the scene of a great British invasion about which the Germans never tired of warning the French. Sometimes it did quite look like a real invasion, for a great number of troops was employed to guard the British lines of communication

BEHIND THE LINES

and garrison the ports they were using. Probably well over a tenth of Sir Douglas Haig's army of 1,000,000 men was engaged in watching the roads and in policing sea bases and towns in which troops were densely billeted.

The feeding arrangements for the British army were rightly generous. It was assumed that every man had the same appetite, and that this was a large one, as the troops were living in the open air. Every man had each day one and a quarter pounds of fresh meat, or one pound of preserved meat; he also had one and a quarter pounds of bread, or a pound of biscuit, four ounces of bacon, three ounces of cheese, four ounces of jam, three ounces of sugar, and a few spoonfuls of tea—five-eighths of an ounce. Eight ounces of vegetables were daily provided, but butter was rare. Only two ounces were given once a week; the soldiers had to get their heat energy out of their liberal ration of jam and sugar. With a million men consuming daily rations of this sort, the labour thrown on the Army Service Corps and its transport department was enormous. Six hundred tons of meat, 600 tons of bread, more than 100 tons of bacon and jam, and nearly 100 tons of cheese and sugar had to be delivered every day. Then, in addition, there was an extraordinary private supply of provisions and little luxuries through the parcel post.

A day's fresh mutton for the army would be represented by a flock of sheep spreading three miles down an ordinary country road, giving the army butchers such an amount of work as would overcome them. In fact, they could not have carried it out; their numbers were not sufficient. Refrigerated beef and mutton were largely used to save space, cattlemen and labour. The French authorities made a gallant struggle to provide their vaster army with freshly-killed, home-bred meat, but they could not continue this estimable policy. As the war lengthened out, and the appetite of the French soldier increased with a year of open-air life, he threatened to eat up all the sheep and oxen of France. Farmers grew anxious about the probable condition of their stocks at the end of the struggle, and the upshot was that both the French troops and the French urban populations had to be educated into recognition of the virtues of refrigerated meat. But the cattle-ships, in which animals used to be brought to Liverpool and London, were used for other purposes; most of them became mule transports, like the famous Nicosian which avenged the torpedoed liner the Arabic.



KING GEORGE AND THE PRINCE OF WALES AT RUINED FRICOURT TRENCHES



Imperial War Museum

CHEERING THE KING AT THE FRONT. A month after the Somme offensive opened King George paid one of his periodical visits to the front. He is seen here being warmly greeted by men of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade at Steenwerck.



HIS MAJESTY AND SIR HENRY RAWLINSON INSPECTING A CAPTURED GERMAN TRENCH



Imperial War Museum

APPRECIATION OF WOMEN'S WAR SACRIFICE. During King George's visit to France in August, 1916, he showed his appreciation of the service rendered by every auxiliary arm. He is seen here chatting with the matron of a casualty clearing station near Reminghelst.

THE DEMAND FOR HORSES

Where motor transport ended, the work of the mule cart began. The French and the British almost emptied certain American states of mules, and these hardy animals required a large force of men to handle them. Then there were the chargers of the cavalry and the enormous number of horses used with the artillery. Even when motor traction developed, the horse could not be safely separated from the guns. Engines went wrong at critical moments, but a well-kept team of good horses, though slower in pace than a steam or motor tractor, was more reliable.

The British held to both methods of moving artillery ; so did all the other armies. They had some form of mechanical transport—steam or petrol—but knowing that a shell might smash the track or an internal-combustion engine break down from its own defect or a shrapnel bullet, they “combed” the whole world for horses. Germany drew upon Holland and Scandinavia, and got within sight of an eventual shortage. Russia had a practically inexhaustible horse supply in her own immense territories. France ran short, and drew on Spain and Ireland. The British government having in Ireland the principal centre of fine horse breeding, with, moreover, a lot of superb blood in England and Scotland, came to the help of Belgium and France.

There was an astonishing rise in the price of British horses, and in everything connected with horses—oats, hay, bran and corn. Poultry and eggs grew dearer, and pork and bacon, because the food on which hens and pigs flourished was requisitioned for the vast number of horses needed by the armies of the western Allies. If the war could have been run on petrol the cost of living throughout western Europe, excluding the Central empires, might not have risen so high. Britain and France, in particular, might have developed their poultry farms in a remarkable way if oats, bran and growing grass had not been so urgently needed by millions of horses and mules conscripted by France, Britain, Belgium and Italy. The Italians also used, to a quite considerable extent, the antique ox-drawn carts, while Belgium developed dogs for machine gun traction. In Russia pony carts were used by the hundred thousand. They brought supplies through the Polish mud at a pace greater than that of the German motor-lorries, which often stuck deeply under their heavy loads. Sledges were also largely used in Russia—motor-sledges as well as horses and pony sleighs. Of all factors behind the fighting-line, the motor transport was the most important.

BEHIND THE LINES

But there was another factor—quite a small thing in appearance—which was almost of equal importance with petrol power, and this was the telephone. As in most military matters, the Prussian staff had been the first to foresee clearly the possibilities of telephone control in warfare. In the great opening battles their overwhelming force of artillery had been remarkably well scattered in small groups of guns to prevent much damage being done to it, yet each battery was linked by a telephone wire to a central control, so that massed fire effect could swiftly be obtained from the dispersed and concealed guns. All through the war telephone control increased in importance, especially during the long and almost stationary parallel battle between the sea and the Jura mountains. Happily, it was the French who produced the man of genius capable of developing to perfection the telephone system of fire control. General Pétain, the organizer of the successful wing in the Champagne battle, and afterwards the defender of Verdun, was the master gunner of the new era. He began by knowing beforehand the utmost that could be done with the latest form of telephones, and by connecting his guns to a central telephone exchange in which he sat, with wireless instruments connecting him also with his aerial scouts, he became a virtuoso in artillery tactics.

At Verdun, for example, he sat in an underground city 100 feet below the earth, and there directed his storms of the new French high explosive that was more powerful than melinite. His principal guns had a range of five miles, but they were often more effective than the longer-ranged 12 in., 15 in. and 16.8 in. ordnance of the Teutons. His telephone wires, sunk out of reach of the heaviest shell, spread in a great network from three sides of his underground city, and enabled him to act like the gunnery lieutenant of an enormous battleship. His men and officers were almost his blind servants. They elevated, traversed and fired the guns as the central control directed.

The telephone system had produced an extraordinary simplification in the handling of the vast and scattered masses of artillery. It was as though General Pétain in person aimed and fired his 2,000 or more guns. The result was often a volume of fire which made any German movement impossible. It was useless to attempt a diversion against Pétain's left flank in the morning, and attack his right flank in the afternoon. His guns could swing round quickly in response to a telephone message; each new

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

elevation or traverse was rapidly and clearly given, and practically the whole tempest of shell under the general's control was directed precisely on the new ground where the enemy's movement had been discerned. Round the French lines were French artillery officers at the end of telephone wires, running, not to their battery but through to the central control, where a large staff of men rapidly organized all information and placed it before the general. All wireless messages from aeroplane observers were also organized and related to the general body of information.

The conduct of a modern war closely resembles the conduct of a great business concern, and the control of the whole organization rests in the hands of the commander-in-chief at general headquarters. From March, 1916, until the end of the war Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters were at Montreuil, a small town in the Pas-de-Calais about 20 miles south-east of Boulogne on the main line of railway to Paris. The commander-in-chief himself was at the Chateau de Beaurepaire, about three and a half miles south-east of the town. The office work of general headquarters was distributed among many departments. There was a quartermaster general to look after the stores, an adjutant general to see to the discipline of the men and reinforcements, and so on. Each departmental chief needed a staff of officers, inspectors, and book-keeping and clerical workers.

The controllers of food supplies, munitions, medical stores, railways, horse and motor transport, clothing and other things, conducted a business far larger than all the stores in British cities. Parts of a considerable town had to be taken over to house the men, and a great network of new telegraph and telephone wires constructed to carry on their business. General headquarters needed also a post office service of its own, large enough almost for the population of Australia, if that population were concentrated into one urban community, and this postal service, with its telegraphic and telephonic service, had to function alongside the ordinary French national organization.

As a rule, the energies of the commander-in-chief were concentrated upon the actual military use of all the forces and materials which were docketed for him by his principal assistants. In the rooms in which he worked with his staff officers were large tables covered with maps, and on the maps was recorded every movement by his own troops and those of the

BEHIND THE LINES

enemy. He had also under his eyes the disposition of his guns, the amount of shell accumulated by the batteries and available for instant use, and the store of shells in the field depots and at the bases. He could tell almost to a minute the time it would take to make concentrations, and he had also clearly set out before him all that was known about the enemy's troops, their regiments, brigades, divisions and army corps, the position of all their artillery and their probable amount of shell supply.

The modern system of aerial reconnaissance had much increased the recording work in the commander's rooms. He had tabulated statements of the arrival and departure of all German trains opposite his lines, and all the transport columns that had been seen on the move, together with the results of the secret service work of the Allies that affected his forces. One of the chief branches of this business of war was strangely prosaic. The information about Allied troops and the enemy's troops was, of course, enormous, yet all the vital factors in it had to be instantly available. So filing systems and methods of displaying concretely exact, summarized information were very useful. Even the daily state of the roads and its effects upon the speed of motor vehicles was worth constant study by some member of the staff.

General headquarters was placed centrally behind the three headquarters of each army. Then each army centre had, a few miles in front of it, the headquarters of each army corps, and closer to the enemy every army corps was divided into divisional, brigade and battalion headquarters. A multitude of staff officers connected these directing centres, but there were also in the British and Belgian armies new factors in the organization—the international liaison officers. These officers maintained daily touch between the general and army headquarters of the British, French and Belgian forces, travelling to and fro in motor-cars. Much of this linking work was, of course, done by telephone, telegraph and written reports, sometimes in plain language, sometimes in cipher. But the liaison officers still had much to do in amplifying communications, discussing points of difficulty, and bearing verbal messages of such importance that prevention of all possible leakage was a prime necessity.

At this time the British 2nd army under Sir Herbert Plumer, and the 1st army under Sir Henry Horne, later Baron Horne, held the line from Boesinghe, north of Ypres, to Grenay, south of

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Armentières. The 3rd army, under Sir E. H. H. Allenby, held the line between Arras and the Somme. Each of the three generals had his own headquarters and staff, his headquarters often being some 12 or 15 miles from the firing line, and situated in a quiet little town close to some junction of highways from which the trenches could rapidly be reinforced. These places were smaller copies of general headquarters, lapped in the same atmosphere of calm but energetic business.

Some miles eastward of each army headquarters were the army corps headquarters. Some miles beyond the army corps headquarters were its two divisional headquarters, which were often within range of the enemy's siege ordnance. Then, well among the ruined houses and scattered villages, were the six brigade headquarters, where the brigadier generals and their small staffs conducted the actual fighting. In many cases the brigadiers and their officers lived in an underground chamber in the firing line, working their 4,000 men by means of telephone cables running beneath the earth from their dug-outs and winding along the walls of the communication trenches to the firing line and to the artillery observation posts, hidden in the neutral zone between the opposing fronts. Except for their daily rounds of inspection along the deep ditches, the brigadiers did not see much open air life when in the firing line. They were office men living in caves, or at best in some very quiet and modest house near the third line.

Houses, however, were usually dangerous lodgings for the brain of a fighting force that was under fire, as enemy gunners naturally were keener to get a hit on the headquarters of a brigade than on a dug-out in a fire-trench. It will be remembered that in the most critical hour of the first battle of Ypres, on October 31, 1914, German spies discovered the headquarters of our 1st division and 2nd division, and enabled the German gunners to put the leader of the 1st division, General Lomax, temporarily out of action, and also to stun Sir Charles Monro, besides killing six staff officers.

This rearward position became, therefore, for excellent reasons, the best method of leadership. The French seem to have retained, in divisional tactics, the old heroic style of leadership. For instance, in the second battle of Champagne, General Marchand went forward at the head of his men, with the result that he was quickly wounded.

BEHIND THE LINES

In the ordinary circumstances of trench warfare, in which grand charges were almost as rare as holidays, the actual fighting line was about half a mile beyond brigade headquarters. The fighting line usually consisted of a fire-trench, a support trench and a reserve trench,*connected by zigzagging, narrow communications, and diversified by excavations of every kind and engineering devices of great ingenuity. There were battalion headquarters by the hundred, linked by telephone to the brigadiers and to their own firing-trenches and observation posts.

The medical officer and the quartermaster lived near the underground orderly room, where the colonel, the major, the adjutant and their orderlies watched over the affairs of the battalion. Usually there were two of these battalion organizations, one for the men in the fire-trench and the other for the men in the support trench. After working for four days as supports, each battalion usually went into the fire-trench for four days, and on being relieved had eight days in billets, which was sometimes a kind of a holiday, and at other times was rather the reverse. In fact, some officers and men thought that true peace was to be found in the support line, while others looked upon a dug-out in the fire-trench as the best place of repose, notwithstanding the bombs that occasionally came over from the German trench mortars.

In making and improving the trenches the German engineers introduced modern novelties. For example, they used electrical power for lighting, pumping and drilling. In answer to Allied bombardments they deepened their trenches to nine feet, constructed special winding, bombproof stairways to their dug-outs, built mazes of underground forts, and at last connected their fire-trenches with their support trenches by means of tunnels. Their industry was ant-like and amazingly effective. Having at the time the most powerful armament in existence, the Germans knew precisely the limits of shell penetration in different soils, and constructed their own earthworks accordingly. They had boasted of the impregnability of their line before the great tests came, but the tests proved that their boasts were justified. It was from them that the French and the British armies learned at last at heavy cost the complete science of trench making until, as at Verdun, Pétain drilled 100 feet below ground, and there made a city with electric-lighted corridors and air chimneys, underground kitchens, dining-rooms and dormitories.

TIMBER IN THE TRENCHES

The amount of timber sunk on both sides in France was enormous. Prop timber became scarce in Great Britain and also in Germany because of the vast demands of the trench makers. Where the ground was marshy the bottom of the trenches had to be boarded, and then, as the trenches universally deepened in answer to the growing power of the artillery, more wood was needed to make the firing step from which rifles could be fired through loopholes in the parapet. An extraordinary amount of timber was also used for posts on which the barbed wire was wound in line after line. The enemy destroyed the French and Belgian forests in his occupation in order to build his trenches.

There were many happenings behind the German fighting front to which no parallel could be found in the area behind the Allied lines. Having captured a great amount of Belgian, Russian and French machinery, the enemy resolved that when peace came it should not work in the markets of the world against him. A good deal of it he removed to his own country, and the larger part of it he destroyed. The first part of his rolling-stock to wear out by constant use was that which he had captured in Belgium and France. The Germans were able to save their own rolling-stock to a very great extent by reason of their admirable network of inland waterways. Happily, France also had a good canal system, and on the British part of the front it was possible to do a good deal of transport by means of barges.

Round the British Isles coasting traffic was practically brought to a standstill by the submarine campaign ; such canals as there were had been neglected and were of no material help, but the British railways met every call upon them for the transport of men and material with complete success.

CHAPTER 21

Verdun Unconquered

B^y the middle of July, 1916, the Germans realized that Falkenhayn's hope of bringing France to her knees by taking Verdun could not be fulfilled, but nevertheless they had no intention of remaining inactive on this sector of the western front. Although a number of the German heavy guns were withdrawn and sent to the Somme, the crown prince still had a superior force of artillery, and throughout the summer he kept up a constant nocturnal bombardment of the French positions. In these circumstances the army of Verdun retired in part to the subterranean shelters of the tunnels beneath the old forts, and left only a thin and flexible line of advanced machine gun posts to guard against any hostile infantry surprise. When abruptly attacked the advanced French line often withdrew on the principal defensive position. But, as it withdrew, the French guns prepared for action, and, working with mechanical precision on marked ranges, destroyed the German forces occupying the lost positions. Thereupon the French infantry returned in strength, and recovered and reconsolidated its line of advanced posts.

In consequence of the flexibility of the French line, only strong and sustained attacks could succeed against the Verdun defences. In making sustained attacks the enemy commander had to expose from 20,000 to 40,000 of his troops to French shell fire and machine gun fire to win any considerable ground and retain it. Nothing was to be purchased cheaply from the army of Verdun. Moreover, though the German artillery remained predominant for nearly nine months, its mastery was reduced to a mechanical outburst of power. By the end of July, 1916, the gunners of the crown prince's army could do little more than fire by the map against the French rear, and by fire-trench and hill top observation against the French front.

General Nivelle, however, was not yet ready to begin the great counter-offensive. He had to wait for his new 16 in. guns, and build a closer network of two-foot gauge railways, along

TOWARDS THIAUMONT

which the shells, weighing a ton or more each, could be hauled. An abundance of bridges and motor tracks had to be thrown across the gorge of the Meuse at a time when the heavy hostile batteries, including naval guns of enormous range, daily and nightly maintained a bombardment upon the rear of the French lines. Gradually the difficulties were overcome. The new 16 in. French guns arrived secretly by night, and were placed in the pits prepared in advance and then covered up; 16 in. shells arrived also by night, and were accumulated in underground store places. The telephone system was extended by networks of underground wires, and the little railways threaded all the ravines and went under new tunnels into new centres of distribution. The much enduring army of Verdun, engaged in alternate spells of navvy work and hand grenade fighting, knew what was impending, and heartened by the tale of victories on the Somme, gained with the new 16 in. gun, the men went daily into action round Fleury in a cold fury that appalled some of the German troops.

After the fruitless German attack of July 11, General Nivelle's troops worked back towards Thiaumont by gradual rushes with bombs. All the ground was ploughed up into waves of earth, owing to the storms of heavy shell overwhelming both sides during the prolonged and intense action. Cover was therefore abundant, and lines of defence could be rapidly made anywhere by digging in between the craters. An unusually heavy rain-fall, succeeded by burning August sunshine, made shell hole warfare a grievous test of endurance. But the Frenchmen lost none of their ardour of attack, for they could feel the Germans weakening in front of them.

Between July 15 and July 20 General Nivelle's men took 800 prisoners, and carried several important points around Fleury and Thiaumont by means of continual small operations in which scarcely more than a battalion was engaged. On some occasions a single French company suffered comparatively little loss in winning an important redoubt or stretch of trench. By the end of the month this method of little warfare brought the army of Verdun back to the Thiaumont hill, whereupon the German commander was compelled to use large forces in a defensive way. After a fierce nocturnal bombardment, on August 1, 1916, he sent forth columns of assault against the new French positions west and south of the Thiaumont Fort. His massed ranks were

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

completely broken by curtains of shell fire and streams of machine gun fire from the alert troops of General Nivelle. Instead of the French losing any fraction of trench, they pursued their shattered foes and bombed them out of part of their line on the southern slope of Thiaumont ridge.

At the time the Germans made this worse than useless thrust upon the French centre their forces on the eastern wing endeavoured to break through the woods in front of Souville Fort. They maintained the conflict for two days by their new method of infiltration. With gusts of hurricane gun fire and clouds of poison gas the hostile eastern wing tried to balance the Thiaumont defeat by sweeping through the woods right to the inner fortress. In the heat wave in the first week of August the fight went on. By August 2 the French lost ground in the woods. They fell back, and, as his men on the eastern side retired, General Nivelle struck out strongly northward, on a wide front from the Meuse to Fleury village. The Germans lost a line of redoubts, 800 prisoners and 16 machine guns. Then, as they reinforced the northern front, the French echelons manœuvred eastward and stormed around Fleury village and the railway station, broke the German line between Thiaumont and Fleury, and finally recovered most of the lost ground in the woods beyond Souville.

Again the German commander was compelled to another action on the grand scale at a time when his general headquarters were anxiously asking him for reinforcements for the Somme front. In a night battle the army of Verdun stormed back into Thiaumont Fort on August 3, and though the victors had to retire owing to the force of the answering German bombardment, they withdrew with 80 prisoners. When day broke the men of Verdun again stormed up the Thiaumont hill and won the site of the fortress for the second time in 12 hours. Having been driven out of the larger part of Fleury village by another blast of heavy shell, they merely waited until the German infantry occupied the ruins, then, having something human to attack, they went into Fleury again with bomb and bayonet, and recovered it likewise.

From the evening of August 4 to daybreak on August 5 the Germans continually attacked Thiaumont with desperate but un-availing courage. Defeated at this point, the German commander swung a fresh force into the eastern woods, and, after

A FRENCH RETIREMENT

having his first assault completely checked by curtain fire, launched another column that reached the French trenches only to be destroyed in a counter-attack by the army of Verdun. Incessant fighting went on day and night on the Thiaumont-Fleury line, and at the close of the first week in August General Nivelle was exercising the power of initiative, and forcing the enemy commander to answer his movements and neglect every call for help on the German side of the Somme front. In the afternoon of August 7 the French garrison of Thiaumont hill moved out in a fresh attack towards the ridge running up to Thiaumont, capturing an important position and several machine guns.

To this direct challenge the chief of staff of the crown prince replied with all his available forces. After a furious nocturnal bombardment he sent out at dawn on August 8 a succession of large masses of men who attacked from Thiaumont to Fleury, under cover of a creeping barrage of a park of 8 in. guns. The French infantry held up all assaults on the Fleury line by means of machine gun fire, but northward they were driven from the Thiaumont work, where they only had the cover of shell-holes against the tempest of shell. When, however, the German infantry in turn occupied the shell-holes, the Frenchmen stormed back into Thiaumont and held it until nightfall, when they were again compelled to retire.

This last retirement was brought about by the fact, already remarked, that the German artillery remained superior in range and in weight, and could therefore bombard furiously at night, and either compel the French guns to remain silent while the French infantry suffered, or to reveal their positions by their flash, and engage in a counter-firing combat at a disadvantage. General Nivelle preferred as much as possible not to reveal the position of his guns. Therefore he withdrew his men from the Thiaumont work in the night of Tuesday, August 8.

But he still held firmly to the line running just below Thiaumont to Fleury village, and resuming the little war of company rushes and hand-bomb raids he again worked forward at small expense. At the end of three weeks he had recovered all the ruins of Fleury and made a new line east of the village and along the road leading back to Vaux Fort. Thus at the beginning of September the German commander was again obliged to make a strong, sudden effort to recover the series of important points that had been gained from him bit by bit. On September 3 he

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

gathered all his remaining forces for a grand assault on the old battlefield below Fort Souville. The woods, the village, the cross-roads, and the slopes south of Thiaumont again rocked under tornadoes of shell and vanished in smoke and poison gas.

The grim struggle lasted until September 6. In their first series of rushes the Germans broke into a French salient on the Vaux road, but by a balancing movement the French northern wing scaled the crest running above Fleury to Thiaumont, taking there 300 prisoners. The Germans then pressed more fiercely upon the Vaux road front and captured another redoubt. When this was recovered by the French the enemy commander ceased to manœuvre on the wings, and, thinking he had at the end of the third day weakened the French centre, he attempted his grand stroke. At eight o'clock in the evening column after column of German infantry charged upon Fleury village. But not a column was able to deploy in the waves of attack. What Germans remained in formation after passing through the curtains of French gun fire were caught by the machine guns of the Colonial Moroccan infantry. It was the final offensive of the 5th German army, and it was so weakly or so unskilfully conducted that the attacking forces melted away before they were able to debouch. The next morning the army of Verdun sprang upon the enfeebled enemy, and, thrusting through the woods, captured a mile of German trenches and numerous prisoners.

There then ensued a long lull on the Meuse, during which the army of Verdun gradually worked forward eastward, and the army of the crown prince assumed a defensive attitude. Men and guns were removed in increasing proportion to meet the needs of Falkenhayn on the new Rumanian front and fill the gaps of the enlarged German armies on the Somme. It was during this period of veiled crisis, when Hindenburg was making his final dispositions for the winter season in the west, that General Nivelle was rewarded for the restraint and patience he had displayed. He still allowed the enemy to prevail in nightly bombardments, and himself made no infantry movement in force by daylight. Consequently, the crown prince was convinced that the French forces in front of him were at last permanently weakened by their own long effort of resistance and by all the divisions moved westward. This view of the situation agreed with that taken by Hindenburg's staff, and more guns and men were shifted westward.

A NEW HOWITZER

By the middle of October, 1916, the German batteries on the eastern bank of the Meuse were reduced to 130. It was much less than half the number employed in June, 1916. Great was the opportunity offered to General Nivelle, but he refused it. He could foresee from his knowledge of the enemy's requirements on other sectors and other fronts that the crown prince would be further weakened. All that the French commander did in an active way was to maintain a complete mastery of the air. By bombing raids on the enemy's artillery positions at Montfaucon and Spincourt and on all his centres of traffic and distribution he challenged the German airmen, who were just arriving on the new Halberstadt and Spad machines, to trials of strength. There was proceeding in the French lines an enormous labour of preparation that needed the utmost secrecy in order to succeed. In spite of the new machines the enemy possessed, he was too much preoccupied with his anxieties on the Somme line to make any unprovoked effort to rule the air above the quiet, muddy chaos around Verdun.

Being unable to reconnoitre the field of great activities on the Meuse, the German high command relied on its sound knowledge of the infantry forces at the disposal of General Nivelle and, on October 20, took the risky step of moving two divisions from Verdun to Bapaume. These two divisions had constituted the strategic reserve of the crown prince's army and had been held so that they could strengthen any point, from the Argonne forest to the plain of the Woëvre, that was menaced by General Pétain's group of armies. The British forces pressing on Bapaume, and threatening the enemy's lines there at Le Transloy, were directly responsible for the condition of things at Verdun. They prepared the first great French victory on the Meuse. There was, however, no time for General Pétain to throw fresh forces into Verdun to take advantage of the weakening of the enemy's lines. He could only ask General Nivelle to do all he could with three French divisions that still faced seven German divisions.

But General Nivelle did not require more infantry. Since June, 1916, he had waited only for the new gun—the 16 in. howitzer, with a range exceeding that of the 16.8 Krupp guns at Spincourt. He now possessed the new piece in considerable number, as well as long-range naval cannon of 15 in. calibre. And with abundant machinery, but scarcely more than 30,000

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

men available, he opened his counter-offensive. His preliminary bombardment, started on October 21, 1916, was an overwhelming surprise to the enemy. To the staff of the crown prince this sign of the resurrection in greater strength of the army of Verdun was disturbing. The German brigadier generals along the front were fearful their men would not sustain the coming assault.

The thunder of the new heavy artillery increased during the night, imposing for a few hours on the German soldiers the ordeal of blasting fire that French troops had endured for eight months without losing heart or nerve. When day came, enabling French airmen to direct the guns, the work of destruction went on rapidly under the favouring influence of clear weather. The Germans, kept in uncertainty of the point of the coming attack by the amplitude of the French artillery action, revealed, little by little, all their batteries. One hundred and thirty were traced by the French, and in furious counter-battery firing nearly half of these were silenced. At the same time all the ravines in hostile territory were searched with heavy shell; the Damloup position was wrecked, and the shelters in the quarries of Hardaumont were destroyed or blocked. One of the new French 16 in. shells penetrated the thick concrete of Douaumont Fort and exploded some of the enemy's ammunition, causing a fire and great loss of life.

On the night of October 23, General Nivelle did not deliver his bombardment with any intensity. He endeavoured to mislead the enemy by withholding the full strength of his artillery for a whirlwind of heavy shell fire on the morning of October 24. He managed, however, to provoke a reply from the German batteries that led to a great artillery duel in which many German guns were destroyed. But when day broke over the waiting troops it looked as though the attack that had been fixed for 11.40 a.m. would have to be postponed to another day. For the clear weather had gone, and a thick mist covered all the crests and valleys of the Meuse. But General Nivelle would not alter his plan. He had spent months in preparing it, and the work had been done with such comprehensive minuteness that many guns could work in the fog in conjunction with the troops, almost as well as if the field of vision had been clear.

Some of the contact patrols of the French flying service went up through the mist and then descended low over the hostile positions and observed what the enemy was doing. All the

THE HILL OF DOUAUMONT

French guns began to fire at top speed on targets that had been registered in advance, and, helped a little by some of the low-flying airmen, made effective shooting in the most difficult of circumstances. At the arranged instant the gunners suddenly lengthened their range, and, with the fog still gathering thickly, the three divisions advanced to their objectives.

The action was arranged in two phases. In a single leap forward the troops were to reach Haudromont quarries, the northern slope of the Ravine de la Dame, and the entrenchment north of Thiaumont farm, the battery position on Fausse Côte, and the ravine of Brazil. They were then to stay for an hour in the positions they had conquered and consolidate them. In the second phase of the operations they were to reach the village and fort of Douaumont and the ridge beyond Fausse Côte, the pond near Vaux village, and the position around Damloup hill.

The hill of Douaumont was flanked by a succession of buttresses, formed of lower hills lying westward and divided by deep gorges. The Ravine de la Dame was the first of these cuttings. In the side formed of an angle of dead ground the Germans had excavated a subterranean city. The armoured caverns were constructed so as to resist the heaviest shell fire. Two German battalions, driven underground by the bombardment, were having their midday meal and waiting without anxiety for the gun fire to end. But a few seconds after the shells ceased to fall, a battalion of Zouaves clambered into the trenches and began to explore the subterranean city. The surprised Germans practically surrendered in a body only two minutes after the Zouaves leaped into the ravine at a distance of 25 yards behind their barrage.

All along the line marked for the first phase of operations the attack was delivered with the same mechanical precision. The only difficulty lay in the nature of the ground, which compelled the advancing troops to work forward very slowly so as not to lose touch in the fog. On the other hand, the fog made the most perfect of smoke screens for the two leading divisions of attack, who escaped from the hostile shell curtain, and followed their own creeping barrage with extraordinary closeness and with overwhelming surprise effect. Connexion with the guns was maintained by carrier pigeons and optical and acoustic posts, as well as by ordinary and aerial means; and as all the systems had been worked out in the mists frequent on the Meuse, they

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

operated with almost perfect precision. The Colonial regiment from Morocco, acting with a Senegalese battalion and Somali companies, went over the German line with great driving power and collected below Fort Douaumont.

The second phase of operations opened by an enveloping movement by the French infantry division under General Passaga. In a single bound his troops advanced over all the German lines south and east of Fort Douaumont, to a depth of nearly two miles, and took Caillette Wood between Douaumont and Vaux. On the right wing, from Vaux to Damloup, the division under General de Lardemelle met with more resistance, and had to wait on the Vaux road until the artillery hammered the German redoubts there when the fog cleared off. Then the Savoyards carried the Damloup height at a run, while their comrades captured the ravine by Vaux village and cleared the enemy from Fumin Wood.

The African division had gone forward with an impetuosity that triumphed over the difficulties of the ground. Slipping, sliding and falling, with the mud up to their knees, soaked through by rain and mist, in bitterly cold weather, Zouaves, Moors and Sudanese worked up the hills and along the great ridge, with the shells of their creeping barrage making a line of mud and smoke in front of them. Every hill and valley flickered with tongues of flame, and from the hogsback of Froide Terre to the dome of Douaumont the line of shell bursts moved in front of the troops.

About 2.30 a wind arose and blew away the mist. Marshal Joffre, who with General Pétain had arrived at Verdun to watch the great offensive movement of General Nivelle, saw through the rents in the fog the soldiers approaching the fort on either side, entering the fort, and then returning from it with grey columns of prisoners. It was a Moroccan battalion, commanded by Commandant Nicolai, that captured the famous fort, owing to another battalion, which had been designed to make a direct attack, being held up.

But this success was largely due also to the energy and initiative displayed by the subaltern of a Sahara battalion, Second Lieutenant Abdelkader Mademba. During the closing attack on the Douaumont height Lieutenant Mademba was at the head of his men, who were in front of the rest of the battalion. Seeing the advance was held up by a nest of German machine

A GERMAN DOCUMENT

guns on his right, he swung round, shouting to his tribesmen, and, as they followed him, he fell upon the flank of the German redoubt, stormed it, and enabled the general movement successfully to proceed. Afterwards he fell badly wounded.

Generally speaking, however, there was not much fighting round Douaumont. It was not so much a battle as an overwhelming surprise; and the Germans had so many guns damaged that, when all their positions were lost, nearly three hours passed before they began in turn to shell Douaumont.

By an ironic coincidence, the German staff, a few days before they lost Douaumont, prepared to publish an official account of the operations at Verdun. The first article appeared on October 25, alongside the news of the loss of Douaumont. An opening passage in the account ran:

Verdun is the north-eastern corner pillar of the entire defence system of the east of France. But this is neither the sole nor the principal importance of the fortress. Verdun occupies a far more significant position. It is the French sally-port against Germany. The attempt to break through our front and get in the rear of our forces of Belgium and northern France was to be renewed from Verdun. In addition to all this, there was a high industrial value attaching to the sally-port, in that it led to the coal-mines and iron-fields of Briey. A French advance from Verdun against Metz would have afforded a possibility of attacking the ironworks of Lorraine and thereby striking at one of the vital points in the German production of munitions for war. Verdun was also a bridge-head guarding the most important road and railways leading from Paris to Metz. Our campaign was planned with the strategic aim of closing completely the sally-port of France, and making use of it ourselves as a wedge for a further thrust into French territory.

The design, apparently, was to palliate the failures of the crown prince by showing that the sally-port of Verdun was such a menace to Germany that it was worth closing at a cost of 500,000 casualties, even if at this price it could not be transformed into a new gate of advance towards Paris. Only seven days before General Nivelle made his first attack the kaiser came to the Verdun front and reviewed the Brandenburg troops that took Douaumont Fort, and received from the commander the public assurance that the men were ready for another achievement of the same order. A week later a mere remnant of the broken Brandenburg division was fugitive, some two miles

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

in the rear of the front it had held, and the "black friends of France," as the Germans had scornfully named the African troops, were chasing German soldiers through the sombre galleries of the great hill fortress.

Four hundred of the men of the garrison of Douaumont surrendered in the afternoon of October 24, but the work of completely clearing out the underground recesses was not finished until midnight. The German commandant of the fort was captured, and the large stocks of water, food, and bombs and other ammunition were of considerable service to the victors.

The rain that had been falling while the French attack was made increased in the night and the following day. The bad weather told against the enemy while he was hurriedly preparing his counter-attacks. He opened with a movement of intense fury in the morning, and made four efforts to return to Douaumont. He first launched against the fort two frontal assaults, which were broken easily by artillery and machine gun fire. Then he made his third and chief counter-movement on the flank, from the wood of Hardaumont. Large forces were employed in four dense waves of attack. But the French guns covered all the ground, and in hurricanes of high explosive and shrapnel overwhelmed each wave and left only a few broken companies the opportunity of approaching the French lines with uplifted hands and becoming prisoners. The fourth counter-attack was weaker, and vainly directed only against a trench in one of the woods. On October 27 another counter-attack of a feeble kind made on the village of Douaumont was prevented from developing by the fire of the French artillery.

General Nivelle had sent his men to a line absolutely dominated by his guns, and, as he had temporarily or permanently put out of action nearly half the German batteries, the new French front was less assailable than the old front had been. The only check in the French operations was that which happened to the division under General de Lardemelle around Fort Vaux. The division had been fighting since September in the woods between Vaux and Souville, and therefore knew the ground thoroughly. But the fog hindered the French artillery from shattering a series of fresh machine gun redoubts, newly built in the enemy's second line, and the infantry had slowly to work round each obstacle that resisted their frontal attack. All the night of October 24 the struggle with bomb, bayonet and

FORT VAUX EVACUATED

machine gun continued in the famous Ravine of Death, running westward from Vaux village. When clear daylight came at 8 a.m. on October 25, both the light and the heavy French artillery intervened. The guns smashed a path to the pond of Vaux, and poured upon the fortress promontory above the ravine a torrent of shell. Then, reinforced by two brigades of another division, the troops of General de Lardemelle reached the pond, and stormed a line of redoubts defending the northern corner of the fortress.

Vaux could then have been carried had General Nivelle cared to lose another 2,000 men in order to win a swift and striking victory. But the French commander refused to pay the price that any German general in the same circumstances would have given. He postponed the assault, and for eight days and eight nights turned his 16 in. guns upon the fortress. The result was that the German commandant lost so many men and was left with so demoralized a remnant of the original garrison that he made no attempt to resist, but evacuated the stronghold.

On the morning of November 2 the Germans were seen to be leaving the fort, and explosion after explosion occurred which could not be traced to the action of the French shells. The enemy had blown up his stores of ammunition. Very cautiously in the evening a French company surrounded the promontory, while a lieutenant, with searching parties of engineers, entered the great galleries beneath the ruined superstructure and, finding no enemy and no mine trap, took possession of the last of the exterior forts of Verdun.

Both Douaumont Fort and Vaux Fort had long since lost all their importance as gun positions. They were designed in 1899 to contain 6 in. guns, and at the outbreak of war were scarcely stronger in striking power than the forts of Liège. Instead of being the pillars of Verdun, they became its points of weakness when the Krupp and Skoda howitzers arrived from Metz. The army of Verdun had to construct entrenchments far beyond the belt of exterior forts and place cannon and howitzers by the hundred well in front of the old strongholds in order to defend them. Douaumont and Vaux, however, were built in extraordinary strength. The French engineers were more thorough than the Belgian in their concrete work. None of the monster Krupp guns at Spincourt sent a 16.8 in. shell through the armoured concrete of Douaumont.

VERDUN UNCONQUERED


When the French, in turn, attacked their own fortress with the 16 in. shell containing a more powerful explosive than the enemy employed, the projectile penetrated only the superstructure. It did not pierce the vaults of the large subterranean galleries that sheltered the garrison. Consequently, the fortresses remained admirable machine gun redoubts, and still more important observation positions. By recovering Vaux the French overlooked the plain of Woëvre, between Verdun and Metz, and thus enabled their long range artillery constantly to harass the enemy. By recovering the higher northern height of Douaumont they prevented the enemy overseeing their lines, and obtained a steady view over his northern front. As outlook towers that no shell could shatter the two fortresses were of high tactical value to General Nivelle.

But the ground he had won required great labour to make it passable. For weeks the troops had to work like pack animals, struggling up to their thighs in mud, at a pace of often less than a quarter of a mile an hour, and carrying on their backs supplies and materials for the new front. The Algerian mules brought stores to the edge of the chaos from which the field guns fired, but over this chaos only streams of packmen could cross. To organize the ground, forests had to disappear in other parts of France and quarries had to be opened. Yet, in less than six weeks, light railways were running through the zone of shell pools, mud, and indistinguishable ruins. The horrible ground, from which bodies protruded by the thousand, was drained and made healthy. A great road was driven through it; and branching tracks made to all the recovered heights. This engineering achievement of General Nivelle was as fine a piece of work as his victory in the field.

He surprised the enemy more by the speed with which he organized the new ground than he did by his attack in the fog. Between the first week of November and the second week of December 20 miles of road were made behind Douaumont and Vaux, with seven miles of light railway line, and a special log track for hauling siege guns close to the German trenches. The immediate consequence of the incomparable display of organizing power on the part of General Nivelle was something that surprised him and the world in general. On November 30, 1916, the defeated crown prince was retired from the personal command of the German forces round Verdun and given the

MANGIN TAKES COMMAND

nominal direction of all the German armies from the Oise to Belfort. A few days later the French government offered General Nivelle the post of commander-in-chief, and General Mangin was appointed to succeed him at Verdun. One of the first acts of the new commander-in-chief was to speed up the preparations for the new offensive. On December 14 an attack was made by two of the divisions that had taken Douaumont in October—the African division under General Guyot de Salins and the French division of the line under General Passaga. With



these acted a fresh division under General Muteau, and another fresh division under General Garnier du Plessis. The enemy forces on the front attacked, running from the Meuse to Bezonvaux village, consisted of five divisions. They were the 14th reserve division, the 29th division, the 10th division, the 14th active division, and the 39th Bavarian reserve division.

During the six weeks' preparation for battle the Germans dug new trenches, with flanking works in the French style. On Côte du Poivre the old organization was strengthened with wider zones of wire entanglements, concreted galleries and sheltered gathering-places. The French troops still clung to some of the lower slopes of Côte du Poivre, but all their line as far as the Thiaumont work was overlooked by higher ground, held by the Germans on the crest of Côte du Poivre and Louvemont ridge. The length of front attacked was about six and a half miles,

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

and with his four divisions General Nivelle employed only four men to the yard to break the hostile fortress system.

The weather was again extremely adverse to all operations. It both snowed and rained, making the work of gunnery observation difficult and hindering the French airmen. But in the three days' preliminary bombardment, in the second week of December, 1916, the masses of French guns smashed a path through the German lines and, working on by the map during the snowstorm, did terrible execution in the German trenches. In the October battle the chief of staff to the crown prince had tried to save his men by holding the first line lightly with machine gun sections and massing his infantry forces in his second and third systems. This method having proved utterly unavailing, the new German commander now held his first line in great strength, and relied on the shelter of his concreted underground galleries for protection against French artillery fire. But the new 16 in. shells that could break into Douaumont Fort pierced the slighter slabs of German concrete built into the northern ridges. In the evening of December 14, for instance, seven Germans deserted from the important position of Ratisbon trench, and said that they were all that existed of a company that had garrisoned the entrenched slope.

At daybreak on December 15 there was an improvement in the weather. The sky brightened, and the visibility became excellent. The result was that the German artillery was completely reduced to silence by 9 a.m., and after a whirlwind bombardment the four French divisions went over the parapets at 10 a.m. By this time the French shells formed an impenetrable line of smoke and fire, drawn with mathematical precision across the German front, and at scarcely more than 70 paces behind their moving barrage the attacking troops moved onward through the deep mud. Thereupon every undamaged German gun resumed fire; and, knowing to an inch the range of the French trenches, the German gunners drenched them in clouds of shrapnel. But the German barrage came five minutes too late. The French troops were well away from their own line, and before their supporting columns passed through the hostile fire curtain, the French siege guns, directed by a row of observation balloons and low flying airmen, smashed the German guns.

Meanwhile, the left French infantry wing, advancing without cover along the low ground by the river, reached the village

THE COTE DU POIVRE

of Vacherauville. Here every cellar and ruined house was a machine gun redoubt. The French artillery on both sides of the Meuse covered the assault with great vigour, but in the close village fighting the opposing forces were soon so mixed up that the artillery on both sides could take no part in the battle, but merely played on the opposing routes of approach. Then it was that General Nivelle's new infantry tactics told with instant effect on the issue of the day. The German division was driven out of the village and retreated along the road to Beaumont.

South of this road was the high, fortified Côte du Poivre. It seemed to be the strongest sector of the hostile front; but it was the weakest sector. This the enemy commander did not know, but General Nivelle and General Mangin did, and their plans were made accordingly. The force attacking Vacherauville was manœuvred slowly and cautiously, in view of the great possibilities afforded by the bare slopes of the hill on their right. Upon these bare slopes the main mass of French artillery fired with great destructive power, and the French infantry moved upward quickly to the summit, completely screened by the smoke of their barrages. Suddenly the German gunners, under some misapprehension, opened a terrific fire of 6 in. and 8 in. shell upon their own troops on the height.

The stricken German infantry sent up signal rockets, and their guns ceased to fire on them. The German gunners, however, had not been so far wrong as they seemed. One of their aerial scouts may have observed something, and given the range a little too hastily. The German barrage was only a few yards short of the first storming French waves of attack, and, as the German guns stopped firing on Côte du Poivre, the French infantry leaped into the German trenches. At the decisive point on the hill fortress the German lines ran sideways, fronting towards the river and protecting the retiring garrison of Vacherauville from flank attack. As the regiments on this flank formed a rearguard to the Vacherauville force, they were abruptly assailed in the rear by the conquerors of Côte du Poivre. Caught unexpectedly with hand grenades and bayonets, the Germans broke, and the French went down into the valley and drove savagely into the flank of the Germans retreating from Vacherauville.

This was the grand stroke in the battle that upset General Nivelle's estimate of his probable successes, and more than

VERDUN UNCONQUERED

doubled his captures of men and guns. To General Mangin, who executed General Nivelle's plan and improved upon it in the course of the fighting, the great break through was due. The Germans on the Beaumont road had been maintaining a gallant rearguard defence. Although they had lost Vacherauville village, they were in strong formation and good heart. But when their flank was broken and their rear threatened they scattered and fled, with the French in close pursuit, and soon surrendered in thousands.

All the Côte du Poivre, stretching for a mile and a half towards Louvemont, was turned in less than an hour and a half. Then the victorious wing bent in north-eastward towards the Louvemont ridge, while the French centre moved directly northward, from Thiaumont and Douaumont across a valley and over the trenches seaming the slopes of Louvemont ridge. The ground on this part of the front was extremely difficult. The mud came over the men's knees, and the snow and the night frost, instead of hardening it, had made it as sticky as glue. But winter mud was as powerless to stop the French infantrymen as were German guns and German men. The great ridge was carried practically without a fight, and the village of Louvemont was enveloped and stormed in two hours. Then, as the Germans retreated in disorder from Louvemont village, French airmen swooped down and, raking them with machine gun fire, so dispersed them that the French centre was able to pass its objective and continue towards Chambrettes Farm.

The troops under General Passaga, forming the right wing of the attack, were the only French force that met with serious resistance. The Passaga division was drawn up between Douaumont, Vaux and Damloup. In front of it were three wooded heights cut by ravines—Hardaumont Wood, Hassoule Wood and La Vauche Wood. The ground rose to the level of the dome of Douaumont, affording the enemy observation over the French forces when they descended into the valley in order to attack the forested spurs. Moreover, there were German batteries around the village of Dieppe, flanking the positions which the French stormed and pouring a cross-fire upon the advancing troops. Thus the task assigned to General Passaga's men was by far the most arduous. But though it took long to carry out, it was completed with almost as much success as the drive across Côte du Poivre.

NIVELLE'S SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT

In the morning the promontory of Hardaumont, strengthened with numerous fieldworks, was carried through heavy hostile curtain fire coming from the north and east. La Vauche Wood proved an obstacle that delayed the division for some hours, but the remarkable team-work of the French brigade on this sector triumphed over the stubborn resistance of the Prussians. At three o'clock in the afternoon all the promontories were carried, together with the earthwork near Bezonvaux.

It was at about this hour that the French centre pushed beyond its objective and captured Chambrettes Farm. From this high advanced position, in the middle of their new front, the French forces began to outflank Bezonvaux village and part of Caurrières Wood. All through the evening of December 15 and the morning of December 16 they pressed the Germans on both sides, and captured the village and part of the wood. Having lost 120 guns by capture and more than three times that number by counter-battery attack, the Germans took a considerable time in attempting to recover the lost ground.

In the afternoon of December 15 they were far too busy dragging their guns out of reach of the French infantry to help their own fugitive troops on the Beaumont road sector by curtaining the French ground there. The German counter-attack did not come until the evening of December 17. Then, after a long and costly bombardment, fresh German forces stormed out against the new French front, but were so overwhelmed by the shell fire and the machine gun fire of the army of Verdun that they could not reach the new French fire-trenches. Only the advanced work of Chambrettes Farm was occupied, and even this was not held for more than a few hours. After a hurricane bombardment the French troops swept back over the farm, killed or captured the garrison, and firmly consolidated themselves in this advanced position.

"The experiment has succeeded," said General Nivelle as he left his glorious 2nd army. The gain of four miles of ground, which prevented the enemy from seeing the famous citadel of the Meuse, was not of supreme importance, although the territory gained levelled up the two French sectors on either side of the river, and brought the French armies around Dead Man Hill and around Louvemont in line with each other, but the victory heartened the French as much as the fall of Verdun would have disheartened them.

CHAPTER 22

Clearing the Turks from Egypt

AFTER the failure of the Turkish attack on the Suez canal in February, 1915, the operations of the Turkish army came to an end. Baron von Kressenstein, who was in actual command of the Turkish force which was nominally led by Djemal Pasha, pretended afterwards that the expedition was merely a reconnoitring affair, and had fulfilled its aim by discovering that the canal was so well defended that a Turkish advance into Egypt was out of the question. The German commander reported that he would have to extend the Syrian railway down to Beersheba and undertake great engineering works across the desert before he could bring close to the Suez canal a sufficiently large army to make the conquest of Egypt possible.

The famous German railway engineer, Meissner Pasha, could not obtain the material he needed to prolong the railway through the desert. All the Turkish lines were in a dilapidated state, and, in the Asiatic section especially, the tracks were becoming very bad, and the boilers of many locomotives were rusting into holes. The British advance from the Persian Gulf and the Russian thrust into Armenia compelled Meissner to devote most of his energy and material to the Asia Minor and Bagdad lines. He was able to extend part of the Bagdad track, but his lack of rails, rolling-stock, and good engines prevented him from building a line of victory towards Egypt. It must be said that Meissner worked magnificently within the limits imposed upon him by Ottoman ineptitude, negligence, and corruption. He provided the roadless waste of Palestine with good log tracks, over which guns could be moved with comparative quickness; but after destroying forests to this end, and laying water-pipes and constructing reservoirs in the desert between Palestine and Egypt, the German master-engineer had been obliged to leave Egypt practically unmenaced.

The British attack on the Dardanelles, combined with the threat against Mesopotamia, relieved the pressure against the Suez canal. Even the Yemen division from Southern Arabia

A SEASONAL LULL

had to be diverted from the Egyptian frontier and sent to Gallipoli. Some skirmishing went on near Suez during the last week in March, 1915. The enemy then had about 1,000 troops at El Kubri, a post opposite Suez. On the morning of March 23 an Indo-British force, under General Sir G. Younghusband, attacked and routed the Turks, who were reported to have been commanded by General von Traumer.

The retreat of the 12,000 Syrians, Ottomans, and Arabs across the desert to Beersheba had been a pitiful affair. In spite of the German organizers, the Ottoman commissariat department was an utter failure; the desert vultures hovered above the demoralized troops, and large numbers of the men fell out and died before water was reached. The German engineers could not get water for a column of more than a thousand men, even in the season when the rainfall on the Sinai heights streamed into the desert sands below.

The British commander, Sir John Maxwell, did not make any attack on the enemy. He did not care to expose his men to desert thirst when Nature in her most terrible mood was working against the enemy. Cavalry patrols seldom went more than a few miles from the fresh-water canal. But a French cruiser, in April, 1915, bombarded the enemy's coast camps at El Arish and Gaza, the fire being directed from a seaplane. At the same time aeroplanes worked over the desert almost as far as El Arish, dropping bombs upon the tented encampments of the enemy, and tracing all the movements of the small Turkish forces that remained based upon the oasis of the wilderness.

Nothing could be done on either side until the winter. The British ran water-pipes into the desert, and laid light railways and motor tracks to advanced posts in the wilderness. In the first attack on the canal, when the enemy could only bring small forces across the desert, the vital waterway between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean was defended by warships, many of which afterwards took part in the Dardanelles operations. This employment of naval force in a land battle was, however, only a temporary expedient, and after the Turks were thrown back from the canal, the British commander erected a system of military defences at a considerable distance east of the waterway. The Well of Moses, with its 12 springs of water and grove of palm trees, was occupied by a battalion of Indians from Flanders, expert in trench work, who tunnelled through the rock

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

and sandbagged the sands. Then Jebel Murr, a mass of red-stone rising 10 miles north of the Well of Moses, was transformed into a fortress by means of blasting and quarrying. The red hill commanded the pass down which the enemy would have to come in his westward march, and before the winter rain fell, rooms, corridors, gun-pits, and machine gun redoubts had been blown out of the great rock to enable the garrison to survive the fiercest attack of high-explosive shell that the enemy could fire from the Raha ridge rising farther in the desert.

When winter came, it was open to the German staff to make a second stronger assault against the canal. Perhaps if General Joffre had not initiated the great Franco-British stand round Salonica, a couple of German and Austrian army corps would have been railed to Palestine to stiffen Kressenstein's army for a great movement of invasion over the Wilderness of Sin. Field Marshal von der Goltz had collected a considerable force near Aleppo, from which he could move either towards Bagdad or towards Egypt. But General Townshend's advance up the Tigris determined the direction of von der Goltz's reserve, and the strength of the Franco-British forces round Salonica made it impossible for the German and Austrian forces there to move into Egypt. Djemal Pasha, on the other hand, insisted on 25,000 German troops being sent to Syria to enable him to make another attack on the canal. He refused to move if this reinforcement were not sent. Owing to the course of events at Verdun and the great Russian sweep on Erzerum and Trebizond, neither Teutonic nor Turkish troops were sent to Djemal; so he did not move, and Kressenstein, his assistant, had but small forces to maintain a demonstration.

As the Turks refused to march again to the conquest of Egypt, British forces began to worry their advanced guards. Small parties of mobile troops, keeping in wireless touch with aeroplanes, broke into the enemy's screen of outposts. On February 20, 1916, the long-delayed air attack on the German reservoir at Massana Well, 100 miles from the canal, was made. More than a year's labour had gone to its construction. Two pairs of British planes set out from different points according to a time-table arranged so that the second set of pilots should arrive over the wells when the first set had begun the work. The plan worked out like clockwork. Each pilot dropped 10 heavy bombs on the reservoir and power station, destroying in an

THE CAPTURE OF JIFJAFFA

operation of half an hour work that the enemy had spent months in carrying out. Towards the end of the attack one airman saw some Turkish infantry firing at his fellow fliers. Swooping down upon them from behind, he got to within 70 yards of the ground and then opened fire with his machine gun, scattering them—officers and men—helter-skelter into the sand for cover. All the planes returned safely after a round voyage of 200 miles.

The damage done to the reservoir, now that all the winter rain had come from the heights on either side of the Hassana Well and the rocky and stony wastes were heating in the springtide sun, was an irreparable disaster for the Teutonic engineers and the Turkish troops depending upon them. The forces near the canal had once more to be reduced in number by reason of the scanty water supply. But at a point nearer to the Suez waterway there was an oasis lying under a range of hills, where a large supply of water might, it was reckoned, be found by deep boring. Jifjaffa was the name of the well village, and an Austrian engineer made three borings there, but without striking water. His labours had been perceived by aerial scouts, and a detachment of Australian Light Horse, with some of the Camel Corps, went out to see what was happening.

Surprise was the essence of the operation, and it was no easy work to catch off their guard the desert Bedouins who did the outpost work for the Turco-Germans. The Light Horse had to march 160 miles in three and a half days, going over either soft, sinking sand or heavy, stony soil. Yet some 30 of the Australians, rather than be left out of the possible fight, acted as camel drivers. On the last day the troopers did 40 miles and then fought.

The Australians, by their last terrific night march, came unperceived within three miles of the enemy's position, and as dawn was breaking they surrounded Jifjaffa north, south, and east, leaving only a westward outlet toward the distant Suez canal. As the attack was developing in daylight, some of the enemy retired from their advanced posts toward the trenches by the well works, but a troop of horse cut them off, shepherded them together, and compelled their surrender. Every Turk, Arab, and Teuton was killed or taken prisoner, the plant and material were destroyed, a gun position was wrecked, and all the works completely demolished.

The actions at Hassana and at Jifjaffa were small in size but important in result. They diminished the enemy's water supply,

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

and thereby weakened the forces around his works of preparation in the desert, and compelled him to draw farther back from the canal. On the day on which the Australian Light Horse captured the Turkish camp at Jifjaffa, a small body of English Yeomanry took the Katia oasis, which lies 48 miles north of Jifjaffa, from which it is separated by a range of heights, the Jebel Magara.

This hilly country, however, was still held by the enemy, thus making the British position at Katia insecure. The Katia oasis was of great importance: it lay some 40 miles east of Port Said, on the old camel route by the coast, the famous Serbonian road, along which armies have moved between Asia and Africa since the dawn of history. At Katia mounted troops, consisting of the Worcestershire Yeomanry, the Warwickshire Yeomanry, and the Gloucestershire Hussars, were able to approach the enemy's positions near the centre of the desert and raid the hostile Bedouin camps. Supporting the Yeomanry and Hussars was a small body of infantry nearer the canal at Duweidar, consisting of a company of the Royal Scots Fusiliers with two other companies on a hill some miles away. The Australian Horse were also within call, with a detachment of the Royal Flying Corps. All these forces, however, were small. In the ordinary way the newly won posts would have been held in some strength. But there was no time to extend the fresh-water supply and the motor roads from El Kantara.

Baron von Kressenstein made his return stroke before a water supply for any larger body of troops could be organized. The weather at Easter favoured the Turco-German commander. A thick mist, the first for six weeks, obscured everything more than 40 yards distant from the Duweidar post, which was held by a company of Ayrshire men. The enemy, some 2,000 strong, made a night march from the hill country, and at dawn on Easter Sunday charged through the mist on the Duweidar oasis. Had the Turkish force captured Duweidar they would have cut off all the Yeomanry and Hussars, who also were fighting against overwhelming forces 16 miles farther in the desert along the Serbonian road.

Of the two actions the encircling sweep to the rear of the Duweidar post was, therefore, the more dangerous. The little company of Ayrshire men had the odds of six to one against them, together with the disadvantages of a surprise attack in a heavy mist. The line they held was about 200 yards from

A CAPTAIN'S HEROISM

the fringe of the oasis, with a machine gun redoubt on a height south-east of the well. The German officer commanding the Turks laid his plans admirably: he brought up machine guns, which swept all the approaches to the machine gun team on the crest, and when the alarm was given by the sound of heavy firing and a great burst of Arab yelling near the British machine gun position, none of the British men in reserve could go to the help of the south-eastern post. Every officer and man who attempted to reach this hot corner was hit by the enemy's machine guns. And against this little isolated redoubt the main attack was made.

The British machine gun was hit, three of the gun team were killed and one was wounded; but the survivors fought the gun to the end, and no Turk or Arab got within 20 yards of the position. Then to the left of the south-eastern post a small party held another British position on rising ground above the oasis. Close in front of them the Turks had a machine gun in action, and they changed its position so frequently that it could not be located. Captain Bruce, of the Territorial Army Service Corps, was sent up with a few men to lengthen the line at this place, and there for three hours he fought the enemy off with cool, inspiring audacity. At nine o'clock the first of the reinforcements were sent to the mound that Captain Bruce and his little band were defending, but the leading officer of the new troops, Lieutenant Crawford, was wounded while crossing the open space, and fell exposed to the murderous fire.

For three hours Captain Bruce had been watching the effect of this fire; when the lieutenant fell Bruce left the sandbag which had served as his cover and ran out to carry in his comrade, but dropped mortally wounded. His example was followed by Corporal Clifford, who, by amazing luck, got through the sweeping fire, brought in the wounded lieutenant, and then went out again to recover the body of the heroic captain, still without being hit himself. The Turks maintained the attack in a resolute manner, and it was only by high skill and desperate courage that the little band held the position until reinforcements arrived from a hill seven miles away. A bayonet charge by two more companies of Fusiliers then routed the Turks.

Whilst this fight was going on, a small force of Yeomanry at the Katia oasis had been almost surrounded by a strong column, consisting of 2,000 picked Turkish infantry who had fought at Gallipoli, and 1,000 German and Austrian troops. This Teutonic-

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

Ottoman force was mounted on camels and provided with four mountain guns and many machine guns. The main attack was delivered against the village of Katia, which was held by two squadrons of Worcester Yeomanry. The rest of the British cavalry brigade was three miles southward, completing a successful raid on the oasis of Magheibra, where the enemy's camp had just been burnt and prisoners taken. The brigadier heard firing in the direction of Katia, and, though his small force had done a long march through heavy sand under a very hot sun, he sent forward the remaining squadron of the Worcester Yeomanry to join the troopers holding the village, and then flung the Warwickshire Yeomanry in a curving movement to the south, while the Gloucestershire Hussars rode round the village to the north.


In the meantime the squadrons in the oasis were suffering heavily from shells. Their horses were nearly all killed by the enemy's mountain guns, so that the men had to make a fighting retreat on foot, while the mounted Germans and Turks continually overlapped them on either flank, and shot them down or took them prisoners. Nearly a squadron was enveloped. But the Warwickshire men succeeded in keeping their end up until the other Yeomanry and Hussars, by a vehement attack, drove the Turks and Germans back for a distance of two miles, and thus released the remnant of the Worcestershire troopers.

That sweep of two miles, however, had brought them very close to the hostile mountain battery and to the enemy's reserve ; and the British brigadier, knowing that both his horses and his men were worn out by two actions and the severe march, abandoned Katia. But this was not the end of the operations in the mid-desert oasis and round Duweidar. At the latter point, when the Scots Fusiliers finished their charge, a regiment of the Australian Horse rode down the routed Bedouin and Turk forces. When the steeds of the Australians began to tire a number of aeroplanes took up the pursuit, and, after bombing the fugitives, raked them with machine gun fire.

Then, in the darkness of Easter Sunday night, more aeroplanes gathered by the canal, and set out in the darkness so as to arrive over Katia at dawn. The Germans had left a strong rearguard of 500 men in the oasis, and the British aeroplanes bombed them amid the palm trees, taking the force by surprise. Some 71 bombs were thrown on the encampment, with such good aim that when the place was retaken half the Turkish



WITH WOUNDED OFFICERS. In this photograph King George is talking to wounded officers at one of the hundreds of field hospitals to be met with in every district behind the lines.



THE PRINCE AT CALAIS. This photograph was taken as King George left for home after his visit to his armistice in France in August, 1916. On this occasion the Prince of Wales, seen here on the quay at Calais, joined his Majesty as aide-de-camp, and was present with him at meetings with Allied leaders.



A 178 TROOPS STEM THE AUSTRIAN ONSET. The illustration shows fighting in the town of Asiago in 1916, when the Italians drove the Austrians out of the burning town and barred the way to the Venetian plain.



ADVANCING THROUGH ALPINE SNOWS. The Austrian advance in Italy was a short-lived success; for, under a vigorous counter-stroke by General Cadorna in June, 1916, and alarmed by the renewed Russian activity in Galicia, the Austrians retreated, not without loss, to the old frontier lines. Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies (May 23, 1915) had been strongly influenced by the consideration that only from their victory had she a chance of obtaining "Italia irredenta," even under Austria's rule.

LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES

force was reported to have been killed or wounded. British mounted columns advanced again to Katia, but the enemy did not care to stand battle, and retired for 16 miles to the oasis of Abd. Half a dozen miles south of this spring of brackish water there was a smaller oasis, with a tuft of palm trees which sheltered a hostile camp. On February 25, British aircraft had bombed the enemy out of this southern oasis and harried him as he fled towards Abd. Then Abd was assailed from the air by the Flying Corps, while the mounted patrol searched all the Katia district and cleared it of hostile troops. All positions were recovered, and the heavy losses of the Worcestershire Yeomanry were more than balanced by the casualties of the enemy. At the beginning of May the British had advanced to a position half across the desert on the road to El Arish. This, of course, did not signify any intention to advance in force across the Wilderness of Sin in the flaming heat of the tropical summer. In the spring of 1916 the British forces were still standing on the defensive on the eastern frontier, and occupying the mid-desert oases in order to keep the enemy's camel corps from the canal.

Apart from some successes, none of which was of lasting importance, the Turks had everywhere failed, while, on the other hand, the British had substantially improved their position on all sides. They now had no grounds for apprehension with respect to the west of the country, and with regard to the eastern front they were preparing to take advantage of the territory which they had occupied east of the canal, and make a forward movement across northern Sinai towards Palestine, thus providing for the safeguarding of the Suez canal in a far more adequate manner than had been possible before.

During the 12 months that followed the Turkish defeat, the ebb and flow of the war told first against and then in favour of the British in Egypt. For, if the termination of the Gallipoli expedition resulted in setting free large numbers of Turkish soldiers for service in Syria and Sinai, the victorious campaign of General Yudenitch in Armenia, which saw the fall of Erzerum, necessitated in its turn the withdrawal of most of these regiments to the threatened area in Asia Minor. This balancing of accounts left Egypt and the canal comparatively safe from attack. To a certain extent this was satisfactory as the situation then was, but it could scarcely be considered that the line of defence, which was no other than the canal itself, was the best obtainable.

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

At the beginning of 1916 the Turks were in occupation of the whole of the Sinaitic Peninsula, with the exception of some stations on the Gulf of Suez ; and a sound strategy required that the peninsula should be reoccupied with all possible speed, as thereafter the defence of Egypt would be a much easier business altogether. Then perhaps more than that might come of it—Palestine lay just beyond. The Holy Land, the birthplace of the Christian faith, might be redeemed from the Turk ; Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and other sacred shrines with their eternal memories, be rescued from infidel hands. But these ideas, like the beginning itself of the advance into Palestine, came later. The first—prosaic, but necessary—effort of the British was the defence of Egypt and of the all-important Suez canal.

Establishing his headquarters at Ismailia, General Sir Archibald Murray had taken over the defence of eastern Egypt from General Sir John Maxwell in January, 1916. These two officers shared the command in Egypt for a little while, but on March 19, 1916, the dual control ceased, and Maxwell returned to Europe. Murray, meanwhile, had gone on vigorously with the completion of the stationary defences of the canal—the great work which had been initiated by General Sir Alexander Wilson. Owing to difficulties connected with the water supply on the east bank, and vexatious delays caused by labour troubles, it was not until the last week of May, however, that the desired end was attained.

Sir Archibald Murray, in a memorandum dated February 15 and addressed to the chief of the imperial general staff in London, stated his opinion that the first step for securing the true base for the defence of Egypt was an advance to a suitable position east of Katia and the construction of a railway to that place. The War Office concurred, and the British government gave its sanction to the outlined scheme. As the march of events disclosed, the new railway was designed to extend many miles east of Katia, and it was destined to have a marked effect on the "offensive-defensive" campaign which Sir Archibald Murray had in view. The line, after leaving Romani, eventually passed through Katia and followed thereafter the ancient camel road across the Wilderness of Sin, a short distance south of the Mediterranean, reaching the coast at El Arish.

Early in May, 1916, the Turks increased their strength in Sinai by bringing up considerable reinforcements, and from a few miles east of Katia were keeping close watch on the

RESULTS OF THE HEJAZ REVOLT

movements of the British, who were in some force at Romani. El Arish was the Turkish base on the caravan road, and an army, composed of about 20,000 men in July, was gradually concentrated there, under the command of Baron von Kressenstein, the Bavarian officer who had been chief of staff to Djemal Pasha in the abortive attack on the canal in 1915. The enemy had by no means abandoned the idea of another direct assault on the canal, and in all probability had intended to assemble a much larger striking force, but the tide of the war again told against him. In this instance the effect was produced by the Arab revolt in the Hejaz, which was headed by the grand sherif of Mecca, who declared his independence of Turkey. By the middle of the summer nearly all Arabia, much of which had regarded but lightly the suzerainty of the Constantinople caliphate, was in active rebellion, and the Turks had been expelled from the most important area of the country.

Two important results of the Arab rising made themselves felt at once with respect to Egypt: one military, the other religious and political; but both affecting the entire Mahomedan world to the furtherance of General Murray's plans. The Young Turk committee at Constantinople, with the sultan and the religious authorities in its power, had posed as the trustee of Islam. It had acclaimed the German kaiser as Hadji Mohamed Guillermo, and had discovered that the Hohenzollerns were descendants of the Prophet. It declared that Germany was the true friend, the benevolent protector, of Mahomedanism. A much more accurate view was presented at the beginning of the war by the Aga Khan, who, in a statement addressed to the Mahomedans of India, pointed out to his co-religionists that the kaiser's resident in Constantinople would be the real ruler of Turkey, and would control Mecca and Medina, the Holy Cities. The grand sherif had come to see that the Aga Khan was right, and in August he issued a proclamation to Moslems throughout the world, in explanation of his course of action, which had already justified itself by its rapid and remarkable success.

Kressenstein's attack did not develop till the beginning of August. In the meantime General Murray went on with his preparations. Permanent lines of defence were constructed from Romani to Mahemdia, on the coast along the Bay of Tineh, where the cooperation of the navy could come into play. In these waters the British naval forces were commanded by Vice

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who could be depended on not to lose any opportunity that presented itself.

In May the most important operation undertaken against the Turks took place on the 18th, and consisted of a combined sea and air attack on the Turkish base at El Arish. With their fire directed by seaplanes, two monitors and a sloop bombarded for two hours the fortifications, aerodrome, and camp of the enemy. Shells from the heavy guns of the monitors hit the aerodrome, a fort was destroyed, and the camp was set in flames in many parts. So overcome were the Turks that they attempted no reply, and many of them sought shelter among the palms near the shore, whereupon the sloop, under cover of the monitors, stood in close to the coast and searched the trees very thoroughly with medium-sized shells. To complete the demoralization of the enemy, six machines of the Royal Flying Corps now joined in, and dropped a large number of bombs, three of which were described as exploding in the midst of a body of 1,000 troops. One of the valuable results of this assault on El Arish was that the place was well reconnoitred, several excellent photographs being taken from the air. Later Kressenstein provided the camp with anti-aircraft guns, and retaliated by making raids in the following month on El Kantara, Romani, Sérapeum, and the canal itself, with aeroplanes.

On June 13 Bir el Mazar and El Arish were visited by a squadron of British machines, the particular effort being to place definitely the whereabouts of an aerodrome known to exist in the neighbourhood of the latter town. On this occasion the Turks sent up a Fokker to try conclusions with the British flyers, but it was easily driven down, and the aerodrome was located to the south of the place. Having obtained the requisite information, the airmen returned and reported—with the result that on the 18th 11 aeroplanes were dispatched to El Arish for the purpose of destroying the aerodrome, and very successful was the venture, which involved in all a voyage of 200 miles.

General Murray was quite ready to meet the second invasion of Egypt, as it was grandiloquently called by the Germans. He was, in fact, better prepared to repel it than Kressenstein was to make it, though the latter had received large quantities of material, including tanks and pontoons, from Germany. The force of the enemy consisted of the 3rd Turkish division, with eight machine gun companies under German officers and partly

TURKISH PLANES APPEAR

manned by Germans, mountain artillery, and batteries of 4 in. and 6 in. howitzers and anti-aircraft guns with Austrian artillerymen. Germany had specially organized for service with the Turks the machine gun units, heavy artillery, wireless sections, and field hospital and supply sections, as Murray noted in his dispatch. In addition to the Turkish infantry, there was to support an array of Arab camelry. In all the total numbers amounted to some 18,000 men.

Indications of the coming offensive were observed by General Murray as early as July 17 in the appearance of numerous Turkish aeroplanes over the Romani-Duweidar district. Two days later British scouting airmen reported that the Turks were on the move westward, and had reached Bir el Abd in considerable strength, with their line extended south-west through Bir Jamiel to Bir el Bayud. Murray's advanced troops fell back towards the Romani-Mahemdia fortifications, and reinforcements were sent forward to Romani. The commander-in-chief gave orders to General Lawrence, who was leading the British on the spot, not to hinder the march of the enemy by a premature counter-attack, but to allow Kressenstein to develop his movement and disclose its aim. Meanwhile, cavalry kept in touch with the Turks, whose every act was closely followed by aircraft and reported to headquarters. On the 20th Kressenstein swung forward his left from Bir el Bayud to the Magheibra oasis and his centre from Abd to Oghratina.

For the next succeeding days there was little change, but Kressenstein was busy entrenching and strengthening his positions. At Magheibra, on his left, he constructed a series of redoubts, and garrisoned them with 3,000 men. Around Oghratina, his centre, he had lines dug among the groves of date palms, and held them with a force of certainly not less than 5,000 effectives. On his right, towards the Serbonian lake, he established rows of entrenchments, and manned them with hundreds of soldiers. He had brought with him a numerous body of labourers from Palestine for making trenches, and he worked them for all they were worth. A tract of desert about 15 miles wide lay between his and the British lines. On the night of July 27 he made a general advance, which was most marked from Magheibra, his troops swinging up to the north-west. On his right he was checked by the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, who, in a brisk skirmish, killed 50 of his men at a cost

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

of only two or three. Then Kressenstein paused again. He threw up fresh entrenchments and brought forward the rest of his army till, by the end of the month, he had 18,000 men.

Before this Sir Archibald Murray, after an exhaustive survey of the situation, had resolved that the enemy should be attacked. The difficulty with which the commander-in-chief was confronted lay in the fact that the huge camel transport necessary for the crossing of the strip of desert that stretched between him and Kressenstein was not immediately available, and for the moment he was unable to move in force. Orders, however, were given for getting ready with all speed a striking force on a pack basis with camel transport; but it was not till August 3 that all formations were in a position to take the field. His intention was, unless his hand was forced, to deliver an assault on the Turks about 10 days later, when it would be full moon. While these preparations for an offensive were going on, General Lawrence kept the enemy anxious and distracted by various minor operations.

On August 2 Kressenstein made a strong reconnaissance in the direction of Katia and Hamisah, the latter lying a little south of the former and a few miles north-west of Magheibra, where he paused, to prepare for the main attack. The reconnaissance made a slight gain on the north, but, after sharp fighting with the Anzac mounted division, was held up everywhere else. For some hours General Murray was in doubt whether he or Kressenstein would attack first, but on the following day any uncertainty there was came to an end when, about midnight of August 3, the Turks assaulted in force, and drove furiously at the Romani-Mahemdia fortifications. These lines were defended by the 52nd division of Territorials from the lowlands of Scotland. They faced east to a point east of an enormous sand dune, 300 feet high, known as Katib Gannit, and thence the British position looked south-westward, its natural features being a hill named Hod el Enna on the south, and two other great sand dunes called Mount Meredith and Mount Royston to the north, with a stretch on the east of high-lying, bright yellow sand termed Wellington ridge. These distinctly English appellations were derived from the names of Colonel Meredith and General Royston, commanding the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse; and from that of the Wellington Mounted Rifles. Behind Mount Royston was Pelusium, on the new railway from Kantara.

THE TERRITORIALS STAND FIRM

Kressenstein planned to press back the British on the south, cut the railway, and then attack from the rear. Having driven in the outposts on Hod el Enna, Mount Meredith and the Wellington ridge, he forced the British to the north of Mount Royston by midday on August 4, and the situation had an alarming look, but the enemy's success was only temporary. "The British troops here consisted of the 1st Australian Light Horse brigade, between Katib Gannit and Mount Meredith, and the New Zealand mounted force, around Mount Royston. In the darkness of midnight 3,000 Turks had attacked the Australians, who kept them off with machine gun fire. The enemy then delivered a bayonet assault on Mount Meredith, which was repulsed; a second attack, for which reinforcements had been brought up, met with more success, and by 4.30 a.m. the Australians had lost the hill.

Kressenstein next tried to outflank them on the left, and the troopers fell back slowly towards the railway. Meanwhile, he had been shelling with his heavy howitzers and field guns the whole of the fortifications stretching between Mahemdia and Romani, but was unable to make any serious impression. Nor did the repeated assaults of his infantry make any change to his advantage. The Territorials stood their ground like veterans, and repelled him at every point.

On the southern front the day had finally gone against the Turks. "After fighting their way to within a mile and a half of the railway—the farthest point of their advance northward—they were counter-attacked about 12.30 by the British, who had received belated reinforcements in the shape of two mounted brigades originally intended to operate on the enemy's rear. Three hours later two brigades of the East Lancashire Territorials appeared on the scene, but by this time the Anzac and other cavalry had begun to throw the Turks back, and at four o'clock the infantry was ordered to drive them out of Mount Royston and Wellington ridge. The Yeomanry dismounted and advanced side by side with the East Lancashires, all fighting with the utmost gallantry. The Turks put up a game and determined defensive for a couple of hours, but Mount Royston was recaptured from them about 6.30, with the loss of 500 men taken prisoners, a mountain battery, and several machine guns. As daylight broke on August 5, Wellington ridge was stormed by Scottish Territorials, under General W. E. B. Smith, helped by some of the Anzacs, the loss of the Turks being very heavy.

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

Kressenstein's attempt, it was now clear, had been a complete failure; the "second invasion of Egypt" was destined to share the fate of the first invasion. On the 5th the British advanced all along the line, and Scottish troops carried the enemy's strong position at Abu Hamra. The cavalry, comprising the mounted ~~azacs~~ and the Gloucester and Warwick Yeomanry, pressed on in hot pursuit, under General Sir H. G. Chauvel, the officer commanding the Australian force, who also was splendidly supported by batteries of Territorial horse artillery. A strong Turkish rearguard made a short stand at Katia and then at Oghratina to cover Kressenstein's retreat, but the British advance was hardly delayed. On the 8th he retired to Bir el Abd, where Chauvel nearly succeeded in enveloping him. Three days later the Turks were again in full retreat, nor did their main body halt until it had reached El Arish, only a rearguard being left at Bir el Mazar.

Thus did the second great effort of the Turco-Germans for the possession of the Suez canal go down in sheer disaster in this battle of Romani, as it came to be called. The victory won by the British would have been even more sweeping than it was but for difficulties in supplying the pursuing troops with water. Much had been done in overcoming these difficulties. As soon as the forward movement began, in a day temperature of 100°, many thousands of transport camels with water, food, ammunition, and material for entrenching stretched over the desert, and for three days and nights, as far as the eye could reach, there was a never-ending procession of heavily laden camels, the only animals that could negotiate with loads the wastes of Sinai, with its drift sand and fierce summer heat.

Even camel transport had its limits, and for several weeks General Murray did not push his advance beyond Bir el Abd; and Kressenstein reinforced his outpost at Bir el Mazar, where he entrenched on a front of three or four miles, and accumulated howitzers and field artillery. On September 16 and 17, however, Murray set to work to disturb him. Starting from Abd, General Chauvel reconnoitred Mazar with a force composed of Australian Light Horse, the Imperial Camel Corps, a mountain battery, and some batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery. Simultaneously British air machines appeared over Mazar and seaplanes bombed the enemy's headquarters at El Arish. There was some fighting at Mazar, not of a very intense description, but it was enough for the Turks, who evacuated the position without

HEADQUARTERS MOVED

any real attempt to check the British. Masaid was the next halting-place of the enemy, some five miles west of El Arish.

Three months passed before the British moved eastward in force again, but in the meantime they had been very busy getting ready, in accordance with General Murray's plans, for the expulsion of Kressenstein and the Turks from the north of the Sinaitic peninsula. The main thing on which he relied for success in this effort was the railway, and he pushed the line on with a speed that was wonderful in the circumstances, its rate of construction being two-thirds of a mile on an average each day. From Romani it passed through Katia, and then swung across the desert through Oghratina to Bir el Abd and Bir Salmana, whence the vagaries of the drift sand continually raised problems almost every minute for his engineers. And with the laying of the rails went the laying, though more slowly, of the pipe lines for the water. In order to be in touch with the civil authority, the commander-in-chief transferred his headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo on October 23, the local command, with headquarters at Ismailia, devolving on Sir Charles Dobell.

Of course, Murray saw to the assembling of the force for striking hard at El Arish when the time came, and till that arrived his aeroplanes were incessantly active in scouting, in taking photographs of the route until it was all clearly mapped out, and in bombing operations at Masaid, El Arish, and elsewhere. In the middle of November a long-distance air raid was made on Beersheba, the great Turkish base on the strategic railway through Syria and Palestine, large quantities of bombs being dropped on the railway station, sidings, and rolling-stock. Also in November, El Auja and El Kossaima, on the road from Beersheba to Nakhl, and both important points on the Turkish lines of communication westward across the central plateau of Sinai, were heavily bombed. The Turks retaliated by an air raid on Cairo, which effected nothing of military consequence.

Although operations now centred in the north of the peninsula, they did not cease in other parts of it. In the invasion of 1915 the Turco-Germans had advanced on the canal by three roads that crossed Sinai: on the north by the Serbonian road, as it was anciently named, which was now being turned into a railroad by British engineers; in the centre, from El Auja towards Serapeum, Tussum, and Ismailia; and on the south by the Darb el Haj, or Pilgrims' road, towards the town of Suez.

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

With regard to the second of these roads, which was the route of the main Turkish advance under Djemal Pasha, the British, as we have seen, had destroyed the wells at Jifjaffa and at Hassana in the first half of 1916. In October a mounted force, after two night marches in drift sand, reconnoitred Magara, a strong mountain position on the southern side of the desert of El Jiffar, between 60 and 70 miles east of Ismailia. In a brisk fight lasting two hours, the outposts of the Turks were driven in, with a loss of 28 men, the British having only three casualties.

Having ascertained the exact position of the enemy's main concentration, the mounted men returned westward; but in the middle of November the Royal Flying Corps paid the place a visit and dropped 400 pounds of explosives on the camp and its stores. Southward, on the third road, General Mudge raided Bir el Tawal, some 30 miles east of Kubri, in September, and taking the Turks completely by surprise, put them to flight after a brief struggle, and captured all their supplies. Thereafter he destroyed the wells and withdrew his troops to the zone of the canal.

From the southern end of the great waterway, where the British had strongly fortified the Well of Moses, otherwise Ain Musa, for the protection of the town of Suez, frequent raids into the interior were made, which easily fulfilled the limited ends in view. Considerable activity also was shown farther south, on the Sinai shore of the Gulf of Suez, Abu Zeneima and Tor, both small ports—but the latter, at least, of some importance—being occupied by Sikh and Bikanir Camel Corps troops. From these places Major W. J. Ottley, who had previously distinguished himself at Aden, conducted a raiding expedition inland, in the course of which he dispersed several bodies of the enemy, took a number of prisoners, rounded up a large quantity of live stock, and traversed 60 miles of difficult hilly country all without a single casualty—a remarkable performance. On the eastern side of Sinai the port of Akaba with its forts was repeatedly shelled by British warships. About half-way between Akaba and Suez, on the Pilgrims' road, lay Nakhl, from which also ran a road north-easterly to El Auja and Beersheba. Of strategic significance, it was one of the chief remaining Turkish centres. In December a British mobile column advanced from Suez towards it for a considerable distance, destroyed two camps en route, and was a distinct menace to the Turks in that quarter.

EL ARISH TAKEN

By the third week in December the main British force was again in motion along the northern road, in the direction of El Arish. The railway was well forward, and General Murray's plans had matured for the advance eastward. His army was small as armies went in the war, but it was composed of the same troops who had won the battle of Romani five months before—the Anzac Horse, Ycomanry, Territorials, and Camel Corps. On the morning of December 20 the British marched out of Bir el Abd, accompanied by a number of aeroplanes, which kept the command well supplied with information, besides tackling the enemy's machines. The columns swept on without opposition across the desert towards Masaid, which the Turks had strongly fortified, and where they were expected to make a stand. But no stand was made. Kressenstein, unable to bring up reinforcements in time to parry this sudden stroke, decided on instant retreat—not only from Masaid, but also from El Arish itself. As soon as General Murray knew that Kressenstein's men were evacuating El Arish he ordered the Anzac mounted division and the Camel Corps to press on and occupy the town.

El Arish fell into the hands of the British on December 21 in the course of this wonderful march of 24 hours, an achievement memorable in the war. During the night of December 22, after a day in bivouac, Chauvel of the Australians, who was in local command, had his men once more on the road; but this time the route was south to Magdhaba, by way of the dry Wadi el Arish. The enemy, in imagined safety at Magdhaba, did not reckon with the powers of endurance these Anzacs and others possessed. General Chauvel knew the kind of troops he had under him, and determined to strike without delay. Starting off soon after midnight at a sharp trot, this remarkable force covered a distance of 20 miles up the rough bed of the wadi in four hours, and, after a personal reconnaissance by the general of the enemy position, the attack was launched at eight o'clock on the morning of the 23rd. The camelry, with a mountain battery, supported by Territorial guns, began the frontal attack, while the Anzacs, who were commanded by Brigadier General E. W. C. Chaytor, moved north of the Turkish position, under cover of the sand dunes, to the east and south-east of Magdhaba, to cut off the retreat of the enemy. The Turks were well entrenched in the form of a rough circle, 3,500 yards in diameter, with five large closed works or redoubts.

CLEARING THE TURKS FROM EGYPT

The battle lasted eight hours, and was of a desperate character, as the Turks offered the most strenuous resistance, mainly in the redoubts. Soon after the attack began, aeroplanes brought word that some of the enemy's troops were already retiring, and the Anzacs on the east pushed on quickly to complete the envelopment of the Turkish force, while a reserve brigade went forward at the trot to cooperate in this movement. It was soon discovered that only small bodies of the enemy were withdrawing, and that the main position was held in very considerable strength. The retreat was, in fact, in the nature of a ruse. The reserve brigade came under heavy machine gun fire, and the other Anzac brigades were systematically shelled by mountain guns.

To assist the frontal assault, the reserve brigade swung to the right and at the same time extended its line to the west to complete the encircling of the enemy. The British gained ground, but suffered from the lack of cover. One of the redoubts which could be seen from the artillery observation-post—it was the only one that could be so seen—was blown to bits, and its survivors showed the white flag; but the other redoubts continued firing, and the battle progressed with violence. About noon the British advance was stopped, except at one point, and as the enemy appeared determined to resist, supporting troops were brought into action. During the next two or three hours the fighting reached the greatest intensity. Artillery fire was hampered by mirage and by lack of forward observation-posts which, owing to the flat nature of the ground, could not be established. Aircraft attacked the redoubts, the guns increased their fire, and the troopers, dismounting, made repeated assaults.

A further danger appeared when the field squadron reported that no water could be found. Thus, unless the position could be taken before the end of the day, the thirsty troops and their thirstier mounts (which had not been watered since the 22nd) would be forced to withdraw to El Arish. The order went forth to push the attack with all possible speed. From this time forward the pressure was increased on all points. A detachment of Australians on the enemy's left captured a work to the west of the wadi, taking 100 prisoners. A little later, two regiments of Australian Light Horse were within 200 yards of the north-east and in touch with the Camel Corps coming in from north-west. By three o'clock the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had got within 600 yards of the enemy on the north-east.

RAFA OCCUPIED

At 3.30 the force from the wadi and the Camel Corps attacked the second line of defences, and half an hour later one of the main redoubts was carried after a dashing charge. In it were 150 Turks and Khabir Bey, the Turkish commandant. Immediately after a Light Horse detachment charged, mounted, with the bayonet, and at 4.30 the Turks who had not escaped from the forces pressing in upon them had surrendered.

On December 27 reports were received from the air reconnaissance that the Turks were preparing an entrenched position at Magruntein, and, though the position had no strategic value, it was felt that it would be bad policy to allow it to be completed. Accordingly, General Sir Philip Chetwode, commanding the desert column, set out from El Arish on the night of January 8-9 with Yeomanry, Australian and New Zealand Horse. The Turks were completely surprised, and at dawn on January 9 the attack began.

For its size, the position was formidable. Three series of works, facing south-east, south-west, and west, were connected by trenches, dominated by a redoubt 2,000 yards west of Rafa. On all sides the ground was so level as almost to constitute a glacis without cover of any kind for the advancing troops. At 7.30 the guns began to register hits, and, after a heavy bombardment, the New Zealand Rifles from the east with the Australian Light Horse on their left attacked the works, with the Camel Corps attacking on the south-east. At 10 o'clock the Turks had had enough, and, too late, began to stream away by the Khan Yunus road. Their retreat was cut off. The New Zealanders captured two Turkish officers and 163 other ranks.

Before 11 o'clock Rafa was in British occupation, and there remained only the works that were being attacked on the left of those troops attacking from east and south-east. Some Australian Light Horse and the Camel Corps pushed forward, and at the same time the New Zealanders and some Light Horse at a hand gallop pushed in 300 yards east of the nearest work. The Yeomanry deployed and with the Camel Corps attacked the western works. Only a small gap to the north-west was open. Now the Horse Artillery dashed forward to support the attack at close quarters, and by two o'clock the gap had been closed.

At 3.30 General Chetwode ordered a general attack on the central redoubt by all the available force. At that time the air force reported relieving Turkish troops approaching

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

from Shellal; but General Chetwode ordered the attack to be pressed to the utmost and left the relieving force to the attentions of the aircraft. Spurred by the need of speed, the storming party, backed splendidly by the gunners, burst into the redoubts, covering the last 800 yards in two spurts. By 5.30 all the fight had gone out of the Turks and they surrendered. A small force was detached to deal with the relieving troops, and dispersed them with few casualties. In this operation the total British casualties in the 10 hours of fighting amounted to 487 in all, of whom 71 were killed. Of the Turkish force, the whole were accounted for.

CHAPTER 23

The Rumanians Retreat

As has been shown in a preceding chapter, by October 16 the tide of war had turned against Rumania, but Rumania herself had by no means lost hope. Determined to offer the utmost resistance within her power, and supported by the prospect of receiving adequate help from her Allies, she continued to make a stand against heavy and ever-increasing odds. But the battles in which she had been worsted by the Germans under Falkenhayn in the region of the northern passes had unmistakably demonstrated that she was severely handicapped by being opposed to artillery much superior to her own.

Assistance was sent to her by her Allies, but the turn of events proved it to be insufficient to protect her from disaster. Nor was Russia able to place at her disposal in time the large forces, backed by heavy guns, which were necessary in the circumstances. In the statement of her case against the dual monarchy Rumania had expressed her belief that her action would shorten the conflict and hasten the overthrow of the enemy, but as the campaign proceeded it became apparent that this confident forecast was erroneous. Throughout November and early December the struggle went more and more against Rumania, and it was clear that her plan of campaign had been vitiated from the start by grave miscalculations.

First, her conception of the strategy of the campaign was faulty. Her invasion of Transylvania, coupled with the

A RESUME

neglect of the Dobruja, proved a gigantic mistake with serious consequences. Her Allies had urged her to secure herself on the north by occupying and fortifying the passes into Transylvania, and at the same time to attack Bulgaria with all her strength on the south. But, swayed by political rather than military considerations and hoodwinked by Bulgaria, she did not act on the counsel. The Bulgarians were not attacked, and the Dobruja was practically left unprotected against a strong assault.

With Bulgaria against her, Rumania's strength was greatly beneath what was essential for her long frontiers. She had bargained with Russia to be given two divisions of infantry and a cavalry division in the Dobruja, but this reinforcement, large as it was, was not nearly sufficient to balance the account, far less to turn the whole position to her distinct advantage and ensure success. In other words, Rumania had overestimated her military resources. Further, she had underestimated those of the enemy. This was the second of her grave miscalculations.

From about October 10, when the Rumanians were compelled to withdraw in Transylvania towards the passes, Falkenhayn had continued to press them back. In the middle of the month he had succeeded in driving them out of the Törzburg and Gyimes passes, and on the 25th had captured the Vulkan pass, beginning that advance along the valley of the Jiu which, though encountering defeat at first, was to have such a strangely decisive influence on the fortunes of his whole offensive, of the entire campaign and of Rumania. Next the Germans took the Predeal pass and the little town of Predeal. At that time they had a firm foothold on Rumanian soil also at Rucaru and Dragoslavele, the latter just south of the former place, on the south side of the Törzburg, on the road to Campu Lung, as well as at Caineni, at the southern exit of the Roter Turm, which they had taken as far back as the beginning of the month. Orsova and the Varciorova pass were still in the possession of Rumania.

Falkenhayn was trying to break the determined and, for a while, not altogether ineffective resistance of the Rumanian forces along the vast mountainous frontier. He was really feeling for the weakest sector in this long front, and the scouting aeroplanes with which he was well supplied incessantly brought him information as to the positions and movements of the Rumanian troops, and enabled him to make good use of his guns. The Rumanians were poorly supplied with aircraft, field telephones

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

and munitions generally, but both France and Great Britain did something towards making up the deficiency. A wireless message from Bukarest reported the arrival there of four British aeroplanes from Imbros on October 24; more British machines came later from Tenedos, and 120 French aeroplanes had previously reached the country from Salonica, or from elsewhere.

In the Carpathians Falkenhayn continued to meet with little or no success, but in the Transylvanian Alps he made progress by violent assaults, backed by his superior artillery, south of Predeal and in the vicinity of Dragoslavele at the foot of the Törzburg, along the two roads which offered the most direct access to Bukarest. The hardy Rumanians clung to their poor entrenchments most tenaciously, and inflicted repeated repulses on him, but they had to yield under the severe pressure which he put upon them. By the 27th, however, the Germans had got no farther south of Predeal than Azuga, five miles nearer the capital, while in the valley of Pravatz, in the Törzburg district, they suffered a decided reverse, the ground, according to the Rumanian communiqué, being covered with enemy corpses.

South of the Roter Turm, the next great pass west of the Törzburg and the Predeal, Falkenhayn also launched on the Rumanians many desperate assaults, which official telegrams usually described as taking place in the valley or neighbourhood of the Alt (Oltu, or Aluta). This river flowed from Transylvania, past Fogaras, into Rumania, crossing the country from north to south till it reached the Danube, and almost bisecting Wallachia, the western half being called Oltenia, the eastern Muntenia. In the summer this stream was not a great river, but when swollen by the late autumn and early winter rains and snows it attained such depth and width that it came next in importance to the Danube, the Pruth and the Sreth.

By this time the weather had broken. Heavy rains had swept the plains and much snow had fallen in the mountains; the Alt was becoming a formidable obstacle in the military sense. The storms impeded operations, whether of friend or foe, but did not cause them to cease. East of the river the Germans attacked continuously for several days, and after some checks captured the villages of Rakovitsa and Titești, both about 11 miles south of the frontier. The Rumanians were afterwards withdrawn a little farther into the interior, and as October closed were holding up the invaders.

A BAVARIAN DIVISION

Meanwhile, more to the west, the struggle in the Jiu valley, south of the Vulkan pass, had been maintained, and as it proceeded it developed unexpected and sensational features. In this region Falkenhayn attacked first with the 11th Bavarian division, composed of hardy highlanders used to life in the mountains under all conditions. On October 24 the Rumanians, who in this sector belonged to the Rumanian 1st army, began to retire before it, and continued their withdrawal during the following day. This retirement signified a hostile advance of 20 miles into the country, and the enemy was in sight of Targu Jiu, a town of some 10,000 inhabitants, lying on a high tableland picturesquely surrounded with wooded hills. Many of its people fled, and the military authorities, fearing the worst, gave orders for the evacuation of the rest of the civil population. The Rumanian soldiers, however, held the place, and now occurred an outstanding episode.

Considered one of the best divisions of the German army, the 11th Bavarian division, to which had been added four cavalry regiments and some howitzer batteries, was commanded by General Knesler, and never anticipated anything approaching a defeat. Indeed, only a few days before the Rumanians turned and counter-attacked, General Knesler had received a flattering communication from the German kaiser, who congratulated his "gallant troops on their success," and the Bavarian leader was so certain of victory that some cavalry of his, who were near Targu Jiu, had orders to take possession of that town on "October 27 at two o'clock in the afternoon."

In this region the Rumanians were led by General Dragalina, who very shortly before had been placed in command. When the campaign began he was at the head of a division, soon was given an army corps, and almost immediately afterwards an army. His forces at Targu, wearied by incessant fighting, were inferior to those of the Germans, but his situation was desperate, and having received some much-needed reinforcements he resolved to counter-attack on a bold plan and roll back the tide of invasion. Splitting up his army into three parts, and regardless of the fact that his projected course of action left the rear on his right exposed, he pushed forward and fell with great impetuosity on the flank of the enemy, who was completely surprised and broke up in panic. This occurred on October 26, and the Rumanians pressed home their advantage next day.

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

Day after day the Rumanians drove on the defeated Bavarians, taking from them many hundreds of additional prisoners and much booty as they fled up the river towards the Vulkan pass. According to one report, the victory of the Rumanians was partially due to the use of a ruse which had been employed as far back as the thirteenth century—trees were cut down on the hillsides and hurled into the valley to stem, or at least to hinder, the German retreat, thus increasing the enemy's difficulties and consequently swelling his losses. As a result of the battle—the battle of Targu Jiu—the Germans lost 2,000 prisoners, an equal number in killed, and thousands of wounded, besides many guns of various types and large quantities of ammunition. And the invaders had been beaten back from the railway, for Targu Jiu was the terminus of the line from Craiova, where it connected with other lines running east and west. All Rumania breathed more freely for this victory.

At the opening of November the feelings of apprehension among the Allies and in Rumania itself with respect to the situation had been considerably decreased by the success of the Rumanians in the Jiu valley, and by the stoutness of their resistance at other points on the Wallachian mountain front. On the Moldavian frontier and as far as the Predeal the position remained much the same; since a repulse of the Germans from the Gyimes it had been favourable on the whole for Rumania. But the thrusts of the enemy still were delivered with great force from the Predeal to the Roter Turm; first, in the valley of the Prahova, south of the Predeal, second, in the district round Dragoslavele, south of the Törzburg, and third, in the valley of the Alt, at the exit from the Roter Turm.

In the first sector Falkenhayn, having failed to penetrate to the plain by the lower defiles, was concentrating his efforts to break through in the mountains near Azuga. But the Rumanians put up a great fight, and repeatedly counter-attacked him. A German communiqué of November 2 claimed that these counter-attacks had failed with heavy losses to their opponents, but did not mention any advance of their troops. The same dispatch announced, however, some gain of ground in the second sector. But it was in the Alt valley that Falkenhayn with large bodies of troops was attacking most heavily. It was by no means sure that he would succeed anywhere in debouching into the plain, notwithstanding all his endeavours, but these continued night

SAKHAROFF IN COMMAND

and day. Bukarest apparently was confident that he would fail, and general opinion in that capital took the view that the mountains, with their defence in good hands, would remain an impenetrable barrier. Furthermore, Russian troops had arrived in the country. North of the Danube they were commanded by General Belaieff, a distinguished Russian general. On November 1 General Sakharoff, the victor of Brody, was in Bukarest, whence soon afterwards he proceeded to take the leadership of the Russo-Rumanian forces in the Dobruja.

In the early days of November the upper valley of the Prahova was the scene of stubborn contests. The Rumanians successfully withstood numerous assaults and repulsed others in the defiles, but on November 5 a Berlin communiqué announced that earlier German successes south of the Predeal had been completed by the storming of the Globucetu position, which had been specially prepared and was defended with stubbornness. An Austrian telegram added that the Germans, with whom were Austro-Hungarian troops, had vigorously followed up their success by capturing the second Rumanian line of entrenchments beyond.

On the 6th the enemy took Mount Omu, 4,356 feet high, six miles south-east of Predeal. Then for the next two or three days there followed a tremendous bombardment by heavy guns of the Rumanian lines, succeeded by continuous, fierce assaults on the Rumanian left wing. The Rumanians replied by sharp counter-attacks on both sides of the road from the pass, but the Germans made progress west of Azuga on the 10th, after sanguinary encounters in which they had heavy losses. On the following day Vienna stated that west of Predeal the Germans stormed six successive positions, which they held against two desperate counter-attacks. Two days later the Rumanians repulsed two enemy assaults in the direction of the Cerburai vale, north-west of Busteni, seven and a half miles south of Predeal, and the starting point of the oil-fields in the district. On the 15th there was comparative calm in this region, the Rumanians maintaining themselves on the ground to which they had withdrawn. Aeroplanes bombed Sinaia on the same day. Up to this date the enemy had not gained much south of the Predeal from the Rumanian 2nd army, who were under General Averescu in person.

During these two weeks of November the story of the struggle in the sector south of the Törzburg was less favourable to the Rumanians. There the Germans were already established in the

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

vicinity of Dragoslavele, in the valley of the Rucar, and there was heavy fighting about November 5 in the hilly uplands between the Argesul and Targu valleys north-east of Campu Lung, the enemy claiming gains of ground and a loss to the Rumanians of 1,000 killed. In this region Falkenhayn was well supplied with guns, and he battered down the trenches of his opponents. He progressed slowly, however, constantly counter-attacked in country which lent itself to assaults on his flanks.

On the 11th the German leader lost some of his trenches, but on the 13th he captured Candesti, a small town close to Campu Lung, and 17 miles south of the frontier—on that date the farthest point he had reached in the interior of Rumania. On the 15th Bukarest announced that in "the region of Dragoslavele the enemy has attacked on several occasions, assisted by heavy artillery, but has everywhere been repulsed, our troops maintaining their positions." That day, according to the German account, saw only slight fighting on the whole Transylvanian front; but the Germans had meanwhile made a decided advance, and closely menaced Campu Lung, with its railway to Pitesti and thence south-east to Bukarest and south-west to Slatina and Craiova. Yet a fortnight passed before they were in Campu Lung.

However heavily Falkenhayn struck from the Predeal and the Törzburg, he struck still more heavily from the Roter Turm along the valley of the Alt. There his forces were led by General von Dellmensingen, the Bavarian commander who was credited with having conducted the successful encircling movement which resulted in the defeat of the Rumanians in the battle of Hermannstadt. On November 5 and 6 he made violent attacks on the right bank of the river near Racovitsa-Titesti, some 11 miles south of the frontier; and on the 7th near Spinu, 14 miles from the head of the pass, he drove the Rumanians back with a loss to them, according to the official German message, of over 1,000 prisoners. His immediate objective on the east side of the Alt appeared to be Curtea de Arges, with its rail-head, and he had set in motion a formidable body in that direction along the road from Caineni. Two days later he reported that he had crossed the Baiesti sector, 15 miles south of the frontier, and had captured Sardoiu, 16 miles south, with the positions on the adjoining heights on both sides, having defeated fierce Rumanian counter-attacks. On the 10th he made a further advance by "successful fighting in which," it was said, "Bavarian

THE ENEMY REINFORCED

infantry, Austro-Hungarian mountain troops, as well as German Landsturm forces, especially distinguished themselves."

The Rumanians resisted doggedly, and on the 11th were able to state they had made progress on the left of the river, recapturing Mount Fruntsi, and had arrested the enemy's march on the right bank at Saracinesti, 10 miles from the frontier. But they were not able to hold the Germans, and their communiqué of November 14 admitted that the enemy, by using fresh and superior forces, had driven them back after repeated assaults, in the course of which positions changed hands several times. On the 15th Dellmensingen was close to Salatruc, on the east bank of the Alt, 21 miles within the frontier, and near Brezoiu, on the west side of the river, 15 miles into the interior.

That fortnight's struggle along the roads south of these three central passes of Wallachia ended in loss of ground, but there had been no great victory on the one hand and no grave disaster on the other. The Germans spoke of the taking of large numbers of prisoners, but did not dwell on the capture of many guns. Their own losses unquestionably were considerable, but they made these good by bringing up fresh forces in strength. They seemed to have no lack of men. The situation had an unpromising appearance for Rumania, but could not be called desperate. It was what took place in the same short period in the region of the Vulkan pass that precipitated the catastrophe.

On November 6 the Rumanian official telegram announced that the enemy had received reinforcements in the valley of the Jiu, and that the division which had beaten the Bavarians and driven them back with great losses into the Vulkan pass had discontinued its pursuit. In this sector the Rumanians had only this single division, and after some slight fighting on the 7th the Germans began a new offensive against it on the next day; but they did not develop their attack in great strength till about the 11th of the month. For this effort the Germans outnumbered the Rumanians by more than two to one. The remains of the 11th Bavarian division, which had been so roughly handled in the first battle of Targu Jiu, had been withdrawn, and its place had been taken by the 41st Prussian division. There was, besides, another German division, with additional troops, mainly cavalry regiments, and extra artillery. The total amounted to about 50,000 men, who were commanded by General Schmidt von Knobelsdorff, an officer of experience, whose name had last been

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

heard of in connexion with operations on the Russian front west of Lutsk early in the preceding October.

On November 10 the Bukarest official dispatch referred to the position in the valley as unchanged, but after mentioning fighting next day on the Moldevis hill, east of the river, and about five miles south of the frontier, the communiqué of the 12th said that a violent German attack had compelled the Rumanians to retire slightly to the south. Under the pressure of Knobelsdorff, which was augmenting hourly, this withdrawal continued, and by the 14th the Rumanian division, already reduced in numbers, was driven south of Bumbesti, a village 13 miles within the interior. It then fell back on Targu Jiu, whence roads ran east to the Alt and west to Orsova, which town the left wing of the Rumanian 1st army still held. For some time little news had come through with respect to the situation at this important town on the Danube, but on November 12 Berlin spoke of German advanced troops pressing forward there, and on the following day of unsuccessful Rumanian counter-attacks with strong forces to the north of the town. Falkenhayn's strategy was keeping this part of the Rumanian 1st army—the part which later was known as the Orsova army—far too busy for it to send any help to the fiercely assaulted centre in the valley of the Jiu.

Beginning on November 14 the second battle of Targu Jiu lasted for three days, and its issue, in a complete victory for the Germans, practically decided the fate of Rumania. There was a great struggle, but the enemy was superior in everything except courage, and their courage, which was never in question, did not avail the Rumanians. It was a thoroughly unequal contest, and from the outset of the battle the result was certain.

How disastrous was the defeat of the Rumanians was not understood among the Allies in the west till the publication of the German and Austrian communiqués of November 19, and then not fully. At first some doubt was cast on their truthfulness, but they were accurate enough. Berlin, after announcing that the German operations on the southern Transylvanian front since the end of October had progressed as intended, declared that the German and Austro-Hungarian troops had forced a way out of the mountain passes into the Wallachian plain. "In the battle of Targu Jiu," it said, "we have broken through the stubborn resistance of the Rumanians between the Jiu and the Gilort, strong enemy forces being defeated with high casualties."

ON THE WALLACHIAN PLAIN

Knobelsdorff was pushing forward quickly with his cavalry and light guns on a wide front, which extended from the Motru on the west to the Gilort, an eastern affluent of the Jiu. With all possible speed he was making for the Orsova-Craiova-Bukarest railway at several points, this being the line of communication with their eastern forces of the Rumanians who were fighting at Orsova and on the Cerna, the stream close to that place, and now in great danger of being isolated, as in fact they soon were. Knobelsdorff was not altogether unopposed, for fighting in rearguard actions was reported on his whole way southward, but the Rumanian strength was exhausted, and his progress was very rapid.

Passing through Filiasi, where the Wallachian plain began, the Germans were in possession of Craiova by noon on November 21, having marched from Targu Jiu, some 60 miles away, in about four days. There was a short fight in front of the town. According to the German communiqué of the 22nd this was what occurred: "Quickly breaking the resistance of the defeated enemy by bayonet attacks and assaults, the West and East Prussian infantry from the north, and squadrons of the Queen's curassier regiment from the west, were the first German troops to penetrate into Craiova."

The capital of Oltenia, and the most important Rumanian town west of Bukarest, from which it was distant 120 miles, Craiova was a thriving place, with a population of over 50,000. Besides being the headquarters of the Rumanian 1st army, it was a busy trading centre, with much business in corn and cattle, as it stood in the midst of a rich agricultural district. Its capture by the Germans had some economic significance for them, as, in addition to the stores of supplies in the place, the farmers in the neighbourhood still had on hand considerable supplies of wheat and maize. But its occupation from the military point of view was of even greater importance to the enemy, as it was well in the rear of the Orsova army, lying 75 miles to the west, whose safety was very directly involved.

During these eventful weeks of November events had not stood still in the Dobruja. In the beginning of the month the Russian Black Sea fleet more than once bombarded Constantza and Mangalia, its guns doing great work on the former place, which was set in flames. But these naval operations could have little influence on the campaign in the Dobruja itself. The

THE RUMANIANS' RETREAT

Allied operations in the field in that area were now directed by General Sakharoff, who, in taking command of the combined Russo-Rumanian forces, issued a stirring address in which he exhorted his men always to advance and never retreat. In the early part of this month large Russian reinforcements arrived on this front, and the influence of the new commander was quickly felt. On the 7th and 8th progress was reported along the whole of the Allied line, and it was noted that as the Bulgarians retreated under Sakharoff's offensive they systematically set fire to and destroyed the various Rumanian villages and hamlets which they were forced to abandon.

With the assistance of the Danube squadron, Harsova was reoccupied on the 9th. At this place there was one of the few good crossings of the Danube, as the left bank of the river was free from those broad marshy tracts which made military movements exceedingly difficult elsewhere on that side. Sakharoff was about 25 miles from Cerna Voda. Berlin, in a curious telegram of that date, said that on the front of the army group of Field Marshal von Mackensen, in the northern Dobruja, reconnoitring detachments advanced in accordance with their instructions, and "avoided all engagements with the enemy infantry." It was exactly a fortnight before this that Mackensen's forces had reached the Harsova-Casapkiol line.

On November 10 appeared indications of an important new move. Petrograd reported on that day that Russian cavalry and infantry had occupied Dunarea, the Danube station, two miles west of Cerna Voda, and were fighting for possession of the famous bridge, after an engagement in which over 200 of the enemy had been killed and a number of prisoners taken. Two days later the advance of the Allied forces had progressed from Harsova to Topalu and Ghisdaresti, on the right bank of the Danube, about 12 miles from the bridge. On the 13th Cerna Voda was shelled from the left bank of the Danube. An attempt was being made on Mackensen's flank, but according to the German account it was unsuccessful from the first. Three days later a Russian communiqué spoke of Allied progress south of Topalu in the direction of the bridge, and then there came a calm on this front. Mackensen had fallen back to a line, which he had strongly fortified, covering the Cerna Voda-Constantza railway, and no very determined effort was made to dislodge him from his well-prepared positions.

A GERMAN TELEGRAM

On the 21st Cerna Voda was once more bombarded, but by that time it was plain that the Russo-Rumanians were not in sufficient force to drive Mackensen from it. Though his army had been depleted of some troops for the relief of the Bulgarians at Monastir (which General Sarraill captured on November 18), it had been reinforced by Turkish and other contingents, and was more powerful than ever before. On the 24th the Allies made a slight impression on its centre and left in the Dobruja, but that date was really remarkable for quite another and much more important event, which at once attracted the keenest attention throughout the world. That day Berlin announced that the Danube had been crossed at several points, and this startling news was true.

Now came the explanation of the curious German telegram which referred to Mackensen's retirement in the northern Dobruja according to plan. It had been a voluntary, a calculated withdrawal—a screen, as it were—behind which he was concentrating his men and maturing his schemes for forcing the passage of the great river, the formidable natural obstacle that protected the south of Wallachia from him. Perhaps an indication of what was coming was contained in a Bulgarian communiqué, published a fortnight earlier, which reported on November 9 that two German companies, supported by a group of Austrian monitors, had carried out a small raid on the left bank of the Danube, opposite the eastern outlet of the Belen canal, and had forced the Rumanian guards to retreat.

It was from Sistov, opposite Zimnita, that, helped by a thick fog, a large body of Mackensen's troops crossed, and established themselves at the latter town. Other of the field marshal's forces gained a passage at Islaz, a few miles farther up the stream. A Berlin message asserted that the "Danube army chosen for operations in western Rumania" made the crossing to the left bank "in the actual presence of Field Marshal von Mackensen." A subsequent dispatch suggested that a rising of the Danube, owing to a thaw which had set in, had had no effect on the success of the operations. The Rumanians offered a gallant resistance, but they were outnumbered.

At Islaz, Mackensen was close to the mouth of the Alt, while at Zimnita he was some miles east of it—in other words, he had turned the Alt on the south, and the line of this river was that on which the Rumanians in Wallachia were at the moment

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

making a stand. A Bukarest telegram said that the invaders were being held at both Zimnita and Islaz, but the Rumanian opposition was soon overborne. Marching rapidly from the former town, Mackensen struck up along the river Vedea towards the capital, and on November 26 he was standing before Alexandria, about 50 miles south-west of it. Another column of his, composed mainly of cavalry, pushed up north along the valley of the Alt, and got into touch with the German forces in that area. The crossing of the Danube by Mackensen had made the whole position of the Rumanian army much worse, and particularly of that portion of it which had retreated east after the fall of Craiova.

After Knobelsdorff's troops took Craiova on November 21, what remained of the division which had been driven out of the valley of the Jiu had, after crossing the Altetsu, retired to the Alt, on the line of which their comrades, taking every advantage of the natural features of their country, continued to offer a strenuous resistance in the face of the heaviest odds. Most of the guns had been got away from Craiova, as well as their ammunition, and the Rumanians made a great stand in this area.

During the third week of that month General von Dellmensingen had kept up the severest pressure in the northern sectors of the Alt. After a prolonged bombardment of the Rumanian positions there, he attacked fiercely at Albesti, five miles north of the rail-head of Curtea de Arges, at Vernesti and Surpatsi, the one three and the other 10 miles west of Albesti, at Monastir, and at Cozia, on the west bank of the river. Rymnik was captured on the 26th, but on the hills north of Curtea de Arges the Rumanians still held on, and fought most stubbornly.

The line of the Alt, as a strong defensive barrier against the invaders, had lost its value when it was turned by Mackensen on the south from Zimnita. The line of the river had to be abandoned, so that the enemy had gained possession of territory 100 miles in width. Before this it had become certain that the Rumanian force known as the Orsova (or Cerna) army had been definitely cut off. An Austrian communiqué of November 24 made it plain that Orsova itself had been captured, and on the same day Turnu Severin, on the Danube below the Iron Gates, fell into the enemy's hands. Some battalions of the Orsova army stubbornly defended themselves in the wooded hills lying north of Turnu Severin. On November 27, south-east of Turnu

THE MENACE TO BUKAREST

Severin, the Germans claimed to have taken from them guns and 1,200 men. Continually followed up by encircling movements, the army succeeded in retreating as far east as the Alt, but there it was forced into a decisive action on December 12, and obliged to capitulate with 8,000 men.

With its left flank turned by Mackensen's advance from the Danube, as was narrated above, the Rumanian army had been unable to make that stand on the Alt which had been anticipated, and it withdrew eastward in the general direction of Bukarest, which was now more or less directly menaced. The forces of the Germans in Wallachia were henceforward divided into two groups; one was the 9th army under Falkenhayn, and the other was the Danube army under Mackensen, who shortly afterwards assumed command of both groups.

Following his usual tactical methods, the enemy struck hard at the Rumanian wings. On the north General Dellmensingen drove back the Rumanians behind the sector of the river Topologu, and advanced 10 miles east of Rymnik. On the south, Mackensen's Danube army on November 27 took Alexandria, a town on the Vedeia with a considerable trade in grain, and it also occupied Rosiori and Valeni, higher up the same river.

Petrograd supplied further information about the events of November 27. After alluding to the retirement to the east of the Rumanians in western Wallachia this communiqué defined the line which the Germans had reached. It ran from Darmanesti, south of Campu Lung, and about 80 miles north-west of Bukarest, to Prunaru, 30 miles south-west of the capital, and thence to Slobodia, a little east of Giurgevo, on the Danube. The Russian statement added the ominous words that the Germans had advanced along the turnpike road to Calugareni, which was only 17 miles distant from Bukarest. But this account, grave as it was, did not state the whole truth, which had not reached Petrograd when the communiqué was issued, with respect to the situation on the Danube, for also on November 27 Giurgevo itself was in the hands of the enemy. This river port, which had been bombarded several times, lay about 40 miles south of the capital.

A Sofia dispatch, while reporting that the Danube army of Mackensen continued to advance without interruption, gave some news regarding the capture of this town. After mentioning various crossings of the Danube, from Rahova to Bechetu, and from Lom Palanka and Widin to spots on the Rumanian

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

shore, it stated: "Our troops, advancing on the left bank of the Danube, attacked Giurgevo, supported by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian monitors. After a sanguinary fight, lasting from 11 o'clock in the morning to five o'clock in the afternoon, the town was conquered. The Rumanian troops and population were seized with panic and fled towards Bukarest." Farther down the river strong artillery attacks were made on Oltenitsa, over against Tutrakan, and only some 30 miles from Bukarest. Thus on the south the threat to the Rumanian capital was growing more and more direct hour by hour.

On the north and west, in Great Wallachia—or Muntenia, as the region east of the Alt was called—the menace to Bukarest came nearer and nearer. On the 28th Dellmensingen, continuing his progress from Rymnik, took Curtea de Arges, in the region of the head-waters of the river Argesul, and the rail-head of a line running through Pitesti to the capital. The place was stubbornly defended to the last, but the enemy's big guns prevailed, and forced the Rumanians to retire.

The German official message of November 29 announced that the 9th army, with which the Danube army was in contact, was pressing forward victoriously on the whole of the Wallachian front, and on the evening of that day Pitesti, an important centre from which radiated several railways, was said to be in the possession of the enemy, bringing him on the north-west to within about 65 miles of Bukarest. Another German column captured Campu Lung on the same date, taking 1,200 prisoners, seven guns and a "large quantity of baggage." Around Drago-slavele and Campu Lung the Rumanians had long and successfully defended the exits from the Törzburg pass, but now were compelled to abandon them.

A passing gleam of sunshine lit up the fast darkening sky of Rumania. Her troops, as November closed, made progress in the valleys of the Prahova and the Buzau, in the oil-bearing districts, but their success in these sectors had no influence on the general situation, which increasingly and unmistakably indicated the peril in which Bukarest stood. A short time before the Rumanian authorities in the capital had realized the greatness and imminence of the danger, and as a measure of precaution had transferred the seat of government to Jassy, the chief city and capital of Moldavia. Jassy was an old-world, sleepy university town, which was suddenly transformed into a

THE STAND ON THE ARGESUL

busy city, as, in addition to the government and the legations, thousands of the better class of the population in the invaded areas fled there for refuge.

While the shadows were gathering round Bukarest, General Belaieff, who commanded the Russians on the Moldavian front, attempted a diversion by beginning an offensive on a considerable scale on the north-western frontier. This movement started on November 28, and met with some success, which, however, was insufficient to avert the fate of the capital. The Russians, after extraordinarily bitter fighting, captured a series of heights. On the 29th Berlin said that "in the wooded Carpathians, on the frontier range of Moldavia, the Russians pursued their attacks without achieving important results," and that at the cost of heavy sacrifices they "had to be content with small local advantages." For some days the Russian offensive was maintained, but without any substantial gains. The country operated in was one of the most difficult in the world, and the weather experienced was of the severest winter type. In any case, if the Russian movement in force in this area, was intended for the relief of Bukarest it came too late.

The expectation that the Rumanians would make a stand on the Argesul was realized. On November 30, the eve of the battle of the Argesul, the German line formed a concave curve, a sort of half-moon, beginning on the north at Predeal, passing south-west through Campu Lung, then going almost due south to the west of Tirgovistea, whence it went along the valley of the river Glavaciog, and finally bent south-eastward to Calugareni, Comana and the Danube. The Russians had reported that the villages of Comana and Gostinari, less than 20 miles south-south-east of Bukarest, had been occupied by the enemy, but on the other hand they stated that on several of the roads in that corridor between the Danube and Bukarest Mackensen's forces had been repulsed.

The 9th army of the Germans was disposed in three parts. One part, which had marched from Craiova, was now commanded by Lieutenant General Kühn, and it formed the right centre of the enemy's attack on the line of the Argesul. Immediately above him was that part which, led by Dellmensing, had advanced along the Argesul from its sources in the mountains, after severe fighting, by way of Curtea and Pitesti, and it formed the left centre. On Dellmensing's flank, and

THE RUMANIAN'S RETREAT

stretching eastward, was that part which had advanced through Campu Lung, under the leadership of Lieutenant General von Morgen. The German right wing consisted of the Danube army of Mackensen, the portion of it which had crossed the river at Zimnita, having as its leader General Kosch, and that which had made the passage at Islaz, having its units strung along north of the river till they touched hands with Kuhne's troops on the right centre. The 9th army was predominantly German, with a large percentage of Austro-Hungarians. The Danube army was a composite force of Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks. In all probability the total strength of the two armies was well over 400,000 men.



Opposed to these great Germanic forces were the Rumanian 1st and 2nd armies, with part of the Rumanian 3rd army, and some Russian divisions, all under the chief command of General Averescu. The Rumanian army, though battered and war-worn, was full of fight. It was still intact, as a wireless message from Bukarest, dated November 30, made perfectly clear. This said that if it was true that the German chief command had obtained strategic advantages, it also was true that it had failed in its essential task, which was the destruction of the principal Rumanian forces. The Rumanians, it stated, had refused to

THE BATTLE JOINED

allow themselves to be encircled, and had retired from position to position, taking with them their heavy guns and field artillery. The enemy likewise, it noted, had failed to envelop the Rumanian force on the Danube, notwithstanding his immense superiority in artillery, and Bulgarian and Turkish assistance.

It was to this quarter of the Danube front, from which Bukarest was most closely threatened, that the Russians had rushed up large reinforcements—amounting, according to one dispatch, to three divisions, one being composed of Cossacks. If a statement of the enemy could be credited, Averescu's plan was to execute a turning movement with the combined Russo-Rumanian troops in the south against the Danube army, while he held the German 9th army in the centre and the north. And it certainly was the fact that a great effort—not unattended without a distinct, if in the end ineffectual, victory—was made by the Allies in the area immediately west and south of Bukarest. But the attempt, which undoubtedly was made with determination, to check and hold the 9th army in the centre and the north proved abortive, and this was fatal. The Allied operations then going on in the Dobruja with some gains had no more beneficial effect on the situation in Wallachia than the Russian offensive had in the mountains of Moldavia.

Battle was joined along the whole line on December 1, the bitter struggle reaching its greatest intensity on the 2nd and 3rd. On their left the Germans attacked violently from the direction of Campu Lung, and forced the Rumanians back into the valley of the river Dambovitza towards Meulosani on the first day, and pressing on compelled a further retirement on the second. In this sector the conflict proceeded among the wooded hills on both sides of the river, and the German progress was not rapid, yet the enemy continued to gain ground. But the scene of the fiercest fighting was farther south, in the region surrounding Pitesti—the German left centre.

In the Dambovitza valley there were no good roads, and movement was necessarily restricted, but from Pitesti there were both a railway and a fine highway making for Bukarest, and it was along these that the enemy drove with all his might. On December 1 desperate encounters took place near Golesti, four miles south of Pitesti, and on the 2nd Bukarest announced that the Rumanians had been obliged to retire slightly. The Berlin communiqué of the latter date, after stating that the conflict

THE RUMANIANS' RETREAT

on the Argesul was growing into a great battle, said that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians south-east of Pitesti had defeated and broken through the Rumanian army which had accepted battle there.

Farther south, in the region of the river Glavaciog and of the river Neajlov, both western tributaries of the Argesul, violent fighting occurred, which ended unfavourably for the Rumanians. On December 1 they met with a slight success, taking several hundred prisoners and 10 machine guns, as well as munitions. Next day the struggle had become more intense, the Rumanians fighting with the utmost resolution, but the onward sweep of the Germans could not be stopped. The battle in this sector, which lacked roads, was not, however, of decisive importance, and was subsidiary to that part of it going on from Pitesti, and also to that taking place at the same time still farther south on the Glavaciog and the Neajlov almost due west of Bukarest, and in the area south of the capital.

On the southern front—that forming the right wing of the Germans and the left of the Rumanians—the pressure of the enemy was most severe. Before December 1 the Danube army had occupied positions only from 19 to 20 miles from Bukarest, and the menace to that city appeared far stronger there than from the north and west, but the rapid advance of the 9th army lent a somewhat different yet still more threatening aspect to the situation. The Danube army, however, pushed on. On the first of the month it forced a passage far down across the Neajlov valley, and was approaching the lower course of the Argesul, which was only three or four miles from the ring of forts surrounding the capital. The villages of Comana and Gostinari were already in the enemy's possession, and the peril of Bukarest was pronounced. But at that moment there came relief, thanks to the Russians, though the relief was only of a temporary nature.

On December 2 a Turkish division was defeated at Draganesti, and the Germano-Bulgar forces in the region of Ghimpati and Mihalesti, the latter being but six miles from the forts, were driven some miles to the south. The enemy also was forced out of Comana and Gostinari, losing many prisoners and no fewer than 26 guns. Berlin had nothing to say about this defeat, but maintained that later Russian attacks had been repulsed, while a body of Rumanian troops, which had pushed forward south-west of Bukarest over the Argesul and the Neajlov,



ITALY'S MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGN. Much of the fighting between the Italians and the Austrians took place in difficult mountainous regions, and campaigning in the winter months was very arduous. Italian gunners are here seen firing the range for artillery.



ITALIANS CROSSING THE ISONZO DURING THE STORMING OF GORIZIA, AUGUST 9, 1916

THE END OF THE BATTLE

was outflanked and thrown across the Neajlov to the north-east, with many casualties. In the upshot the counter-offensive of the Russians and Rumanians did not achieve permanent success in this area, and meanwhile the Rumanians higher up on the Argesul were heavily defeated.

On December 3 the battle of the Argesul* passed into its last phase, and came to an unfortunate conclusion for Rumania and the Allies. It was the continued progress of the left centre of the Austro-Germans along the Pitesti-Bukarest railways and road, in spite of the most gallant efforts to arrest it, that practically settled the matter. The enemy's left wing under Morgen, in the northern area, took Targoviste, a former capital of Wallachia, and a commercial centre situated on the edge of the oil-fields. Dellmensingen, marching on triumphantly from Gaesti, again attacked the Rumanian 1st army, overthrew it, and, according to Berlin, drove its remnants beyond Titu, a town where the railways from Pitesti and Targoviste joined, en route for Bukarest, 30 miles distant.

While the battle of the Argesul was being fought, the Russians and Rumanians were attacking the enemy with great vigour in the Dobruja. On December 2 Bukarest reported violent assaults on the hostile positions in this area, and announced that the fighting had been carried up to and in some cases past the wire entanglements on this front. A message from Petrograd of the same date said that the Allies had gained possession of the western part of the Cerna Voda bridge, and in the region of Kalakeui-Satsiskeui, about 12 miles north of the Cerna Voda railway, had compelled a retirement of the foe from several heights. Next day the Russians continued their attacks on the Bulgarian left wing close to the Danube.

Counting the assaults made on the 2nd, they delivered seven attacks in all in this sector, each more fierce than that which had preceded it. The Russians made progress, but in the result were held up. The Sofia communiqué, which gave some information of this conflict, but not of a specially accurate kind, alleged that the Turkish troops captured an armoured car, from which they made prisoner two British officers and six men. It also asserted that of three armoured cars that were engaged two were destroyed and the third driven off.

Two squadrons of British armoured cars had cooperated with the Russians in the latter's campaign in eastern Armenia during

THE RUMANIANS RETREAT

the summer, and these were the cars which had been transferred to Rumania. After a month's journey from the east they made a sudden and dramatic appearance in the Dobruja. Under heavy fire and at great risk they forced a passage through the enemy's lines and succeeded in cutting off a considerable force. Contrary to the statement of Sofia, all the cars got back safely, but this was not accomplished without some loss in personnel, one officer and six men, who had left the cars in order to save them by a ruse, being taken prisoners by the Turks. It was reported from Petrograd that Commander Locker-Lampson, in command of the cars, had been wounded, but this happily proved incorrect, as almost immediately afterwards it was known that the commander had arrived in England fit and well. By December 4 the fighting in the Dobruja died down, the Allied forces retiring to their trenches. They had been unable to give any real help to the Rumanian army on the other side of the Danube.

After the battle of the Argesul the Rumanians retreated eastward, fighting continuously, and occasionally delivering counter-attacks. On December 4 and 5 there were rearguard actions on all the roads from Targoviste to Ploesti, and from Titu to Bukarest. The Germans, throwing forward their cavalry, marched on without halting. In the Targoviste-Ploesti region they were making straight for the valley of the Prahova and the rich oil-fields. Moreover, the Prahova valley was the line of retreat of that part of the Rumanian army which had withstood for a couple of months all the efforts of the Germans to emerge from the Predeal pass.

The march from Titu south-east had Bukarest itself as its objective, but the force employed in this operation was not the first body of enemy troops to reach the city. On December 5 Mackensen crossed the Argesul in the immediate neighbourhood of Bukarest. Early next morning Bulgarian troops of the Danube army cleared the places on the southern bank of the river of such Rumanians as had till then maintained themselves there, and then they advanced on the capital, to find that it had already been evacuated, a step which had been rendered imperative by the result of the battle of the Argesul, if indeed it had not been determined on and proceeded with some time before, as there was every reason to believe.

On the day before, Mackensen had sent a parlementaire with a letter into Bukarest demanding the surrender of the fortress.

BUKAREST LOST

When the parlementaire returned to Mackensen next morning the field marshal was informed that the commander-in-chief of the Rumanian army of the Danube refused to accede to his demand, inasmuch as Bukarest was not a fortress, but an open town.* No forts or troops existed for its defence, and there was neither governor nor commandant. In other words, Mackensen was free to occupy it. On the morning of the 6th, soon after the Germans had received this reply, they began their entrance into the city.

While the loss of Bukarest had in the circumstances no very extraordinary military importance, yet as the capital of the country, its passing into the hands of Germany could not but have serious political consequences. Furthermore, its capture, with the seizure of the greater part of Wallachia, must go a long way to encourage the Germans both in the field and at home, and make up to some extent for their own serious economic position. Along with the news of the fall of the Rumanian capital came that of the taking of Ploesti, in the heart of the oil-fields, and the cutting off, according to the German plan, of the Rumanians retiring from the Predeal pass—all heavy blows, though the tragic course of the campaign after the second battle of Targu Jiu had prepared the Allies for them to some extent, but they were none the less grievous. As Mr. Lloyd George said in the memorable speech of December 19, which marked his first appearance in the House of Commons as prime minister, the cause of the entente had suffered a real set-back.

General sympathy flowed out to the Rumanians who had fought so well and had made such sacrifices. Rumania herself was determined to carry on. King Ferdinand and his queen did not leave Bukarest till December 2, and then they motored to Jassy, whither M. Bratiano and the other members of the government had already gone. The first royal act at Jassy was the issue of a decree calling a meeting of the Rumanian parliament for the furtherance of the war.

CHAPTER 24

Battle of the Ancre

THE great British thrust in the middle of September, 1916, almost completed the operations on the Somme. The German front there was heavily dented. On the fortified line of his own choosing the German commander was severely defeated and thrown back. Not only were all his original zones of defence taken, but the new works he began to construct on July 2, 1916, after the loss of Mametz and Montauban, were penetrated between Flers and Le Sars. Only by a miracle of skill and heroism on the part of his thinned line of machine gunners and sharpshooters, between Gueudecourt, Lesbœufs and Morval, did he save one of his main masses of artillery from capture between September 16 and September 21, 1916. As it was, that artillery was severely hammered and damaged by the British siege ordnance, which was being reinforced by new large pieces.

By the middle of September all the summit ridge between Bapaume and Albert was won by Sir Douglas Haig, with the exception of the Thiepval peak and the Morval spur at either end. British forward observation officers around Mouquet Farm, Pozières windmill, High Wood and Ginchy overlooked the Germans' movements for miles beyond Bapaume, and brought their parks of howitzers crashing down upon the hostile forces they spied through their glasses. All that the northern British army had suffered for two years around the Lille ridges, where the enemy had observation over them to direct his heavy artillery, was at last balanced by the advantages gained by the southern British army. The ground won was the main watershed of the entire jumble of downland stretching from the Somme valley to the flats of Douai. Except for the footholds he was soon to lose about Thiepval and Lesbœufs, the enemy had on the Bapaume sector no outlook more than 500 feet above the sea. His highest positions were 100 feet lower, and beyond Bapaume the undulations gradually sank to 250 feet above sea-level.

On the other hand, there were some grave disadvantages attaching to the winning of the dominating summit ridge by the

THE FOUR PHASES

British. Direct cannon fire against the Germans became difficult. There was at first little room between Courcellette, Martinpuich and Flers and the great backing ridge, and the advancing infantry forces, with their machine gunners, trench mortar parties and tanks occupied the strips of favourable ground. Then came, just after the victory, a great downpour of rain that seriously retarded the forward movement of artillery, as the slopes were transformed into slides of mud. Even when the British army extended its conquest to the lower ground facing Bapaume the action of its cannon remained restricted. The enemy was sheltered, but his guns had a direct fire upon the reverse faces of the main watershed, while his howitzers pitched shells everywhere.

In short, between July and September, the geographical conditions of the British and German armies were reversed. By hard fighting the British eventually approached within two miles of Bapaume, but they could not capture the city because, among other things, their position along the Thiepval-Martinpuich-Ginchy ridge exposed them incessantly to a smashing direct fire from hostile guns in the northern hollows, similar to the fire they had poured on the enemy when he was on the watershed and they were in the southern hollows. Then, heavily aggravating this disadvantage of the attacking British forces as they descended from the great ridge, there was an immense mass of hostile artillery and infantry across the Ancre, which maintained a long and terrific flanking attack upon the western side of the thrusting Franco-British armies.

From the middle of September to the middle of December, 1916, there were four important phases of the mighty battle of the Ancre, which followed upon the great victories of the Somme. In the first place, Sir Douglas Haig countered the menace to his left flank by exerting a most violent counter-balancing pressure against the German Ancre position from Thiepval to Grandcourt. In the second place, the British commander cleared his right flank by combining with the French army in a decisive movement of envelopment against the German base at Combles. In the third place, after clearing his flanks, Sir Douglas Haig attempted a direct forthright thrust against Bapaume. Checked on this sector, he opened the fourth phase of the struggle by a very brilliant movement of surprise across the Ancre, in which Beaumont-Hamel, St. Pierre Divion and Beaucourt were stormed. This brought the British army up to the Serre plateau,

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

with larger elbow-room for operations against Bapaume, and effected an improvement of promising importance in the general operations of the western Allies.

The ferocious fighting in and under Thiepval was only preliminary to the long main struggle for the Thiepval spur. The Württembergers played an effective part in the battle by their stubborn defence of the village. For high above the village rose the dominating ridge, where a tangle of fortified positions, famous as the Schwaben redoubt, extended for a third of a mile from a point near the Crucifix where the Ulstermen fell after their thrust across the Ancre ravine. In the strength of at least a brigade the Germans held the Schwaben redoubt, the Crucifix trenches, and the cemetery farther south. Most of the large slab of land they held was some 30 feet or more above the slope on which Thiepval spread in vague brick-dust. But this advantage in altitude did not assist the Germans; it merely exposed them more severely to British gun fire. What did help them was the fact that their long systems of works connecting Thiepval spur with Grandcourt and Miraumont—the Schwaben redoubt, the Stuff redoubt, the Hessian trench and Regina redoubt—ran along the edge of the Ancre ravine. Whenever the British troops reached the ravine edge all the downward slope towards the Ancre was swept by machine gun and shell fire from the opposing face of the river valley between Beaumont-Hamel and Miraumont.

The conditions on this sector were thus a vivid illustration of the revolution produced by recent developments of heavy artillery. A great deal of the extraordinary defensive power of the Germans was derived from their low sheltered positions in and about the Ancre ravine. Much of the difficulty of the British attacking movement was due to the high exposed slopes on which their infantry operated. So long as the German ordnance around the Serre plateau and Miraumont could mass on a vast arc against a small number of British cannon sited on the higher Thiepval and Martinpuich spurs the British infantry worked forward against serious odds. The British army could bring to bear upon the enemy only the indirect fire of howitzers, while the Germans had the direct fire of 1,000 cannon and howitzers and thousands of machine guns.

There were other factors in the situation. For example, the British commander could throw a very heavy cross-fire of howitzer shell upon the German positions along the Ancre by

LINEs AND REDOUBTS

concentrating the artillery on the Gommecourt-Beaumont-Hamel front. Although the enemy could answer this bombardment by cross-firing from his Bapaume front against the flanking British lines along the Ancre from Thiepval to Grandcourt, he had also to meet the British and French guns on this front. The British salient from Thiepval to Combles produced a German salient from the Ancre to Gommecourt, and both salients were naturally subject to cross-fires. Superiority was a question of numbers of guns, and here the British army, by the calibre and quantity of its artillery and the speed of its munitioning, retained the advantage.

Owing to the nature of the ground about the Ancre the enemy for a considerable period launched successful counter-attacks against every important British advance. The Stuff redoubt, on the east of Thiepval, was captured on September 27 by a whirlwind bombardment of heavy shell, followed by a series of leaps by the British infantry. The next day the Schwaben redoubt was assailed in the same manner and carried. But the moment the position was lost the German guns in turn churned up the undulating lines of chalk to prevent the victors from consolidating the works. Then in the night the counter-attacks began, and continued until September 30 from the Schwaben lines on the Thiepval spur to the Hessian lines near Grandcourt. The struggle in places was of a savage persistency. Parts of the Hessian trench held by the Canadians changed hands four times by September 30, and though most of the Hessian work and all the Stuff work remained then in possession of the British forces, the Germans recovered half the Schwaben line, thus retaining their footing on the high part of the Thiepval ridge.

It was not open field fighting. Between Thiepval and Grandcourt the Germans had a chain of forts, oval redoubts and circular redoubts dug above the Ancre valley, and buttressed with stones and timber, with cement emplacements for machine guns and a skilful, intricate network of communications threading the sunken roads, gullies and fields. Most of this elaborate fortification had been constructed after the opening of the Franco-British offensive, and the mark of the German genius who had improvised the mysterious defences of Mouquet Farm was evident in the southern works of the Ancre. He was one of the greatest military engineers of his period—possibly greater than any engineer in the British, French or Russian armies.

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

Meanwhile, Germany continued to fight for time on the Somme at the cost of 750,000 casualties. She inflicted equal losses upon the British and French armies, the British having 500,000 men put out of action, and the French possibly half that number. As the two Allies divided the terrible cost of attrition, their sacrifices of manhood would not have weighed so heavily as the Germans' losses did upon them, but for certain circumstances. The British army was still hampered by the delay to organize and train the entire man-power which could have been put in the field to ensure victory. The French army was in such a condition that it had already to be economical of man-power, and its directors were beginning to look to Great Britain and Italy for additional infantry. From the point of view of the German high command, the prevention of a break-through in the Bapaume sector was the only matter of supreme concern. If the front were held through the winter the effect of the mass levy then under consideration would, it was expected, alter the tragic complexion of their affairs.

In these circumstances the leading British army corps commanders prepared, as rapidly as the weather would allow, another great blow against the Bapaume front, and on September 25, 1916, victory again crowned the efforts of the tired but enthusiastic army of the Somme. It was the anniversary of the battle of Loos, and the memory of that early and partial success of the first new national force was celebrated by such a display of the growing strength of the British empire as shook the entire fabric of German confidence.

The pivot of the attack was Bouleaux Wood, just above Combles. From the western edge of the wood all the British forces on the right flank were to swing forward against Morval, Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt, while the forces in the British centre also moved forward so as to close about Gueudecourt from the northern side. As at the same time the French army was pressing up from Frégicourt, on the western ridge above the Combles valley, Combles was immediately menaced by the Allies' movement. The British offensive extended far beyond Combles, and employed the instant threat to this enemy base as a means of weakening the German line near Bapaume. Thus there was subtlety as well as strength in the British attack.

The German commander could see what was impending, and with strategic insight he packed Bouleaux Wood with an

BOULEAUX WOOD

extraordinary number of machine gunners and trench mortar detachments. He thought to break the attack by disposing his forces in a sharp wedge at the point on which the assaulting line pivoted, so that his resisting wedge would shear through the charging waves of infantry. But by a tactical stroke more brilliant than the skilful disposition of the enemy, the menace at Bouleaux Wood was entirely avoided. In the morning of the great battle several British battalions which had been fighting heavily in the ridge campaign, and had suffered many losses, rallied with a fine spirit in working to secure the point on which success depended. They advanced against Bouleaux Wood, and in five minutes of fierce combat stormed two lines of trenches on the western edge of the long, narrow copse. The masses of Germans hidden among the shattered trees waited for the khaki line to swing out again for the decisive forest battle.

They waited in vain. A British pioneer battalion was furiously labouring in the captured new outer trenches, and transforming these into a wall that shut the picked German force out of the great battle. The Germans had either to advance into the open and attack, or remain idle while the fortune of the day was going against them for miles along the more northerly position. "You didn't play the game in Bouleaux Wood," complained a German officer. "You ought to have attacked us." Instead of so doing, the entrenched Britons worked along an embankment running at right angles from the line and, after a savage bomb fight in a warren of dug-outs, outflanked the hostile garrison of the wood and gained an easy way of approach to Combles.

Long before Combles fell, positions of greater importance had been conquered north of the town. At noon on September 25 the British artillery was firing in a desultory way about 20 shots a minute. Abruptly 1,000 shells hurtled upon the German lines and continued to fall at the fiercest speed with which the gunners could feed their pieces. This stupendous tempest of death lasted only 10 minutes; then it slackened as the British infantry poured out on the wilderness of chalk and assailed the lines that the guns had hammered. Again all the infernal fury of the artillery filled the sky and smote the earth. The second bound of attack was coming, and the German artillery across the Combles valley and along the Péronne road answered with a rain of shrapnel, through which the British troops worked forward.

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

All the line about Morval was soon a single continuous bank of smoke and flame. Yet in their third bound the attackers reached the hill village lying on the low western spur of the High Wood watershed. It was a knot of caverned ruins and redoubts, all framed by an unusual number of country roads worn deep into the chalk by the traffic of a thousand years. These sunken roads were the strongest positions held by the Germans. Their artificial lines of firing-trenches and support-trenches were carried with remarkable ease as their narrow, shallow openings gave little protection against heavy high-explosive shell. But the wider and steeper hollows of the sunken road, lined often with dug-outs and manned by many machine gun teams, survived the whirlwind artillery fire and checked the successive waves of the British assault.

But the spirit of the British was far stronger than the spirit of the Germans. They went steadily through the hostile barrage, running after their own curtain of shell fire. Checked at first south of Morval, they broke across the machine gun positions in the north, and then in a furious hand-to-hand fight in the ruins they gradually drove the Prussian garrison into a corner of cellars and loopholed works. In less than three hours all the village was taken, except for an island of machine gunners that gallantly held out until the supporting batteries of field guns behind them retired to escape capture.

At the hamlet of Lesbœufs, on the northern slope of the western spur of the watershed, the defenders displayed less stamina, in spite of the fact that they had been informed by a special army order that their position was of supreme importance. Around the broken farmsteads and white-walled manor house, fortified sunken roads rayed like the tentacles of an octopus. Here the attackers reached their roads ahead of their time-table. They found then only a remnant of dismayed grey figures crouching amid shattered machine guns and collapsed dug-outs. A few hundred feet away was Lesbœufs, with scattered fire coming from its wreckage. So the victors went forward; some bombing out the gunners and snipers, while others enveloped the village, when the garrison surrendered.

In the meantime an event of a memorable kind was occurring four miles along the line of battle. For the first time in two years of trench warfare on the western front the Allies were recovering a town from the enemy. Hamlets and villages had

DEEDS OF THE PATROLS

been won in various advances, but Combles was the first town in western Europe to be wrenched from the Germans.

The operation was made practicable by the British conquest of Morval, a mile and a half due north of Combles, and the French advance into Frégicourt, half a mile west of the town in the great hollow. By meeting each other half-way across the hollow the Allies could envelop Combles and capture the large amount of war material the enemy had stored there to supply his great forces lately deployed on the eastern heights. The enveloping movement began in the evening of September 25, when the British troops that had held the pivoting trench in Bouleaux Wood sent out patrols to explore the slope to the hollow. All the night the British artillery flung a heavy barrage across the neck of Combles valley to prevent the enemy from removing material from the town. This was effective. Four thousand 6 in. shells were afterwards captured, and the cellars were full of rifles and ammunition. The heights above blazed with the fires of war against the autumnal starlit sky; but in and over Combles there was a sombre quietness.

The British patrols, however, found some German patrols in the town, and in a fight killed 10 opponents and captured 30. Then cautiously the streets were explored by tired, grim men who had been fighting desperately all day. They feared a trap, and the silence and gloom made them only more careful. Their machine guns covered every movement made by the advanced scouts. At a quarter-past three in the morning of September 26 a patrol reached the railway station and saw a group of figures emerge from the shadows on the other side. "It's the blooming French!" "Ce sont les Anglais!" are said to have been the historic words at this glorious meeting of khaki and horizon-blue which set the crown upon the greatest victory of the western Allies since the Marne.

When the sun rose and the day wore on, the last definite zone of hostile works immediately in front of Bapaume was captured—from Gueudecourt to Combles. The Allied forces, which for three months had gradually advanced towards different objectives on either side the great downland valley, stood united above the valley at Lesbœufs.

Then there was afforded a striking instance of the observation value of the dominating ridge that had been won. In the afternoon three famous Prussian regiments were launched

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

on a great counter-attack in a supreme endeavour to recover the defences of the Gueudecourt line. They appeared on the rising slope near Le Transloy and were ranged by forward observing officers, who brought battery after battery upon them. Good fighting men these Prussians had proved themselves in clash after clash with the British; but the incessant wear of desperate battle had unstrung them and robbed them of their native courage. Although they were veterans of many fierce encounters, they broke like an untrained mob, and at the first shock bolted, flinging away their weapons to speed their flight to shelter. After the fight the field was littered with their rifles and equipment.

For about a fortnight, from September 28 to October 12, a cumulative series of small advances was made on the Bapaume front from Le Sars to Lesbœufs. Often positions of high tactical value were won with remarkably small losses. Such an action was the progress towards the ruined monastic edifice of Eaucourt l'Abbaye, where the British line was moved forward 800 yards, with total casualties amounting only to twice the number of prisoners taken. In other places, such as the low hills near the Péronne-Bapaume road, the quality of the defending forces was high, and the British movement, therefore, slow and difficult. This patchwork character of the enemy's arc of deployed troops, by turns ragged and firm, was no doubt related to the length of time the men had been fighting between the Somme and the Ancre. When at last fresh and rested troops could be found to hold the centre arc, the British offensive there came to a practical standstill.

On September 30 Destremont Farm, south-west of Le Sars village, was taken. On October 2 the vaulted ruins of Eaucourt l'Abbaye were occupied, then partly recovered by the Germans, and finally securely conquered by the British two days afterwards. October 8 was another red-letter day in the annals of the new army. It marked the capture of the cellars and shattered farmsteads of Le Sars, forming the strong point at the north-western end of the old long Grid system of works. It was the 22nd village captured by the British troops. The actions at Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Le Sars were one long connected battle against an unusually intense concentration of German forces, consisting of a Bavarian division and an Ersatz division arrayed upon a front of only 3,000 yards.

AN ABBEY SHELLED

On October 1 a general assault was delivered against Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye, with the object of taking the first line of German trenches. All the trenches were taken except a short stretch fronting the abbey; but on the east of the abbey a more fortunate body of the attackers broke through the entire German works, and, extending north of the ruins, held on there. Then the tanks came to the help of the checked British centre, and conquered the main trench and advanced into the abbey ruins. One monster that could not move farther operated as a stationary fort, the wounded skipper lying with two of his men in a shell-hole for two days. Meanwhile, the Germans remained in a gap on the west, and both attackers and attacked were ignorant of the general situation. A German detachment crossed the open ground to the north to reinforce the trenches there, and the men of it were shot or captured. The prisoners complained that their comrades on the northern side must have bolted without giving any warning, as the detachment had moved forward as a relief. Then a larger German force came to the new eastern British line to take over the position, and was also tragically surprised.

By this time the German commander, a mile away, grasped the situation. He launched a strong counter-attack through the western gap, and recovered the front trench. The British still commanded the communication from the abbey eastward and northward at nightfall. A day was spent in strengthening the captured positions and bombing the enemy farther back. Then on October 4 the abbey was furiously shelled and the entire place carried by British infantry, crawling through deep, grey, slime puddles and by water-pools that had once been shell-craters. Nearly a battalion of Bavarians made a fierce stand in the huge abbey vaults; they hid in dark corners, waiting with bomb and rifle, but they were cleared out. The British soldier was a supreme expert in the art of subterranean warfare; his experience in the matter was large and varied.

When the vanishing abbey was reconsolidated by the conquerors, who found the vaults a paradise after nights and days spent under continual rain, the operations against the neighbouring fortress of Le Sars were resumed in greater force. The reserve division there was known to be one of the most demoralized. British machine gunners had fought down German machine gunners in order to protect from German fire the groups of grey


BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

figures that openly left their trenches and walked in surrender to the attacking line.

The capture of Le Sars was not a struggle but a rounding up, complicated by knots of resistant machine gunners and a number of desperate sharpshooters, including officers of the old school. In the first rush a sunken road running through the middle of the wreckage was taken; in the second rush the troops were out on the farther side along the Bapaume road. A thousand prisoners, mainly of the reserve division, were taken. East of Le Sars the Bavarian troops fought hard and well, but after a fierce tussle their line was broken and half the ground covered towards a prehistoric tumulus known as the Butte of Warlencourt, where the great British offensive gradually came to a standstill. The tumulus stood about 50 feet above the level of the land, and the Germans had dug into this burial-place of some chieftain of immemorial days and transformed his monument into a bomb-proof shelter for a strong machine gun force, which enfiladed infantry movements from the Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye line.

The Butte was bombarded with monster shells, and the battered heap of earth which they left was carried by the British, recovered by the Germans, stormed again by the British, and again recovered. After a month's fighting, between October 9 and November 6, in which Anzac forces were engaged, most of the ground about the Butte remained in the enemy's possession. It seemed as though the Germans had fought their opponents to a standstill, and as if the Butte would be the monument of the close of the battle of the Ancre as the Hohenzollern redoubt was the monument of the close of the battle of Loos.

Thus a struggle of incessant violence continued by the ravine of the Ancre above Thiepval to the area of Miraucourt. Neither side made any decisive gain of ground, yet the forces of guns and men employed were large. The rain of shell was continuous, and at intervals it increased to a terrific tempest, behind which the infantry crawled from crater to crater through mud, water and dead. Among the more remarkable assaults was that of October 14, when the British resumed their hold on Stuff redoubt, capturing three times more prisoners than their casualties. Then on October 17 the Bavarians were pushed farther from Schwaben and Stuff works. They returned in great force on October 21, and in a hand-to-hand combat all along the Ancre front regained part of their old positions. But the British and Canadian troops



had also been preparing that day to attack, and they broke furiously upon the weakened Bavarians, and along a three mile line of battle recovered Stuff trench and the posts about Schwaben redoubt, together with the Regina trench. Some 1,200 prisoners were taken. Then, on November 11, the eastern portion of the Regina trench was also recovered.

This, however, only restored the line held by the British army at the close of September. For six weeks there had been an intense, grinding balance of forces along the Ancre, but as the line formed the exposed flank of the large British wedge driven

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

towards Bapaume, it may fairly be concluded that the violent and prolonged fighting on this sector was on the whole a defensive victory for the British army. No attempt was made by Sir Douglas Haig to break across the Ancre valley by a main offensive movement and get in the rear of the Serre and Beaumont-Hamel front. His continuous local pressure was intended to exhaust the forces which General von Marschall would, if left alone, have used in a grand assault on the British flank.

But while thus holding up and wearing down a strong hostile army on their left flank, the British forces found considerable difficulty in making progress on their front towards Bapaume. Here there occurred a forward sweep, similar to the sweep over the Thiepval down, but it was followed by a grinding equilibrium of opposing armies also similar to that obtaining in the Thiepval-Ancre sector. Yet at first, with the French breaking westward at Bouchavesnes and the British army striking out north-westward at Lesbœufs and northward at Le Sars and Warlencourt, there was the promise of a victory of liberation greater than that of the Marne. A German army order of September 21, for example, insisted on the importance of Lesbœufs as "the last protection of the artillery, which must in no circumstances be lost."

So extraordinary was the weakness of parts of the Bapaume front that the British commander could not get his patrols to work forward quickly enough to keep touch with the enemy. British cavalry forces had to ride out and reconnoitre the ground to find where the Germans were in strength, and where progress could be made merely with the shovel, instead of with bomb, bayonet and heavy shell fire. The cavalry patrols advanced to the neighbourhood of Pys, meeting with no resistance except from scattered snipers in shell-holes and a few resolute machine gunners sheltering in the sunken roads.

With certain exceptions the German forces south of Bapaume were generally in the same condition as the Prussians at Le Transloy, or, tending to that condition. Among the exceptions were some heroic knots of machine gunners, backed by regimental officers of the old, stern school, and some fresh forces newly blooded to British siege warfare, such as the German naval brigades hastily railed from the Nieuport area to fill the gaps in the line against the Canadians near Grandcourt and Le Sars. A Bavarian force, renowned for its conquest of Fort Vaux

CONSTANT RAIN

at Verdun, also came, refreshed after a rest, into the furnace of the Ancre, and distinguished itself by its energy of resistance. But taking as representatives of the two races the general body of German forces and the general body of British forces, which had alike sustained the effort of conflict from the middle to the end of September, the German was patently beaten.

On the battlefield in front of Bapaume, meanwhile, some German of genius seems to have emerged and saved the situation by a superb display of tactical skill. This unknown genius of war arranged his country's remaining pawns in such an effective new disposition that a decisive defeat was evaded. His problem was first to reduce the deadliness of the British artillery and limit the effect of the higher power of observation due to the Franco-British position on the ridge and superiority in the air. Next was the task of preserving the German infantry from the terrible wastage of persistent close conflict with British infantry. Both these ends were attained by one means—the German infantry forces were withdrawn to a slight extent and dispersed over a wide field.

This was the reason why, for a week or more after the rupture of the Grid line, British cavalry patrols continued to be able to scout an uncommon distance ahead of the infantry before coming upon any powerful trap or defence work. The governing idea was to leave an extraordinarily broad glaxis between the German fire-trenches and British assembly trenches. In some places there were 1,000 yards of exposed, torn, difficult slope left for the attacking infantry to cover before bomb and bayonet could be used. This greatly enlarged the defensive area of the German artillery. Then, to restrict the striking power of the British artillery, the fire-trench was manned mainly by machine gunners well spaced out. To protect the gunners from raids the ordinary infantry was largely dispersed in an organized system of shell-holes across the wide slopes. Whirlwind shrapnel bombardments, so finely developed by British gunners, did not seriously disorganize the new formation.

The master factor in the situation was the weather. The autumnal country song of the Somme downlands should have run to Shakespeare's refrain, "The rain it raineth every day." And it also rained nearly every night. Night frosts set in early. Chalk usually permits rain to drain off rapidly; in this respect it is superior to gravel, for gravel is often thin and patchy, while

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

chalk is solid and deep. General Castelnau opened the first great French offensive in Champagne in February, 1915, because the chalk there had absorbed the winter rains more quickly than the soil on other western sectors. But the bosses, ridges and rolls of chalk between the Somme and the Ancre in the late autumn of 1916 were of a peculiar nature. On Sussex downs, from the Stone Age, men have been wont to make dew-ponds in the chalk. On the downs and slopes south of Bapaume the labours of a million or more munition workers of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States resulted in the creation of a million or more shell-craters. And for months the rain kept the craters full of water. In the excavation works of the big shells there was sufficient depth of water for men to drown. They drowned singly, by scores, and then by hundreds, and finally by thousands. It was the result of the new method of shell-hole warfare that the enemy had developed.

It was not while charging that men were caught in these deadly pools. The end came usually in the darkness, through utter exhaustion, when the sharpshooters moved about laboriously in the gloom, their boots sticking in the deep slime as they were relieved or came out on duty. Many of them had to work all day in the water of the holes or the mud of the shallow linking trenches. It grew very bleak and chilly at night. What the Germans suffered can only be guessed from a consideration of the geographical position and the weather conditions. They were in low-lying land, channelled with valleys and pitted with innumerable cisterns in the form of shell-craters.

Immediately above them was a high, long watershed, down the northern sides of which the rains soaked and streamed towards the Bapaume area. All their old works on the dry uplands were places of winter comfort and protection for their enemies. Most people know what the British army endured in the winter of 1914, when it stood frost-bitten in the marshes around Ypres and Lille, while the German army sat in comparative ease on the eastern hills and ridges. It was long before the German public knew what its main army suffered in the watery craters, frozen puddles and solidifying slime about Bapaume in the winter of 1916. There are more ways than one of killing—disease is as enfeebling and deadly as poison gas or phosphorous shell. The brilliant German commander who invented shell-hole warfare did not foresee all the results of this manner of holding a front.

A STATIONARY BARRAGE

Clearly Sir Douglas Haig, at the beginning of November, 1916, was well content with the position of affairs on the Bapaume front, for Bapaume was his to take. He had but to give the order, and his reinforcements of fresh troops of superb quality, including the Naval Division that had proved itself on the Gallipoli peninsula, would have fulfilled his command. But for good reasons the Germans were allowed fully to suffer the penalties of their geographical situation.

The British commander and his chief of staff, General Kiggell, and the southern army commanders had been studying the advantage of another lowland area. This consisted of the wedge of the Ancre valley, with its rising slopes between Beaumont-Hamel and St. Pierre Divion. Its conquest would free the British left flank on the Thiepval spur from all annoyance around the Schwaben redoubt, and transform the lee of all the Thiepval upland into a shelter from the enemy's enfilading fire from the Serre plateau. Farther along the Ancre front near Grandcourt the British troops were on a low slope and exposed to close-range observation across the hollow. The strength of the enemy during the soaking, freezing winter was likely to be improved by operations down the Ancre. For months the heavy British artillery north of the brook had been pouring an intense enfilading fire upon the enemy batteries that faced Thiepval, Courcellette and Le Sars. There was therefore nothing unusual when the British guns from the Gommecourt to the St. Pierre Divion sectors began to exhibit a fierce activity. It seemed merely to indicate that the forces on the Thiepval-Le Sars line thought of working from the Schwaben, Stuff and Regina trenches.

In the darkness before dawn on Monday, November 13, 1916, the main mass of British artillery smote the German position from Gommecourt to St. Pierre Divion with a fierceness unparalleled. As the British munition factories increased their output, until the help of the United States could be dispensed with, so the terrific striking power of Sir Douglas Haig overreached the enemy's efforts to increase the German production of shells. About six o'clock, when a thick winter fog shrouded the marshes of the Ancre and kept back the glimmer of day-break, the guns divided for their special tasks.

One great mass lifted, and created with its shells an appalling stationary barrage on the enemy's communication trenches and reserve position. Another mass operated in front of the

BATTLE OF -THE ANCRE

waves of infantry attack and formed the "creeping" barrage that kept down enemy machine gunners and cleared the last obstacle of the advance. Both the near mobile wall of shells and the distant stationary hurricane of shrapnel and heavy high explosive were operated with tremendous violence. Surprise was the essence of the action; and the Germans were entirely surprised. At some of the most important points they were in their dug-outs, waiting for the "creeping" barrage to move, when the bombers rushed the trench. The German artillery was taken still more unawares than the infantry. Over half the front of advance it did not curtain the lost ground; for the enemy gunners were too busy getting their pieces removed beyond the risk of capture to drench the lost fortress with shell.

The success was the finest achievement in technique of the British army. In classic method it surpassed the victory of Thiepval and ranked with the French recovery of Douaumont. Practically perfect aerial reconnaissance and forward observation work resulted in swift and exact execution. The infantry movement was made on a front of about five miles from Gommecourt to St. Pierre Divion, with the marshes and stream of the Ancre dividing the front into two sectors. The action about Gommecourt was of a holding nature, designed to prevent the troops about the Serre plateau from moving to the assistance of the garrison of Beaumont-Hamel. The northern demonstration also had the foreseen effect of distracting some of the weight of the enemy's shell fire, and thus lightening the real task on either side of the Ancre.

The vanished village of Beaumont-Hamel, which was the main objective, was with reason considered to be the strongest fortress in the German line. The French had vainly assailed it when they held the Somme front. The British had failed there with heavy loss on July 1, and had again attacked in vain in the early autumn. The houses had disappeared; but beneath their ruins was an underground town. Two cemeteries, two quarries, and a chalk-pit were worked into the defensive system, together with a long Y-shaped ravine sheltered from gun fire. Single dug-outs were of such a size they could hold 400 men, and beyond the subterranean corridors were underground lanes running to Puisieux. Five lines of trenches with wire entanglements formed the mere approach to the village, which rested in a hollow on a slope rising to the Serre plateau.

GERMANS TRAPPED

Simultaneously with the fine holding advance against the northern side of the Serre plateau that sternly continued throughout the day, a representative force of Scotsmen went forward in bounds behind a creeping barrage. Two days of dry weather had partly dried the porous ground, so that the mud on the slopes was not a deadly impediment. Only at one spot was there a considerable remnant of the elaborate wire entanglement. •All the rest of it, not only before the fire-trench, but before each successive line beyond, had been swept away. The trenches and position were so battered that a week afterwards the British sappers were still searching for the mouths of buried dug-outs. Scarcely any resistance was at first encountered, except before the prongs of the Y ravine. The ravine was full of sheltered machine guns that no howitzer shell had reached, and the gunners maintained continuous streams of bullets at the entrance. Stalled at this point, the Scotsmen flowed round either edge of the great gash above the Ancre marshes.

Swerving on either flank of the flame-rimmed mouth of the ravine, the attackers worked in the darkness up either side of the gully, passing with scarcely any struggle over two obliterated trench systems. The difficulty of keeping touch in the gloomy fog was fully offset by the cover afforded by the darkness and by the surprise effect produced on the enemy infantry. But the third trench system, flanking the Y, was strongly held by men aroused by the battle, and with these the Scotsmen had a furious hand-to-hand conflict. They left the two sections of trench full of dead, and then with bayonet and bomb they turned behind the prongs of the Y, and tumbling down the steep banks assailed the garrison in the heart of their central fortress.

Bitter was the conflict, and while the body-to-body grapple was at its height the British commander skilfully made another frontal attack. The Germans then were trapped. When they swung forward to hold the mouth of the ravine, the attackers in the middle of the gully pressed their rear. When they swung backwards to strengthen their rear, the forces against their front advanced. Meanwhile, towards the end of the Y, other troops broke down upon the enemy. There was a period of murderous confusion, but not for long. They surrendered, and in the afternoon all the ravine was won.

While the combat in the ravine was increasing in fury, other Scottish troops swarmed over the dip of the hill into Beaumont-

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

Hamel, and more or less captured the village. There was really no village to capture, but the attackers took all the surface positions in sight, bombed some of the entrances to the hidden town below the ground, and stood guard over all suspected spots, ready to accept surrender or to fight their way into the caverns.

While the Scotsmen were winning their spurs in the village, Colonel B. C. Freyberg, commanding a battalion of the naval division, was advancing on the right of the Scottish force through the fortified river valley to the hamlet of Beaucourt. In the foggy darkness the naval men followed their barrage through a wire barrier eight feet deep, and assailed the riverside redoubt against which the Newfoundlanders had been broken on July 1. From the whaleback of the fortress massed machine guns swept the advancing battalions; but a few men, pressing against its steepest face, were able to go on. For 14 hours the naval division persisted doggedly, until Colonel Freyberg, wounded in four places, set about getting reinforcements. With a nucleus of 250 men of one battalion and other groups added he collected some 400 men of various battalions into a compact little force. With these, as day broke, he dashed forward, and after 10 minutes of savage bayonet work Beaumont-Hamel was captured. For his gallantry Colonel Freyberg was awarded the V.C.

While the garrison at Beaumont was surrendering, the garrison of the riverside redoubt was assailed by a tank. The Germans attempted no resistance, but thrust up from one of their shelters a long pole with a streamer of white cloth dangling from it. The terror of the tank was upon them, as they afterwards confessed. A threat coming from the toad-like instrument of which all Germans had heard fearful and wonderful rumours was quite sufficient to make them throw down their arms.

South of the Ancre the enemy had retained, since the charge of the Ulstermen, all the slope of downland between Thiepval Wood and the riverside. Close to the water a church had stood about a cluster of houses known as St. Pierre Divion. The buildings had vanished, but the Germans continued to dwell in the cellars. By the hillside, at the water's edge, they made openings that led into the great T-tunnel, running for 500 yards through the hill. At the end of the right working was a cross tunnel forming the top of the T, and extending for 200 yards on either side. Offshoot workings from the tunnel led into innumerable rooms and suites of rooms. Then, from the top of the

A GERMAN 'DIVISION'S FATE

tunnel, shafts ran to the surface of the lower slope of Thiepval down, below the famous Schwaben redoubt and above the riverside hamlet. Thus any frontal attack on St. Pierre Divion could be met by the garrison climbing through the holes in the tunnel to the hill trench and pouring a deadly fire upon the attackers below. A sheltered communication-trench known as the Hansa trench connected the troops in the hamlet with the general Ancre front opposite Beaumont-Hamel.

English and Irish troops were employed in an enveloping movement against the St. Pierre Divion position. A flanking force moved northward to the Ancre, near Beaucourt, from Schwaben redoubt and Stuff trench, while a frontal force moved in an eastward direction against the tunnelled face of the hill, where the waters of the Ancre swerved down towards the Somme. In the flanking movement from Thiepval the left of the attacking line swung over the hill-top, while the right formed the pivot of the sweep. The Germans had four entrenched systems, with various connecting works on a large boss of chalk, 160 feet above the river valley. They could retreat down their shafts to the T-tunnel, where there was a huge store of ammunition. But the enveloping attack caught them disastrously by surprise in the fog and darkness of early morning.

A great relief was taking place along the Ancre valley. The 38th division was being relieved by one of Ludendorff's new formations, the 223rd division. The duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was waiting at headquarters to review his regiment, which had been ordered to move out down the shrouded ravine. Neither division was properly armed. The 38th was laying aside its equipment and smartening up its appearance for a happy rest in billets. The 223rd was marching down the riverside, confident of the cover of fog and gloom and unprovided with machine guns, when the terrific barrages of British artillery roared down from the west and from the south, in an absolutely overwhelming cross-fire of shells of all sizes.

Then it was that the whirlwind method of intensive bombardment against positions measured almost to an inch by months of aerial study and hill observation gave wings of victory to the charging infantry. The relieving division in the valley reeled back, broken and demoralized, so that Colonel Freyberg, with a handful of unorganized scraps of naval men, was able to take Beaumont. The division that was being relieved could not get

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

back properly to fighting trim before the British troops on the Thiepval line fell upon them. Chiefly using hand grenades in large quantities upon the crowded and dismayed trenches, the attackers had a miraculously small amount of machine gun fire to encounter, as the confusion of relief routine and the fog made many gun-teams almost powerless. Hands went up by the thousand, and after the slope had been won down to the river, a still more extraordinary event occurred. The German artillery did not fire. The victors sat on the parapets smoking cigarettes and watching the conflict across the valley. Panic had struck the enemy staff. The German guns did not fire because they were being moved back in frenzied haste to avoid capture.

The frontal attack across the Ancre marsh and river against the low eastern sector of St. Pierre Divion did not prosper with such driving speed. Charge after charge was made against the village and the hillside; but the Germans' principal line of works remained unbroken. Thereupon, one of the life-savers of the British army crawled over the Ancre meadows and lifted up its steel snout. But at the critical moment something went wrong, apparently with the gear of the tank. The crew closed the firing ports and sat tight; and the Germans, as in the affair beyond Gueudecourt, gradually gathered courage to assail the fabulous machine of which they had hitherto heard much and seen nothing.

An oldish, energetic colonel was the leading spirit in this particular affray. He was bent upon distinguishing himself as the first man to capture in fight the last creation of the British. Under his orders the tank was assailed in every likely manner. Men crawled under it to see if it could be blown up; men crowded round it, just outside the range of their own bomb splinters, and tried to crack its armour with high explosive. Very patiently the skipper of the tank waited, watching everything through his periscope. Not until the Germans were close about him in large force did he give his crew the command they eagerly awaited. Then the dead monster came to life, and with every gun firing a stream of bullets destroyed the throng of attackers. The sheltered enemy machine gunners were next assailed by the lumbering terror, and early in the afternoon British infantry were in the village and with electric torches began to explore the tunnel. With the fall of this point the British were able to reach Beaucourt from the south and to support the naval division

A DEMONSTRATION IN FORCE

there. By this route half the 37th division was brought up to assist the naval division.

While the battle was in progress, the 19th and 18th divisions, south of the Ancre, demonstrated in force or attacked the German trenches on their front, moving forward in the direction of Grandcourt. They gained some ground. On November 15 the Germans brought up reinforcements and delivered a counter-attack, which was crushed without the loss of any of the points gained. In all, down to this date over 6,000 prisoners had been taken, the largest number yet captured in any battle on this part of the western front. On November 17 the British right made a small advance south of Grandcourt, and on the following day an attempt was made to clear the ground south of the Ancre and increase the British gain. The first German trench line in this direction was stormed, but the Germans offered a fierce resistance; the terrain was difficult and they were in great strength, so that, though the outskirts of Grandcourt were reached, the British troops could not maintain themselves there. The Germans, however, were left in a difficult position at Grandcourt, which could now be enfiladed and attacked from both flanks.

This fight was the closing episode of the great series of battles on the Somme, and it so greatly weakened the German positions there as to render a retreat inevitable. General Joffre had wished to continue the attack on the Germans throughout the winter, but the British armies, after continuous fighting for more than four months in cruel weather conditions, needed a respite. The casualties were heavy on both sides.

After the loss of Beaumont-Hamel and Beaucourt the German front was left running from south-west of Serre as far as Baillescourt, Grandcourt, Pys and the Butte de Warlencourt, all of which were inside the German front. As the winter prevented large scale operations, the British command decided to take this formidable position bit by bit in local attacks carried out by the British 5th army. On January 11, 1917, the ridge east of Beaumont-Hamel was stormed after a prolonged artillery preparation. The capture of this ridge exposed the communications of the German troops on the Ancre to the British artillery fire, and greatly increased their difficulties.

Ground was steadily gained. By February 4 the British front was carried forward north of the Ancre up to a point level with the centre of Grandcourt; and on February 6 the German line

BATTLE OF THE ANCRE

south of the river was abandoned as far as a point lying southwest of Miraumont. On February 10 important ground was gained towards Serre; on February 17 an attack on a more considerable scale was delivered on both sides of the Ancre; to the north of it the British pushed in to half a mile west of Miraumont; to the south of the river the fighting was fiercer, but there, too, a substantial gain of ground was made, and the British drew in towards Pys and Miraumont. On February 24, after several fruitless counter-attacks on the British front, the Germans evacuated their advanced line south of Miraumont and Pys; on February 25 British troops occupied Serre, Miraumont, Pys and Warlencourt, and the commanding ground near these villages.

Owing to the break-up towards the end of February of the intense frost which had followed an unusually wet autumn, the British were hampered in their advance over the shell-torn battlefield and in the consolidation of the positions they had carried. Close pursuit of the Germans was impossible; the whole country became a sea of deep mud, in which men sank up to their armpits. On February 27, nevertheless, the British occupied Gommecourt, and next day they took Puisieux. The whole German front on the Somme was imperilled by this continuous advance, and a retreat was rendered imperative if the Germans were to avoid disaster. Ires was stormed on March 10, and on March 13, after a terrific bombardment, Grévillers and Loupart Wood were seized by the British.

Then followed the German "retirement according to plan" to the Hindenburg line—a retirement which was carried out only because it could not be avoided, and which marked the first important surrender of territory by Germany in the west since the opening of the war of trenches in 1914. The salient which had been created by the Somme battles was "pinched out," and a total of 2,500 prisoners was taken in this series of closing combats on the Ancre.

CHAPTER 25

Russia on the Verge of Collapse

THE Russian successes in June, July, and August, 1916, had been so great as to induce the Central Powers completely to reorganize their armies on the eastern front. With the consent of the Emperor Francis Joseph, Hindenburg was appointed commander-in-chief of all the German and Austrian troops on the eastern front, with the exception of three armies on the extreme south of the line commanded by Bothmer, Kolvens and Kirchbach, which formed a separate high command under the Archduke Charles, heir presumptive to the Austrian emperor. Even he had a German chief of staff. The armies on this front were strengthened early in August by six divisions, two of them composed of Turkish troops which, since their release from Gallipoli, had been undergoing training in Germany.

It may be doubted whether the Russian commander expected to win a great decision on the Galician battlefield. He may have contemplated the recapture of Lemberg; but that must have been almost the limit of his possible substantial gains. But though he did not reach Lemberg, he succeeded in one of his principal strategic aims; for by the middle of August the Russian offensive had so crippled Austria-Hungary as to relieve the pressure on the Italians on the Trentino front and enable them successfully to resume their attack upon Gorizia. It also reduced, but in a much slighter manner, the pressure against the French armies, as some of Hindenburg's reinforcements came from Verdun and the Somme.

The end of Brusiloff's offensive was to a great extent brought about by the lack of adequate railways and rolling-stock. There was but a single line of railway between Odessa and Tarnopol to feed and munition General Brusiloff's southern armies. The Russians had no good railway system extending from the Black Sea to the Rumanian frontier and Bukovina. The frontier province of Bessarabia was only scantily provided with poor branch tracks from the Odessa-Tarnopol line. The Russian armies in Bukovina and eastern Galicia in the summer of 1916 were linked with their base by only one railway line. Only across

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

the old frontier in the northern Kovel sector was there good railway communication with Kiev and Moscow. The enemy, on the other hand, had a network of lines behind his front. All the resources of western Galicia and Poland, Hungary, Austria, eastern Germany, and Serbia could, if occasion required, be rapidly concentrated against the southern Russian armies. A vast gridiron of railways existed. Tracks ran over the Carpathians at five points; main lines came down Silesia towards Lemberg; and new lines, both light and heavy, had been constructed since 1915 to feed the battle-front.

The Russian railway system had been inadequate to the needs of southern Russia before the war. It was overstrained and greatly damaged by the unforeseen amount of traffic required in two years of terrific warfare. In the greatest agricultural empire in the world the urban population almost starved because trains were lacking to carry the crops from the countryside to the towns. In some places mining and iron-founding stopped owing to men being called up for the army, when the army bureaucracy was slow in adapting itself to the extraordinary needs of an extraordinary war, and what remained of the comparatively small industrial and transport powers of the empire was tragically insufficient to supply the wants of the fighting forces alone. Though the population in the cities suffered in a way that made it look as if Russia was blockaded, the trains, diverted almost entirely to military uses, did not suffice for the army.

At the beginning of his offensive General Brusiloff had evaded some of his insuperable railway difficulties by accumulating large stores of shell and slowly marching his men up in masses, while supplying them by means of tens of thousands of pony carts. So long as he continued to move directly forward towards Galicia his slow and primitive cart system and tramping bodies of reinforcements enabled him to maintain the force of his thrust. The Germans used the superior Galician and Hungarian railway systems to their utmost capacity, transporting new armies by the half-million, new guns by hundreds, and shells by millions; yet they continued to give ground on the Zlota Lipa and in the Carpathians. In the end the railway triumphed over the pony cart and the marching power of the Russian soldier.

When the plans of the Rumanian staff failed and the Rumanian forces withdrew from Transylvania, disaster followed, because there was no Russian railway running lengthwise through

A MIS·CALCULATION.

Bessarabia. The Russians were stuck. They formed a huge, primitive battering-ram, set in one direction, that could not be moved quickly enough towards a different target. They could not transfer their guns from the Galician front into western Rumania. They could not throw a force of any great striking power across the Danube towards the Bulgarian frontier. There was no railway by which ordnance and shells, troops and supplies, could be moved. It may be doubted whether, even had the tracks existed, Russia could have found locomotives and rolling-stock by which to transport a modern army, with its great train of siege guns, rapidly to the assistance of Rumania.

Undoubtedly Russia would have done better had she refused to cooperate with the former Rumanian commander-in-chief when he arranged to leave his Bulgarian frontier weak and invade Transylvania. But General Alexeieff, who had shown such remarkable skill during the great Russian retreat in 1915, appears to have miscalculated the situation in Germany. In the middle of August, for instance, the chief organ of the Russian staff published the extraordinary statement that the lack of free reserves in the Central empires would quickly lead to enormous changes on the eastern front. Yet at this time Germany possessed quite a large number of free reserves. She had a new army, perfectly prepared for action, provided by General von Falkenhayn, and waiting only the turn of events in order to make a new drive against the Russian lines, or against Rumania, or to change the situation on the Somme. Therefore, when Hindenburg succeeded Falkenhayn he inherited a reserved and hidden power of initiative which seems to have been much greater than any of the Allied staffs calculated.

Had General Alexeieff possessed the means of rapidly moving large forces, he would have probably out-maneuvred Hindenburg and held up first Mackensen and then Falkenhayn. But there was no main Russian railway line near the new critical theatre of war. Between the Dniester river and the Pruth river there were only two roundabout branch railways, both depending on the overworked Odessa line. In the days before the war Rumania had lived in fear of Russia, and had indeed relied upon Germany and Austria-Hungary to save her from attack. With this view she had constructed five direct lines, running through the mountain valleys into Hungarian territory, and there linking up with two main networks of their new railways. But on her

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Russian frontier she had connexion, near Jassy and Reni, merely with two poor Russian subsidiary lines, which became one track on the Dniester and thence ran as a single-line branch to the Odessa and Galician railway. This lack of Russian railways in Bessarabia used to please the Rumanians in the days of peace. They regarded it as their security against attack.

Under their late King Carol, Rumania had been organized to fight against Russia and receive abundant supplies through Hungary. When, therefore, she returned, under the stress of circumstances, to the natural alliance she had formed in the days of Plevna, her railways were as inadequate to the new conditions as was the southern Russian railway system. Had Russia been a great industrial state she might still have saved the situation by the same means as the French saved Verdun. She could have brought up thousands of motor-lorries and used them incessantly while constructing new light railways. In Bessarabia, however, there were few of the fine roads that the French had and fewer great river bridges. The Danube was so wide that even to maintain a light temporary bridge of pontoons taxed the resources of military engineers.

In August the extent to which Alexeieff had underestimated the resources of the Central Powers became apparent. On the Russian front the number of hostile troops was suddenly increased in a remarkable manner. Count Bothmer's army, for example, had consisted in June, 1916, of six Austrian divisions and one German division. When the Austrian forces were half shattered and withdrawn, they were replaced by seven fresh German divisions, a Turkish army corps, and two fresh Austrian army corps. This army thus became, after a great defeat, stronger than it had been when it was attacked. A similar strengthening process went on all along the front General Brusiloff was assailing. The organizing skill of the Germans transformed the scattered remnants of the Austro-Hungarian army into good fighting material. The men were for the first time fed in a regular and sufficient manner, and the consequence was that the spirit of the troops steadily rose with the improvement of their commissariat, transport, and general management.

After the retreat of Bothmer's army from the Strypa river line in the middle of August, the Russian armies under General Shcherbacheff and General Lechitsky advanced in an enveloping movement south-east of Lemberg. Bothmer took up a new

THE LACK OF RAILWAYS

position on the Zlota Lipa river line, with his right wing slanting backward to the town of Halicz on the Dniester. While falling back, Bothmer received as a reinforcement the new Turco-German army already mentioned, the aim of the general staff being apparently to make the new Bothmer army one of the principal thrusting forces of an intended drive towards Odessa if Rumania remained neutral. Bothmer's forces occupied a front of 50 miles, from Halicz on the Dniester to the village of Pluhov on the Lemberg and Tarnopol branch railway line.

A range of hills stretches from Pluhov to the sources of the Zlota Lipa river, and extends farther southward in a tract of high broken country to the Dniester. While Bothmer had been making his long stand farther eastward, multitudes of men, under the direction of German engineers, had been fortifying the high wooded hills and the steep grassy valley slopes. In some places extensive wire entanglements were erected, and on the edges of all the high oak forests were screened and deeply excavated machine gun positions, which the Russians could only discover by launching infantry against them. By his great stand in eastern Galicia, Bothmer had gained three months' grace for the engineering work in his rear. Consequently, when he retired he possessed, in addition to a new army, one of the strongest fortified lines on any front. What Russia needed at this juncture was heavy guns such as were now being used on the western front. British, American, and Japanese armament firms could have supplied them, but if they were to have the requisite mobility and a sufficient supply of shells it was essential that they should be connected with main-line railway bases by a network of light railways. As the Russians had neither the rails nor the rolling-stock necessary to improvise such a railway system they had to continue to use only guns of medium calibre which could be hauled by horse-power and supplied with shells by cartage.

They opened the fourth great Galician battle on August 29, 1916, by an attack on a height covering the town of Zawalow, on the lower course of the Zlota Lipa. At this point Bothmer's wing began to bend back towards Halicz, forming a salient exposed to assault on two sides. But the position had been selected with good judgement. A great height, known as Hill 413, covers the river town, and by means of its artillery swept part of the river valley. Yet, climbing up the slopes, with their artillery behind making lanes through the enemy entanglements,

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE


the Russian infantry won by man-power the great hill, which had seemed invincible to any force but the fire of heavy modern guns. Then, with this important key position in their hands, the soldiers of General Shcherbacheff delivered a general assault on the whole length of Bothmer's southern flank, from Zawalow to Mariampol on the Dniester. They broke across the Złota Lipa some 10 miles north of Zawalow, and also across the Dniester between Mariampol and Halicz.

Day and night the struggle raged from August 30 to September 3. When both rivers were forced, the advance lay through successive lines of hills and deep woods, where the German troops fought with splendid courage. In the forests between Zawalow and Halicz the Russians were three times repulsed by the Brandenburgers and Pomeranians. But in the afternoon of September 3 the right flank of the Germans was turned, and the Russian infantry pierced the German flank and let their cavalry through the gap. Germans, Turks, and Austrians were overwhelmed, 4,000 prisoners were taken, and Lemberg again seemed about to fall to General Brusiloff by the same manœuvre as that which he had employed in 1914.


Halicz, which he had captured in September, 1914, was once more enveloped on three sides. The Turks had been broken in the central portions of the Złota Lipa, south of the town of Brzezany, and the victors stormed westward and arrived within gunshot of the railway feeding Halicz. Thereupon, the line of battle moved from the Złota Lipa river line to the Gnila Lipa river line. At the same time as the army of General Shcherbacheff pressed back the enemy's south-eastern flank and assailed his front, the army of General Lechitsky, operating on the Dniester line, gained a series of successes. Lechitsky's men stormed the railway station of Halicz, and then swerving to the north-west, crossed the Dniester and cleared the corner between the main river and its tributary, the Gnila Lipa. Pursuing their stricken enemy, they also crossed the Gnila Lipa in the night of September 4. Some 20 miles of fortified hills had been stormed in a battle lasting 150 hours. The broken enemy wing had withdrawn in remnants northward and westward along the railways connecting with Lemberg. Of the three railway towns on the 50-mile front, Halicz in the south seemed about to fall, Brzezany in the centre appeared to be tottering, and Pluhov in the north was menaced by the wings of two Russian armies.



HOODWINKING THE ENEMY. Ingenious mat screen device used by the Italians in their campaign against the Austrians in 1916. Similar methods of camouflage were employed by the Allies on the Western front.



An Austrian searchlight station in the limestone region known as the Carso. The latter gave its name to four battles fought between the Austrians and the Italians.



Military bridge over a mountain torrent near a deserted Italian camp. This illustration vividly shows the wild scenery in the Carso district where in October, 1916, fierce fighting raged between the Italians and the Austrians.

POSITIONS IN THE CARSO CAMPAIGN

THE BATTLE OF HALICZ

Brusiloff's view of the position, as his dispatches showed, was optimistic, and he was confident that either the Germans would break in front of him, if they went to the assistance of the Austrians in Transylvania, or that the Austrians, left unassisted, would break in front of the Rumanians. But the arrival of General von Falkenhayn with a new German army on the Transylvanian front, and the appearance of General Mackensen with an unexpected force of artillery on the Danube front, entirely altered the complexion of affairs, and deprived the successes of the Russian armies of much of their value.

Yet General Brusiloff's campaign, which had opened victoriously, went on for a while in a promising manner. The second great battle of Halicz began on September 5, 1916. The Russians strengthened themselves on the Gnila Lipa, in their position behind the town, and the Germans retired from the southern bank of the Dniester river and entrenched on the higher ground across the river. They blew up the forts and the bridge, and removed their stores, while all the civilian population fled. The Germans were picked troops, including some of the 3rd division of the Guard, with the Fusiliers of the Guard and the Pomeranian Grenadiers. They held the river line of the Narayowka tributary, between the Zlota Lipa and the Gnila Lipa, and along their river line ran the branch railway linking Halicz with Lemberg. In their first drive the Russians stormed across the river, some 22 miles north of Halicz, and constructed an entrenchment on the western bank. On a semicircular front they fortified an area three miles long and two miles deep.

The Germans, with their artillery of larger calibre and longer range, drenched with barrier fire the portion of their river line taken by the Russians. The Russians had but 6 in. and 7.2 in. guns, but despite their enemy's superiority in material, and his concentration of the finest German troops, he was at last thrown back after terrible slaughter and the capture by the Russians of 3,000 prisoners. This happened on September 17, when the struggle in the salient had lasted for 10 days.

The German commander, General von Gerok, at once brought up reinforcements and, counter-attacking on both sides of the river, recovered some of the lost ground, and took in turn more than 3,000 prisoners. The wood by the village of Svistelniky was the main pivot of this almost decisive clash of Slav and Teuton. The wood changed hands six times a day on some

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

occasions. The German Guardsmen and the Finns and Russians swayed continually to and fro in bayonet and hand-bomb combats between the blasted trees and over the shell-ploughed ground. The Russian armoured cars fought like old-fashioned cavalry in advance of the infantry, steering under shell fire through the German wire entanglements and keeping down the German machine gunners until their own bayonets arrived. In the end, however, the longer-ranged German guns dominated the battlefield, and though the struggle went on until the first week in October, the opposing forces then remained in much the same positions as those which had been held in the first week of September. General von Gerok, by his great counter-attack of September 19, had saved Halicz from falling; and while General Brusiloff was preparing for a final blow from the river salient, the unfortunate turn of events on both frontiers of Rumania compelled him to cease his own thrusting operations.

About 20 miles north-east of the Svistelniky salient there was another prolonged and intense struggle around the northern course of the Zlota Lipa and the railway junction near Brzezany. There, in a diversified region of river marshes, upland forests, and high, bare rock, the left wing of General Shcherbacheff's army tried to crown the operations by breaking the German centre and striking through directly to Lemberg. South-east of the town rises a hill, Lysonia, which overlooks the valleys of the Zlota Lipa and its tributaries and dominates the railway lines and the river fords. On September 2 the Russian guns began to bombard the Lysonia mass of chalk and rock. Nearly all the German artillery on the height was silenced when the Russian infantry clambered up from the valley and, in a combat that went on all day and through the night, carried the Lysonia and the other hills south-east of the town.

When the Russians had carried all the heights and taken 2,700 prisoners, they were counter-attacked before dawn the next day (September 3) and driven from the Lysonia height by the Bavarians. Worn out though the Russians were, they managed to hold one of the main hills in the angle between the rivers, and after another month of terrific fighting they captured the important village of Potutory, at the point where two railways crossed below the bastion town. But Brzezany remained—like Halicz near by and like Bapaume far distant—an unbroken tide-mark of the Allies' slow progress in the summer offensive of 1916.

KALEDIN AT THE FRONT

Farther northward, in the neighbourhood of Vladimir Volinsk, in a land of low hills watered by tributaries of the Bug river, there was also heavy fighting. The army of General Kaledin, which had captured Lutsk and advanced across the Stokhod towards Kovel, opened another offensive around the village of Shelvov, amid the marshes and forests of the Luga river. This operation was subsidiary to the main southern actions around Lemberg, and was designed to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the critical front. The battle ceased for a while when the principal Russian thrust in the south failed in effect. It was resumed in the latter part of September, and continued until the middle of October. But all the October actions by General Brusiloff's armies were of a defensive nature. They were partly intended to relieve the pressure on the Rumanian army, and also to veil the withdrawal of the central Russian army under General Sakharoff, as it moved southward to save the upper corner of Rumania from the invaders.

On the northern Rumanian frontier another fine fighting force of Russians, under General Lechitsky, had originally prepared to break across the Carpathians into the Hungarian plain. By the middle of August the Tartar pass, leading to Maramaros Sziget, was stormed and held, and by the end of the same month the Pantyr pass, farther north, was also occupied. General Lechitsky's southern forces then began a great mountain battle on a front of 90 miles, from the Rumanian frontier to the central Hungarian border. Amid peaks rising to 7,000 feet, the Carpathian battle, that had been broken off in 1915, was resumed with greater fury. Each side had guns of heavier calibre, such as the 6 in. which was hauled behind the light artillery to points of vantage on the great Carpathian slopes. Primeval forests, through which only a few paths were kept, were the scene of machine gun ambushes and arduous enveloping movements.

Around every great mountain the fighting increased in intensity during the first part of September, when the Rumanian advance into Transylvania seemed to promise a great combined Russo-Rumanian success. General Lechitsky's forces were divided into small groups by the peaks and ridges of naked rock. No manœuvring by rapid concentration was possible. Only from the distant army headquarters could any large surprise effect be engineered by the slow process of sending up reinforcements, with a new supply train, wearily to tramp to the scene of action.

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

The enemy incessantly poured his men and supplies forward, and continually recovered from the defeats inflicted upon him. Nevertheless, the three Russian army corps detached for the mountain operations gradually worked forward. By the middle of September five of the great heights between Mount Bantyr and Dorna Vatra had been captured, each with a considerable remnant of its garrison. Then towards the end of the month, when nearly all the main crests had been occupied and the Russians were fighting their way down some of the eastern ravines towards the Hungarian villages, the general scheme of the offensive was completely checked by the failure of the Rumanian wing to maintain the ground it had won. After the retreat of the old allies of Russia the second battle of the Carpathians came to an end, with the Russians still holding on to the 90 miles of crest and forest they had vainly won.

Generally speaking, the great Russian offensive of the summer of 1916 achieved a partial measure of success, similar to that attained in the Franco-British offensive on the Somme. No decision was effected, but heavy losses were inflicted on the forces of the Central empires. By far the greater portion of these losses fell upon Austria-Hungary, who was most seriously crippled in man-power thereby. But the Austro-Hungarian munition works remained in full productivity, and, under German supervision, were again speeded up to replace by machinery the 1,000,000 men that had been lost. The Russian capacity for the production of shells, explosives and guns fell behind that of Austria-Hungary, owing to the fact that the rich industrial and mining districts of Russian Poland were occupied by the enemy. Russia had lost an army of trained mechanics as well as mines and factories and plant of many kinds. Thus, although in numbers she was more than able to meet Austria-Hungary and a part of the forces of Germany, she could not make her superior man-power tell in a decisive manner because of her much inferior industrial power and political organization.

Germany remained enormously strong, by reason both of her supremacy in steel-making and of her extraordinarily efficient bureaucratic and military systems. There was no serious element of weakness in the German organization. The official class was hard-working and, on the whole, remarkably honest, and the military class was of similar character. Very powerful caste interests, such as those of the large landed estates, were no doubt

THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM

able to bring influence to bear upon the government, which did not always make for general national strength; yet even in the case of the agrarian interest there was some attempt to reconcile the needs of the urban populace with the requirements of the producers of food. The farmers were favoured for much the same reason as the troops were fostered. They were recognized, long before the outbreak of hostilities, as an essential element in the strength of the nation for war.

The Russian system of government, on the other hand, was more of an Oriental than a European type. In its virtues and defects it somewhat resembled the mandarin system of China. The official class was underpaid and yet well-to-do, because it obtained money from persons who had occasion to use the machinery of the state for their private advantage. The corruption, however, was itself of a slack, easy-going nature, the money obtained being regarded rather as the perquisite of office than as blackmail or bribery.

During the war the loose, careless, and corrupt system of Russian officialism proved disastrously inadequate to the new conditions. The situation was far more complicated than it had been in the Manchurian campaign. In the war with Japan the strong and efficient German elements in Russia, drawn from the Baltic provinces and from the German settlements in Russian Poland, Volhynia, and the Chersonese, were loyal to the land of their birth and vehement against the Japanese.

In the Russian civil service the methodical, businesslike and hard-working German-Russian was generally the master of the ordinary, easy-going Russian official. He was more practical, more industrious, and more ambitious, though not more honest. In peace-time his loyal aim was to impart to the Russian system the stern and machine-like efficiency of the Prussian system, which he genuinely admired as the highest standard of good government. He despised the Russians because they would not be logical and strict and hard, but wavered between medieval communism, modern bureaucratism, and essays in democratic institutions. The German of this class often gave up the Russian idea because he could not understand it, and went over to the clean-cut Prussian idea of a modern caste organization because the latter at least satisfied his intellect. The most important men of this type did not commit any overt act of treason towards Russia. They did not wish to see her beaten to the ground and

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

reft of her Baltic and Black Sea provinces. In spite of their intellectual prejudices, they loved the Russian character, and the most they wanted was to see Russia receive such a lesson from Germany as would force her to adopt the Prussian system of social and political organization, and acquire all the military strength appertaining⁴ to a thoroughgoing autocracy. Their principal aim was to detach Russia from the democracies of western Europe, and bind her to the Central empires by means of a new Holy Alliance of a strongly anti-democratic nature.

At the head of the Russian ministry was M. Boris Stürmer, who had succeeded M. Goremykin in February, 1916. M. Stürmer, a man of Austrian stock, a court favourite, and a bureaucrat of the reactionary school, was suspected of engineering a movement for peace with the enemy. In his ministry were men attached to the Black Hundred organizations, who maintained subsidized newspapers which openly attacked Great Britain and France and worked for a friendly settlement with Germany. In any other country than Russia such patent signs of intrigue on the part of one principal section of the administration would have been good evidence of the underlying intention of the government. So in easy-going Russia, in a condition of disorganization, the wheels of the official machine often revolved in opposite directions, and merely checked each other without driving the country along any clear path.

The Duma of Moscow, in particular, became once more the grand focus of the fighting spirit of the Russian race, and showed at times a hostile attitude to M. Stürmer because he was suspected of using the machinery of his administration in the interests of a settlement with Germany and Austria-Hungary on an anti-democratic basis. Certainly there were dark forces then in Russia, working in all kinds of underhand ways, sometimes against the fluctuating mind of the tsar, and continually against the will of his nobles and his people. Great Britain was bitterly attacked by the engineer of this sinister conspiracy. As the British ambassador at Petrograd complained in a speech at Moscow, his country was at first assailed for doing too little in the war and then maligned for doing too much. One of the principal pro-German statesmen, Count de Witte, invented an epigram that ran like fire through all levels of Russian society. "Britain will fight Germany to the last drop of Russian blood" was the most telling of the slanders of the great bureaucrat.

DISORGANIZATION PREVAILS

Later in the autumn of 1916, when the military power of Great Britain had at last been fully displayed on the Somme, the leaders of the "dark forces" entirely changed their ground of attack, and alleged that Great Britain had become so great a military power as well as so mighty a sea power that Russia would be helpless in the future unless she made a fighting alliance with Germany.

After the check to General Brusiloff's armies in Galicia and Volhynia, and the defeat of Rumania on both frontiers, the pro-German conspiracy in the bureaucracy and in the entourage of the court began to increase in scope and power to a formidable extent. Even some ministers, who were loyal to their race and confident in its great destiny, seemed to lose hope for a while, and think that Russia would do well to make the best peace she could obtain. The disorganization of the country was deplorable. Many of the large Russian towns were running short of food, and the native production of munitions of war was still quite inadequate to the needs of the army, in spite of the help given by Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.

When honest and patriotic Russians began unwillingly to incline to this view, it can easily be imagined what were the opinions spread through thousands of channels by the army of disloyal and corrupt pro-Germans. The leading men in the Imperial Duma, the town Dumas, and the county councils did not, however, lose heart. The tsar seemed determined to pursue the war, and the Grand Duke Nicholas and other members of the royal family were far more resolute than the head of their house. It was the administrative machine which chiefly failed the empire in military virtue as well as in civil efficiency. As was afterwards seen in the Congress of the Nobility, practically all the descendants of the ancient fighting boyars, who under their tsars had broken the rule of the Mongols and checked the aggressions of Poles, Swedes, Turks, and Frenchmen, were eager to continue the war, and also resolved to find in the development of representative forms of government an improvement upon the bankrupt system of bureaucracy.

The result was that Russia for the time blended the main elements of her domestic crisis with the main elements in her military problems and conflicting foreign policies. In almost every representative group in the Imperial Duma, the municipal assemblies, and the rural councils the controlling majorities were

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

averse to a German peace and desirous of extending the system of representative government, as both a means of victory and an instrument of Russia's soundness and greatness in the period of reconstruction following the war. The leading statesmen of the bureaucratic school, on the other hand, were more alarmed by the signs of growth of free institutions in their country than by the disasters in Rumania and the unexpected strength shown by the enemy in Galicia. Like Chinese mandarins under Manchu rule, some of the Russian reactionists had made money by devious ways during the war and wanted to save their face and their fortune by making a fairly favourable peace with the enemy. Then, if possible, they designed to employ their own army in repressing the new spirit of liberty and abolishing the new representative institutions.

It was not known who was the governing mind of the "dark forces" in Russia. Possibly there was no governing mind planning and directing all the details of conspiracy. There may have been only separate agents, more or less in touch with Teutonic influences and acting mainly on the immediate circles around them. But one sinister figure swiftly emerged into the daylight of history. He was Rasputin—a type of man such as flourished in all lands of twilight culture before the daybreak of modern science. Such men were known in pagan Rome and in the heathen Orient.

Gregory Rasputin was a Siberian peasant who had obtained some religious instruction and developed into a sort of "holy man," wandering about the countryside and professing to cure disease by hypnotic suggestion to which he gave a religious colouring. Men of his type were not uncommon, and they found easy dupes among the Russian peasantry. But Rasputin managed to attract the attention of a lady of the Russian court by whom he was introduced into the imperial household with the idea that his gifts of healing might be exercised on the tsarevitch. The tsar's heir and only son had been an invalid from birth, and by some means or other Rasputin managed to convince the tsaritsa that he was exercising a beneficial effect upon her son's health, and, in consequence, he rose to high favour, and exerted an amazing and sinister influence on imperial politics. He did all in his power to pervert the liberal ideas of the Russian emperor and make him as personally autocratic as the kaiser. It is, however, probable that Rasputin's influence

THE DUMA MEETS

would not have done any vital damage to the tsarist government had it not been that some of the principal bureaucrats began to work, directly or indirectly, in the German interests.

In these circumstances, the first great open clash between the bureaucracy and the constitutional party occurred. A rumour went through the country that the premier, M. Stürmer, who was also acting as minister for foreign affairs, intended to negotiate a separate peace. Thereupon, more than three-fourths of the members of the Imperial Duma gathered together in a solid, patriotic *bloc*, with the declared intention of carrying on the war to a decisive victory. M. Stürmer made an ineffectual effort to alter the date fixed by imperial order for the meeting of the Duma, but his intrigues were defeated, and on November 14, 1916, the assembly met. Professor Miliukoff, the leader of the Progressive Party, then made an historic speech charging M. Stürmer with treacherous conduct. The ministers of state withdrew from the Duma in a pointed manner, and the debate continued in a hush of expectation. Two days after the premier had been denounced by Miliukoff an even more telling attack was made by M. Shulgin from the Conservative side of the House.

There can be little doubt that M. Stürmer meant to close the Duma by military power. But, to the deep relief of all the Russian people, the minister of war and the minister of marine broke away from him and from the reactionary group of irresponsible bureaucrats and openly sided with the progressive *bloc*. In ordinary circumstances, General Shuvaeff and Admiral Grigorevich would have been the two ministers most independent of Duma influences. Their estimates and demands could not be contested, and only by express permission from the tsar were they able to attend the National Assembly. The design was that these two ministers of imperial defence should not be in any way restrained by the popular representatives. But, by the irony of history, it was these two ministers who, for the sake of the army and the navy, abandoned the bureaucratic system and supported the Duma.

After their speeches, the two departmental chiefs descended into the body of the House, and General Shuvaeff walked towards M. Miliukoff and stretching out his hand said: "I thank you." Great was the significance of the three commonplace words spoken by the minister for war, for they directly led to the downfall of M. Stürmer. The Russian Zemstvo Union,

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

the Duma of Moscow, and many other public bodies telegraphed to the ministers of war and marine, thanking them for their action in the National Assembly, and the tsar, shaken for the moment by the defection of his military minister, also telegraphed to the Council of State reaffirming his decision to continue the war until Russia was victorious.

On November 24 one of the most enterprising of Russian ministers, M. Trepoff, was appointed premier after M. Stürmer's resignation. As former controller of ways and communications, M. Trepoff was well aware of the internal difficulties of the empire and of the good work done by all the representative bodies, and he therefore arranged to work with the Duma. On December 2 he made a speech declaring the intention of his government to work in accord with the legislative institutions, and he went on to reveal that an agreement had been made in 1915 with Great Britain, France, and Italy, establishing the right of Russia to Constantinople and the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. "It is time," he said, "that the Russian people should know for what they are shedding their blood, and, with the consent of our Allies, I to-day make from this tribune the announcement of the agreement." Wide and deep was the impression made by M. Trepoff's speech.

There was one member of M. Trepoff's government, however, who soon began to cause uneasiness among the advocates of constitutional reform. That one was M. Protopopoff who, as minister of the interior, wielded immense power. He controlled all the domestic government, including the censorship, the police, the political secret service, and the governorships. His ministry, having been the centre of reactionary repression, contained many officials deeply imbued with the idea of autocratic government. Some of his early acts aroused suspicions as to his real intentions, and these grew until there was a decided movement against him which he countered by the exercise of autocratic powers.

He practically silenced the Duma by censoring speeches that indicted the reactionary school, and incited and aggravated the misery of the people by causing greater disorder in the transport of food and other necessities of life. Towards the middle of December, 1916, the Russian nobility broke away from the bureaucracy, and displayed in their old and new assemblies a marked tendency towards Liberal representative government. In the Council of Empire—the upper house of the imperial

THE UNITED NOBILITY

legislative chambers—a direct movement was made against the maleficent influence of Rasputin. Then, at the annual Congress of the United Nobility of Russia, the oldest institution in the empire, a resolution was passed against Rasputin and the German party. The resolution of the United Nobility, which was passed on December 15, ran:

Into the heart of the administration of the Russian state there have penetrated obscure forces, irresponsible and outside the power of the law. These forces are subjecting to their influence the supreme power, and are even making attempts upon the government of the Church.

In the opinion of many of the best men in the Duma and the United Nobility, the empire was moving, under the control of the reactionary ministers, towards a hunger-born revolution that would leave Germany and Austria-Hungary victorious in their eastern theatre of war. Some of the Liberal politicians reckoned that nearly nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Petrograd were slowly famishing, and only living on because of their grim determination that the war must be seen through. But M. Protopopoff continued his sinister course as leader of the reactionaries. He prohibited, towards the end of December, the congress of the union of country and town representative bodies, thus openly acting against the declared policy of the new premier, M. Trepoff. It appeared that in the bureaucratic cabinet the minister of the interior had become supreme and the prime minister a mere figurehead.

With the close of this troubled year came the end of the sinister figure which had for so long cast a shadow over the imperial policy. On Friday night, December 29, 1916, two young officers drove up in a motor-car to the house in Petrograd occupied by Gregory Rasputin. They carried him off to the house of Prince Yusopov where he was shot and, a day later, his body was thrown into the Neva.

CHAPTER 26

Minor Naval Operations

THE British blockade in the North Sea was maintained by the 10th cruiser squadron, which was under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair until he became naval adviser to the ministry of blockade in February, 1916. The squadron consisted of 24 armed merchant cruisers, each commanded by a naval officer, with officers and seamen drawn from the Naval Reserve and the merchant service. Their task was to stop and examine every merchant ship which passed through the area they patrolled, and during 1915 over 3,000 vessels had been taken into port for examination.

To Admiral de Chair fell also a more difficult task—that of preventing minelayers and commerce raiders from creeping out of their ports and harassing Allied shipping. Towards the close of 1915 there was an impression in Germany that Great Britain was in complete command of the North Sea, and the German naval authorities, feeling that it was necessary to counteract that impression, decided to send out surface raiders in addition to submarines. One of the most famous of the raiders was the *Moewe*. The first indication that there was renewed activity by the Germans in the North Sea came to the British navy through the loss of the pre-war battleship *King Edward VII*. She was on her way from Scapa to Belfast to refit, but when she was north of Cape Wrath she struck a mine. Destroyers were hurried to the scene, and before she sank, four hours after she had struck the mine, the whole of the ship's company was safely transferred to the destroyers. It was at first thought that she had by chance struck a single mine laid by a submarine minelayer. Owing to heavy weather it was weeks before the area in which the battleship had sunk could be fully swept, but when this became possible it was found that the minefield was so extensive that it could not have been laid by a submarine, and that a surface vessel must have been at work.

The mines had actually been laid by the *Moewe*, commanded by Count zu Dohna-Schlodien. She was a small merchant ship

THE APPAM CROSSES THE ATLANTIC

of about 4,500 tons, and in addition to mines she carried an armament of 6 in. guns, carefully screened, and a couple of torpedo tubes. She had the Swedish colours painted on her sides, and owing to her disguise and the bad weather she was able to escape the British patrols. Her first achievement was to lay the mine-field which sank the King Edward VII, and she then proceeded into the Atlantic and began her exploits as a commerce raider.

As the fact that she had passed the British patrols was as yet unrealized, it is not surprising that her successes were considerable. On January 11 she took the s.s. Farringford with a cargo of copper ore; on January 13 she took four more ships each of over 3,000 tons, and as one of them carried a cargo of coal she was not sunk, but sent under a prize crew to a port on the coast of Brazil in order that the Moewe should later be able to re-coal. Other captures two days later were of less practical value, but more spectacular. One ship, the Appam, carried a large sum of bullion and two personages of importance, the governors of Sierra Leone and Nigeria. But Count zu Dohna-Schlodien could only find accommodation on the Moewe for the bullion. The prisoners he now held were numerous, and he packed them all, including the colonial governors, on board the Appam and directed her to proceed to America.

While the Appam was steadily making her way across the Atlantic Ocean the British fleet and the Admiralty still remained in ignorance of the Moewe's activities. The Atlantic, of course, had not been left unpatrolled by British ships. A small mixed squadron of warships and armed merchantmen was under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore; farther south there was a patrol of a couple of small vessels, and there were two light cruisers off the South American coast. The Moewe was now making for South America, where she could re-coal. When she was off the North African coast she encountered the Clan Mactavish, a liner homeward bound from Australia. The liner's skipper put up a gallant fight, but was eventually obliged to surrender. Before doing so he had been able to send a wireless message to Admiral Moore's squadron, but though it was received by one of the ships it was not, by some mischance, communicated to the commander; and once more the Moewe escaped.

On January 31, however, the Appam, with the crews and passengers of the ships which Count zu Dohna-Schlodien had taken, reached Norfolk, Virginia, and the Moewe's remarkable

MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

exploit was no longer a secret. But she was to have more successes. She now set off across the Atlantic to meet the captured collier which she had sent to Maraca. On his way Count zu Dohna-Schlodien took four more ships, but in each case rescued all the crews, and on February 8 he sent away another batch on a captured steamer in charge of a prize crew to be landed at a suitable port. The British navy was now fully aware of his activities, and cruisers and armed merchantmen were in pursuit of him. Knowing this, he abandoned the trade routes. All efforts to find him failed, and early in March the Moewe returned to German waters, the count having accomplished an exploit in the best traditions of naval warfare with spirit and humanity.

The raid of the Moewe having been so successful it was natural that the Germans should make fresh efforts to get ships through the British blockade. The next attempt was made by the Greif, a former merchantman, armed with 5.9 guns and two torpedo tubes. On February 23 the Admiralty learned that she had come through the Skagerrak, and every effort was made to intercept her. The ship which succeeded in doing so was the Alcantara, commanded by Captain T. E. Wardle, a British armed merchantman inferior in armament to the Greif. When Captain Wardle first sighted the raider he was in some doubt as to her identity, and after challenging her he attempted to send an armed guard on board.

But before he could do so his doubts were resolved, for on board the Greif flaps fell disclosing guns, and she opened fire on the Alcantara. There was a fight between the two ships, but the Alcantara was finally hit by a torpedo, and Captain Wardle had to give the order to abandon ship, his crew being rescued by a destroyer which had come up in response to signals. The enemy was still afloat when the Alcantara sank, but she went down a few minutes later with her flag flying. Over 200 of her crew of 300 men were rescued by the British.

After the failure of the Greif to break through the blockade the Germans made no further attempt with surface vessels. But all through these weeks the German preparations for the great submarine campaign, which they believed would close the war, were going forward silently. Types were being tested and arrangements made, though for the time being it suited the German government to profess that it would faithfully observe the rules laid down by President Wilson. The torpedoeing of

THE CASE OF THE SUSSEX

the steamer *Sussex*, on March 24, was an incident of much importance. She was a cross-Channel boat belonging to the London, Brighton and South Coast railway, and was crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe with 380 passengers on board. In mid-Channel she was torpedoed without warning by the German submarine UB29. As soon as her S.O.S. signal was received French and British warships proceeded to her help, and eventually 370 survivors were landed. Among the passengers were some Americans, and this fact once more brought about a crisis between Germany and the United States, which country immediately forwarded a note of protest.

The German government explained that from the crowded state of her decks the *Sussex* had been mistaken for a transport, and, alternatively, that she had been torpedoed under the impression that she belonged to one of the new *Arabis* class of minelayers. Neither of these excuses was considered adequate by the Washington authorities, and a third suggestion by the German foreign minister that the disaster was due to a mine was equally unacceptable: the proof of submarine agency was too clear. Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador to Washington, has since described these notes as the most unfortunate documents ever sent from Germany to the United States.

The president replied to this misrepresentation with a note requiring the German government "now, without delay, to proclaim and make effective renunciation of its present methods of submarine warfare against passengers and cargo ships," or the United States would break off diplomatic relations. On May 4 Germany simulated obedience, and informed the United States that an order had been issued to the effect that merchantmen "both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning, and without the saving of human lives, unless the ships attempt to escape or offer resistance." The German government at the same time called on the United States to force the British government to abandon the blockade, as otherwise Germany must reserve herself "complete liberty of action."

This outward surrender raised a furious storm in Germany, where it was not understood that the German submarines had not, in actual fact, in any degree altered their methods. If they were less successful than previously, it was because of the precautions taken by the British navy. They still sank ships without

MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

warning; indeed, on May 8, when the German government's order forbidding this ought to have been in the hands of the submarine commanders—supposing it to have been genuine—the unarmed British liner *Cymric* was sunk without warning. There were many subsequent instances of Germany's disregard of her pledges. A few typical examples may be mentioned. On June 9 the Norwegian steamer *Orkedal*, on a voyage from the Argentine with a cargo of maize for Denmark, was sunk without warning off the Dutch coast. She was proceeding from one neutral port to another neutral port, and her cargo would ultimately have reached Germany in the form of Danish butter and bacon. Again, the *Kelvinia*, with 27 American horse-tenders on board, was sunk without warning on September 2. The German submarines did, however, show a certain caution when they suspected that there were American citizens on board ships attacked. But, as Herr Bethmann-Hollweg told the Reichstag on January 31, 1917, he never opposed the ruthless use of submarines from principle, but only because "according to the unanimous judgement of the political and military authorities, the question was not ripe for decision."

At the end of May, 1916, a German submarine, U75, laid a number of mines off Scapa, and it was one of these which the British cruiser *Hampshire*, with Lord Kitchener on board, struck on June 5. Russia was at this time hard pressed, and was pleading for credits with which to give large orders for armaments. During May the British government decided to send an envoy to Petrograd to discuss the situation, and Lord Kitchener consented to go at the head of a military and financial mission. It was arranged that this mission should be carried from Scapa to Archangel by the *Hampshire*, a cruiser of 11,000 tons commanded by Captain H. J. Savill. When the *Hampshire* was due to sail a strong north-easterly gale was blowing and heavy seas were running; but about five o'clock on June 5 she put to sea accompanied by the destroyers *Victor* and *Unity*, taking a north-easterly course through the Orkneys.

About two hours later the weather became worse, and Savill ordered the destroyers to return to port. At 20 minutes to eight on June 25 the *Hampshire* struck one of the mines laid by U75. The force of the explosion almost split the ship in two, and she sank in a few minutes. She was then only a mile and a half from the shore, and 14 men managed to reach land, of whom

SEAHAM SHELLED

two died of exposure. Some of the survivors had seen Lord Kitchener on deck after the explosion, and said that Savill made desperate efforts to get him away in one of the boats.

For some weeks after the battle of Jutland the German fleet was undergoing repairs, but continual skirmishing proceeded between the British and German light craft in the North Sea. The German destroyers at Zeebrugge made frequent sorties, and eluded destruction at the hands of the British with extreme good fortune, or possibly through the scouting of the Zeppelins. On June 8, 1916, a few shots were fired, and the British flotillas drove the Germans back into port. On June 23 the Germans came out again and seized the British passenger steamer *Brussels*, Captain Charles Fryatt. She was taken into Zeebrugge, as there was no British warship to protect her—the line of traffic to Holland was left open to interruption by the enemy all through 1916—and Captain Fryatt, separated from those on board her, was tried by court-martial on July 27 and sentenced to death. He was shot on the charge that he had been guilty of acting as a "franc-tireur," because on March 28, 1915, he had tried to ram a German submarine which was attacking him. The German naval prize regulations, issued on the eve of war, recognized the perfect legality of his conduct, for from time immemorial it had been the universally admitted right of a merchantman to be armed and to defend herself.

On July 11 a German submarine shelled the small defenceless town of Seaham, on the Durham coast, killing a woman and hitting a colliery and a house. On July 23 there was a double skirmish with German small craft from Zeebrugge. According to the British report, three German destroyers were encountered by British light craft off the North Hinder (a shallow in the North Sea north-west of Zeebrugge), and retired at once. The Germans professed that they had reconnoitred to the Thames mouth, and that on their return they had met a number of British light cruisers and destroyers, on which they made some hits. The second affair was off the Schouwen Bank, which lies almost due north of Zeebrugge in the North Sea. Six German destroyers were encountered there, and after being repeatedly hit by the British fire went off at great speed. According to Dutch reports, when the German destroyers returned two of them were seen to have a heavy list. No damage was done to the British vessels, and the enemy's escape appears to have been due to the very

MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

high speed of his newer destroyers, which had been particularly designed for such "tip and run" raids as this.

On July 9 a German submarine, the *Deutschland*, claiming to be a merchantman, arrived at Baltimore from Bremen, having left Germany on June 14—according to her captain's statements—with a cargo and mails on board. The figures in her bill of health indicated a tonnage of 791 and a carrying capacity of 441 tons, though her captain stated her tonnage at 1,000. She had 290 tons of dye-stuffs on board. The American authorities permitted her to embark a cargo of nickel and rubber, of both of which Germany was in extreme need. The event was one of great importance. This was the first occasion on which a submarine was used for cargo-carrying work, and the success of the voyage for the time being gave Germany a means of communicating secretly with her diplomatic agents in the United States, obtaining information from her army of spies there, dispatching securities for sale in the American market, and importing small quantities of certain raw material of which the German munition factories were running short.

On August 18 it became known that the German fleet was preparing to put to sea, and the British Grand Fleet got ready to meet it. At 10.30 they were ordered to raise steam, and half an hour later came the order to concentrate in the "Long Forties." It was evident that several German submarines were out. Sir John Jellicoe was then unwell, and Admiral Burney was the commander-in-chief, but a British ship, the *Royalist*, had been sent to Dundee to take Sir John out to the Grand Fleet should the German fleet come out. Admiral Burney sent the *Iron Duke* on in advance of the Grand Fleet to take the commander-in-chief on board, but as the *Royalist* was approaching the appointed rendezvous one of the protecting destroyers was attacked by a submarine. Admiral Burney thereupon opened out his fleet and gave the danger spot which the attack on the *Royalist's* escort had disclosed a wide berth.

While Beatty was steaming to the eastward one of his screen of cruisers, the *Dublin*, sighted what appeared to be a sailing boat, but it was actually a submarine, and shortly afterwards another of the cruisers, the *Nottingham*, was torpedoed. This German success had been greatly helped by a thick haze. The general direction of the movement of the German fleet was towards Sunderland. Admiral Jellicoe, who had meantime been

THE GERMAN FLEET AT SEA

taken on board the Iron Duke, having received the news that the Nottingham had been torpedoed or mined, and suspecting that a trap had been laid for him by mines or submarines, turned north. Had he continued his southward course he might have come in contact with the German fleet and engaged it with some hours of daylight to spare.

The German fleet, however, was actually far in advance of the position in which, according to Admiral Jellicoe's information, it should have been. Admiral Scheer had received from the commander of a Zeppelin information that a force was approaching him with which he could easily deal. This was the Harwich force under Commodore Tyrwhitt. The Zeppelin message was due to faulty reconnaissance, but before it could be corrected Scheer had turned south again to meet the force which he expected easily to annihilate. If he had kept on he might have met the full strength of the British fleet, but after he had turned south-east he received information which showed him that whatever might be the truth of the messages stating that a comparatively weak British force was approaching him, the Grand Fleet was in such a position that it might engage him between his base and the British coast.

Admiral Scheer therefore turned towards his base, but Commodore Tyrwhitt was in contact with him. A force of destroyers might be dangerous in a night attack, and might have held the High Seas Fleet until the Grand Fleet came up with it. But Commodore Tyrwhitt received a message stating that Admiral Jellicoe was too far off to reach him while he could hold the enemy, and ordering him to return to his base. Admiral Scheer was therefore able to return to his base unmolested. He had left several submarines operating in British waters, and they torpedoed the cruiser Falmouth.

In August the Allies proposed that neutrals should prevent all belligerent submarines from using their waters and ports. They pointed out that these vessels could navigate submerged and thus elude control; and that it was impossible to identify them or even ascertain whether they were combatant or non-combatant, and in the former case to remove "the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such vessels." The neutral response to these proposals was unsatisfactory. The United States flatly refused to exclude combatant or non-combatant submarines from its ports or waters, and pushed its note to a point of unreasonableness

MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

by calling on the Allies to "distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality," ignoring the fact that a surface ship could not possibly tell from the appearance of a periscope whether it belonged to a German or a neutral submarine; and that, if she waited to investigate and did not fire, she would almost certainly be sunk.

The question was one of extreme gravity, as was seen on October 7, when submarine U53, for which the way had been left clear by the withdrawal of the British patrols, arrived at Newport. She was a war submarine fully armed; but she was allowed to communicate with the shore, where she obtained full details of Allied and neutral shipping in the vicinity. From such facts as were disclosed she seems to have been larger than the British E boats and the Deutschland, a vessel of about 1,000 tons. She put to sea after three hours' stay, without taking on board any supplies, and in the absence of the British patrols, the presence of which President Wilson had denounced in a previous note as "vexatious and uncourteous," she could do what she liked.

The U53 'cruised off the American coast, and torpedoed in succession the British ships Westpoint, Strathdene, Stephano and Kingston; the Dutch steamer Blomfnersdijk, and the Norwegian vessel Christian Knudsen. The exploits of U53 caused great indignation in the United States, but it soon died down. German submarines were very active at this time everywhere. On August 25 the armed yacht Zaida was sunk and the Duke of Albany torpedoed. On October 4 the Gallia, a French fleet auxiliary of 14,966 tons, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean with the loss of over 1,000 lives. On October 23 the Genista, a British minesweeper, was sunk by a German submarine off Ireland with a loss of about 80 officers and men.

Towards the end of October anxiety was caused to the British Admiralty by signs of German activity at Zeebrugge. The Germans had held the Channel ports for two years, but had used them solely as submarine bases, and now it was apparent that a raid on the Channel barrage by destroyers was in preparation. On October 23 Captain Andreas Michelsen, in command of the 3rd and 9th destroyer flotillas, left a German port for Zeebrugge, where he arrived without interference, and on October 26 he left Zeebrugge to raid the British barrage and shipping in the Channel. The German flotillas having reached

A RAID FROM ZEEBRUGGE

a point not far from Folkestone, and having sunk some British drifters, came upon the British Channel steamer *Queen*, which fortunately had no troops or passengers on board her, and placed bombs in her after her crew had made their escape. Encountering a detachment of British destroyers they sank the *Flirt*, an old boat of 380 tons, with most of her crew. They torpedoed the larger and modern destroyer *Nubian*, which had to be beached. She was later recovered, her shattered fore-part cut away, and her after-part attached to the remaining fore-part of another destroyer, the *Zulu*. The combined vessel was named the *Zubian*. They then disappeared.

The German destroyers had this great advantage that, as there were no other German ships at sea, they were able to fire at everything they met without challenging. The British, before they opened fire, had to ascertain whether the vessels which they suspected were British or neutral, and it was quite easy for the Germans to discharge their torpedoes at the challenge, thus dealing a deadly blow at once. The German force returned to Zeebrugge without loss.

Another raid from Zeebrugge was made on the night of November 23 by a flotilla of 13 destroyers commanded by Commander Goehle. When they got within sight of Ramsgate they were sighted by the 2nd Ramsgate division of drifters, which gave the alarm. Before the British destroyers could close in, the raiders had hurried back to Zeebrugge, firing a few shots at Margate as they passed. A third sally was made on November 25, when a British armed trawler on duty off the east coast was sunk and her crew captured. The Germans claim to have searched a number of neutral steamers for contraband, but to have released them as they carried nothing objectionable. For the third time they returned safely. Throughout the summer and autumn the German molestation of shipping on the route between England and Holland continued, and between the date of the capture of the *Brussels* and the end of November no fewer than 12 vessels were seized and taken into Zeebrugge for examination, some of them being condemned.

On November 29 Sir Henry Jackson, the first sea lord, was replaced by Sir John Jellicoe, who in turn was replaced in command of the Grand Fleet by Sir David Beatty. The command of the battle cruiser fleet was taken over by Sir William Pakenham. Sir Cecil Burney became second sea lord.

MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

On November 23 Count zu Dohna-Schlodien succeeded in getting the *Moewe* past the British patrols, followed about a week later by the *Wolf*, commanded by Captain Nerger. It was the count's intention to operate mainly on the North Atlantic trade route, but one of the first ships he stopped was the *Samland*, a Belgian relief ship with a safe conduct from the German ambassador in America. He was therefore bound to release her and on December 7 the Admiralty received from the *Samland* a report of the *Moewe*'s activities. Immediate steps were taken to hunt down the raider, and all transports in harbour were ordered to postpone their sailing while those at sea were ordered back to port. But the *Moewe* managed to elude her pursuers and to do serious damage to Allied shipping. Between December 6 and 12 she sank three British ships and captured two more. On one of these ships, the *Yarrowdale*, zu Dohna-Schlodien sent 400 prisoners to Germany, and she got safely through the British blockade. The names of 11 ships, with a total displacement exceeding 70,000 tons, sunk by the *Moewe* were published in January, 1917.

As for the method employed, the case of the *Dramatist* may be taken as typical. On December 18 she sighted a vessel approaching the same course, but closing in on her. Suddenly the stranger increased speed, and came up fast alongside. The bulwarks were dropped, revealing a couple of small guns, and the *Dramatist* had no course but to surrender. She was boarded, a detachment of Germans was placed in her, and most of her crew were transferred to the raider, where they were kept below when any vessel was sighted. The *Dramatist* was sunk by explosives the night of her capture. The island of Fernando de Noronha, in the central Atlantic, which belongs to Brazil, was for several days the raider's headquarters. Then she vanished, possibly to the base which the Germans were said to have secretly prepared and provisioned at the mouth of the Amazon, possibly the Indian Ocean, where mines were presently laid in the Gulf of Aden and off Ceylon. Off the Cape of Good Hope other mines were laid. On March 22, 1917, the German Admiralty reported that she had returned to Germany with 593 prisoners, and that in all she had taken 22 steamers and five sailing vessels of 123,000 tons gross register.

CHAPTER 27

Aerial Activity.

FOR all arms of the services the year 1916 was a testing time: to none more so than to the British and Allied air forces. The serious losses of the Royal Flying Corps on the western front from October, 1915, to March, 1916, seemed to show that all was not well in regard to the production of British machines. On the Mesopotamian front the machines of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, engaged in the attempt to relieve the garrison of Kut, were also inferior to the new aeroplanes with which the Germans supplied the Turks. The Allies generally seemed to be in a condition of inferiority in regard to aerial equipment. At the opening of the battle of Verdun the French army had been blinded by the onset of Fokkers, Aviatiks, Rolands, L.V.G.'s, and other German machines of an improved kind. On the Russian front the anti-aircraft defences were so weak that the Germans were able to employ Zeppelins on daylight reconnaissances to a distance of 100 miles into Russian territory.

The fact was that in the autumn and winter of 1915 the Germans had repeated in aerial material their achievement in shell production of the winter of 1914. By speeding up the production of improved types of machines and engines they won a very important material gain over the Allies. Only the Italians, with their rapid production of small-crew airships and double-engined bomb-dropping machines of the Caproni type, maintained something like an equality with the Austrians. Even so, the Italians appear to have had to borrow fast aeroplanes of the Nieuport class from France in order to maintain some hold upon the air. And this hold was not altogether strong; for the Austrian offensive in the Trentino, in 1916 opened with such unusual force as to take the Italian commander by surprise.

In France General Pétain and General Nivelle took instant steps to obtain machines with the speed and powerful climb of the victorious Fokker. It was essential to General Pétain's system of artillery defence that his army should enjoy a

AERIAL ACTIVITY

considerable command over the air. Under the stress of his fierce organizing genius a large number of enterprising private aeroplane-making firms of France found a free field of development. The result was that the tale of French air victories began rapidly to increase. By means of a new missile used against kite balloons and his fast new aeroplanes employed against the Fokker and Aviatik, General Pétain restored the eyes of his army, and though he did not succeed in blinding the German gunners, he seriously interrupted their powers of aerial observation. Thus characteristically France solved her problem of air power by her genius for improvisation, without any public scandal over her former official negligence.

In Great Britain Lord Kitchener also proceeded to repair the defects which had arisen in the Royal Aircraft Factory and the methods of the military authorities who relied upon this factory. General Branker, an artillery officer with flying experience, was made director of air organization, assisted by two capable officers from the front—General Salmond and Colonel Charlton. The best available material from private and foreign sources was ordered in considerable quantities, and the personnel of the Royal Flying Corps was quickly and largely expanded. A private British machine, the de Havilland, began to be used on active service in large numbers before the improved official F.E. machine arrived. The new Martinsyde, the fighting Maurice and the new Sopwith—the last of which had been waiting for official recognition since June, 1915—were placed at the service of the Royal Flying Corps pilots.

Refusing to waste time on the problematic 200 h.p. engine of Royal Aircraft Factory design, the Rolls-Royce company produced a splendid 250 h.p. aero-motor of an original kind. It was fitted into a government machine, and entrusted to a pilot who had never flown to France. Being ordered to fly to the front, he lost his way, strayed over Lille, was attacked by German guns, and, coming down, presented the enemy with a valuable sample of the new aero-motor on which Great Britain was largely relying to regain her dominion of the air. But this misfortune, which occurred at the end of May, 1916, happened too late to enable the Germans to profit by it.

The old Royal Aircraft Factory production, the B.E.2c machine, designed by one of the few fine private designers temporarily attached to the government works, had become

TRENCHARD'S NEW METHODS

antiquated owing to the progress made by German, British and French manufacturers. British air losses had been partly due to the B.E.2c being sent out alone on reconnoitring or bombing work, and becoming "Fokker fodder" when the German falcons swooped from their towering pitch. Hundreds of British machines of an obsolescent or inefficient type had been manufactured to the order of the government by firms new to the art of aeroplane construction. Some of these firms had been delayed in production by late alterations in the drawings they had received from the Royal Aircraft Factory authorities, and by downright errors in official drawings.

But serious as were the defects in War Office organization for providing the British army with the means of holding the command of the air, General Trenchard, the active chief of the Royal Flying Corps, devised a brilliant method of operation as soon as he obtained from private British firms a few battle-planes capable of assisting the Bristol "Bullet" pilots and Vickers "gun-bus" pilots, and manœuvring against the new Fokker. The old, slow machines were sent out in flocks of from six to 12. High above the weak flock of workers circled two or three of the battle-planes, ready to engage any Fokker that swooped into the field. By the first week in May, 1916, duels in the air began to grow infrequent. Combats took place between squadrons of fast fighting machines, whirling against each other with their machine guns flashing, while far below them there was often a flight of almost defenceless working planes waiting the issue of the battle.

As the summer wore on, and the number of British fighting planes increased, the finest Fokker pilots went down one after the other, and the perils of the British scouts, spotters and bombers were diminished: For a time Great Britain and France held a practical dominion of the heavens. Meanwhile, some remarkable battle practice went on behind the British front in the late spring and early summer of the year. From aerial photographs a good reproduction of the German system of fortifications was constructed on the practice field, and over the lacework of trenches the British infantry manœuvred in attack, in conjunction with low-flying, directing airmen known as "contact" patrols. Signor Marconi had recently invented an apparatus whereby aeroplanes could receive as well as transmit wireless messages to supplement the flares, mirror signals and other

AERIAL ACTIVITY

ordinary devices, such as General Nivelle had developed in his efforts to return to Douaumont Fort at Verdun.

Organization in the field resulted in a thorough rearrangement of the Royal Flying Corps under General Trenchard. Six distinct orders of machines were developed. Above all were the fighting planes, divided into two classes, one of which operated over the British lines in a defensive manner while the other swept out over the German lines to attack Fokker pilots, and at the same time protect British working machines. The working machines were usually arranged in scouting groups, artillery observation groups, aerial photography groups, bombing raid groups and infantry contact groups. All this subdivision of labour tended to produce specialized kinds of aviators, so that an expert in photographing the German trenches could not always be regarded as deadly marksmen for bomb-dropping expeditions.

By the nature of things the fighting pilots in the warplane order came most brightly into the limelight of fame. The tale of their exploits is a long record of singular daring, of daily hazard cheerfully faced and conquered. There is space for but a few examples of their doings; but it may suffice to record the names of some of the better known fighters, whose adventures were typical examples of the daily work of the air service. Chief among them was Captain Albert Ball, who ranked in the summer of 1916 above all French and German fighting pilots in regard to his record of kills. Only 19 years of age, he had taken part in 100 air combats, and had brought down 30 enemy aeroplanes. He won the D.S.O. for attacking six German machines in one flight, forcing two down and driving off the others. Then in an attack on the enemy's kite-balloons he used all his bombs and failed to hit, returned for a fresh supply, flew back, and brought a balloon down in flames.

Almost equal in renown was Second Lieutenant George R. McCubbin. While still an apprentice as a fighting airman he went out with Lieutenant Savage and saw his comrade brought down by the ace of the Fokker fighters, Lieutenant Immelmann. A few days afterwards, on June 18, 1916, Lieutenant McCubbin, with his observer handling a machine gun, engaged Immelmann and sent his machine crashing to the ground, Immelmann being killed. Captain R. N. Adams, who attacked six enemy machines over the enemy's lines, set one on

THE HALBERSTADT WORKS

fire and drove off the others, was another noted pilot. Lieutenant Dirk Cloete first acted as observer to Captain Adams, and shooting an enemy machine forced it down.* Then, promoted pilot, he saw his former chief, Captain Adams, engaged with six enemy machines, and diving into the affray sent one enemy crashing to the earth, and helped to fight away the other five another of which was brought down by Captain Adams. •

Captain W. A. Summers as pilot, and Lieutenant W. O. T. Tudor-Hart as observer, appear almost to have topped the list in the fight against odds. With their single machine quite unsupported, they attacked over the German lines a formation of 10 enemy aeroplanes. Under constant heavy fire from as many as four hostile machines at one time, they broke up the formation in a fight ranging many miles over the enemy's territory, and though their own machine was badly damaged they continued their extraordinary struggle until all their ammunition was expended. Captain A. W. Vaucour also attacked 10 hostile planes and broke their formation, and on several other occasions was responsible for the death of German airmen.

All that the fighting pilots of the British empire and the French republic needed was material equal to the production of the enemy. The German seemed at the time to rely almost entirely upon the thorough organizing talent of his race. He laid his plans far in advance, and laboriously increased the horse-power of his machines by known and sound methods. After creating the 200 h.p. Fokker he went on to develop two new types, afterwards famous as the Albatros-Spad, and the Halberstadt. The Halberstadt works were of British origin, having been founded before the war by Sir George White, of the Bristol works, at a time when private British aeroplane makers received little encouragement from the War Office and the Royal Aircraft Factory, and had to extend into Germany to keep their men and plant going. This was the reason why the old Bristol "Bullet," which did good work in the early campaigns, became the foundation of some of the best machines made by the Halberstadt works.

In their latest machine the Halberstadt makers took the Morane as a model, and used a Benz engine of great power. The new Spad, made by the Albatros firm, was another imitation of a French model. The Germans, as usual, employed a very powerful engine, and produced an aeroplane with remarkable climbing power and a speed of 120 miles an hour.

AERIAL ACTIVITY

In the autumn of 1915, when the Fokker crisis arose, the British pilots often operated scarcely higher than 8,000 feet, mainly in obsolescent machines of the Royal Aircraft Factory design. In their new Fokkers, with engines of 200 h.p., Immelman, Boelcke, Wintgen and other German pilots used to wait at an altitude of 12,000 feet and dive down on the B.E. machines. From the end of March to the middle of October, 1916, the new British machines enabled the officers of the Royal Flying Corps to meet the enemy on terms of equality in equipment. German gunners and German staffs were reduced to a condition of purblindness. On some sectors their range of vision extended only a few hundred yards beyond their fire-trenches, while the aerial eyes of the British and French armies ranged hundreds of miles over the scenes of German activities. By two of the new Sopwith aeroplanes the Krupp works at Essen were at last bombarded. The feat was accomplished by two French airmen, Captain de Beauchamp and Lieutenant Daucourt, on September 22, 1916. The Sopwith enabled them to make a flight of 500 miles with a cargo of bombs. On November 17 Captain de Beauchamp took another cargo of bombs in his Sopwith biplane, passed over Friedrichshafen, turned northward to Munich, and bombed the Bavarian capital, then veered southwards and landed in Italy.

When the Fokker was at last beaten, the Royal Aircraft Factory, with Colonel Mervyn O'Gorman as superintendent and Sir David Henderson as military chief, does not seem to have prepared alertly against the arrival of enemy machines of greater capacity. In the first week of October, 1916, the new Halberstadt, with a 240 h.p. engine, and the German Spad, of similar power, soared above the British fighting planes. Possessing terrific speed and extraordinary power of climb, the Halberstadt and the Spad enabled the new school of German pilots to excel the records of operating altitude of Immelman, Boelcke and Wintgen. At the amazing working height of 17,000 to 20,000 feet the German officers were able to swoop upon all British battle-planes that could not cruise at more than 12,000 or 15,000 feet.

Casualty lists began to show that the Royal Flying Corps was again losing heavily. Sir Douglas Haig, in his communiqués, admitted day after day serious losses in machines; and war correspondents at the front, some of whom had never seen for months a German aeroplane over the British lines, observed that the enemy was becoming more venturesome. Then, in a dispatch

THE FARNBOROUGH FACTORY

written in the last week of December, 1916, the British commander-in-chief pointedly remarked: "I desire to point out that the maintenance of the mastery of the air, which is essential, entails a constant and most liberal supply of the most up-to-date machines, without which the most skilful pilots cannot succeed."

Long before these words of warning from the highest authority were published, efforts were made to reform British aeroplane construction. At the beginning of August, 1916, an investigating committee—composed of a business man, Sir Richard Burbidge, a great inventor, Sir Charles A. Parsons, and Sir H. F. W. Donaldson, of Woolwich Arsenal—reported on the condition of affairs at the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough. It was found that the 3,000 hands in the factory had produced since the war began only 50 ordinary machines and small quantities of spare parts to very numerous orders. Bad organization was shown in sending out to private firms engaged in making government machines drawings of an incorrect kind. In addition to these gross mistakes, firms engaged in making machines to the designs of the Royal Aircraft Factory had often to submit to numerous alterations in the design. The combination of absolute errors and continual changes in drawings issued to the trade was regarded by the committee as the reason for "a considerable amount of criticism passed on the Royal Aircraft administration."

The committee proceeded to remark that the factory efficiency in experimental work and in finished productions could be increased, on existing wages cost, by reorganizing the works and managing them on a businesslike and engineering basis. Several departments of a non-productive nature were found to be full of men who were not doing their proper amount of work, and, in spite of the ample financial resources of the factory, production had been delayed owing to want of a large stock of material. Labour-saving devices were not employed in a scientific way, although the Royal Aircraft Factory was connected with the National Physical Laboratory, and presumed to be royally equipped with all that scientific genius could devise. The success of the Fokker pilots was attributed to "some lack of foresight—whether on the part of the Royal Aircraft Factory or the War Office is not clear—as to the size of the engines required to meet war conditions."

A thorough reorganization of the Royal Aircraft Factory was carried out, and in September, 1916, a new superintendent was

AERIAL ACTIVITY

appointed in the person of the chief engineer of the Midland railway, Mr. Henry Fowler. Closer and more friendly relations were instituted between the Royal Aircraft Factory and the many inventive minds in private British works.

About the time when the Burbidge committee began investigating the organization of the Royal Aircraft Factory, another committee was appointed, with Mr. Justice Bailhache as chairman, to report on the administration of the Royal Flying Corps. The final report of this committee was issued on December 20, 1916, a few days before Sir Douglas Haig stated in his dispatch that better machines were still needed. The Bailhache committee found that the military authorities had on occasions greatly delayed the ordering of available high-powered engines. For example, there was 12 months' delay in supplying the Royal Flying Corps with machines fitted with the 110 h.p. le Rhône. On the other hand, a high-powered engine, designed by the Royal Aircraft Factory, and offered for construction to the Rolls-Royce company and refused by them, was ordered in large quantities by drawings from other private firms before the engine had been proved. The Rolls-Royce company went on with their own 250 h.p. aero-motor, which proved successful. But the committee found that Sir David Henderson relied on the unproved R.A.F. engine because it was of R.A.F. design.

The committee considered that the feeling of the private manufacturers that their designs did not receive fair treatment and their finished products fair tests, in comparison with those of the R.A.F., could not be removed under the existing conditions. The lack of judgement of some of the subordinate officials had been deplorable, and private manufacturers who came in contact with them had, so Sir David Henderson himself admitted, genuine cause of complaint. But the most important sentence of the committee was that "the later productions of the Royal Aircraft Factory are not, on the whole, so good as some of the machines now produced by private firms."

In regard to the fighting organization of the Royal Flying Corps the committee found some serious deficiencies. The war had been proceeding for over a year before an aerodrome was fitted up for aerial musketry. No school for air fighting was constructed until September 1915, and the small one then set up at Hythe was insufficient. There were many cases of pilots having to fight in the air without a sufficient knowledge of their

THE AIR MINISTRY

weapons. Moreover, the frequency with which machine guns jammed in the early aerial combats was, the committee suggested, a sign of lack of careful training in aerial musketry.

In regard to the Fokker crisis, the Bailhache committee found that the loss of the mastery of the air for some six months from October, 1915, to March, 1916, was due to the fact that the old Royal Aircraft product B.E.2c was not so fast or so handy as the Fokker. There were some machines at the front capable of dealing with the Fokker on equal terms, but they were not available in sufficient numbers. Which, being interpreted, meant that they were machines of private design, the makers of which had not been favoured with large orders. In conclusion, the committee recommended that the position which Sir David Henderson occupied should be split up into a fighting command and an equipment directorship. A single equipment department should supply both the army and navy flying services. The continued existence of the Royal Aircraft Factory was recommended, not as a manufacturing establishment, but as a research and experimental centre and drawing office, the full time of the hands being occupied, when not needed on experimental work, in the making of spare parts, and in repairs.

All this investigation and advice, with the consequent reorganization of the War Office works and an establishment of an efficient air ministry, came too late in the year. The Spad and the Halberstadt, with their climb of 20,000 feet, were first in the air, and the position of things at the front after nearly 30 months of war was such as to make Sir Douglas Haig patently anxious. Meanwhile, a new source of trouble arose in a quarrel over common sources of equipment between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. The technical advisers of the Admiralty in aerial affairs had relied upon private British makers long before the opening of the war, and had given orders that saved some of the best of them from bankruptcy at a time when the Royal Aircraft Factory seemed to discourage private enterprise. Owing to the difference between the official military discouragement and the helpfulness of naval officials, the navy obtained in advance equipment that the army afterwards found it wanted. The quarrel shook the foundations of the new air board, which had been formed in May, 1916, as a break-water against the strong current of agitated popular feeling in the matter of air services. Lord Curzon was appointed chairman

AERIAL ACTIVITY


of the board, but even he was unable to impose agreement upon the representatives of the naval and military wings.

The fall of the last Asquith cabinet and the creation of the new war ministry under Mr. Lloyd George called Lord Curzon away from the air board, much, no doubt, to his relief. He was succeeded as chairman by Lord Sydenham, a man of great experience in military material. But the abrupt resignation of Lord Sydenham, on December 30, 1916, indicated that the tension in the air board had been increased rather than diminished by the publication of Sir Douglas Haig's request for better machines in larger numbers. Thereupon the new war ministry made a determined effort at a thorough and reorganizing development of the air board into a great air ministry.

The most successful of British engineers, Lord Cowdray, was made air minister, and given the Hotel Cecil as his office. Admiral Vaughan-Lee, the chief of the Naval Air Service, was succeeded by one of the most expert of flyers, Commodore G. M. Paine, for whom a remarkable new position was created as air lord of the Admiralty. Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson remained director general of aeronautics, and occupied on the army council a position similar to that which Commodore Paine filled on the board of Admiralty, but the ministry of munitions took over the control of the production of aircraft for both services, in order to put an end to the competition between the navy and army.

The idea of the new scheme was that the air board should design the machines and that the ministry of munitions should make them. Strong objections were raised to this scheme, and how it would work remained to be seen. The chief requisite in organization was to keep the leading designers in close touch with the fighting forces, so that constant foresight in the development of machines and engines might govern the productive work of the munition factories.

The Spad and Halberstadt crisis of the autumn and early winter of 1916 was not so serious as the Fokker crisis of the previous year; for, mainly as the direct result of public agitation, the inventive and organizing genius of Great Britain was roused. Accidents, however, continued to happen in extraordinary sequence. The first de Havilland fighter, answering the Fokker, was shot down by the enemy in the spring of 1916, the day after it arrived at the front. Then, as we have seen,



Troops of the Austrian Alpine corps scaling a hill during the first Italian offensive on the Isonzo.



Behind earthworks are some of the Austrian troops during the fighting between them and the Russians in the Carpathians.

AUSTRIA AT WAR ON TWO FRONTS



FORT VAUX TWO YEARS AFTER THE WAR. Most of the German advance in the battle of Verdun was achieved in the first attack which drove in the outer French defences to a line running from Fort Vaux on the east to the Mort Homme ridge on the west. On the extreme French left the line in front of Bethincourt and Malancourt still held.

Imperial War Museum



MEMORIAL TO FRENCH HEROISM ON THE MORT HOMME RIDGE. After the first attack on the Verdun sector the Germans made material progress only on the two flanks of the flattened Verdun salient. The Mort Homme ridge, after changing hands several times in May, 1916, was left with the attackers established precariously on it. Here was the most desperate fighting of the battle. In 1919 the memorial seen here was erected.



King Ferdinand of Rumania, whose country joined the Allies, August, 1916.



General Alexander Averescu, Rumania's leading soldier in the war.



London! Ion Brătianu, Rumanian statesman, staunch friend of the Allies.



RUMANIA AT WAR. Left, the church of St. Nicholas at Kronstadt. Right, the shattered tower on the roadway through the pass of Roter Turm. Both town and pass were prominent in the struggle between the Rumanians and Austro-Germans in the autumn of 1916.

THE NAVAL WING

the first new government machine, with the first 250 h.p. Rolls-Royce engine, was landed in the enemy territory. And on January 3, 1917, the first British machine of superior power to the Spad and Halberstadt was likewise given to the Germans. It was a Handley-Page "super-aeroplane," with two Rolls-Royce engines, giving together 500 h.p., and the R.N.A.S. pilot lost his way in the mist and landed within the enemy's lines. The loss of the Handley-Page warned the enemy of what he would soon have to encounter, and showed that the Admiralty, like the War Office, was wrong in sending single examples of new types to operate in an experimental way on the front, instead of reserving each machine for trial flights at home until a large formation could be sprung upon the foe.

On the naval side of aerial warfare, during the period under review, there were some stirring incidents, considerable progressive work under difficulties, and some dull, stagnant conditions. Naval patrols in small airships and seaplanes had constant and arduous work, watching coastwise and channel traffic, in searching for and hunting submarines, and occasionally pursuing a Zeppelin. The naval wing in Flanders, attached to the Dover patrol, was a splendid school of diverse experience. Its officers spotted for the British bombarding squadrons during attacks on the enemy batteries along the Belgian coast; they attacked and destroyed hostile submarines, Zeppelins and Zeppelin sheds; kept under regular observation all enemy movements in western Flanders, in cooperation with the Belgian air service, and made numerous bombing raids. Excellent work was also done by the Thames patrol, and various coast patrols had a history of exciting achievements in the anti-submarine campaign. Owing, however, to the want of high-powered engines and machines of superior carrying power, the naval wing failed to develop its early plan of raiding enemy bases.

A certain aerial activity was maintained in the eastern Mediterranean by means of obsolete, slow seaplane-carriers and machines of inadequate capacity and engine power. On April 14, 1916, Constantinople was bombed by three naval pilots, who made a round journey of 300 miles, and another naval pilot raided Adrianople and attacked the enemy's vital railway communications between Germany and Turkey. But after April nothing more was done in the matter for eight months. Only in December, 1916, was the enemy's vital link line again attacked

AERIAL ACTIVITY

by the naval wing, and a bridge below Adrianople, crossing the Maritza river, bombed so that one of the arches was destroyed.

In the stand of General Townshend's division at Kut-el-Amara, and in the efforts made to raise the siege by Sir Percy Lake and General Aylmer, pilots of the Royal Naval Air Service had played a picturesque and romantic part in their old-fashioned machines; but it was not until it was too late to save Kut that machines were sent out fit to cope with the Fokkers on the spot.

While attention was being directed towards increasing the British striking power on the fighting front, the defence of England against air raids had been rather neglected. On January 23, 1916, a hostile aeroplane travelled on a moonlight night over the Kent coast, and dropping nine bombs in rapid succession, caused some fires, killed one man, and wounded a man, two women and three children. In the afternoon of the next day two German seaplanes made another attack, upon Dover, but were beaten back by heavy fire and pursued. Four British military aeroplanes and two seaplanes went up in pursuit, but the raiders had faster machines and could not be overtaken. Again on February 9, at half past three in the afternoon, two German seaplanes bombed Ramsgate and Broadstairs.

For some reason a girls' school at Broadstairs was selected for attack, and four bombs launched at it, which just missed the target. Two women and one child were, however, injured, and again the raiders escaped scot free. On February 20, the enemy extended his aeroplane raids, and two biplanes circled over Lowestoft, dropped bombs, and vanished. A quarter of an hour afterwards they returned and dropped more bombs. Five minutes before their return two naval aeroplanes went up, but once more, and in more favouring circumstances, failed to overtake the raiders. The British machines were clean outclassed in speed. At the same time two other German seaplanes were making for the Kentish coast, and after bombing the lightship by the Kentish Knock one of the raiders made straight for Walmer, and reached that town at 11.27 a.m. It flew at the low altitude of 3,500 feet and bombed a church, missed it, and then bombed a roadway, killing two men and one boy.

Two aeroplanes went up from Dover and came over Walmer at 11.15 a.m., 12 minutes before the raider arrived. Again the British machines could not overtake the enemy.

RAIDS ON ENGLAND

What was noteworthy in the Lowestoft raid was the fact that the distance from the Belgian coast to Yarmouth and back was about the distance from Dunkirk to Düsseldorf and back. In other words, if British airmen had possessed as good machines as the Germans they could have retaliated. Moreover, such a machine was in existence. It was built by Messrs. Sopwith, of Kingston-on-Thames, who for nearly a year had been making aeroplanes that broke all British records in climbing power. But the Sopwith machine had been offered to the government about June, 1915, and neglected in favour of the R.A.F. product.

On March 12 a German seaplane was sighted off the North Foreland at midday, but the Dover station was uncommonly alert, and sent up men who beat the German away from the land, and pursued him vainly, as usual. A week later four seaplanes came over Kent. The first pair bombed Ramsgate, Margate and Westgate, and the second pair flew over Dover at a low altitude, bombed the harbour and the town, and dropped bombs on Deal. Three men, one woman and five children were killed; 16 men, five women and nine children were injured.

On January 31, 1916, the midland counties were attacked, 67 persons being killed and 117 injured. Among the killed and injured were 74 women and 14 children. Six or seven airships came over England and dropped bombs in Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire. It was a foggy night that turned to rain, and the mist and moisture helped to defeat the enemy. Only in Staffordshire was any considerable material damage done. On this occasion the raiders did not escape with impunity. One of them was struck and another, L19, was winged and fell in the North Sea. The trawler King Stephen sighted the wreck, on which were a score of men, some armed. Fearing they might overpower his own small crew if he took them aboard, the captain left the rescue work to a larger vessel. Unfortunately, however, a gale sprang up, and L19 sank with her crew before help could reach them.

On March 5 there was another air raid by three or more Zeppelins over eight English counties—Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Rutland, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Essex and Kent. According to the War Office report, three men, four women and five children were killed, while 33 were injured, of whom one afterwards died. No military damage of any kind was done, but a number of houses were destroyed.

AERIAL ACTIVITY

Under pressure of public opinion the Admiralty arranged an attack by seaplanes on Zeppelin sheds in Schleswig on March 25, supported by Admiral Tyrwhitt and destroyers. The aerial force, however, was quite inadequate. A week earlier 65 Allied pilots had been launched with considerable success against Zeebrugge. But against the more important Zeppelin base on the Schleswig coast it seems only five seaplanes were sent. Three of the seaplanes were brought down either by engine trouble or by enemy gunners, and three pilots captured.

The Admiralty claimed that the object of the attack had been achieved, which may have been the case if no Zeppelin sheds were aimed at. There were from eight to 10 sheds on the Schleswig-Holstein coast; each protected by very powerful anti-aircraft artillery, including the 4.1 in. gun discharging every minute ten 39 lb. high-explosive shells to a height of 26,000 feet. If 50 seaplanes had been used on an intensive operation against one or two sheds, the German gunners would have had so many targets that they could not have concentrated against them, and some of the pilots would probably have got home with their bombs on one shed or even on two; but there were not sufficient of them to distract and scatter the enemy's fire. The affair seems to have been designed, with incomplete knowledge of air tactics, for the political purpose of making a show of activity to silence critics in Parliament and reformers in the country. Had a feeble raid of this kind been conducted at the outbreak of the war it would have been passed, like the little Cuxhaven affair, as an interesting practical experiment.

Towards the close of the spring of 1916 reports began to appear in the German and the Swiss press of a new type of Zeppelin surpassing in size and power everything that up to that date had been constructed. The new airships, it was said, were being specially built, from Count Zeppelin's designs, for the destruction of London. They were to carry an increased armament of guns, and a heavier cargo of bombs. Their peculiar virtue lay in a far larger displacement, which enabled them to reach and hold much higher altitudes in the air, and in a greatly enhanced speed. Their range of action was to be such as to bring the whole area of the British Isles within their power.

From time to time these giants had been observed over Lake Constance, and their immense size, the large number of gondolas, the extraordinary speed with which they moved, had

A SUPER-ZEPPELIN

impressed all who saw them. It was not till the autumn of 1916, when one of these mysterious giants, intact but for its outer covering and the material of its gasbags, fell into the hands of the British forces, that the exact details of its construction could be ascertained. The airship in question, L33, was one of the very largest type built by the enemy. It was compelled by the British artillery fire to make a forced landing in Essex, where the crew, after setting it alight, surrendered. Hence its machinery could be studied at leisure.

The super-Zeppelin was of immense bulk, little inferior in size to a Lusitania. It displaced 50 tons weight of air and contained 2,000,000 cubic feet of gas. In favourable conditions it may have attained 80 miles an hour, though the average speed would not be more than 50 miles an hour. The gondolas were four in number. Two of these were like large boats, about 50 feet long, placed forward and aft in the centre line. The two others were much smaller, and were placed abreast on either side of the hull, nearer the centre of the ship. The forward one contained the captain's cabin, with wheels controlling the two rudders for vertical and horizontal movement, and other controls for the petrol tanks and the water ballast. Aft the captain's cabin was a wireless room, which was little more than a cupboard, six feet by four feet, and aft that again was a 240 h.p. Mercédès-Maybach engine with a dynamo, and two machine guns. The engine drove a propeller immediately behind the gondola and underneath the hull. The two small amidships gondolas each contained a similar engine driving a similar propeller, with a dynamo and a machine gun. The large gondola astern carried three engines, two of which drove propellers at the side of the airship by bevel gearing, and the third a propeller astern of the gondola and underneath the hull. Each engine was fitted with a dynamo, and in the gondola there were two machine guns. Thus there were six engines each of 240 h.p., totalling 1,440 h.p. in all, each driving a propeller. The crew numbered 23. Though the engines were fitted with silencers, the noise of the exhaust was deafening, and from the ground was audible for miles.

The earlier naval Zeppelins were of one-third the size and horsepower, with screws at the side and engine of rather under 500 h.p. The petrol tanks of the super-Zeppelin carried 2,000 gallons, and were all placed in or near the "cat-walk," so as to keep them well away from the engines. Like other Zeppelins, this airship was

AERIAL ACTIVITY

equipped with a small observation car capable of containing one man, which could be lowered 1,000 yards, and was connected with the airship by a telephone cable. Such were the super-Zeppelins.

German hopes of these ships ran high, and were not dimmed by a series of misadventures to the old type of Zeppelin in the spring. - On March 31 five Zeppelins raided the eastern counties, and one of the five, L15, was hit by the British anti-aircraft guns and was finally compelled to descend near the mouth of the Thames, where the crew surrendered to H.M.S. Olive, which took her in tow till she sank. The men on board were rescued, but not before they had set fire to the gas and destroyed the ship. On the following days Zeppelins attacked the south-east coasts of Scotland and the north-east of England with a casualty list of 27 killed and 111 injured; and again, in a raid on east coast towns on April 5, one person was killed and eight injured.

Next month on May 3, L20, which was probably returning from a raid on the Scottish coast, was caught by a storm and swept towards Stavanger, in Norway. Her petrol ran out, and owing to the failure of her engines she could not be kept under control. She struck the Norwegian coast with great violence and was badly damaged, though nearly all her crew escaped with their lives. As she became a danger to navigation the Norwegian government ordered her destruction. On the following day a number of British light cruisers in the Bight of Heligoland sighted L7, which was apparently watching their movements, and at once attacked her. They hit her with gun fire and damaged her badly. She hovered low down near the water, not far from the enemy coast, in an area within which it was perilous for British surface ships to venture. At this juncture a British submarine, E31, suddenly rose from the sea, fired several rounds into the airship, setting it on fire and completing its destruction, and took off seven of the crew.

On the following day, May 5, at the other end of the battle-front, near Salonica, yet another Zeppelin was destroyed. This craft, LZ85, was a military airship of the very latest design, but was much smaller than the German naval Zeppelins. She had for some weeks been stationed on the eastern front, and used to raid the Allied lines and depots at Salonica. On this particular date she ventured too close, within range of the Allied warships. They opened a sharp fire on her and struck her several times.

A ZEPPELIN OVER SCOTLAND

She dropped, disabled, in the marshes near Salonica, where her crew set her on fire. Most of them were captured, but one or two succeeded in making their way to the Bulgarian lines. After this affair enemy airships gave Salonica a wide berth. LZ85, when examined, proved to be almost identical with LZ77, which the French had shot down in flames, on February 20-21 near Verdun, after three hits with their incendiary shell. She had two gondolas, five propellers driven by five engines, and bombs of three sizes, weighing 220 lb., 175 lb., and 110 lb.

In July the new super-Zeppelins began their flights over England. Between May 2 and July 28 there was an interval during which the enemy airships attempted no raids, possibly because the shortness of the nights, in view of the growing efficiency of the British anti-aircraft artillery, made the Germans chary of taking risks. On the night of July 28, however, in very warm and fine weather, three airships of the super-Zeppelin type crossed the coast and travelled over Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. They did no damage, and the object of their visit was a little difficult at the time to understand.

On July 31 six or seven Zeppelins crossed the coast at various points and cruised over no fewer than seven of the eastern counties. They flew at enormous heights and dropped bombs at random in the oddest places. But again they did no damage beyond burning a haystack. On August 2 they reappeared, when eight Zeppelins, two of which were of super-Zeppelin type, dropped bombs in the eastern counties, again causing only trifling damage and injuring no human being. They were heavily fired at, and after this raid L11 was seen steering in damaged condition over Dutch territory, where she ought to have been shot down. She was attacked with musketry by the Dutch but was not hit. On August 9 there was another raid by a large number of airships, in which south-eastern Scotland was visited and 27 casualties were inflicted. On August 23 a solitary airship, probably reconnoitring, crossed the coast, but, though she dropped many bombs, she did no damage whatever.

The Germans, in fact, now fought shy of points where they knew anti-aircraft artillery was mounted, while they found it increasingly difficult to discover their own whereabouts. The darkening of all lights had been so effectively enforced, after long and inexcusable delay, that the largest city might be quite invisible from above. An effort to attack, however, was made

AERIAL ACTIVITY

on August 24, when some six Zeppelins raided the eastern and south-eastern counties. One of these, seemingly a super-Zeppelin, reached outer London, and there dropped incendiary and explosive bombs, damaging an engineering works and a power station. Forty-four persons were killed and injured, and the raiders escaped unhurt. This failure of the defence forces was severely criticized, and defects were remedied. From this date the raids began to be increasingly disastrous to the enemy.

On September 2 the greatest raid yet planned was made. All Germany was agog with anticipation. Three super-Zeppelins, at least seven other Zeppelins of the naval pattern, and three military rigid airships took part in this invasion, which was to lay London in ruins and attack most of the great manufacturing centres of the Midlands. It ended in the most grotesque failure. In the eastern and south-eastern counties the airships wandered about, lost in the upper air, evidently quite uncertain of their position, and dropped a large number of bombs at random, with so little result that only 15 casualties were reported. Two of the airships were hit by the British artillery, but were not set on fire. One of them threw overboard many objects, including an observation car and portions of her machinery and armament. On the following day this airship was seen by the Dutch passing their coast and going very slowly.

The squadron of military airships was less fortunate. Two of the three were driven off London by the fire of the anti-aircraft guns. The third attempted to attack by the east. About 2.20 a.m. on the 3rd, which was a very clear starlit night, though with cloudy patches here and there, the enemy was plainly seen by spectators over a vast area near London. Pencils of light swept across the sky; the searchlights of the defence forces caught the German airship in their beams, and presently lights were made out twinkling near it. For some moments the spectators, 9,000 feet below, took these flashes for the bursts of the shrapnel. While tens of thousands waited and watched the struggle—so near and yet so immensely remote—a faint glow of red, altogether different in hue from the pallid sheen of the cover under the glare of the searchlights, showed towards the stern of the airship; it spread with great speed and deepened into a crimson glow, and the whole huge structure began to fall, slowly at first, but gathering momentum and blazing more fiercely as it approached the earth, when it lighted up the whole sky with a

LEEFE ROBINSON'S FEAT

blaze that was seen for 50 miles. As the flaming airship fell, high overhead showed other lights from a solitary aeroplane. It was the conqueror in such a battle as before him no man had ever fought, disclosing his presence in the high air. Not the least astonishing fact about this first encounter in which an airship was brought down on English ground was that the issue of it was simultaneously known over an area of 1,000 square miles, and that the sound of cheering rose in every direction, like the roar of a stormy sea, before the final crash of the fall was heard.

The victor in this fight was Lieut. W. Leeft Robinson, of the Royal Flying Corps. He had been patrolling for several hours at a great height when he discovered and attacked the airship. He caught no glimpse of his human antagonists on board her in this fierce struggle of the upper air, though flashes from the hull showed that the Germans were firing at him. When the flames began to run along the fabric of the airship's cover and he knew that she was doomed, he seemed to be caught up to unimaginable heights of exultation. Like David, he had slain his Goliath, and the victory was of lasting importance, as it once and for ever abolished the menace of the airship. It may be simple to repeat a feat which has actually been performed, but to Lieutenant Robinson belongs the glory of the pioneer. Lieutenant Warneford's attack was made by day; Lieutenant Robinson had to land at night, which is always a matter of danger, and was then the more perilous because the aerodrome arrangements had not been perfected. He dropped swiftly and easily to the landing point, half dead with cold and exhaustion, but was not too exhausted to proceed by motor-car to the wreck of the burning airship, which had fallen at Cuffley. The bodies of the crew lay about; some had evidently leapt out or been flung out as the airship fell.

The enemy did not attempt to conceal the loss. Probably imagining that the destruction of the vessel had been due rather to luck than to consummate courage employing proper methods, the Germans, like Pharaoh of old, hardened their hearts, and determined to continue their policy of raids.

On the night of September 23 another raid was made with 12 airships. Ten of these ranged over the south-eastern, eastern and east midland counties; two coming from the south-east attacked London. The night was calm and starlit, with patches of cloud. Two of the airships actually reached London and dropped many bombs there, in the southern and south-east district, killing 28

AERIAL ACTIVITY

persons and injuring 99. Though several small houses were demolished and a few fires were caused, no military damage was inflicted. In the country there were 15 casualties, while a railway station in one midland town was injured. Against this the enemy suffered very serious loss. One of the super-Zeppelins, L32, was attacked east of London by two British aeroplanes.

Again enormous crowds over a vast area witnessed a thrilling combat in mid-air. Again they suddenly saw a glow like that of a red-hot cigar appear at one end of the Zeppelin. For a few seconds the vast mass of the airship remained aflame at a height of about 8,000 feet, then, like the vessel destroyed by Lieutenant Robinson, it plunged swiftly to the ground, lighting up the whole sky with a crimson glare. Again all on board perished.

Earlier in the night British anti-aircraft guns struck another Zeppelin of the giant type, L33, attempting to reach London. She seems to have been hit on her petrol tanks, some of which showed dents when she was captured, and also on the bevel gearing of one of her wing propellers, which was shot off. She was seen at many points in Essex travelling low and in evident difficulties. Eluding the British aeroplanes which hunted her furiously to complete her destruction, she passed over the Essex coast, steering to sea. It was noticed that her engines made an unusually loud noise, and seemed to be running badly.

The airship proceeded about a couple of miles out, to sea when her crew, presumably realizing that the fate of the men in L19 awaited them if they persisted in any attempt to cross the North Sea, returned shoreward. The great vessel came gliding in at low speed, almost touching the surface of the water, and took the land safely not far from the coast. As it came down it cut a deep furrow, and finally came to rest 20 yards from a wooden cottage. The Germans on board, who numbered 22, shouted a warning to the people in this cottage, who were frightened out of their wits by the sudden apparition of this grey monster at their very doors, and perhaps imagined that the nightmare of an invasion by airship was at last being realized. After the warning the Germans set fire to the airship. It burnt with four sharp puffs of flame, emitting such heat that the paint on the cottage was badly scorched. The little body of Germans marched off on the road to Colchester, which one of them knew well; and presently meeting a special constable made their formal surrender to him.

THE AIRSHIP RAIDS CONTINUE

The loss of these two magnificent airships caused intense chagrin and dismay in Germany, so much so indeed that it offset the really important successes which the German armies were gaining against the Rumanians. The official report spoke of the "extraordinarily heavy fire with incendiary shells" which had destroyed the two airships. Yet a third Zeppelin sustained some damage. It was seen off the Danish coast, heavily down by the stern, with German destroyers accompanying it.

The German government was now in a most difficult position. It had led the German people to suppose that British towns could be attacked and laid in ruins by German airships. The false and fantastic tales which it had published of the airships' exploits had given a totally misleading impression of the effect produced by haphazard bomb-dropping. The German authorities had also assiduously preached "hate" against Great Britain, and now Germans generally demanded that the raids should continue. To abandon the raids altogether would be to admit that the large capital and immense amount of labour sunk in the Zeppelin had been wasted. It was true that the Zeppelin had proved of the highest value for naval scouting, which was its proper sphere of action, within which it was most serviceable so long as it was not resolutely attacked by aeroplanes from aeroplane-carrying ships. But in view of Germany's position, not more than a dozen large airships were needed for this special business. The others represented so much material wasted, and Germany was now beginning to run short of material.

German opinion was summed up by the Munich "Neueste Nachrichten," which wrote: "The glorious German aerial engines of war penetrate to England's heart, and London trembles before their attacks, which it is hoped will be more frequent in future." And on September 25 the airships were ordered once more to attack. On this occasion seven Zeppelins crossed the coast (the dwindling number showed that Germany had not anything like the force available which she was commonly supposed to possess). They attacked the south coast, east coast, north-east coast and north Midlands. No damage was done to factories or works, but several small cottages and houses were wrecked, and 36 persons were killed and 27 injured. The enemy falsely claimed to have bombed Leeds, Lincoln, Derby, Portsmouth and York. On this occasion, perhaps owing to mist, no airship was brought down.

AERIAL ACTIVITY

On October 1, 10 Zeppelins crossed the British coast, striking at London, the eastern counties and Lincolnshire. It was a very clear, dark night, and quite early in its course the London anti-aircraft defences came into action. A further great advance had been made since the raid of September 23, and this time two large Zeppelins which endeavoured to reach London found every attempt to penetrate the line of defences frustrated by the guns and searchlights. While they were engaged in endeavours to break through, one of them was attacked by an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Tempest, of the Royal Flying Corps. The crowds below now knew what to expect, and watched eagerly. A little before midnight a bright glow was seen on the tip of one Zeppelin, cruising at an enormous height; the airship capsized with the glowing tip pointing downwards, righted itself, then, with the glow spreading, broke into two flaming balls, which were probably the two ends with the two heavy gondolas, and finally fell as one big pear-shaped mass of crimson fire to the ground at Potter's Bar, where it lay a blazing heap, the size of a large house.

This Zeppelin was speedily identified from the wreckage as L31, the first of the super-Zeppelins, and the third of that type destroyed by the British forces in this country. For its destruction Lieutenant Tempest received the D.S.O. He was injured, but not seriously, in making his landing after putting the airship out of action. All the crew of L31 perished. Her captain was the ablest and most experienced airship officer in the German navy, Lieutenant Commander Mathy. He had commanded the airship which bombed London in September and October, 1915. His rather imaginative account of the September raid, which he gave to an American correspondent, has this historic value that it affords some idea of what an airship crew feel and observe during an attack.

London is darkened, but sufficiently lighted to enable me to see its reflected glow in the sky nearly 40 miles away.

This applied to September, 1915, but the conditions were afterwards entirely changed. He continued:

A large city, seen at night from a great height, is a fairylike picture. There is no sign of life, except in the distance a moving light, probably from a railway train. As in the twinkling of an eye all this changes. *A sudden flash and a narrow beam of brilliant light reaches out from below and begins to feel around the sky. A second, third, fourth, and fifth come out,

ZEPPELIN COMMANDER'S STORY

and soon there are more than a score of criss-crossing-ribbons—tentacles seeking to drag us to destruction. Now from below comes an ominous sound that penetrates the noise of the engines. There are little red flashes and short bursts of fire. Above the Bank of England I shouted through the speaking-tube connecting me with my lieutenant at the firing apparatus, "Fire slowly!" Mingling with the dim thunder from the guns below came the explosions and bursting flames of our bombs. Over Holborn Viaduct, in the vicinity of Holborn station, we dropped several bombs. From the Bank of England to the Tower—a short distance—I tried to hit the bridge, and believe I was successful. Arriving directly over Liverpool Street station, I shouted "Rapid fire!" and bombs rained down. I could see that I hit well, and apparently did great damage.

I am not afraid of aeroplanes, and think I could make it interesting for them, unless, perhaps, there was a regular swarm. It takes some time for an aeroplane to climb as high as a Zeppelin, and by the time it gets there the airship would be gone. Then, too, it is most difficult for an aeroplane to land at night, while a Zeppelin can stay up all night.

In the raid in which the super-Zeppelin was destroyed at Potter's Bar very trifling damage was done, and only two casualties were inflicted. The airship crews seem to have been unnerved by the losses they had suffered, and except in the case of the two ships which tried to reach London were careful to keep out of reach of the British defences. Though many bombs were dropped, only four houses were damaged.

For some weeks after this the weather remained very unfavourable, and no raids were possible. On the night of November 27 the Zeppelin crews were again driven out to attack the British coast. The number of airships engaged is not officially stated, but seems to have been about five, for the total of effective vessels which the Germans had available was steadily falling. Four of these attacked the north-east coast and dropped bombs in Durham and Yorkshire, doing very little damage. One of them was engaged off the Durham coast by an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant I. V. Pyott, of the Royal Flying Corps. The airship, after a short engagement, took fire, and the flames spread along her till she began to fall. Her end was witnessed by large crowds over a great area. It came in the same fashion as with the other Zeppelins, except that the blazing mass fell into the sea.

While this was happening in the north, another large airship had crossed the east coast and pushed inland towards the north

AERIAL ACTIVITY

Midlands, where she dropped bombs at random. So far she had not been attacked, but on her return journey she began to feel the effect of the strengthened British defences. Aeroplanes chased her; guns opened on her. It seems certain that she sustained some damage, as she travelled very slowly, and may, indeed, have stopped for some time not far from the Norfolk coast, where she evidently succeeded in making repairs. Day was at hand when she was seen voyaging towards the sea, followed by a number of aeroplanes piloted by officers of the Royal Naval Air Service. At a height of 8,000 feet four aeroplanes were in action, supported by an armed trawler. The aeroplanes again had the upper hand. Lieutenant Egbert Cadbury and Sub-Lieutenants E. L. Pulling and G. W. R. Fane drew closest to her and hit her repeatedly, till the flames swept along her side, and she also plunged a hissing mass into the sea. The officers concerned in the destruction of these two Zeppelins received the D.S.O., which they had so gloriously earned. The record of the two flying branches for 1916 now stood at four destroyed by army airmen and one by navy airmen. The British casualties in this raid were 17.

Later in the morning on which the Norfolk Zeppelin had been destroyed (November 28), a German aeroplane made a pointless attack on London. It appeared over the capital about noon, and dropped six bombs from a height so great that the occupants of the machine could not have taken any proper aim. This wanton piece of mischief caused only the slightest damage, but inflicted injury on nine persons, one of whom was seriously hurt. The aeroplane, on its return journey, was brought down by the French at Dunkirk, when it proved to be manned by two naval lieutenants. This affair, small though it was, was important as indicating the real danger which threatened Britain from the air—that of aeroplane attack on the great cities.

The close of the year saw the effective German Zeppelin fleet reduced to somewhere about 20 airships, and entirely shorn of its prestige. It could no longer frighten women and children in isolated villages and remote little towns; in the last five raids it had suffered far more damage than it inflicted. It had tried every stratagem—attacks in mass, attacks isolated, attacks on London simultaneously delivered from several directions, attacks avoiding London and the growing power of the metropolitan defences. All had failed.

CHAPTER 28

The Home Front

IN previous chapters we outlined the course of events which led to the formation of a coalition ministry in Great Britain and later, after the Derby scheme for raising more men for service in the field had failed, made compulsory military service a necessity. But the foundation of the vast munitions department and the adoption of conscription were only two of the many changes that "in the fell clutch of circumstance" were transforming the whole life of the nation. One by one the state took a fuller control of the country's activities, and in addition to becoming the direct employer of some millions of men and women, entered upon a course of action which included controlling the food supply of the people, and made Britain, for the time being at least, a socialist state.

Under these conditions the main industries of the country blazed with prosperity. Immense fortunes were made, while the working classes as a whole were never better off. Wages increased abnormally, especially in industries that supplied necessities, and there was a drift of labour away from the less well paid trades and occupations. Domestic servants found they could make more money elsewhere, so they discarded the housemaid's apron and donned the uniform of the ticket collector, the bus conductor, and even the railway porter. Many sensible artisans, knowing that the financial sunshine would not always be so radiant, put some of their earnings in the bank for the cloudy days, but many people made no provision whatever.

Receiving wages two, three and four times as great as formerly, they proceeded to have a good time, justifying themselves with the argument that in the past they had had plenty of bad times; and that the future could look after itself. So they lived well; they clothed themselves better; they bought better furniture. Nor did they disregard luxuries. The shops of the furriers did well; piano dealers never did better; there was something of a boom in jewellery. While theatres generally patronized by the wealthier classes were adversely affected, the popular houses

THE HOME FRONT

which produced melodrama, especially in the great industrial areas, were crowded. Music halls were packed twice a night, and cinema shows did thriving business. Britain saw very little of the privation amongst the civilian population which is supposed to stalk alongside war. But there were always people who saw the shadow behind the glare. What, they asked, would be the position of the industrial classes when war work ceased and the population tried to readjust itself to normal conditions? And what would happen when the abnormal wages disappeared and maybe, with a slump in trade, there was very little wages at all?

Other important changes swiftly progressed. Restrictions were imposed on the sale of drink. Though the ostensible reason was to stop drunkenness amongst munition workers, the real reason was to prevent people wasting their money. These restrictions began with a gentle limitation of the hours, and as the public acquiesced in this without demur, the restrictions soon became severe. Power was granted to local authorities to close public-houses altogether in the neighbourhood of munition works. Instead of these places being open from early morning till 10 or 11 o'clock at night in the provinces, and till half past 12 in London, the rule was that spirituous refreshment could be obtained only during two and a half hours around midday and three hours in the earlier part of the evening. The treating of friends was prohibited. The carrying away of small quantities of liquor was not allowed, for this would undoubtedly have been the plan adopted by those who had a weakness towards drink. Larger quantities for home consumption must be paid for at the time of purchase. In munition areas no spirits for home use could be purchased between Friday midday and Monday midday. There were individual and unorganized protests, complaints that people were being treated as children, and that the restrictions implied that Britain had been sottish, which was not true; but the amount of murmuring was really infinitesimal.

All this was accompanied by the exploitation of the necessities of life. Merchants of many kinds held up commodities in order to extort higher prices. The government, through the board of trade, secretly bought up most of the available sugar, and by letting it drain into the market as occasion required, did much to keep the price to the consumer steady. In other articles of food, shopkeepers, under the plea that wholesale prices had leapt up, enhanced charges for old stock, to the gathering discontent of

HEAVY TAXATION

the people. Pleas were advanced in Parliament that the government should regulate prices. This the government did not see its way to do; but at repeated intervals it issued statements of what ought to be, all things considered, the legitimate retail prices. Thus the whole country knew what were the proper charges, and the moral effect on tradesmen who might have been disposed to squeeze an extra profit out of customers was undoubted.

With war charges rising colossally, the government not only mortgaged the future, but proceeded to impose heavy taxation. Every available source of income was squeezed for the benefit of the exchequer. It being considered unfair that people should grow inordinately wealthy in time of war—especially as there were so many men offering everything, even to the sacrifice of their lives, for their country—an innovation was introduced in the shape of the special taxation of profits. In regard to controlled establishments, the arrangement was that the companies which managed them should have their profits fixed on an average of the previous three years, with the addition of something like six per cent on the annual revenue which it was assumed would probably have been the normal expansion in time of peace. But in the case of non-controlled establishments, all businesses, except those conducted by professional men, lawyers, doctors, architects, schoolmasters and others, were compelled to pay 60 per cent of their surplus profits to the state.

To keep much of the wealth of the country at home to meet the increasing war charges, instead of allowing it to go abroad, strong endeavours were made to induce the public to buy British articles, and not goods—particularly luxuries—from foreign lands. The government put heavy import duties on certain luxuries, and began to restrict and prohibit importations. The importation of paper pulp was reduced by fully a third, so that newspapers had to be curtailed in size, stationery became scarcer, and some articles made of paper disappeared altogether.

But behind the argument for retaining wealth within the country was the important matter of shipping facilities. The government had exercised its power in securing to itself an immense proportion of British ships, not only for the transporting of troops but for conveying commissariat and performing particular functions round our coasts. Thus there was a shortage of carrying capacity. Freights rose three-, four- and six-fold, and

THE HOME FRONT

this had a striking effect on prices at home. Shippers were compelled to charter the vessels of neutral countries, and, as there was always the danger of these falling victims to German submarines, the foreigners' charges, with insurance imposed, were high, and payment for these neutral ships meant the exportation of quantities of gold. The object, therefore, of restricting imports was that vessels should be used as little as possible for carrying anything that had not directly to do with the war.

During his stay in Great Britain, in the early part of 1916, Mr. W. M. Hughes, the Australian premier, had exercised a telling influence upon the British working classes, and engineered a movement against the activities of German trade and finance. To carry out these and similar ideas, the Allies concerted measures at a conference held in Paris in June, 1916. The Marquis of Crewe, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. W. M. Hughes himself, and Sir George Foster, Canadian minister of trade and commerce, represented the British empire. France was represented by her ministers of commerce and agriculture and other statesmen of influence. Russia, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Serbia and Portugal also sent some of their principal ministers to the conference. Working together from different points of view, the delegates arrived at a scheme of economic war and economic defence. They provided for measures to be taken in common during the war, for measures of defence during the difficult period following the conclusion of peace, and for measures to develop industry and commerce in the Allied states during the period of reconstruction, and for permanent defences against the methods of penetration and monopoly which had been successfully employed by the Germans.

On the return of the British delegates to London a committee was appointed to consider the conclusions reached at the Paris conference, and to work out in detail methods to prevent the resources of the empire from falling under foreign control, to protect all industries essential for the safety of the nation, and generally to develop the resources of the empire. Some weeks afterwards, at the Trade Union congress, representatives of the working classes decided by 1,750,000 votes against 500,000 for the restriction of foreign goods made by sweated labour. This seemed a significant indication of a popular movement towards a system of economic defence, but on this matter, as on several others, the Cabinet was divided, and nothing definite was done.

TRADE AND WAGES

While Mr. Lloyd George who, after the death of Earl Kitchener, had been transferred from the ministry of munitions to be secretary of state for war, was using his wondrous energy to supply the army with the materials of war, the president of the board of trade, Mr. Walter Runciman, was working hard in another direction. With the help of Mr. McKenna, the chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Runciman pursued a policy which undoubtedly produced some remarkable results. By exempting certain men from military service and extending the use of female labour, which Mr. Lloyd George had employed in a large way in munition work, he helped to maintain a wonderful volume of British commerce. The export trade rose in 1916 to a little over £506,500,000. This figure much exceeded British exports in any of the years before the war except 1913.

Great Britain had a fleet of some 4 000 vessels engaged in military and naval duties, and 1,000,000 men manning or working it. She had placed in the field new armies numbering millions, and behind these soldiers she had millions of munition workers, withdrawn from productive labour. Yet in spite of her stupendous naval, military and munition efforts, which seemed at times as if they monopolized all the human resources of the country, the island state maintained her export trade close to its high figure of 1913. The great markets of the enemy countries had been lost, and ordinary commerce with Russia was blocked in the Baltic and the Dardanelles. But Great Britain found larger markets in Allied countries and neutral states.

By December, 1916, the wages of some 3,000,000 British workers were increased by eight shillings a week each. Alongside this expansion of ordinary wages there was an unparalleled development in the income of the family owing to women, girls and lads engaging in productive or distributive work. The cost of living rose by some 45 per cent, but this did not check the prosperity of the working class. The increase in the family income more than balanced the rising price of food. The middle classes felt the strain of rising prices, and the members of the various professions were impoverished. Exceedingly heavy taxation, combined with the great rise in prices and the falling value of many classes of investment, reduced a considerable section of the upper middle classes from a position of luxury to one of poverty. But from a national point of view even this disaster to one class brought compensation. It was estimated

THE HOME FRONT

that about 1,000,000 men and women, who had been engaged before the war in work of a non-productive nature, were liberated for labour of a directly productive or military kind.

In spite of much prosperity, especially among the working classes, the strain of the war was being seriously felt, and there were many who wondered whether an early peace was not possible. Some ministers appear to have discussed informally the idea, and in September, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George began openly to fight against the gathering influences making for a settlement without victory. In an interview with an American journalist, published towards the end of the month, he warned all neutral states of the danger of interfering, and asserted that the British empire intended to fight to the finish.

At this period of the struggle the American proposal of intervention in the affairs of Europe by means of a league to enforce peace received some support from certain Radical papers in London and the provinces. Viscount Grey, who had taken a seat in the House of Lords but who continued in office as secretary for foreign affairs, favoured the American idea of a league for enforcing peace. In a public speech on October 23, 1916, he asked the president of the United States if he would agree to use force to prevent another outbreak of war. Nothing in Lord Grey's speech, however, directly conflicted with Mr. Lloyd George's warning to neutrals not to interfere in the fight. This question was not the only one on which the British Cabinet was divided. The demand for the state control of food became urgent when the second German submarine campaign against shipping was clearly seen to be attaining a considerable measure of success. Mr. Runciman, as president of the board of trade, had long opposed a demand for state control of coal mines, food, shipping and other large branches of national activity. Lord Rhondda, the leading colliery owner in South Wales, had endeavoured to induce the government to take over the most valuable mines, and only when his proposal was rejected did the Welsh coal magnate proceed with a scheme of private consolidation of coal resources that tended to grow into a trust of huge proportion.

Mr. Runciman could also have socialized the mercantile marine for the period of the war, and thereby he would have prevented the scandalously large profits made by some ship-owners, which were a source of popular discontent. On

WHEAT PURCHASES

October 17, 1916, he tried to assuage the anger of the public in regard to high freights, by pointing out that the cost of ocean transport was often only a minor item in the general rise of prices. He stated that when bacon, for instance, rose in price ninepence a pound, higher freights accounted only for a half-penny in the rise. The failure of harvests in many of the agricultural countries, such as the United States and Canada, had increased the price of wheat, oats and other cereals, making bread dear as well as meat.

Since the close of 1915 a grain committee had sat in London. Formed of representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, it had arranged wheat purchases for the three Allied countries. But this group of officials and experts was apparently no match for the operators of the United States. By the autumn the stocks of cereals in Great Britain were so low that the Cabinet's committee on food supplies was alarmed at the situation. In the second week of October, therefore, a royal commission was appointed to control all imports of wheat and flour, and prevent any unreasonable increase in price by retailers. The earl of Crawford, president of the board of agriculture, was appointed as chairman to this commission.

Forced doubtless by the pressure of public opinion, Mr. Runciman announced, on November 15, 1916, that with great reluctance he had agreed to the appointment of a food controller, to prevent the coming strain that would fall upon the country in the ensuing year. But in the course of his speech, Mr. Runciman remarked that no more men of the farming class could be spared for the army, alleging that if three or four further divisions were recruited from the soil the reduction in food supply would outbalance the increase in fighting strength. Then, returning to his own field of survey, he went on to state that conscription had been carried on too far in some trades, and steps must be taken to remedy the matter.

That party of Liberals who were working for a peace by compromise developed Mr. Runciman's statement into a plea for a smaller army. It was suggested that skilled men should be drawn from the fighting line in order to increase industry and agriculture, and that the men past military age, who kept their businesses going while acting as a voluntary defence force, should be compelled to undertake military duties at home. A raiding invasion by the veteran troops of Germany, so the

THE HOME FRONT

argument seemed to run, could be defeated by the very patriotic, but amateurish, volunteers. The suggestion had one good result, in that it led Lord French to improve the equipment and training of the volunteer force. The members had to agree to train for a considerable period, and could no longer withdraw on short notice when their businesses required attention. Many younger men, indispensable to the ordinary life of the community and exempted by tribunals from national service, were drafted into the volunteer force towards the close of the year. But the military value of this force was still too low to permit it to be the main defence against invasion.

Mr. Lloyd George needed more men for the army, and he was bent on getting them. He was not greatly afraid that the total of British exports in 1917 might drop below the extraordinary record of 1916, as he thought that better organization might prevent any serious decline in industrial productiveness. He was determined to obtain from the agricultural classes, which contained men of the best fighting stamp, the backbone of another army corps. He thought this might be done without running any serious danger of lessening the home production of food.

In the middle of November, 1916, the struggle in the Cabinet in regard to the means and end of the war was nearing the acute stage. But an open crisis was temporarily postponed by a general attack on the board of Admiralty. The Liberal press joined with amazing vigour with most of the Conservative press in condemning the combination of Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson as political and naval chiefs of the navy. It was widely thought there was not sufficient energy in the combination, and that either Mr. Balfour must be replaced by a politician of active temper, or that Admiral Jackson must retire in favour of some officer fresh from the sea.

The force of this criticism, which had been heard for months, was at last admitted by the government. Changes were made both in the board of the Admiralty and in the command of the Grand Fleet. For some time the announcement of the changes was delayed for military reasons, but on November 29, 1916, it was stated that Sir John Jellicoe had been appointed first sea lord of the Admiralty, and had been succeeded in his command of the Grand Fleet by Sir David Beatty.

At this time the direction of the war was in the hands of a committee of the Cabinet over which the prime minister

CABINET DISSENSIONS

presided, but with other matters also engaging its attention, this body, so Mr. Lloyd George and many others thought—among them Mr. Bonar Law—was unequal to the tremendous task entrusted to it. Mr. Lloyd George, therefore, after a conversation in Paris with Sir Maurice Hankey, who suggested the idea to him, put forward a proposal for the establishment of a war committee, the essential conditions of which were that it must be independent of the Cabinet and must be in continuous session, facts which made it impossible for the premier, burdened with a multitude of other duties, to preside over it. It should be said that Sir Maurice indicated that Mr. Lloyd George himself was the man most fitted to be the chairman of this committee. Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were in the following terms:

That the war committee consist of three members—two of whom must be the first lord of the Admiralty and the secretary of state for war, who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and deciding all departmental business, and a third minister without portfolio. One of the three to be chairman.

That the war committee shall have full powers, subject to the supreme control of the prime minister, to direct all questions connected with the war.

This was delivered to the premier on Friday, December 1, and on the same day Mr. Asquith wrote a letter to Mr. Lloyd George agreeing to changes in the war committee, but insisting that he, as prime minister, must preside at the meetings. Mr. Lloyd George did not consent to this, but December 2 passed without anything definite happening. This pause in the movement for strong reform was quickly ended. On December 3 the Unionist members of the Cabinet decided that they would resign if Mr. Asquith did not tender his resignation. Thereupon Mr. Asquith discussed the condition of affairs with Mr. Lloyd George and proceeded to announce a reconstruction of the government. But strong and sharp differences of opinion in regard to the selection of men for the new war committee and the position of Mr. Asquith still divided the prime minister and the secretary for war. After discussion on the main question of the chairmanship, Mr. Asquith discussed the following proposal:

The prime minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy. The agenda of the war committee will be submitted to him; its chairman will report to him daily; he can

THE HOME FRONT

direct it to consider particular topics or proposals, and all its conclusions will be subject to his veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion, attend meetings of the committee.

Here the matter is said to have been left for further consideration. But the next day (December 4, 1916), when Mr. Asquith was to have had a further meeting with Mr. Lloyd George, he postponed the interview and wrote withdrawing from the arrangement. He stated that a leading article in "The Times" made him doubt the feasibility of the scheme. "The impression is," he wrote, "that I am being relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the war."

On the same day the following announcement appeared in the press:

The prime minister, with a view to the most active prosecution of the war, has decided to advise his majesty the king to consent to a reconstruction of the government.

It may have been given to the leader writer of "The Times" to make history and produce a sudden change in the decision of Mr. Asquith. It is, however, more probable that the newspaper article was merely used as a pretext for abandoning the arrangement, as the Unionists two days before it appeared had decided to resign. Some of Mr. Asquith's principal colleagues were scarcely pleased at the position to which they were being reduced, and were not averse from the policy of their chief resigning and forming a strong opposition, hoping to return to power at an early date after the overthrow of Mr. Lloyd George.

During the whole of this day (Monday, December 4) the prime minister was engaged in discussions about the proposed reconstruction of the Cabinet, and its Liberal members met to examine the situation. Mr. Asquith wrote the same day to Mr. Lloyd George:

The king gave me to-day authority to ask and accept the resignations of all my colleagues, and to form a new government on such lines as I should submit to him. I start, therefore, with a clean slate. After full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a committee could be made workable and effective without the prime minister as its chairman.

I quite agree that it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the chairmanship to another minister as his representative and locum tenens, but (if he is to retain the authority which corresponds to his responsibility as prime minister) he must

MR. ASQUITH RESIGNS

continue to be, as he always has been, its permanent president. I am satisfied, on reflection, that any other arrangement (such, for instance, as the one which I indicated to you in my letter of to-day) would be found in experience impracticable and incompatible with the retention of the prime minister's final and supreme control.

In constitutional practice Mr. Asquith was quite right in claiming the position of chairman for the prime minister,* and also in requiring, as he did, that the committee's decisions should be subject to approval or disapproval by the Cabinet. But when a violent storm is raging the niceties of constitutional procedure must yield to the stern necessities of the hour.

Mr. Lloyd George thereupon stated that he should leave the government, and the sequel was that on the same day Mr. Asquith handed his resignation to the king. He had been continuously prime minister since April, 1908, nearly nine years, a period longer than that of any of his predecessors since Lord Liverpool. His retirement was inevitable if the war was to be won, but the nation should not forget his gifts as an orator, his calm dignity under provocation, his indifference to material rewards, his contempt for advertisement, his attainments as a scholar, and his unfailing courtesy to all. After 30 years spent in the public service, he left it as he entered it—a great gentleman.

On Mr. Asquith's resignation the king sent for Mr. Bonar Law. But the Unionist leader, though assured of the cordial support of Mr. Lloyd George, was not able to arrange what he considered a stable government. In these circumstances the king asked Mr. Lloyd George to form an administration, and on the afternoon of December 6 the Welsh statesman agreed to undertake the task. He was already certain of the assistance of Mr. Bonar Law, with whom he had been in close communication for some days, and he took steps to secure the help of another influential Unionist, Mr. A. J. Balfour, who also consented to serve under him.

Mr. Lloyd George turned next to the leaders of the Labour party, for whose support he was also anxious. On December 7 he had an interview with Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. G. J. Wardle, Mr. W. Brace and Mr. C. H. Roberts, and convinced them that the working classes of the kingdom had a supreme opportunity of taking a large and active part in both the conduct of the war and the reorganization of the country and empire. On the same day the Labour leaders held a private meeting at the

THE HOME FRONT

House of Commons to decide what attitude they should adopt towards the new government. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Philip Snowden and other pacifists denounced the proposal to federate the trade unions even temporarily with the Conservative and Liberal forces that Mr. Lloyd George was directing. But Mr. Henderson was strongly supported by Mr. Brace, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Hodge, Mr. G. N. Barnes, Mr. O'Grady and other representatives of the large trade unions. By the vote of the majority it was decided to take part in the new government. On the same afternoon the Liberal war committee met and resolved to support Mr. Lloyd George. The Welsh Liberal representatives also gathered around the first Welsh prime minister in history. The result was that, without resorting to a general election, Mr. Lloyd George obtained in the House of Commons a majority which made him independent of the men whose aim was to defeat him in time to arrange general terms of peace.

The dispute between Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mr. Wardle on the one hand and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Snowden on the other hand, was clearly decided at the Labour party conference on January 23, 1917. The delegates, representing more than 2,000,000 workers and voting by card, gave a majority of 1,542,000 for the new government. This was a remarkable increase over the vote given the previous year in practical support of the Coalition government.

As Mr. Lloyd George's chief lieutenant, Mr. Bonar Law became chancellor of the exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. Mr. Balfour became secretary for foreign affairs, Mr. Austen Chamberlain secretary for India, and Mr. Walter Long secretary for the Colonies. The important posts of first lord of the Admiralty and secretary for war were filled by Sir Edward Carson and Lord Derby. Lord Curzon joined the ministry as lord president of the council to assist in the general direction of affairs. Lord Milner and Mr. Arthur Henderson became ministers without portfolios.

A promising element in the new administration was the force of experts and business men that Mr. Lloyd George called to his council. The intricate affairs of food control were entrusted to Lord Devonport, formerly Sir Hudson Kearley, M.P., who had shown remarkable talent and firmness in public administration as chairman of the Port of London Authority. He was assisted by Captain Charles Bathurst, later Lord Bledisloe. As president

THE NEW MINISTRY

of the board of agriculture the earl of Crawford was replaced by Mr. Rowland Prothero, historian of British agriculture and former agent to the duke of Bedford. More important than the appointment of Mr. Prothero was that of Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, of the university of Sheffield, as president of the board of education. Quite as revolutionary was the selection of Sir Joseph Maclay for the new post of shipping controller. Lord Rhondda became president of the local government board. Another man of business genius, Sir Albert Stanley, later Lord Ashfield, the managing director of the London General Omnibus Company and the London Electric Railway system, brought a fresh mind and skilled energy to the work of the board of trade. Lord Cowdray, a contractor, engineer and petroleum magnate, found scope for his talents as chief of the air board, where he placed the provision of their material under the ministry of munitions.

New political powers were given to the latest force in British politics—the Labour representatives. A ministry of labour was created and placed under Mr. John Hodge, who began to prepare for demobilization by reorganizing and extending the labour exchanges. Mr. George Barnes was also provided with a new post, that of minister of pensions. Two other Labour leaders, Mr. W. Brace and Mr. C. H. Roberts, were given positions in the home office and the board of trade.

In regard to the relations of the war committee and the Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George saw no reason to pursue his old plan for a committee of public safety. A committee consisting of Mr. Lloyd George as prime minister, Mr. Henderson and Lord Milner as ministers without portfolios, and Lord Curzon, lord president of the council and leader of the House of Lords, was formed to direct the war, and was known as the War Cabinet.

The speed with which the new prime minister formed his brilliant administration was very remarkable. The political crisis opened on December 1 and ended on December 7, 1916. Within a week a clear, fresh, invigorating spirit swept the kingdom and blew over the seas. To France and Italy the news of the end of the long reign of the party of compromise and the beginning of the rule of a truly national British party came as a source of hope and great encouragement. The Italians, who had long been deeply interested in the personality of Mr. Lloyd George, hailed him with the title of prime minister of Europe. To them he was the incarnation of the genius of modern democracy.

THE HOME FRONT

To the French it was the success of his work as minister of munitions that made the new premier an example of democratic genius. They looked upon him as a greater Carnot—the organizer of victories—and rejoiced he had at last won the control of the war on the British side.

In "A short History of the Great War," Professor A. F. Pollard gives an excellent, if caustic, account of the new administration.

The genesis of the movement which led to the Cabinet crisis of the first week in December remains obscure, and the transference of power was effected within the camarilla itself without so much as a reference to the House of Commons and still less to the electorate. The old system of Cabinet government and collective responsibility disappeared and, while ministers multiplied until they numbered 90, there was little connexion or cohesion between the endless departments. They were all subject, however, to the control of the new War Cabinet, which soon consisted, like the old war committee, of seven members. The old body of 23 was reduced to less than a third its size for the purposes of supreme direction and deliberation, and increased to twice its numbers for those of departmental execution. The higher functions were still reserved for the much abused politicians; three of them had been members of the old war committee, and all of them, with the exception of General Smuts who was recruited in June, had been members of the old Cabinet. So-called business men were, however, admitted to departmental duties, though the most striking successes were achieved by two ministers of academic training, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, president of the board of education, and Mr. R. E. Prothero, president of the board of agriculture. Both navy and army were entrusted to civilians for political reasons, though one retired in July, 1917, when the submarine campaign had reached its zenith, and the other as a result of the German offensive in March, 1918. Deliberation had been the foible of the Asquith regime; the characteristic of his successors was the speed of its versatility. The War Cabinet's agenda resembled nothing so much as a railway time table with ten minutes allowed on an average for the decision of each supremely important question reserved for its discussion; and departmental changes recurred with a rapidity which was reminiscent of French governments in times of peace.

CHAPTER 29

V.C. Heroes of the War—(III)

BETWEEN August 4, 1916, and August 3, 1917, 145 officers and men received the Victoria Cross. This number was nearly equal to the total awards made during the first two years of the war. A considerable number of those made in this period were for acts of valour actually performed earlier in the war, while the large increase in the British forces also helped to account for the increase. Of these 145 crosses 10 were awarded to the navy and five were won by airmen. Thirty were given to men from the Oversea Dominions—17 falling to Australians, eight to Canadians, three to South Africans, and two to New Zealanders. Of the remaining 100, three were carried off by the R.A.M.C., three by the artillery, two by the cavalry, two by Indian regiments, one by the Royal Engineers, and one by the chaplains' department. Eighty-eight remain to be accounted for. Of these, two fell to the Guards, and two to the Honourable Artillery Company. We will take the navy first.

On September 16, 1916, "The London Gazette" contained the notification of the award of three Victoria Crosses for valour displayed in the battle of Jutland. The recipients were Boy First Class John Travers Cornwell, Commander the Hon. Edward Barry Stewart Bingham, and Major Francis John William Harvey, R.M.L.I.

"Jack" Cornwell is the boy hero of the war. At one time a boy scout in the St. Mary's Mission Troop, East Ham, the lad lived up to the scout motto, "Be prepared," and the undaunted spirit in which he confronted death immortalized his name and made him a noble exemplar for all boys throughout all time. Mortally wounded early in the battle, the gallant lad, who was under 16½ years of age, remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders until the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded round him.

Commander the Hon. Edward Barry Stewart Bingham, R.N., H.M.S. Nestor, was awarded the Victoria Cross for the gallant manner in which he led his destroyer division to their attack,

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

first upon enemy destroyers and then upon enemy battle cruisers. He finally sighted the enemy battle fleet and, followed by the *Nicator*, closed to within 3,000 yards in order to obtain a favourable position for firing his torpedoes. While making this attack the *Nestor* and *Nicator* were under heavy, concentrated fire from the secondary batteries of the German High Seas Fleet. The *Nestor* was sunk subsequently, and Commander Bingham was taken prisoner by the enemy, being the only winner of the Victoria Cross in the great fight off Jutland to survive the battle.

Major Francis John William Harvey, R.M.L.I., earned the cross when in the very throes of death. Mortally wounded by the explosion of a shell in "Q" turret of the *Lion*, and almost the only survivor of the explosion, he maintained his presence of mind and ordered the magazine to be flooded, thereby saving the ship. He died shortly afterwards. Another Jutland V.C. was Commander Loftus William Jones, R.N., who, on the afternoon of May 31, 1916, took his division into action against the German battle cruiser squadron, and there, badly hit, the *Shark* stayed with her engines and steering-gear out of action, and the pipes which connected up steam blown away. A shell took off the commander's leg above the knee, but, undaunted, he continued to give orders to the gun's crew, now reduced to three, while a chief stoker improvised a tourniquet round his thigh. The *Shark* was sinking quickly now and a German destroyer was coming quite close, so the captain gave the order "Save yourselves!" And then the German destroyer came near, fired a torpedo into her, there was an explosion, and she sank with her flag flying. Her commander was helped on to a raft, but died a few hours after, the six survivors being rescued later by a Danish ship.

On January 31, 1917, the king approved the posthumous grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Humphry Osbaldeston Brooke Firman, R.N., and Lieutenant Commander Charles Henry Cowley, R.N.V.R., in recognition of their conspicuous gallantry in an attempt to reprovision the force besieged in Kut-el-Amara on April 24 of the previous year. Starvation was then bringing General Townshend's fine resistance to an inevitable end, and as a last forlorn hope the relief army decided to send a supply ship up the river. Accordingly, at eight p.m. that day, the *Julnar*, manned by a crew from the Royal Navy and commanded by the two officers named, left Felahieh with 270 tons of supplies. She was, however, discovered and shelled on her passage up the

HEROES OF THE MYSTERY SHIPS

river. At one a.m. on the 25th, General Townshend reported that she had not arrived, and that at midnight a burst of heavy firing had been heard at Magasis, some eight and a half miles from Kut by river, which had suddenly ceased. There could be little doubt that the enterprise had failed, and the next day the air service reported the Julnar in the hands of the Turks. The two officers had been killed and the crew taken prisoner.

On April 21, 1917, the Victoria Cross was awarded to Commander (now Rear Admiral) Gordon Campbell, D.S.O., for his remarkable exploits while in command of "Q" ships. He had already destroyed a number of German submarines, but on February 17, while in command of the mystery ship Q 5 off the south-west of Ireland, he deliberately allowed her to be torpedoed by the German submarine U 83, sent most of the crew away in the boats, and thus lulling the commander of the submarine into false security induced him to come to the surface. Only then did Commander Campbell unmask his guns and open fire, and U 83 sank in a few minutes. Though the Q 5 was almost water-logged Commander Campbell succeeded in beaching her. A little later Commander Campbell had the honour of having the V.C. awarded to his mystery ship, the Pargust, under one of the statutes of the Victoria Cross which authorizes the award to any unit that has specially distinguished itself, the actual recipients, one or more officers and men, to be chosen by secret ballot. In this case those chosen were Lieutenant R. N. Stuart, D.S.O., R.N.R., and Seaman W. Williams, R.N.R. Another naval V.C. was Acting Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Commander) William Edward Sandars, R.N.R., who gained the honour for "conspicuous gallantry, consummate coolness and skill while in command of one of his majesty's ships."


First in chronological order of the five airmen awarded the Victoria Cross was Captain (Temporary Major) Lionel Wilmot Brabazon Rees, R.A. and R.F.C. On July 1, 1916, he met a squadron of 10 hostile aeroplanes near Double Crassiers, France, and attacked and dispersed them, afterwards returning, wounded in the thigh, to the British lines. Sergeant Thomas Mottershead, 20th squadron R.F.C., received his cross for most conspicuous bravery, endurance, and skill when, attacked at an altitude of 9,000 feet, he had his petrol tank pierced and his machine set on fire near Ploegsteert Wood, France. Enveloped in flames, which his observer, Lieutenant Gower, was unable to subdue, this

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)


gallant airman succeeded in bringing his aeroplane back to the British lines. The machine collapsed, however, on touching the ground, pinning the unfortunate pilot beneath the wreckage, from which he was released only to die.

Popular acclamation greeted the award of the cross to Lieutenant William Leece Robinson, Worcester Regiment and R.F.C., for his intrepidity and skill in destroying a Zeppelin at Cuffley on September 3, 1916. Although not the first airman to destroy a Zeppelin, having been anticipated by Lieutenant Warneford, V.C., Lieutenant Robinson was the first to bring down one of the raiding airships upon English soil, and his achievement was hailed with relief as assurance that the days of the Zeppelin menace were numbered. The posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to Captain Albert Ball, D.S.O., M.C., 7th battalion Notts and Derby Regiment and R.F.C., crowned the career of the greatest airman this country produced during the war. He was awarded the Victoria Cross for "most conspicuous and consistent bravery from April 25 to May 6, 1917, during which period Captain Ball took part in 26 combats in the air and destroyed 11 hostile aeroplanes, drove down two out of control, and forced several others to land." Lieutenant Frank Hubert McNamara, R.F.C., a member of the Australian forces, the fifth and last airman to win the Victoria Cross in the third year of the war, showed conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty in Egypt on March 20, 1917, during an aerial bomb attack upon a hostile construction train, when one of the British pilots was forced to land behind the enemy's lines. Lieutenant McNamara descended under heavy rifle fire, and despite a serious wound in his thigh, rescued the pilot, setting fire to the abandoned machine. Although weak from loss of blood, Lieutenant McNamara flew the damaged aeroplane back to the aerodrome, a distance of 70 miles, and so completed the rescue of his comrade.

In addition to Lieutenant McNamara, 17 Australian soldiers were awarded the Victoria Cross in the third year of the war. Utter disregard of danger characterized the qualifying performance of Second Lieutenant Arthur Seaforth Blackburn, of the 10th battalion Australian infantry at Pozières, France. On July 23, 1916, he was directed, with 50 men, to drive the enemy from a strong point. He personally led four separate parties of bombers, many of whom became casualties, against the enemy trench, and in face of fierce opposition captured 250 yards of it.



Famous double bridge across the Danube at Gernavod. Right, a close view of one of the massive bridge towers. German and Hungarian forces occupied the town and burned the bridge, October, 1940.




General view of Constantza, evacuated by Rumanians October 22, 1940.

III-FATED RUMANIAN TOWN AND BRIDGE



MACKENSEN ENTERS BUKAREST IN TRIUMPH. After successfully piercing the Carpathians the Rumanian army round itself fronted by the Germans under Field Marshal Mackensen; and the autumn saw a complete debacle ending with the fall of Bukarest on December 6, 1916.

Imperial War Museum



ON THE SALONICA FRONT. An ammunition dump of the Serbians fighting in the Allied army under General Sarrail based on Salonica. By 1916 a considerable force was available for an advance through Macedonia in order to attack the Austrian and Bulgarian invaders.



ALLIED FLEET OFF SALAMIS. The Allies landed forces at Salamina in October, 1915, and, although their attempts to help Serbia came to nothing, they decided to hold the city as a base for further operations. The Allied fleet assisted by blockading Greece and safeguarding the Salamina front.

GALLANTRY AT POZIÈRES

About the same time four privates of the Australian infantry won their crosses. Private Thomas Cooke, of the 8th battalion, paid for his determination and devotion to duty with his life. After a Lewis gun had been disabled, he was ordered to take his gun and gun team to a dangerous part of the line at Pozières. This he did, coming under such heavy fire that at last only he was left alive. He continued to fire his gun until death overtook him. Equally brave and resolute was Private William Jackson, of the 17th battalion, of whom the "Gazette" declared that "his work has always been marked by the greatest coolness and bravery."

Remarkable exploits were performed by Private John Leak, of the 9th battalion at Pozières. When the enemy's bombs were outranging the British, he jumped out of the trench, ran forward under heavy fire at close range, and threw three bombs into the enemy's bombing post. Utter contempt of danger was displayed, too, by Private Martin O'Meara, 16th battalion, while saving many lives at Pozières. He repeatedly went out and brought in wounded officers and men from No Man's Land under intense artillery and machine gun fire, and carried up ammunition and bombs through a heavy barrage to a portion of trenches which was being heavily shelled. Sergeant Claude Charles Castleton, of the 5th battalion Machine Gun Company, represented Australia in a list of 12 Victoria Crosses awarded on September 27, 1916—posthumously, in his case, for he lost his life after saving several of his comrades near Pozières. Captain Henry William Murray, D.S.O., D.C.M., 13th battalion, earned the cross by "wonderful work" at Stormy trench, north-east of Gueudecourt, France.

Second Lieutenant (Temporary Captain) Percy Herbert Cherry, 26th battalion A.I.F., was awarded the decoration for "most conspicuous bravery, determination, and leadership when in command of a company detailed to storm and clear a village." After all the officers of his company had become casualties, Lieutenant Cherry carried on at Lagnicourt, France, in face of fierce opposition, and later exhibited qualities of the born leader by taking charge of the situation and beating off the "most resolute counter-attacks" made by the enemy. He was wounded early in the day, and was killed late in the afternoon.

In one of the longest lists of awards of the Victoria Cross, containing 29 names, appeared those of six Australians—a most

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

creditable proportion. One of these was Lieutenant F. H. McNamara, R.F.C., the story of whose deed has been told already. Another was Captain James Ernest Newlands, 12th battalion A.I.F. "In face of heavy odds" Captain Newlands displayed "most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty" on three separate occasions at Bapaume-Cambrai road, west of Bourisies and north-east of Lagnicourt, France.

His brother-officer, Lieutenant Charles Pope, awarded the Victoria Cross at the same time in April, 1917, at Louveral, was ordered to hold a certain picket-post at all costs, and was being heavily attacked. Ammunition had run short, and in order to save the position Lieutenant Pope was seen to charge with his picket into a superior force, by which they were overpowered. His body, with those of most of his men, was found in close proximity to 80 enemy dead.

Sergeant John Woods Whittle distinguished himself on two occasions. On the first he was in command of a platoon when the enemy attacked the small trench he was holding and forced an entry into it by sheer weight of numbers, whereupon Sergeant Whittle collected all the men available, charged the enemy, and recovered the position. On the second occasion the enemy broke through the left of the British line and endeavoured to bring up a machine gun to enfilade the position. The sergeant rushed alone across the fire-swept ground, attacked the hostile gun crew before the gun could be got into action, and succeeded in killing the entire crew and in bringing the machine gun into the position.

As brave an exploit as any that won the Victoria Cross in the first three years of the war was that performed by Private Jorgan Christian Jensen. With five comrades he attacked a barricade behind which more than 40 of the enemy were concealed with a machine gun at Noreuil. One of his party shot the gunner, and Jensen rushed the post. He then sent one of his prisoners to order a neighbouring party of the enemy to surrender; this they did, but were fired upon by some other British troops who were unaware of the capitulation. Wholly regardless of personal danger, Jensen immediately stood up in the barricade and, waving his helmet, caused the firing to cease, after which he sent his prisoners into the British lines. One of Jensen's comrades, Private Thomas James Bede Kenny, performed an act of super-heroism at Hermies. His platoon was held up by very heavy fire at close range, and Private Kenny dashed forward alone, killed

AUSTRALIAN CROSSES

a man in advance of the point who tried to bar his way, bombed the position, captured the gun crew and the gun.

"Magnificent" bravery characterized the behaviour which won the Victoria Cross for Lieutenant Rupert Vance Moon, 58th battalion, A.I.F., in the course of an attack upon an enemy strong point. He was wounded three times during the advance, but continued to lead his men with the utmost valour, and only when he was seriously wounded a fourth time while consolidating the trench did he retire from the field. Again, near Bullecourt, a very brave Australian, Corporal George Julian Howell, on his own initiative, singlehanded, and exposed to heavy bomb and rifle fire, climbed on to the top of the parapet and proceeded to bomb the enemy, pressing them back along the trench. Having exhausted his supply of bombs he attacked the enemy with the bayonet, and shortly afterwards was severely wounded.

On the last day of the third year of the war 10 Victoria Crosses were awarded, two of them to Australian soldiers. Captain Robert Cuthbert Grieve, at Messines during an attack on the enemy, located two hostile machine guns which were holding up the advance. Under continuous fire from these he bombed and killed the two gun teams, reorganized the remnants of his company, and gained his original objective, being wounded during the proceedings. Private John Carroll, at St. Ives, France, was also the hero of a singlehanded deed. Immediately the barrage lifted in an attack, he rushed the enemy trench and bayoneted four of its occupants. Noticing a comrade in difficulties, he went to his aid and killed another of the foe. He then attacked a machine gun with a crew of four men hidden in a shell hole; killed three of the men and captured the gun. Later on he extricated two of his comrades who were buried by a shell.

Among five soldiers who received the distinction on June 15, 1917, were two New Zealanders, Sergeant Donald Forrester Brown, 2nd New Zealand infantry, who showed great bravery in storming and taking several German machine gun positions south-east of High Wood, France, but was killed before his honour was gazetted, and Lance Corporal Samuel Trickleton, who was twice wounded, the second time severely, while attacking and destroying enemy machine gun positions at Messines. He dashed forward at the head of his section and with bombs destroyed a machine gun position which was causing heavy casualties. He received a severe wound. Private William

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

Frederick Faulds was the first of three South Africans to be awarded the cross. During an attack at Delville Wood he rescued in broad daylight an officer, Lieutenant Craig, who lay wounded midway between the lines, and carried him back, being wounded in so doing. Two days later he again brought in a wounded man under heavy fire and carried him nearly half a mile to a dressing station. Captain William Anderson Bloomfield, Scouts Corps, South African Mounted Brigade, being heavily attacked and forced to retire with his men to a new position found that one of his wounded had been left behind, and went out over 400 yards of fire-swept ground and brought him in. Sergeant Frederick Charles Booth, South African forces, attached to the Rhodesian Native Regiment, earned his cross at Johannesburg, near Sougea, East Africa. Under heavy rifle fire he brought in a wounded man. Later he rallied native troops who were badly disorganized.

Three Canadian officers and five Canadian private soldiers were awarded the Victoria Cross in the third year of the war. Private (Acting Corporal) Clarke was detailed with his section of bombers to clear the continuation of a newly captured trench and cover the construction of a "block" near Pozières. After most of his party had become casualties, he was building a "block" when a counter-attack was made by about 20 enemy and two officers. They were driven off singlehanded by Private Clarke, who killed five of them and captured a sixth. Private Kerr was awarded the cross for an exploit at Courcellette. When during an attack bombs were running short he ran along the parados and opened fire at point-blank range. The enemy, thinking they were surrounded, surrendered, and Private Kerr captured 250 yards of trench and 62 prisoners.

Four Canadian soldiers figured in the list of 29 Victoria Crosses awarded on June 9, 1917. Captain Thain Wendell MacDowell, D.S.O., rounded up a very strong enemy machine gun post in the face of great difficulties at Vimy ridge, capturing two machine guns besides two officers and 75 men. Although wounded, he continued for five days to hold the position until he was relieved. The second Canadian officer in this list was Lieutenant Frederick Maurice Watson Harvey, Lord Strathcona's Horse. During an attack on the village of Guyencourt, a party of the enemy ran forward to a wired trench just in front of the village and opened rapid fire and machine gun fire at a very close range,

CANADIAN BRAVERY

causing heavy casualties in the leading troop, of which Lieutenant Harvey was in command. Lieutenant Harvey ran forward well ahead of his men, dashed at the trench, jumped the wire, shot the machine gunner, and captured the gun.

Lance Sergeant Ellis Welwood Sifton, 18th battalion Canadian infantry, was awarded the cross posthumously, for locating a machine gun at Neuville St. Vaast that was holding up his company, charging it singlehanded and killing all the crew. He was killed while performing his great deed. Private William Johnstone Milne also sacrificed his life in winning his Victoria Cross by a deed similar to that of Lance Sergeant Sifton. Near Thélus, France, he twice crept towards a machine gun that was firing on the advancing troops, killed the crew with bombs, and captured the gun. Shortly after the second feat he was killed.

Lieutenant Robert Grierson Combe was killed in the action in the course of which he won the Victoria Cross. He steadied his company under intense fire south of Acheville, France, and led them through the enemy barrage, reaching the objective with only five men. With great coolness and courage he proceeded to bomb the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties; and then, collecting small groups of men, he succeeded in capturing the company objective and 40 prisoners. The fourth Canadian was Private John George Pattison, who at Vimy ridge advanced on a machine gun position which was holding up the advance. Going from shell hole to shell hole he reached cover within 30 yards of it, and, after killing and wounding some of the gun team with bombs, advanced and bayoneted the remaining five gunners.

Three members of the R.A.M.C. and one member of the chaplain's department gained the Victoria Cross at this time. Captain John Leslie Green, R.A.M.C., lost his own life while trying to save another's at Fonquevillers, France. Himself wounded at the time, he went to the assistance of an officer who was hung up wounded on the enemy's wire entanglements and succeeded in dragging him to a shell hole, where he dressed his wounds, notwithstanding that bombs and rifle grenades were being hurled at him the whole time. In endeavouring to bring the wounded officer into safe cover Captain Green was killed. "Conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty" were exhibited by Captain William Barnsley Allen, M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C., near Mesnil, France, on September 3, 1916. Gun detachments were unloading high-explosive ammunition from wagons which had

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

just come up when the Germans suddenly shelled the battery position. The first shell fell in one of the limbers, exploding the ammunition and causing several casualties. Captain Allen at once ran across the open, under heavy shell fire, and by his promptness in dressing their wounds saved many men from bleeding to death. He was himself hit four times.

Captain Noel Godfréy Chavasse, M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C., was given the Victoria Cross for courage and self-sacrifice "beyond praise" at Guillemont, France, and Wieltje, Flanders. He tended wounded in the open all day, under heavy fire the whole time and frequently in view of the enemy. That same night he searched for wounded on the ground in front of the enemy's lines for four hours. Next day he went with one stretcher-bearer to the advanced trenches, and under intense shell fire carried an urgent case for 500 yards into safety, being himself wounded on the journey. That night he rescued three more wounded men from a shell hole near the enemy's trench. Altogether he saved the lives of some 20 badly wounded men, to say nothing of the ordinary cases which passed through his hands. It was announced in August, 1917, that this gallant officer had died of wounds.

The chaplain to whom the cross was given was the Rev. William Robert Fountaine Addison. He showed conspicuous bravery at Sanna-i-Yat, Mesopotamia, April 9, 1916, in carrying a wounded man to the cover of a trench and assisted several others to the same refuge after binding up their wounds under heavy rifle and machine gun fire. Sapper William Hackett, Royal Engineers, displayed marvellous courage when entombed with four other men in a gallery owing to the explosion of an enemy mine. The party made a hole, after 20 hours' work, and Hackett helped out three of the men and could have followed them to safety, but the fourth man had been seriously injured, and Hackett refused to leave him. Finally the gallery collapsed and the two were killed.

Three Victoria Crosses were awarded to the artillery. Sergeant William Gosling, R.F.A., won his by an act of courage near Arras that was supremely great. He was in charge of a heavy trench mortar, and, owing to a faulty cartridge, the bomb after discharge fell 10 yards from the mortar. The sergeant sprang out, lifted the nose of the bomb from the ground into which it had sunk, unscrewed the fuse, and threw it on the ground, where it immediately exploded. Second Lieutenant Thomas Harold

TWO CAVALRY OFFICERS

Broadbent Maufe, R.G.A., showed rare initiative as well as great courage at Feuchy, France. Under intense artillery fire he repaired, unaided, the telephone line between the forward and the rear positions, thereby enabling his battery to open immediate fire upon the enemy. Further, he extinguished a fire in an advanced ammunition dump, thus averting a serious disaster.

Major (later Brigadier General) Frederick William Lumsden, D.S.O., R.M.A., was the first member of the Marine Artillery to win the cross since the Crimean War. Six enemy field guns had been captured at Francilly, but it was necessary to leave them in dug-in positions, 300 yards in advance of the position held by the British troops. The enemy kept the captured guns under heavy fire. The major succeeded in sending back two teams with guns, and himself went through the barrage with the team of the third gun. He then went back to the position to await further teams, and these he succeeded in attaching to two of the three remaining guns and dispatching into safety, despite the intense rifle fire. Returning yet again, Lumsden got away the last gun, in the face of the enemy, who had by now driven through and blown up the breach.

The two cavalry officers who gained the Victoria Cross were at the time dismounted. Captain (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) Adrian Carton de Wiart, D.S.O., Dragoon Guards, won his cross on September 11, 1916. After three other battalion commanders had become casualties he controlled their commands and ensured that the ground won was maintained. He frequently exposed himself in the organization of positions and of supplies, passing unflinchingly through barrage fire of the most intense nature. Second Lieutenant John Spencer Dunville, of the Dragoons, when in charge of a party of scouts and Royal Engineers engaged in the demolition of the enemy's wire near Epehy, placed himself between a non-commissioned officer of the engineers and the enemy's fire, and thus protected the N.C.O. who was enabled to complete a piece of work of great importance. Dunville was severely wounded, and succumbed later to his wounds.

One of the two Victoria Crosses awarded to representatives of Indian regiments was won by Naji Shahamad Khan, Punjabis, who, singlehanded, beat off counter-attacks with a machine gun and held a gap in the British line under very heavy fire for three hours. Major George Campbell Wheeler, Gurkha Rifles, Indian army, won the cross at Shumran on the Tigris. Accompanied

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

by another Gurkha officer and eight men, Major Wheeler crossed a river and rushed the enemy's trench under heavy bombing, rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. When afterwards counter-attacked by a strong body of the enemy he charged with his brother-officer and three men and, despite a severe wound, dispersed the enemy and consolidated the position.

Fifteen Victoria Crosses were awarded on October 27, 1916, and two of these went to the Guards. Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) John Vaughan Campbell, D.S.O., Coldstream Guards, on two separate occasions at Ginchy in the battle of the Somme rallied his men with the utmost gallantry, once leading them against the enemy machine guns, which he captured, killing their teams, and once, at a critical moment, leading them through an intense enemy barrage against the objective, being one of the first to enter the trench. Lance Sergeant Fred McNess, Scots Guards, distinguished himself near Ginchy by coolness and resource in some very fierce fighting. When the first line of enemy trenches had been reached, it was found that the left flank was exposed, and that the enemy was bombing down the trench. McNess thereupon led a counter-attack in person. Although very severely wounded he went on, passing through a barrage of enemy bombs, in order to bring up fresh supplies of bombs to his own men. Finally he established a "block," and continued encouraging his men and throwing bombs until he collapsed through exhaustion.

In March, 1917, it was announced that the Victoria Cross had been conferred upon the following officer and non-commissioned officers of the 1st battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in recognition of most conspicuous bravery displayed: Captain (Temporary Major) Cuthbert Bromley, Sergeant Frank Edward Stubbs, and Corporal (later Sergeant) John Grimshaw. They won their honours on April 25, 1915, during the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula to the west of Cape Helles, and were selected by their comrades as having performed the most signal acts of bravery and devotion to duty. In the case of Major Bromley and Sergeant Stubbs the award was posthumous, the former having been drowned in the Royal Edward on August 14, 1915, and the latter having died of wounds. The other Gallipoli hero was Lance Corporal Walter Richard Parker, R.M.L.I., R.N.D., whose award of the cross was made on June 23, 1917.

COLONEL R. B. BRADFORD

Only seven awards of the Victoria Cross were officially linked with particular battle areas on the western front during the year under review. The first of these in point of date were earned on September 3, 1916, by Captain W. B. Allen, R.A.M.C., at Mesnil, as already narrated, and by Private Thomas Hughes, of the Connaught Rangers, at Guillemont. The award in the latter case was announced on October 27, 1916, as follows: "for most conspicuous bravery and determination at Guillemont, September 3, 1916." Private Thomas Alfred Jones, Cheshire Regiment, won his cross at Morval, France, on September 25. He detected a sniper at 200 yards' distance, returned his fire and killed him. He shot two more Germans who were firing at him, and then, as the firing continued, he walked over to the German trenches quite alone, and, singlehanded, disarmed 102 of the enemy, including three or four officers, and marched them back to the British lines.

Temporary Captain Archie Cecil Thomas White, Yorkshire Regiment, earned his cross at Stuff redoubt, September 27-October 6, 1916, where for four days and nights he held his position when commanding the troops holding the southern and western sides. The Germans, in greatly superior numbers, almost succeeded in ejecting the British from the redoubt, but Captain White led a counter-attack which finally cleared the enemy from the threatened points. Eaucourt l'Abbaye was the scene of the heroism which won the cross for Lieutenant (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) Roland Boys Bradford, M.C., Durham Light Infantry, on October 1, 1916, when his bravery and leadership saved the situation on the right flank of his brigade and of the division. Colonel Bradford's battalion was in support, and, at a critical moment, he asked permission to command an exposed battalion whose commander was wounded, as well as his own. Permission being given, he proceeded to the foremost lines, where by his fearless energy under fire of every description and by his skilful leadership of the two battalions he rallied the attack, captured and defended the objective, and so secured the flank.

On November 13, 1916, opposite the Hebuterne sector, Private John Cunningham, East Yorkshire Regiment, went with a bombing section up a communication trench, where such fierce resistance was encountered that all save he became casualties. Collecting bombs from his wounded comrades, Cunningham went on alone and, having exploded the entire supply, returned for more.

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

Lance Sergeant (later Second Lieutenant) Frederick William Palmer, Royal Fusiliers, was honoured for "most conspicuous bravery, coolness and determination" north of Courcellette, February 17, 1917. He assumed command of his company after all the officers had become casualties, rushed the enemy trench with six of his men, and dislodging the machine gun which had been hampering the advance, established a "block." Palmer held the barricade for three hours against eight counter-attacks.

Captain (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) Bernard Cyril Freyberg, D.S.O., Royal West Surrey Regiment and Royal Naval Division, was awarded the Victoria Cross on December 15, 1916, for his brilliant leadership of the Naval Division, which, with others, captured Beaucourt and Beaumont-Hamel, north of Ancre, France, on the previous November 13. Colonel Freyberg's conduct during the war had already been most distinguished, with the Naval Division at Antwerp, and also in Gallipoli, where he earned the D.S.O. in the Gulf of Xeros, on the eve of the landing, by swimming ashore two miles from a destroyer to light flares on the beach in order to confuse the Turks as to the precise spot chosen for the disembarkation.

On the occasion when he won the Victoria Cross he carried the initial attack with great personal gallantry straight through the enemy's front system of trenches. His command became somewhat disorganized under the intense fire to which it was subjected, but Colonel Freyberg rallied and re-formed his men, including some from other units who had become intermixed with them. He then led a successful assault upon the second objective, where, unsupported, he held the ground for the remainder of the day and throughout the night. Reinforced in the morning, Colonel Freyberg dashing led the assault upon Beaumont-Hamel, capturing the village and 500 prisoners. He was wounded four times during these operations, but refused to leave the line until he had issued his final instructions.

Three crosses awarded to the Yorkshire Regiment were announced together on September 11, 1916. The recipients were Major Stewart Walter Loudoun-Shand, Second Lieutenant Donald Simpson Bell, and Private William Short, not one of whom survived his deed to learn how it had been rewarded. Near Fricourt, France, Major Loudoun-Shand leapt on to the parapet when his men were stopped from going "over the top" by savage machine gun fire, helped his men over it, and

YORKSHIRE AND LANCASHIRE

encouraged them in every way until he fell mortally wounded. Even then he insisted on being propped up, and continued to encourage and stimulate his men until he died. Second Lieutenant Bell was killed five days after performing the deed which won him the cross at Horseshoe trench, France. A very heavy enfilading fire was opened on his attacking company by a machine gun, and Bell crept up a communication trench and then, followed by two of his men, rushed across the fire-swept open and attacked the gun, shooting the gunner with his revolver and destroying gun and personnel with bombs. He was in the act of performing a precisely similar deed when he met his death. Private Short died while performing the act which won him the cross at Munster alley, France. His leg was shattered by a shell.

At Stuff redoubt another cross went to the Yorkshire Regiment on June 14, 1917, the recipient being Second Lieutenant (Acting Captain) David Philip Hirsch, who exhibited remarkable bravery near Wancourt, France, in encouraging his men to dig and hold a hard-won position. Captain Hirsch "continued to encourage his men by standing on the parapet and steadying them in face of machine gun fire and counter-attack until he was killed." The last award to the regiment during the year was made to Private Tom Dresser. He was twice wounded and suffering great pain, but, nevertheless, succeeded in conveying an important message from battalion headquarters to the front line trenches near Roeux, France, where he arrived in an exhausted condition, a feat which "proved of the greatest value to his battalion at a critical period." Private Dresser and Captain White, whose exploit is narrated on a previous page, were the only two survivors of the Yorkshire Regiment heroes.

Three of the four crosses awarded to the Lancashire Fusiliers were for the heroic conduct at the landing on Gallipoli which has been described already. The fourth recipient was Private James Hutchinson, who during an attack entered the enemy's trench at Ficheux, France, shot two sentries, and cleared two of the traverses. When a retirement was ordered, Private Hutchinson on his own initiative undertook the dangerous task of covering the retreat, and did this with great gallantry and determination.

The first of the four Victoria Crosses awarded to the Liverpool Regiment was gazetted in August, 1916, to Private Arthur Herbert Procter. He won the supreme military honour by crossing open ground near Fuchaux, France, under heavy fire to dress the

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

wounds of two comrades, and was thus instrumental in saving their lives, both of them being brought in at dusk. Second Lieutenant Felix Baxter, also of the Liverpool Regiment, was engaged before a raid upon the enemy line near Blairville for two nights in cutting wire close to the enemy trenches. Later he led the left storming party, and was the first man into the trench, shooting the sentry with his revolver. He then assisted to bomb dug-outs, concluding by climbing out of the trench and helping the last man over the parapet. "After this," said the official account, "he was not seen again."

Sergeant David Jones, the third hero of the Liverpool Regiment, was rewarded for bravery, devotion to duty, and ability in the handling of his platoon at Guillemont. He led the platoon, occupied the position, and held it for two days and two nights without food or water until relieved, on the second day driving back three counter-attacks with heavy losses. Captain Oswald Austin Reid, of the Liverpools, consolidated a small post with advanced troops on the side of the Dialah river, Mesopotamia, opposite to the main body, after his line of communications had been cut by the sinking of pontoons. He maintained this position for 30 hours against constant attacks, and it was due to his tenacity that the passage of the river was effected.

Drummer Walter Ritchie, a Glasgow man, the first of the four Seaforth Highlanders to receive the Victoria Cross during the third year of the war, stood on the parapet of an enemy trench north of Beaumont-Hamel, and repeatedly sounded the "charge" under heavy machine gun fire and bomb attacks, rallying many men belonging to various units. Corporal Sidney William Ware, of the Seaforths, picked up a wounded man at Sanna-i-Yat, Mesopotamia, and carried him 200 yards to cover, and then returned for others, moving to and fro under heavy fire for more than two hours, until he had brought in all the wounded and was completely exhausted. "Beyond all praise" was the official comment on the gallantry and devotion of Lieutenant Donald Mackintosh, Seaforth Highlanders, awarded the cross on June 9, 1917. During an advance north of Farnpoux, France, he was shot through the leg, but though crippled he continued to lead his men and captured the trench. Here he collected men of another company who had lost their leader, and drove back a counter-attack. He was wounded again, but, though now unable to stand, he kept control of the

. SOUTH WALES BORDERERS

situation. When only 15 men were left, this indomitable man ordered the party to be ready to advance to the final objective, and getting out of the trench with great difficulty he was encouraging them to advance when he was once more wounded, and fell. Lance Sergeant Thomas Steele, of the Seaforths, was also awarded the cross on June 9. At a critical moment, when the enemy had recovered some captured trenches near Sanna-i-Yat, Sergeant Steele rushed forward and helped a comrade to carry a machine gun into position, and then kept the gun in action until relieved, being "mainly instrumental in keeping the remainder of the line intact."

The cross was also won by a private and an officer of the East Yorkshire Regiment, Private George William Chafer, the award to whom was notified on August 7, 1916, and Second Lieutenant John Harrison, M.C. During a heavy bombardment and attack upon the British trenches east of Meaulte, a man carrying an important message to his company commander was rendered unconscious and half buried by a shell. Chafer took the message from the man's pocket and, although severely wounded in three places, ran along the ruined parapet under heavy fire and just succeeded in delivering it before collapsing from the effect of his wounds. Second Lieutenant Harrison led his company against an enemy trench in a dark wood at Oppy, France, and, being repulsed, reorganized his command and made a second attack in darkness and under heavy fire—again without success. He was reported missing, believed killed.

Superb courage of a perfectly selfless type characterized the deeds for which Private James Henry Fynn was awarded the first of the three Victoria Crosses that went to the South Wales Borderers in 1916-17. He was one of a small party which dug in in front of the British advanced line at Sanna-i-Yat after a night attack and about 300 yards from the enemy's trenches. Seeing several wounded men lying out in the open, Fynn went forward and bandaged them all under heavy fire, making several journeys for the purpose. He then returned to the advanced trench for a stretcher, and being unable to find one, carried a badly wounded man on his back into safety, and going back with a comrade brought in another man. Awarded his cross at the same time as Fynn, Lieutenant (Temporary Captain) Angus Buchanan, of the South Wales Borderers, assisted to carry a wounded brother-officer into safety at Falahiye Lines,

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

Mesopotamia, and going back brought in a second wounded man who had gone to the aid of the officer and had himself been hit. Sergeant Albert White, of the same regiment, made the supreme sacrifice at Monchy in an attempt to capture a machine gun which would probably hold up the advance of his company. "He willingly sacrificed his life," says the official narrative.

The three V.C.'s of the South Lancashire Regiment were Second Lieutenant Gabriel George Coury, Private John Readitt, and Private William Ratcliffe. Lieutenant Coury was in command of two platoons near Arrow Head Copse, France, ordered to dig a communication trench from the old firing line to the position won under intense fire, and it was mainly due to his inspiring confidence that the task was accomplished. Later he brought in his commanding officer, who was lying wounded in full view of the enemy. He also distinguished himself in rallying and leading forward the attacking troops, who showed signs of being shaken. Private Ratcliffe located a machine gun at Messines which was firing on his comrades from the rear, rushed it, bayoneted the crew, and brought the gun back.

One of the outstanding Victoria Cross achievements of the war was that performed by Private John Readitt, while fighting against the Turks at Algayat-al-Gaharbigah Bend, Mesopotamia. The South Lancshires were working down a broad, deep watercourse, and five times Readitt went forward in the face of very heavy machine gun fire at close range, on each occasion being the sole survivor of the party. These advances drove back the enemy machine guns, and in an hour about 300 yards of the watercourse was made good. His officer being killed, Readitt organized and led several more advances, but on reaching the enemy's barricade he was forced by a counter-attack to retire, which he did slowly, continuing to throw bombs the while.

Lieutenant Colonel Bradford, whose work at Eaucourt l'Abbaye has been described already, was the first member of the Durham Light Infantry to win the V.C. during this year. The second was Private Michael Heaviside, a regimental stretcher-bearer. Near Fontaine-les-Croiselles, France, a wounded man was observed in a shell hole about 40 yards from the enemy line making signals of distress and holding up an empty water-bottle. Owing to snipers and machine gun fire it was impossible during daylight to send out a stretcher party, but Heaviside volunteered to carry water and food out to the unfortunate man. Ho

. AN HEROIC MESSAGE BEARER

succeeded in his task despite the intense fire. The same evening Heaviside went out again with two comrades and rescued the wounded man. The third V.C. hero of the Durham Light Infantry was Second Lieutenant Frederick Youens. He rallied the team of a Lewis gun, and while doing so an enemy bomb fell on the gun position without exploding. Youens immediately picked it up and hurled it over the parapet. Shortly afterwards another bomb fell near the same spot, and again Youens picked it up. This bomb, however, burst in his hand before he could fling it away, severely wounding him and also some of his men.

Self-sacrifice was the distinguishing note of the acts that won the Victoria Cross for Privates William Frederick McFadzean and Robert Quigg, of the Royal Irish Rifles. McFadzean, who was only 20 at the time, threw himself upon a box of bombs which had been dropped accidentally, near Thiepval Wood, and was blown to pieces, giving his life without a moment's hesitation to save his comrades. Quigg went out seven times under heavy shell and machine gun fire to look for his platoon officer at Hamel, each time bringing back a wounded man, dragging the last one in on a waterproof sheet from within a few yards of the enemy wire. He was engaged for seven hours in this work.

A most dramatic deed that won the cross was that of Private James Miller, of the Royal Lancaster Regiment. He was carrying an important message at Bazentin-le-Petit, and was obliged to cross open ground under intense fire. Immediately he left the trench he was shot in the back, the bullet coming out through the abdomen. With astonishing fortitude he compressed the gaping wound in his abdomen with his hand, delivered the message, staggered back with the answer, and fell at the feet of the officer to whose hand he committed it. The other soldier of the Royal Lancasters to win the cross was Private Jack White, the first member of the Manchester Jewish community to achieve the honour. During an attempt to cross the river Dialah, White, who was a signaller, saw the two pontoons ahead of him come under heavy fire from machine guns with disastrous effect. When his own pontoon reached mid-stream every man in it except himself was either dead or wounded; and finding himself unable to control it, White jumped overboard, tied a telephone-wire to the pontoon, and towed it to the shore, thereby saving an officer's life and bringing to land the rifles and equipment of the other men in the boat.

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

The two V.C.'s of the Worcester Regiment were Lieutenant Eugene Paul Bennett and Private Thomas George Turrall. The former displayed conspicuous bravery in leading the second wave of an attack to its objective near Le Transloy, France. Isolated there with a party of 60 men, he consolidated the position under heavy fire from both flanks, and, though wounded, remained in effective command. Turrall remained with his officer, Lieutenant Jennings, for three hours under continuous heavy fire at La Boisselle, and at last carried the officer into the British lines.

Second Lieutenant Edgar Kinghorn Myles and Private Herbert William Lewis brought the two Victoria Crosses that were added to the honour of the Welch Regiment in 1916-17. Myles served in the ranks of a Territorial battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment in France, where his conduct gained him a commission. Subsequently he transferred to the regular army and served with the Welch Regiment in Gallipoli. The official account of his V.C. deed says that he went out on several occasions in front of the advanced trenches at Sanna-i-Yat, and, under heavy fire and at great personal risk, assisted wounded men lying in the open, carrying a wounded officer on one occasion to safety under circumstances of great danger. Private Lewis set "a brilliant example of courage, endurance, and devotion to duty" in a trench raid at Salonica. Twice wounded and twice refusing attendance, he searched dug-outs and then, again wounded and again refusing attendance, he attacked and captured three of the enemy. During the retirement he rescued a wounded comrade.

The Royal Welch Fusiliers were represented in the V.C. roll by Corporal Joseph Davies and Private Albert Hill. Davies got separated with eight other men from the rest of his company, and was completely surrounded by the enemy at Delville Wood, France. Taking up a position in a shell hole, the corporal opened rapid fire, and, also throwing bombs, put the foe to flight, whereupon Davies followed them up and ran several through with the bayonet. In the same area Hill's battalion had deployed for an attack upon a wood, and when the order to charge was given he dashed forward and bayoneted two of the enemy. Sent later by his sergeant to get into touch with the company, he was cut off and surrounded by 20 of the enemy, whom he promptly attacked with bombs, killing and wounding many and scattering the rest. He then joined a sergeant of his company and helped him to fight the way back to the lines.

MAJOR CONGREVE

Second Lieutenant George Edward Cates, Rifle Brigade, was one of the several heroes awarded the Victoria Cross for localizing the effect of bombs. East of Bouchavesnes he struck a buried bomb while engaged in deepening a captured trench, and it at once started to burn. In order to save the lives of his comrades, Second Lieutenant Cates placed his foot on the bomb, which immediately exploded, killing the gallant and self-sacrificing man.

The second Victoria Cross to go to the Rifle Brigade during the third year of the war was awarded to Major William La Touche Congreve for most conspicuous bravery in France during the period of 14 days preceding his death at the front in July, 1916. During preliminary preparations for an attack, Major Congreve carried out personal reconnaissances of the enemy lines, taking out parties of officers and non-commissioned officers for over 1,000 yards in front of the British line in order to acquaint them with the ground. Later, by night, he conducted a battalion to the position assigned to it, and afterwards returned to it to ascertain the situation after assault. He then established himself in an exposed forward position, whence he successfully observed the enemy and gave orders necessary to drive them from their position. He had returned to the front line to ascertain the situation after an unsuccessful attack, and was writing his report when he was shot and killed.

The first of the two crosses with which the Leinster Regiment was honoured was won by Lieutenant John Vincent Holland at Guillemont, who led his bombers through the British barrage and cleared a great part of a village in front. He started out with 26 bombers and came back with five, after capturing 50 prisoners. The second cross was awarded to Corporal John Cunningham. While in command of a Lewis gun section at Bois-en-Hache he came under heavy enfilading fire and suffered severely. Wounded and almost alone, Corporal Cunningham reached the objective with his gun, which he brought into action in face of much opposition. Counter-attacked by a party of 20 of the enemy, he exhausted his ammunition against them, and then, standing in full view, began throwing bombs until they were exhausted. He died from his wounds.

Second Lieutenant Tom Edwin Adlam, Bedfordshire Regiment, led his men in bombing attacks at Thiepval throughout the day, and on the following day exhibited equal bravery, continuing to lead his men after a second wound had incapacitated him from

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

throwing bombs. Private Christopher Cox, also of the Bedfordshire Regiment, at Achiet-le-Grand, rescued four men, and later he assisted to bring in the wounded of an adjoining battalion.

On November 27, 1916, two Victoria Crosses were awarded to the Middlesex Regiment, the recipients being Private Frederick Jeremiah Edwards and Private Robert Ryder. The former showed bravery and resource in destroying with bombs an enemy machine gun which was holding up his part of the line at Thiepval, thus clearing up a dangerous situation. Ryder cleared an enemy trench in the same battle by skilful manipulation of his Lewis gun.

Second Lieutenant John Manson Craig and Private David Ross Lauder carried off the two Victoria Crosses awarded to the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The officer exhibited courage of the highest order when an advanced post was rushed by a large party of the enemy in Egypt. He at once organized a rescue party and was removing the dead and wounded when his men came under heavy fire. He took a wounded non-commissioned officer and the medical officer into shelter, being wounded himself in the process, scooped cover for them, and saved their lives. At Cape Helles, Lauder threw a bomb which failed to clear the parapet and fell amongst the bombing party which were retaking a sap. He immediately put his foot upon it, thereby localizing the explosion. His foot was blown off, but his comrades escaped unhurt.

Corporal George Jarratt, Royal Fusiliers, won the cross by a similar act of self-sacrifice. Captured by the enemy, he was placed with some wounded men in a dug-out near Relyes. British troops drove the enemy back, and as they were leaving the position they bombed the dug-outs, including the one in which Jarratt and the others were waiting. Directly the grenade dropped among the wounded men, Jarratt placed both feet on it, having both his legs blown off by the explosion.

The East Surrey Regiment's two heroes were Sergeant Harry Cator and Corporal Edward Foster, both of whom won the Victoria Cross by engaging machine guns which were holding up advances. The sergeant set out near Arras with another man, who was killed, and going on alone he picked up a Lewis gun and reached the northern end of the enemy trench. He continued to hold the end of the trench with the Lewis gun with such effect that the bombing party was able to work along and capture 100 prisoners and five machine guns. Corporal Foster, who had

RECKLESS COURAGE

charge of two Lewis guns at Villers Plovich, engaged two enemy machine guns which were checking the advance. One of his Lewis guns was lost, but "with reckless courage" the corporal rushed forward, bombed the foe, and recovered the gun.

Sergeant John William Ormsby, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, took command of the company and led them forward a quarter of a mile to a new position, which he organized and held until relieved. Private Horace Waller, of the same regiment, when with a bombing section forming a "block" in the enemy line, repulsed two counter-attacks, and after all the little garrison had been put out of action and he himself was wounded, he still continued to throw bombs until killed.

Lieutenant Richard Basil Brandram Jones, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, shot 15 of the enemy as they advanced to recapture Broadmarsh crater, counting them aloud as he did so in order to cheer his men. His ammunition being expended, he took a bomb, but was shot through the head as he rose to throw it. Lieutenant Thomas Orde Lawder Wilkinson, of the same regiment, with two men, held up the enemy with a machine gun at La Boisselle, France, until relief came, and later, when the advance was checked during a bombing raid, forced his way forward and found four or five men of different units stopped by a solid block of earth, over which the enemy were throwing bombs. Mounting a machine gun on the top of the parapet he dispersed the enemy bombers. The last regiment of the line to obtain two Victoria Crosses in this third year was the Northumberland Fusiliers, one of them being awarded to Lance Corporal Thomas Bryan, who did "very far-reaching" work near Arras by disabling an enemy machine gun and killing the team; the other to Private Ernest Sykes, who under intense fire brought in four wounded men.

Second Lieutenant Reginald Leonard Haine and Second Lieutenant Alfred Oliver Pollard, both of the Honourable Artillery Company, won the Victoria Cross by exploits which deserve somewhat fuller mention. The first-named officer organized six bombing attacks against a strong point which threatened the British communications near Gavrelle, capturing the position, together with 50 prisoners. The enemy counter-attacked with a battalion of the Guard and recovered the position. Second Lieutenant Haine formed a "block" in his trench and maintained his position against repeated determined

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III)

assaults throughout the following night. Next morning he reorganized his men and recaptured the strong point.

Second Lieutenant Pollard noticed that troops of various units on the left of his battalion were becoming demoralized owing to their heavy casualties under shell fire in the same sector, and dashed up to stop a retirement. With only four men he started a counter-attack with bombs and pressed it home until he had broken the enemy's attack, and regained all that had been lost, with much ground in addition. Lieutenant Arthur Batten-Pool, Royal Munster Fusiliers, displayed conspicuous courage in command of a raiding party near Calonne, France, directing the operations after receiving a severe wound in the hand, and assisting to rescue two wounded men.

Sergeant John Erskine, Scottish Rifles (T.F.), won the cross by rescuing a wounded sergeant and private under continuous fire at Givenchy, France, and later going out to his wounded officer, bandaging him, and remaining with him for an hour. In assisting to bring him in Erskine shielded him with his own body in order to lessen the chance of his being hit again. Private George Stringer, the V.C. of the Manchester Regiment in the third year, earned the soubriquet of "the one-man army" by the gallantry with which he held his ground at Es Sinn, Mesopotamia.

Lieutenant Geoffrey St. George Shillington Catler, Royal Irish Fusiliers, earned the cross by splendid service to wounded men. For five hours at night he searched No Man's Land and brought in three, and next morning he brought in a fourth, and gave water to others, arranging for their rescue later. Company Sergeant Major Nelson Victor Carter, Royal Sussex Regiment, penetrated with a few men into the enemy's second line at Boar's Head, Richebourg l'Avoue, and inflicted heavy casualties with bombs.

Corporal George Sanders, West Yorkshire Regiment, was awarded the cross for "the greatest courage, determination and good leadership during 36 hours under very trying conditions." After an advance into the enemy's trenches near Thiepval, he was isolated with 30 other men, and, organizing his defences and detailing a bombing party, he resolved to hold the position at all costs. Private Theodore William Henry Veale, Devonshire Regiment, went out to a wounded officer who was lying in growing corn within 50 yards of the enemy east of High Wood, dragged him to a shell hole, and finally achieved his rescue.

WORK IN THE TRENCHES

On September 27, 1916, the name of Captain Eric Norman Frankland Bell, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, appeared among a list of 12 V.C. awards. Captain Bell shot the gunner of a machine gun which was holding up the front line at Thiepval, and later went forward on three occasions and threw trench mortar bombs amongst the enemy. When he had no more bombs left he stood on the parapet and used a rifle with great coolness and effect upon the enemy.

Sergeant Boulter, Northamptonshire Regiment, figured in a V.C. list dated October 26, 1916, for having bombed the team of a machine gun from the position where they were causing heavy casualties at Trônes Wood. On the same date was announced the award of the cross to Sergeant Albert Gill, King's Royal Rifle Corps, for rallying the remnants of his platoon after the enemy had rushed the bombing post, and reorganizing his defences, "a most difficult and dangerous task," in which he was killed.

On November 27, 1916, the award of the Victoria Cross was made to three more single representatives of their regiments. Second Lieutenant Henry Kelly, West Riding Regiment, twice rallied his company under intense fire at Le Sars, France, and finally led the only three available men into the enemy's trench, where they remained bombing until two of them became casualties and reinforcements reached the enemy. Sergeant Robert Downie, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, reorganized an attack in gun pits east of Lesbœufs, France, when most of his officers had become casualties, and at the critical moment he rushed forward alone, so stirring the men that the line leapt forward after him. He personally accounted for several of the enemy, and in addition captured a machine gun and killed the team. Sergeant James Young Turnbull, Highland Light Infantry, captured an important post, and was subjected to severe counter-attacks at Leipsic salient, Authville, France. "Displaying the highest degree of valour and skill," he was killed later in the day.

The Victoria Cross awarded to Sergeant Edward John Mott, Border Regiment, was stated to be "for most conspicuous gallantry and initiative when in an attack south of Le Transloy, France, the company to which he belonged was held up at a strong point by machine gun fire." Although wounded in the eye, Mott made a rush for the gun, and after a fierce struggle seized the gunner, took him prisoner, and captured the gun. The cross awarded to Lieutenant and Adjutant Robert Edwin

V.C. HEROES OF THE WAR—(III),

Phillips, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, was earned by "sustained courage in its very highest form."

Major (Acting Lieutenant Colonel) Edward Elers Delavel Henderson, North Staffordshire Regiment, awarded the Victoria Cross, brought his battalion up to the two front line trenches on the west bank of the Hai, Mesopotamia, which were under intense fire. This gallant officer was wounded yet twice again, and died when he was eventually brought in.

On June 28, 1917, award of the cross was made to Company Sergeant Major Edward Brooks, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, and Lance Corporal James Welch, Royal Berkshire Regiment. At Fayes, France, Brooks on his own initiative rushed forward from the second wave of a force raiding the enemy's trenches and killed with his revolver one of the gunners of a machine gun that was checking the advance and bayoneted another. He then turned the gun on the remainder of its team, who made off, after which Brooks carried it back into the British lines. Lance Corporal Welch entered an enemy trench near Oppy, and killed one man after a hand-to-hand struggle. Armed only with an empty revolver he chased four others across the open and captured them singlehanded. He also handled a machine gun with utmost fearlessness and effect.

Lieutenant (Acting Captain) Arthur Henderson, M.C., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, earned the Victoria Cross during an attack on some trenches near Fontaine-les-Croiselles, France, when, though wounded, he led his company through the enemy front line to his final objective. This gallant officer was killed after he had accomplished his task. The last name to be recorded here is Frank Bernard Wearne, second lieutenant in the Essex Regiment, to whom the Victoria Cross was posthumously awarded on August 2, 1917. He was in command of a small party on the left of a raid on the enemy's trenches east of Loos, when, "by his tenacity in remaining at his post though severely wounded, and his magnificent fighting spirit, Second Lieutenant Wearne was enabled to hold on to the flank."

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

IN each volume we provide concise and authoritative biographical information concerning the outstanding personalities of the war. For clearness and ready reference they are grouped according to nationality. The most suitable volume in which to include these biographies is that wherein the subjects figure most prominently.

BRITISH

Earl Beatty

DAVID BEATTY, first earl Beatty, was born January 17, 1871, at Howbeck, Cheshire, the son of Captain D. L. Beatty of Borodale, Wexford, and entered the navy in January, 1884. He was promoted to a sub-lieutenancy in 1890, and became a lieutenant two years later. In his early years he had that good fortune which Napoleon sought in his commanders; he was present at points where there was fighting, and he always distinguished himself. In 1896, while on the Mediterranean station, he served as second in command with the naval brigade on the Nile, and attracted the attention of Lord Kitchener, who secured his services in 1898 for the expedition to Khartum, when he was mentioned in dispatches and promoted to commander.

In the Boxer rebellion in China, 1900, Beatty was with the naval brigade at Tientsin, being twice severely wounded in the arm, and for his conduct he was promoted to the rank of captain before he was 30. In succeeding years promotion followed with marked rapidity. In 1904-5, Beatty served first in the *Diana*, then in the *Suffolk*, in the Mediterranean, receiving the M.V.O. in 1905. Appointed naval adviser to the army council in 1906, he became an A.D.C. to King Edward VII in 1908. He was promoted rear admiral in January, 1910, attaining flag rank at the age of 39, for which there is no precedent, save in the case of princes, since the days of Nelson who also became rear admiral at 39. He became naval adviser to Mr. McKenna, when first lord of the Admiralty, but, differing with him in opinion, was placed on half-pay; he was recalled to the Admiralty by Mr. Churchill in 1912, when he became naval secretary to the first lord, which office he held until March, 1913, when he was appointed to command the battle cruiser squadron, composed of five battle cruisers and forming part of the Home Fleet. He was still in command of this squadron when, with the Grand Fleet, he proceeded to the Scottish coast on July 30, 1914.

Beatty's first action in the war was off Heligoland, August 28, 1914, when his battle cruisers were ordered by Sir J. Jellicoe to support the British destroyers and light cruisers in their scooping expedition. On January 24, 1915, he fought the battle of the Dogger Bank, and by an unfortunate chance his flagship, the *Lion*, was disabled by two hits, and while his flag was being transferred to a destroyer the action was broken off without the remaining German vessels being destroyed. Beatty during most of the battle was on the upper bridge.

Beatty's hour came on May 31, 1916, when he sighted Admiral Hipper's squadron of five German battle cruisers and opened the

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

battle of Jutland. He had with him six battle cruisers with, some distance astern, four fast battleships of the Barham type, and immediately gave chase, disposing his ships in a line of bearing, and pushing in to get between the Germans and their bases. Fire was opened at 3.48 p.m., and from then till 8.40 p.m. the British battle cruisers were almost continuously in action. In his published dispatch dealing with the battle, Beatty showed that he expected the German fleet to be located and attacked next morning "under the most favourable circumstances"; but, for reasons beyond his control, this did not take place.

In November, 1916, when Sir John Jellicoe became first sea lord, Beatty succeeded him in command of the Grand Fleet, but the refusal of the German High Sea Fleet to face battle deprived him of an opportunity of destroying it. In 1917 his fleet was reinforced by a squadron of American Dreadnoughts. On November 21, 1918, under the armistice terms, he received off Rosyth the surrender of 16 of the best German Dreadnoughts, eight light cruisers, and 50 destroyers. After they had anchored, at 11.4 a.m. Beatty made the historic signal "The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without permission."

In 1919 Beatty was promoted to the rank of admiral of the fleet, and for his services during the war was granted £100,000 by Parliament and given an earldom, receiving also several other honours. In October, 1919, he was appointed first sea lord and he retained this office until July, 1927. Beatty married a daughter of Marshall Field of Chicago. The elder of their two sons, Viscount Borodale, was elected M.P. for Peckham in 1931.

Beatty's rapid promotion was the result of hard and unswerving devotion to work. He was fortunate in the possession of a great share of that personal magnetism which has distinguished all leaders of men. One who knows him has well written of him: "The extraordinarily forceful and clear-cut features, the compact, well-knit frame, the quick movements, and yet with it all the curious, restrained, contained, and most ponderable energy, produce an effect at once distinguished and formidable."

Sir Charles Madden

SIR CHARLES EDWARD MADDEN was born in 1863, joined the navy in 1875, and served in the Ruby during the Egyptian War of 1882. He specialized in the torpedo branch, and was first lieutenant of the Vernon torpedo school-ship, 1893-96. During 1902-4 he acted as flag captain to Sir Wilmot Fawkes, commanding the cruiser squadron, in the Good Hope. Made naval assistant to the controller of the navy in 1905, he was naval assistant to the first sea lord, 1906. In the following year he was captain of the Dreadnought and chief of the staff,

BRITISH

Home Fleet, and in 1910-11 junior sea lord. In April, 1911, he was promoted rear admiral, and successively commanded the first division Home Fleet, the third cruiser squadron, and the second cruiser squadron. He was appointed chief of the staff to Admiral Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, August 4, 1914, and during the next two years served as chief of the staff to the commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet, taking part in the battle of Jutland. In 1917 he was appointed second in command of the Grand Fleet, and in 1919 became commander-in-chief Atlantic and Home Fleets. He was promoted vice admiral in 1916 and admiral in 1919. He was first sea lord of the Admiralty and chief of the naval staff, 1927-30. Knighted in 1916, he was created a baronet in 1919, and awarded £10,000.

Sir William Pakenham

SIR WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER PAKENHAM was born July 10, 1861. He entered the navy in 1874. He was attached to the Japanese fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, and was fourth sea lord, 1911-13. In 1914 he became rear admiral. On the outbreak of the Great War he commanded the third cruiser squadron, and the second battle cruiser squadron at Jutland, succeeding Sir David Beatty as commander-in-chief of the battle cruiser force, November 29, 1916. In 1919-20 he was president of the R.N. College, Greenwich, and in August, 1920, was appointed commander-in-chief, North America and West Indies. He was knighted in 1916 and promoted vice admiral in 1918. He retired in 1926, and died July 28, 1933.

Sir Cecil Burney

SIR CECIL BURNEY was born May 15, 1858, the son of a naval officer. He was educated at the Royal Naval Academy, Gosport, and entered the navy in 1873. He was at one time captain of the Lion training ship at Devonport. In 1882, as lieutenant in the Carysfort, he fought against Arabi Pasha; a year later he was present in the campaign against Osman Digna round Suakin; and he accompanied Sir Charles Warren on his punitive mission in the Arabian desert. In 1912 he was sent as senior naval officer of the third battle squadron of the Home Fleet to the Albanian coast with an international force to settle Balkan and maritime difficulties.

When the Great War broke out Burney was in charge of the Channel Fleet. In December, 1914, he was made second-in-command of the Grand Fleet, and, leading its first battle squadron, took part in the battle of Jutland. He was in the Marlborough, but when that ship was damaged he transferred

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

his flag to the *Revenge*. He was second sea lord, 1916-17, and subsequently commander-in-chief on the east coast of Scotland, whence he was transferred, in 1919, to Portsmouth, which post he held until April, 1920. He was knighted in 1913, and made a full admiral in 1916. He died June 5, 1929, and was succeeded by his son, C. D. Burney, the inventor of the paravane.

Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas

SIR HUGH EVAN-THOMAS was born October 27, 1862. He entered the navy in 1875. He was flag captain to the Channel Fleet, 1903-4, and private secretary to the first lord of the Admiralty, 1905-8. From 1910-12 he was in command of the R.N. College, Dartmouth, and A.D.C. to the king, 1911-12, when he was promoted rear admiral. Commander of the first battle squadron, 1913-14, he commanded the fifth battle squadron in the battle of Jutland and had his flag in the *Barham*. Knighted for his services, he was made vice admiral in 1917. He was promoted to admiral in 1920, and was commander-in-chief at the Nore, 1921-24. He died August 30, 1928.

Sir Robert Arbuthnot

SIR ROBERT KEITH ARBUTHNOT was born March 23, 1864, and entered the British navy in 1877. In 1889 he succeeded his father as fourth baronet in a Scottish title dating from 1823, and in 1912 he attained the rank of rear admiral. In 1913 he commanded part of the second battle squadron, and soon after the outbreak of the Great War took over the first cruiser squadron. He led this to the battle of Jutland, flying his flag in the *Defence*. About 6.15 p.m. on May 31, 1916, his ship was sunk while fighting some German light cruisers, and Sir Robert and all his crew were lost. He wrote books on naval matters.

Hon. Horace Hood

HORACE LAMBERT ALEXANDER HOOD, the second son of the fourth Viscount Hood, was born October 2, 1870, and joined the Britannia training ship in 1883. He was a midshipman in the *Calliope* during the famous hurricane off Samoa in 1889. Lieutenant in 1890, he specialized in gunnery and served on a Nile gunboat in the Sudan expedition, 1897-98, being mentioned in dispatches and promoted commander. In 1907 Hood was appointed naval attaché at Washington, and from 1910-14 was in command of the R.N. College at Osborne. He was A.D.C. to the king, 1912-13, being promoted rear admiral in the latter year. He was in command of the third British battle cruiser squadron in the battle of Jutland, and distinguished

BRITISH

himself "in a manner," according to Sir D. Beatty's dispatch, "worthy of the spirit of his great ancestors." His flagship *Invincible* sank with all hands save six; and Hood went down with her, May 31, 1916.

Hon. Edward Bingham

EDWARD BARRY STEWART BINGHAM, a younger son of the fifth Lord Clanmorris, was born July 26, 1881. He entered the navy in 1895 and served at the battle of the Bight, August, 1914, in the *Invincible*, which he commanded at the destruction of the German ships off the Falkland Islands in December, 1914. He was in command of a division of destroyers at the battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916, where he won the V.C. for the gallant way in which he led his division against German destroyers and battle cruisers. In the *Nestor* he approached within 3,000 yards of the enemy in order to fire his torpedoes, coming thus under the concentrated fire of the German ships. The *Nestor* was sunk and Bingham taken a prisoner of war to Germany, only returning home on the signing of the armistice in November, 1918. He published "*Falklands, Jutland, and the Bight*," in 1919.

Sir Lionel Halsey

SIR LIONEL HALSEY was born February 26, 1872. He was educated at Farcham and joined H.M.S. *Britannia* in 1885, becoming a lieutenant in 1893. He served in the defence of Ladysmith, 1899-1900, and reached the rank of commander in 1901. Promoted captain in 1905, he commanded H.M.S. *New Zealand* during the empire cruise of that ship, which he also commanded in the action in the Heligoland Bight, August, 1914, and in the action off the Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915. He was on Jellicoe's staff in the *Iron Duke* in the battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916. In 1917 he became third sea lord, and in October, 1918, was appointed to command the Australian navy. Halsey accompanied the prince of Wales in the *Renown* as chief of staff, March-October, 1920, became comptroller and treasurer to the prince in December of that year, and accompanied him to India and Japan, 1921-22. He was promoted rear admiral in 1917 and knighted in 1918.

Sir Percy Scott

SIR PERCY MORETON SCOTT was born July 10, 1853, and educated at University College School, London. Entering the navy in 1866, he became captain in 1893, and rear admiral, 1905. His name is intimately connected with the development of scientific methods in naval gunnery. He was a member of the ordnance committee in 1894-96, but first came into prominence by reason of the excellent shooting of the

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

cruisers the Scylla and the Terrible, for which the training of gunners by means of a "dotter" of his own invention was largely responsible. Having already served in the Ashanti and Egyptian wars, he landed with the naval brigade in South Africa, 1899, and improvised the mountings for the heavy guns for Ladysmith. He was captain of the Excellent, the R.N. Gunnery School, 1903-5, inspector of target practice, 1905-7, and commanded cruiser squadrons, 1907-9. In 1910 he was created K.C.B., and given a special grant of £2,000 in recognition of his numerous inventions; and in 1913 was created a baronet. He retired in March, 1913, but rejoined for service on the outbreak of the Great War, and for some time was in charge of the gun defences of London against aircraft. He was later a strong advocate of the submarine. Scott died on October 18, 1924.

Captain Fryatt

CHARLES FRYATT was born December 2, 1872, and entered the service of the G.E.R. as an able seaman. In 1904 he became chief officer, obtained his master's certificate in 1905, and in 1913 was promoted captain. When the Great War broke out he was in command of the G.E.R. steamer Brussels, and helped to maintain the service between Holland and England. He was attacked and escaped from a German submarine on March 3, 1915, but on the 28th of the same month he was attacked again, and succeeded in ramming the U-boat.

Bound from Holland to Tilbury on June 23, 1916, he was captured by a German destroyer, taken to Zeebrugge and thence to Ruhleben. Removed to Bruges, he was tried by a court-martial on July 27, the evidence of his log for March 28 being produced against him, was condemned as a franc-tireur, and shot the same evening. This was an obvious injustice, as Fryatt was wearing uniform and was in government employ. The matter was considered by a German commission of inquiry in April, 1919. It upheld the sentence, but expressed regret for the haste with which it had been executed. Fryatt's body was brought to England and buried at Dovercourt, July 9, 1919.

Sir William Robertson

SIR WILLIAM ROBERT ROBERTSON was born January 29, 1860, at Welbourn, Lincolnshire. He enlisted as a private in the 16th Lancers in 1877, becoming corporal in 1879 and sergeant in 1882. While in the ranks he showed exceptional promise and determination to make a career in the army, and as troop sergeant major, to which he was promoted in 1885, decided to qualify for a commission. He passed the necessary examinations and tests, and was gazetted second lieutenant in

1888, proceeding to India that year to join the 3rd Dragoon Guards. He remained there until 1896, during which period he rose to rank of staff captain and served as intelligence officer with the Chitral relief expedition.

In 1896 he entered the staff college at Camberley, the first ranker to do so, and on passing out in 1898 joined the intelligence division at the War Office, and proceeded to S. Africa in 1899, serving on the staff and taking part in various battles. From 1902-7 he was again at the War Office (intelligence), then served as chief of the staff, Aldershot, and in 1910 was appointed commandant of the staff college, Camberley, which post he retained until 1913, when he returned to the War Office as director of military training.

Robertson went to France in August, 1914, as Q.M.G. of the expeditionary force, and was chief of the staff, January-December, 1915. In December, 1915, he went to the War Office as chief of the imperial general staff. From that time onward, and especially after Kitchener's death in June, 1916, Robertson was responsible for the direction of British military operations on all fronts. He resigned early in 1918, owing to a difference of opinion with the government as to the Versailles War Council. He held the eastern command, February, 1918—March, 1919, when he became commander-in-chief of the British Rhine forces, vacating that position in 1920.

For his war services Robertson, who had been knighted in 1913, was made a baronet, and received £10,000, in August 1919. Promoted major general 1910, lieutenant general 1915, general 1916, he was created a field marshal in 1920, thus becoming the first soldier in the British army to rise from private to the highest rank. He published in 1921 his autobiography, "From Private to Field Marshal," and in 1926, "Soldiers and Statesmen." He died February 12, 1933.

Lord Rawlinson

HENRY SEMOUR RAWLINSON, first baron Rawlinson, was born February 20, 1864, the eldest son of Sir Henry C. Rawlinson, to whose baronetcy he succeeded in 1895. From Eton he went to Sandhurst, and in 1884 joined the 60th Rifles, transferring to the Coldstream Guards in 1892. Meanwhile, he had been A.D.C. to Lord Roberts in India, and had served with the mounted infantry in Burma in 1886-87. In 1898 he joined Kitchener's staff in Egypt, and was in the expedition that recovered Khartum. In the South African War he served on the staff and commanded a mobile column. Having passed through the staff college, he was commandant of that institution from 1903 to 1906. In 1907 he took over a brigade at Aldershot, and in 1910 he was promoted to the command of a division.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

When the Great War broke out, Rawlinson was made director of recruiting at the War Office. In September he was put at the head of the 7th division, which he led through Belgium to Ypres, in such desperate fighting that it was soon reduced to a mere handful. In 1915 he played a leading part at Neuve Chapelle. At the end of 1915 he was given command of the 4th army, and was responsible for the main attack on the Somme in July, 1916. He continued at the head of this army until early in 1918, when he became British representative on the Versailles council. In March, after the serious disaster of St. Quentin, he was recalled to the front, and his 4th army took a brilliant part in the final offensive.

Having been knighted in 1915 and made a full general in 1918, Rawlinson's services were further rewarded in 1919 with a barony and a grant of £30,000. He was appointed in 1918 to the command at Aldershot, but he soon left this position to become commander-in-chief in India, where he remained until his death which took place on March 28, 1925, when his peerage became extinct. His life was written by Sir Frederick Maurice.

Lord Horne

HENRY SINCLAIR HORNE, baron Horne, was born at Caithness, February 1, 1861. He was educated at Harrow and the R.M.A., Woolwich, and in 1880 obtained a commission in the Royal Artillery. Constantly with his unit except for two years (1890-92), when he was on the staff in Bengal, he went through the South African War, and in 1905 became a lieutenant colonel. He was a staff officer at Aldershot, 1910-12, and for the next two years an inspector of artillery. In August, 1914, he went to the front in charge of an artillery brigade of the 1st corps, and in January, 1915, took over the 2nd division.

For a few months he was in Gallipoli and Egypt, reporting on the defences of the Suez Canal, but in 1916, when the battle of the Somme began, he was in command of the 15th corps. He was then transferred to a northern sector to take the leadership of the 1st army, which he led for the rest of the war period. In 1916 he was knighted.

Horne's rise was most rapid, for he was promoted from the command of a brigade to that of an army in less than two years. The only artillery officer among the army commanders in the Great War, he is reported to have been the inventor, or at least the improver, of the creeping barrage. In March, 1919, he was appointed to command the eastern district. Raised to the peerage, August, 1919, and awarded a grant of £30,000, he took the title of Baron Horne of Strkoke, in the county of Caithness. He retired from the army in 1926, and died August 14, 1929, when his title became extinct.



BRITISH VICTORIOUS ON THE ANCRE. The battle of the Ancre, fought November 11-21, 1916, was the closing episode of the great series of battles on the Somme. It resulted in the capture of Beaumont-Hamel and Beaucourt and so weakened the German positions as to render a retreat inevitable. The illustration which shows British troops storming a German trench also indicates the terrible devastation of the terrain over which the battle was waged.



U-boat on the surface

INHUMAN U-BOAT WARFARE. The illustration shows a German U-boat on the surface prior to shelling an unarmed British merchantman. By 1916 the enemy submarine campaign was in full swing, and merchant vessels, liners and neutral shipping were included in its quarry. The Germans totally ignored the recognized rules of submarine warfare which limited its use to the attack of warships and army transports.



INGLORIOUS END OF A ZEPPELIN. One of the objects of the air raids over England was to intimidate the civil population. This Zeppelin, the L 33, is one that was forced down in a lonely part of Essex, through engine trouble and loss of gas, on the night of September 23, 1916.



The church and part of the village of Encreval, France. This place figured prominently in the battles of the Somme and the Ancre. Its capture by the British gave the Allies the key to the Ancre valley.



Beaumont-Hamel was the scene of fierce fighting in the battles of the Somme and the Ancre. The British attack here on the first day of the former battle was beaten back, but the stronghold was stormed at the point of the bayonet on November 13, 1916.

ENEMY STRONGHOLDS IN FRANCE STORMED BY BRITISH

BRITISH

Sir Thomas Morland

SIR THOMAS LETHBRIDGE NAPIER MORLAND was born August 9, 1865. He joined the King's Royal Rifles, 1884, and by 1904 was lieutenant colonel. Attached to the West African Frontier Force in 1898, he fought with it in Nigeria, and in 1905 was made its inspector general. In 1910 he was at the head of the 2nd brigade at Aldershot, and on the outbreak of the Great War was appointed to command the 2nd division of London Territorials, but in October he went to France to take command of the 5th division. He led the 10th corps at the battle of the Somme. He commanded the 13th corps in the final British battles of November, 1918, and became commander-in-chief of the British army of the Rhine, 1920-22, and at Aldershot, 1922-23. In 1915 he was knighted. He died May 21, 1925.

Sir T. D'Oyly Snow

SIR THOMAS D'OYLY SNOW was born May 5, 1858, and educated at Eton and St. John's College, Cambridge. He entered the army in 1879, joining the Somerset Light Infantry, and served in the Zulu War. In 1884-85 he was in the Sudan with the mounted infantry, being wounded at El Gubat, and as brigade major served with Kitchener. In 1899 he transferred to the Northampton Regiment, and in 1903 rose to command one of its battalions, and was appointed to the staff. He went to France in 1914 in command of the 4th division, of which he had been in charge since 1911; in 1915 he was promoted to a corps, the 7th, which he led in the battle of the Somme. In 1915 he was knighted, and in August, 1918, he returned home on his appointment to the western command.

Sir William Congreve

SIR WILLIAM NORRIS CONGREVE was born November 20, 1862, and educated at Harrow and Pembroke College, Oxford. He was a staff officer in the South African War and won the V.C. for his attempt to save the guns at Colenso, December, 1899. In 1909 he became commandant of the school of musketry at Hythe, and from 1911 was at the head of the 18th brigade of regulars, which he took to the front in August, 1914. He distinguished himself on the Somme, and later took over the 7th corps, which bore the brunt of the German offensive, March, 1918. On January 1, 1918, having just been knighted, he received the rank of lieutenant general. He took over the southern command in December, 1922, and became governor of Malta, 1924. His son, Captain W. La Touche Congreve, V.C., D.S.O., was killed in action in 1916. He died February 28, 1927.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

Sir William Pulteney

SIR WILLIAM PULTENEY was born May 18, 1861, and educated at Eton. He joined the Scots Guards in 1881. He served in the Egyptian campaign of 1882, was in Uganda, 1895-97, seeing active service in the Nandi expedition, where he won the D.S.O., and with the Guards went through the South African War, remaining with his regiment until 1908, when he was appointed to command the 16th brigade. In August, 1914, he was in command of the 6th division, which he had held since 1910; but was put at the head of the 3rd corps, and led it until 1918. In 1918 he went on a mission to Japan with Prince Arthur of Connaught. In 1915 Pulteney was knighted. He became gentleman usher of the black rod to the House of Lords in 1920. He published "The Immortal Salient," 1925.

Sir Claud Jacob

SIR CLAUD WILLIAM JACOB was born November 21, 1863, and educated at Sherborne and Sandhurst. He entered the Worcestershire Regiment in 1882, and two years later transferred to the Indian Staff Corps. He served in the Zhob valley in 1890, and on the frontier in 1901-2; and in 1908 attained the rank of colonel. In 1914 he went to France at the head of the Dehra Dun brigade of the Indian army corps, and in September, 1915, took over the Meerut division. Remaining on the western front, he took command of the 21st division in November, 1915, and in May, 1916, was promoted to the command of the 2nd corps, which he led during the battle of the Somme in 1916, throughout 1917 and the German offensive of 1918, when it defended the Passchendaele region. In 1920 he was appointed chief of the Indian army general staff. He was promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1926. In the same year he became secretary of the military department in the India Office. He was knighted in 1917.

Sir Richard Haking

SIR RICHARD CYRIL BYRNE HAKING was born January 24, 1862. He entered the army in 1881, joining the Hampshire Regiment. His first active service was in Burma, in 1885-87, and he was in South Africa in 1899-1900. By then he was a major on the staff, and returned home to become professor of the staff college, 1901-6. Five years on the general staff followed, and in 1911 he was given command of the 5th infantry brigade, which he took out to France in 1914. In December, 1914, he was promoted to a division, and in September, 1915,

BRITISH

was put at the head of the 11th corps, which he led to the end of the war. In 1920 he commanded the Allied troops of occupation in the plebiscite areas of East Prussia, and in 1921 became permanent high commissioner for Danzig under the League of Nations. He was general officer commanding the British troops in Egypt, 1923-27.

Bernard C. Freyberg

BERNARD CYRIL FREYBERG was born in London. He was educated at Wellington College, New Zealand, and became a lieutenant in the New Zealand Territorial Army. On the outbreak of the Great War he came to London, and joined the Royal Naval Division, serving at Antwerp, the Dardanelles, and in France (1914-18). He won the D.S.O. in April, 1915, in the Gulf of Xeros, and the V.C. for brilliant leading on the Ancre, November, 1916, where he organized the attack on Beaucourt. He was brigadier general with the 29th division, 1917-18.

Lord Milne

GEORGE FRANCIS MILNE, baron Milne, was born November 5, 1866. He entered the Royal Artillery in 1885, and saw service in the Sudan in 1898, being present at the capture of Khartum. In South Africa, where he was on the staff, he won the D.S.O., and returning home held a succession of staff appointments. In 1913 he was placed in charge of the artillery of the 4th division, and he took it to France in August, 1914.

In January, 1915, he was chosen to command an infantry brigade and in February a division. He was for a time chief staff officer of the headquarters staff, 2nd army, and was twice mentioned in the early lists of those whom Field Marshal French recommended for gallant and distinguished services in the field, serving in both France and Flanders. As their divisional general, December, 1914, to September, 1915, officers and men of the 27th division had many good things to say of him, and his services were recognized on February 8, 1915, by his promotion to the rank of major general. At the end of the year he was sent to Salonica, where, after holding for a time the command of the 16th corps, he succeeded Sir Bryan Mahon in the command of the British Salonica force on May 9, 1916. Under the supreme direction of the French commander he was responsible for the defensive operations against Bulgaria in 1917, and in 1918 for the offensive ones that ended with Bulgaria's capitulation.

Milne next commanded the army of the Black Sea, retiring in September, 1920. In December he became lieutenant of the Tower of London. Milne was made a lieutenant general in 1917, was knighted in 1918, and in 1920 became a full general. From 1926-29 he was chief of the imperial general staff. In 1928 he

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

was made a field marshal. Raised to the peerage January 1, 1933, in February he was made constable of the Tower.

Sir Edward Bethune

SIR EDWARD CECIL BETHUNE was of Scottish parentage. He entered the 92nd Highlanders in 1875, transferred to the 6th Dragoon Guards, and then to the 16th Lancers. He saw service in Afghanistan (1878-81), the first Boer War (1881), and the South African War (1899-1902). In the last named he raised and commanded Bethune's Horse, and later a cavalry brigade. He was director general of the Territorial Force, 1912-17. He became a lieutenant general in 1913, and was created K.C.B. in 1915. He died November 2, 1930.

Sir Bryan Mahon

SIR BRYAN THOMAS MAHON, the son of an Irish landowner, was born at Belleville, county Galway, April 2, 1862. In 1883 he entered the 8th Hussars, and his early years in the service were passed in India. In 1893 he went to Egypt to serve in the Egyptian army. There he won the D.S.O., and was with the force that captured Khartum and restored British power. In South Africa he led the flying column that relieved Mafeking in the spring of 1900. Having been for a short time at the head of a cavalry brigade there, from 1901-4 he was military governor of Kordofan, and from 1904-14 he commanded a brigade and then a division in India. On the outbreak of the Great War Mahon was selected to command the 10th division, raised in Ireland, and this he led to Gallipoli, where it fought round Suvla, and to Greece. Mahon, who was knighted in 1912, was in command of the British force at Salonica for some months, and from November, 1916, to May, 1918, was commander-in-chief in Ireland. He died September 24, 1930.

Sir Edmund Barrow

SIR EDMUND GEORGE BARROW was born January 28, 1852. He was educated at Marlborough and Sandhurst, entering the army, 102nd Foot, in 1871. He first saw active service in the Afghan War of 1878-79, having by then joined the Indian Staff Corps. He was in Egypt in 1882, in the Tirah campaign in 1897, and in 1900 was chief of the staff to the China expeditionary force. In the intervals of active service he was assistant to the Indian military department, and after 1901 its secretary. He was knighted for his services in China; from 1904-8 he commanded a division in India, and from

BRITISH

1908-12 was head of the southern army. In 1909 he became a full general. When the Great War broke out Barrow was secretary to the military department of the India Office, and had some responsibility for the failure in Mesopotamia. He was censured by the commission of inquiry. The army council, however, exonerated him, and in 1917 he was made a member of the Council of India.

Sir F. J. Aylmer

SIR FENTON JOHN AYLMEY was born at Hastings, April 5, 1862, the son of a soldier. He joined the Royal Engineers in 1880. He served in Burma, 1886-7, and in expeditions on the Indian frontier, including the Hazara and the Chitral. In 1897 he won the V.C. for gallantry at the storming of the Nilt Fort in Kashmir. From 1912 to 1915 he was adjutant general, and in 1915 went to Mesopotamia in charge of a division. In January, 1916, his attempt to relieve Kut failed, and in March he was relieved of his command. He was knighted in 1916, and succeeded his brother as thirteenth baronet in 1928.

Sir Percy Lake

SIR PERCY HENRY NOEL LAKE was born June 29, 1855, and educated at Uppingham. In 1873 he joined the 59th Foot (East Lancashire Regiment), and saw active service in Afghanistan in 1878-79. He began in 1889 a long career on the staff. For five years he was on the staff of the militia in Canada, where he returned as chief of its general staff in 1905; in 1908 he was made inspector general of the militia. In the intervening years he held posts at home and in 1911 went to India to take charge of a division. In 1912 Lake was made chief of the general staff in India, and in January, 1916, he went out to take command of the force in Mesopotamia, where he remained only until the following August, his period covering the surrender of Kut to the Turks. He was knighted in 1908.

Sir George Goringe

SIR GEORGE FREDERICK GORRINGE was born at Southwick, Sussex, February 10, 1868. He entered the Royal Engineers in 1888, and afterwards saw much service with the Egyptian army, winning the D.S.O. in the Dongola campaign, 1896, and actively participating in the Khartum expedition, 1897-98. He was specially employed in charge of the reconstruction of Khartum, 1899. He took part in the South African War, being A.D.C. to Lord Kitchener and D.A.A.G. of the headquarters staff, and commanded a flying column in Cape Colony

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

in 1901. He commanded in the operations in Southern Sennar, 1904, was director of movements and quartering at the War Office, 1906-9, and brigadier general commanding the 18th infantry brigade, 1909-11. In 1912 he went to India to command the Bombay brigade. In Mesopotamia he commanded the 12th Indian division and captured Nasiriyeh, July 25, 1915, and was chief of the staff of the Tigris force, January-March, 1916, and succeeded Aylmer in the command of the Kut relief force, April, 1916. In 1917-18 he was engaged in France. He was created K.C.B. in 1915, and K.C.M.G. in 1918. He retired in 1924.

Sir John Nixon

SIR JOHN ECCLES NIXON was born August 16, 1857, and educated at Wellington College, he entered the K.O.S.B., but transferred to the Indian Staff Corps. He was in the Afghan War, 1879-80, was a staff officer with the Chitral Relief force and the Tochi field force, commanded a mounted brigade in the South African War, 1901-2, and, having returned to India, was given a brigade. In 1906 he was promoted to be inspector general of cavalry, and in 1908-12 commanded a division. Knighted in 1911, he was appointed to the southern army in 1912, made a full general, 1914, and in April, 1915, took charge of the operations in Mesopotamia. Responsible for ordering the first advance to Kut, "with insufficient transport and equipment," he was censured by the commission that inquired into that campaign, and he retired in 1919. He died December 15, 1921.

Sir Charles Townshend

SIR CHARLES VERE FERRERS TOWNSHEND was born February 21, 1861, grandson of Lord George Townshend. He entered the Royal Marines in 1881, and saw service in the Suakin operations and in the Nile expedition. In 1886 he transferred to the Indian Staff Corps, and in 1891 accompanied the expedition against the Hunza and Nagar tribes. He first came into prominence by his gallant defence of Chitral, for which he was awarded the C.B. He was at Atbara and Khartum, 1898, and served in the South African War, 1899-1900. In the latter year he was transferred to the British army, joining the Royal Fusiliers. After various commands in India, he became major general, 1911, and commander of a Territorial division in 1912. He returned to India in 1913. Early in 1915 he was sent to Mesopotamia at the head of a division, and after gaining several victories had to retreat. Faced with odds of five to one against him, apart from the lack of water, he withdrew his little army

BRITISH

for ninety miles back to the river bend at Kut, fighting, meanwhile, a rearguard battle at Azizie, which smashed and utterly misled the van of his pursuers. He defended Kut for five months. Taken prisoner after the fall of the town Townshend was removed to Constantinople, and interned in Prinkipo Island. Townshend was knighted in 1916, and resigned from the army in 1920. In the same year he was returned to Parliament as an independent member for the Wrekin division, joining the Conservatives in 1922. In 1920 he published "My Campaign in Mesopotamia." He died May 18, 1924.

Sir Charles Briggs

SIR CHARLES JAMES BRIGGS was born October 22, 1865, the son of a soldier. He was educated abroad and at Sandhurst. In 1886 he entered the 1st Dragoon Guards and first saw service in Egypt in 1892-93. He went through the South African War as a major, and for a time commanded the Imperial Light Horse. In 1906 he served in Natal; in 1910-13 he commanded a mounted brigade at home; and in 1913 he took over the 1st cavalry brigade, in command of which he went to France in August, 1914. In February, 1915, he took charge of a division, and in May, 1916, was appointed to command the 16th corps at Salonica, and in 1919 was in command of the British forces there. In 1917 he was knighted.

* Sir Archibald Murray

SIR ARCHIBALD JAMES MURRAY was born April 21, 1860. He was educated at Cheltenham College and Sandhurst. He entered the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in 1879, and in 1900 became a lieutenant colonel. Meanwhile, he had served in Zululand and in South Africa. After five years on the staff at Aldershot, he was made director of military training in 1907, was inspector of infantry, 1912-14, and in August, 1914, went to France as chief of the staff. In October, 1915, he returned to England to become the head of a reorganized imperial general staff, but was soon appointed to the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. He took over his new duties January 9, 1916, and from Egypt led the British troops into Palestine, but returned home early in 1917 after the checks before Gaza. He held the Aldershot command, 1917-19. Knighted in 1911, he was promoted general in 1919.

Sir John Monash

SIR JOHN MONASH was born at Melbourne, June 27, 1865, of Jewish parentage. He graduated at Melbourne University, and in 1884 began to practise as a civil engineer. He was a pioneer in introducing reinforced concrete into Australia, and

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

became president of the Victorian engineering institute. He entered the Australian forces in 1887, and rose to the rank of colonel. When the Great War began, Monash was first of all chief censor. In command of the 4th brigade he went to Gallipoli, and remained there until the evacuation, leading his men in some of the most desperate fighting, and then, after a rest in Egypt, went to France, where he commanded the 3rd Australian division, which he led when the Germans made their last attack in March, 1918. On June 1 following, he took command of the Australian Corps, and retained it until the armistice, when he became director general of demobilization for Australia. Knighted in 1918, he returned to civilian life in 1920, and was appointed manager of the Morwell Brown coalfield scheme in Victoria. He died October 8, 1931.

Jan C. Smuts

JAN CHRISTAAN SMUTS was born May 24, 1870, at Bovenplaats, Cape Colony. Of Boer parentage he graduated B.A. at Victoria College, Stellenbosch, and then entered Christ's College, Cambridge, where he took a first in the law tripos in 1892. In 1895 he was admitted as advocate by the supreme court at Cape Town, and in 1896 he settled in Johannesburg and practised at the Transvaal bar. In 1898 Kruger appointed him state attorney, and he held the office until the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. Obtaining a command under De la Rey, he fought in many actions, and during 1901, in independent command, he penetrated to Cape Colony, where he raised trouble on Kitchener's line of communications and continued a daring guerrilla warfare until the spring of 1902, when he was summoned to the peace conference at Vereeniging.

Loyally observing the conditions then imposed, Smuts, in conjunction with Botha, thereafter devoted himself to the restoration of South African prosperity. In the first Transvaal government, 1907, he was minister for the interior, and in the first South African government, 1910, he held the joint portfolios of the interior, of mines and of defence.

At the outbreak of the Great War Smuts was Louis Botha's leading colleague. The rebellion of Beyers and De Wet was rapidly quelled by the united efforts of Botha and Smuts, and the first half of 1915 was employed by them in the rapid conquest of German South-west Africa. Smuts led the government in Botha's absence, and for a brief period took command of the southern invading column until Windhoek was occupied. In the autumn a general election took place, when Botha gained a good working majority. Smuts was then offered the chief command in East Africa, but he declined. The command was given to Smith-Dorrien, but on the breakdown of the latter's

BRITISH

health Smuts took it over, and during 1916 so far overran German East Africa that there was only a guerrilla force left in the field. Meantime the war was not going well for the Allies in Europe, and Smuts was therefore called to London, where he was employed until the armistice and during the peace negotiations. He was a member of the War Cabinet and signed the peace treaty at Versailles.

On the death of Botha, August 27, 1919, Smuts became premier of South Africa, holding office until 1924, when he was defeated by Hertzog's party and became leader of the opposition. Early in 1933 he joined forces with General Hertzog and the two formed a coalition ministry, Smuts becoming minister of defence and deputy prime minister. In 1933 he was a delegate to the World Economic Conference in London. A philosopher of distinction, he was the founder of the system called Holism. His books include "Holism and Evolution," 1926, "Africa and Some World Problems," 1930. In 1931 he was president of the British Association.

Sir Edward Northey

SIR EDWARD NORTHEY was born May 28, 1868. He served in the Hazara and Miranzi expeditions, 1891, and in that against the Isasai, 1892. He was in South Africa, 1899-1902. In the Great War he commanded the 1st battalion K.R.R.C. at Mons, and subsequent battles in 1914, the 15th brigade, March-July, 1915, and the Nyasaland-Rhodesia field force, 1916-18, rendering assistance in the conquest of German East Africa. In 1918 he was appointed governor and commander-in-chief of British East Africa (later Kenya Colony), and high commissioner for the Zanzibar Protectorate. He was awarded the K.C.M.G. in 1918. He was general officer commanding the 43rd division of the Territorial army and south-western area, 1924-26. He retired in 1926.

Sir Arthur Hoskins

SIR ARTHUR REGINALD HOSKINS was born May 30, 1871. He entered the North Staffordshire Regiment in 1891, served in the Dongola expedition, 1896, under Kitchener in the reconquest of the Sudan, 1897-99, and in South Africa, 1899-1902, where he gained the D.S.O. He was engaged in minor operations in East Africa, 1902-3, was inspector general of the King's African Rifles, 1913-15, served under Smuts in East Africa, 1916, and succeeded him as commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force on January 20, 1917, being then lieutenant general. He was appointed to the command of the North Midlands (Territorial Force) in 1919, in which year he was knighted. He became principal of the Bonar Law College in 1929.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

Sir Charles Dobell

SIR CHARLES MACPHERSON DOBELL was born in Quebec, June 22, 1869, and entered the British army, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, in 1890. He served in the Hazara expedition, 1891, and in Crete, 1897-8. In the South African War he won the D.S.O., in 1905 went out to Nigeria, and in 1913 became inspector general of the West African Frontier Force. On the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, Dobell commanded the Allied force which reduced the Cameroons, September, 1914. In September, 1916, he took command of the force which, under Sir Archibald Murray's direction, was intended for the conquest of Palestine. He cleared the Sinai peninsula of the Turks, but soon after the two checks before Gaza in the spring of 1917 his health broke down and he returned home. He commanded a division in India, 1917-19, and took part in the third Afghan War, 1919. In 1915 he was made a major general and in 1916 he was knighted.

Thomas Edward Lawrence

THOMAS EDWARD LAWRENCE was born in Carnarvonshire on August 15, 1888, and educated at Jesus College, Oxford, where he specialized in Oriental languages. He proceeded to the East, and, dressed as a native, spent some years in Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia, mastering the dialects of the Arab tongue and studying their ancient monuments and buried cities. When the Great War broke out Lawrence was excavating Hittite ruins near Carchemish. The British government recalled him to England and employed him on cartographical work. When the sherif of Mecca revolted against the Turks in 1916, Lawrence, with the rank of colonel, went with the British mission to Hussein, who had proclaimed himself king of the Hejaz, and was appointed to the staff of Prince Feisal, his eldest son. He then organized the Arab army, which he practically commanded, and during 1916-18 rendered valuable assistance to the British in Palestine by forming and securing their right flank. He was one of the outstanding figures at the Peace Conference in 1919 where he opposed the French plans for Syria. In 1921 he was appointed to the Colonial Office as adviser on Arab affairs.

Lawrence was awarded the D.S.O. in 1918, and received high honours from the king of the Hejaz, being made an emir and a prince of Mecca. His profound knowledge of Arabia led to his appointment as adviser on Arab affairs in February, 1921, when the administration of Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Aden were transferred to the Colonial Office, and in that year changed his name to Shaw by deed poll. For a time he served in the R.A.F. His book, "Revolt in the Desert," was published in 1927.

BRITISH

D. Lloyd George

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE was born January 17, 1863, at 5, New York Place, Chorlton-on-Medlock, Manchester, where his father, William George, taught in an elementary school. His mother was, before her marriage, Elizabeth Lloyd, both parents being of Welsh extraction. Soon after his birth the family removed to a farm in South Wales, where the father hoped to recover his lost health. He died, however, and his two boys were brought up by an uncle, a shoemaker, at Llanystumdwy, North Wales. The uncle, Richard Lloyd, a man of strong character as well as strong opinions, took special pains to supplement the schooling which David got in the village, and spent his money in making him a solicitor.

At Portmadoc, where he served his articles to a solicitor, from 1879, the young man quickly became known as a speaker at the debating society, and when he began to practise for himself, having passed the law final in 1884, his shrewd grasp of difficulties, his combativeness and resolution soon brought clients to his door. He made a name which was known throughout all the countryside, and was beginning to make money when a chance came to him to win a national reputation.

A Church of England clergyman refused to allow a Nonconformist to be buried in the churchyard beside his daughter. The young solicitor was consulted, and gave the opinion that the clergyman was acting beyond his rights. He further advised that the churchyard be entered "by force, if necessary," and the body buried as the old man wished. This was done, and when legal action was taken, Lloyd George was engaged for the defence. A county court judge decided against him, but he took the case to the high court and before the lord chief justice in London the decision was reversed.

On the wave of this triumph, Lloyd George was chosen to stand as radical candidate for Caernarvon Boroughs against a local squire, Ellis Nanney. A by-election came, and in April, 1890, the young solicitor of 27 took his seat in the House of Commons. He did not make any immediate mark, though he spoke frequently; indeed, his opportunity to show what a fighter he was did not come until 1895. He had, in pressing for the disestablishment of the church, shown pertinacity and pluck, even venturing to stand up to Gladstone; but it was only when he found himself in opposition to the Conservatives, and especially to Joseph Chamberlain, that his fighting qualities developed.

Thinking that the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State were being unjustly treated, Lloyd George pleaded their cause during the South African War. By this time Chamberlain had been forced to regard him as a dangerous opponent,

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

one who dared everything, as, for example, when he tried to address an anti-war meeting in Birmingham itself. The meeting was broken up, the hall wrecked, and Lloyd George was compelled to leave the building in a police constable's uniform. He continued all the same to declare the war unjustified, and in the end his courage increased public respect for him. There was no outcry against Lloyd George's appointment to be president of the board of trade, in December, 1905, when Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman formed his Liberal ministry. In that office he showed good qualities as an administrator, threw over the ministerial tradition of aloofness and superiority, and won golden opinions by his accessibility.

Lloyd George handled the great railway dispute of 1907, and the trouble in the cotton industry the same year, with distinct success. He had few temptations now to make attacks, though he once and again turned his power of invective against the tariff reformers. He seemed to be settling down into a front bench politician of the usual type, until a fresh phase of his career was opened by his being made, on April 12, 1908, chancellor of the exchequer.

He had now the opportunity to effect some of the changes which he had advocated so often in the direction of greater social justice, and in his 1909 Budget he laid before the House a number of proposals for raising money. These included taxation of land values, taxation of coal royalties, fresh imposts upon land and alcohol, and super-taxation of large incomes; and were attacked with furious vehemence by the land-owning class and their representatives in both Houses of Parliament. There was also a great deal of general middle-class feeling against them as disturbing. Lloyd George answered this by pleading the cause of the poor, and holding up to ridicule those who complained. A violent speech at Limehouse, in which he assailed his opponents with particularly irritating effect, gave rise to the expression "Limehousing," descriptive of his style of oratory. In the country, as a whole, the Budget was popular, and the fight its author made for it increased his power.

When the House of Lords refused to pass the measures connected with the new taxes, they were accused, according to plan, of interfering with a money bill, and the government successfully appealed to the country against what he called "that sinister assembly." The Liberals were returned to power, and the scheme for depriving the House of Lords of its right to veto legislation was carried into effect in 1911. His next piece of legislation was the National Insurance Act, modelled on the German plan. In spite of its promise of "ninepence for fourpence," this never appealed strongly to the mass of people; but, by sheer force of personality and enthusiasm, he forced it through.

BRITISH

Then came the Great War. Deep as was his hatred of violence between nations, he showed at once that he could see nothing for it but to fight until the Germans had been taught that powerful empires have no right to crush small nationalities. At once he set himself, with the help of the leading financial and business brains, to devise means of providing the money required. Early in 1915 he left this to Reginald McKenna, and turned his immense energy to the task of supplying the army with munitions. Here and at the War Office, whither he went in July, 1916, he did most valuable service, and it was by his speeches also that the nation and its Allies were more heartened and encouraged than by those of any other public man. There was no surprise, therefore, when at the end of 1916 he was called to take Asquith's place as prime minister.

Dissatisfaction with the Asquith regime had culminated after the disastrous result of Rumania's entry into the war. More energy, closer co-ordination of effort, wider visions were, it was generally felt, essential for winning the war. Asquith's friends accused Lloyd George of intriguing against his chief; the affair had an underhand look, and the few days in which it was brought to a head were filled with mysterious manœuvres. The effect of the change was useful in giving the world an impression that the war was being more vigorously prosecuted, and the belief in Lloyd George at home was proved by the great majority which returned him and his coalition ministry to office just after Germany's submission in 1918.

Lloyd George now became one of the arbitrators of Europe's destiny at the Peace Conference, where, without following any decided line of his own, he exercised a moderating influence. He did not altogether support President Wilson, but neither did he agree to all the proposals of the French. For many months he was engaged in negotiations which often required him to leave the country, and in the intervals of his journeys he was frequently occupied in settling labour troubles. On the signing of peace, 1919, he received the Order of Merit. He resigned the premiership on October 19, 1922; merged his party, known as the National Liberals, with Asquith's followers in November, 1923, and led the Liberal party in the House of Commons until the coalition was formed in 1931. He then refused to join the national ministry, and with only three followers occupied a detached position in the House. In 1929 Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. T. P. O'Connor as the father of the House.

As a speaker, Lloyd George was delightful. A pleasant voice, an easy manner, skill in gesture and in tone would in any case have made him an orator out of the common. To these he added a Celtic fervour, a Biblical diction, an imaginative quality that lifted his themes out of the political rut, and gave them that touch of "uplift," that relation with the deeper yearnings

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

and the idealism of mankind which scarcely ever fails to move an audience. Those who had been charmed by his social gifts of urbanity and humour, his frank admission that there must always be two sides to a case, his readiness to discuss everything quietly and reasonably, were astonished to hear or to read his denunciations on the platform of those who differed from him, his outbursts of fiery zeal, and his solemn prophecies. As soon as he began to speak, he seemed to be a changed man; he was carried away by his own power of speech; he was, as it were, inspired; moreover, he reflected in his speeches to an unusually large degree the temper of the particular audience which he was addressing. This helps to explain his apparent inconsistencies as an orator, and his extreme moods of conciliation and violence.

In 1880 Lloyd George married Margaret, daughter of Richard Owen, of Criccieth. Their family consisted of two sons and three daughters, but one daughter died in 1907. The first volume of his "War Memoirs" appeared in 1933.

Lord Mottistone

JOHAN EDWARD BERNARD SEELY, first Lord Mottistone, better known as Sir John Seely, was born May 31, 1868, the third son of Sir Charles Seely, Bart. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, and was called to the bar. He served with the Imperial Yeomanry through the South African War, winning the D.S.O. While in South Africa Seely was returned to Parliament as Unionist M.P. for the Isle of Wight, but soon after his return home his free trade views led him to join the Liberals. He came to the front during the controversy over tariff reform, and in 1908 was made under-secretary for the colonies in the Liberal ministry.

In 1911 he became under-secretary at the War Office, and in 1912 succeeded Lord Haldane as secretary. He resigned in 1914 in somewhat unusual circumstances, the reason being that he had initialled a demand made by certain officers from the Curragh that they should not serve against Ulster. When the Great War broke out Seely went to France, and after serving on the staff was appointed to command a brigade of Canadian cavalry. He returned in 1916 to become parliamentary secretary to the ministry of munitions, and for a time in 1919 was under-secretary for air. He left the House of Commons in 1922 and in 1933 was raised to the peerage as Baron Mottistone. He published "Adventure," 1930, and "Fear and be Slain," 1931.

William Morris Hughes

WILLIAM MORRIS HUGHES was born in North Wales, September 25, 1864, the son of a carpenter. He was educated at Llandudno Grammar School and at a school in Westminster. In 1884 he went to Australia, where he spent some time

BRITISH—FRENCH

as a sheep drover and in other outdoor occupations in Queensland and New South Wales, before settling in Sydney in 1890. During a great strike among the waterside workers in that year he organized the wharf labourers of Sydney into a powerful union, of which he became general secretary, and took part in the campaign that, in 1891, returned for the first time four Labour members to the New South Wales legislature. In 1894 Hughes himself was returned for the Lang division of Sydney, and he remained therein until the Commonwealth was formed in 1901.

In that year Hughes was elected Labour member for West Sydney. In the first Labour government, formed in 1904, he became minister for external affairs. In a few months he and his colleagues were out of office, but in 1908 they returned, and he was for some months attorney general, a post which he also held from 1910 until the fall of the Labour government in 1913. In 1914 he was again attorney general, and in October, 1915, he succeeded Andrew Fisher, whose chief lieutenant he had long been, as prime minister, retaining also his legal post. In 1915 he visited England, and also in 1916, when he was made a privy councillor. In 1918 he attended the Peace Conference in Paris. He remained prime minister until 1923. He was called to the bar of New South Wales in 1903, and in 1919 became an English K.C. His collected speeches and writings include "The Case for Labour" and "The Splendid Adventure"—a review of empire relations.

FRENCH

Marshal Pétain

HENRI PHILIPPE PÉTAİN was born at Cauchy-à-la-Tour, Pas-de-Calais, April 24, 1856. He entered the military school of St. Cyr in 1876, passing out as a sub-lieutenant of infantry in 1878. After rising to the rank of major, he was given command of a battalion, and became instructor at the musketry school at Châlons in 1902. Assistant instructor at the school of war under Foch in 1906, he was promoted colonel in 1912, when he commanded the 33rd regiment of infantry at Arras. At the outbreak of the Great War he was in command of the 4th brigade of infantry.

In October, 1914, he was placed in command of the 33rd army corps, and he thoroughly justified his appointment in the heavy fighting in the vicinity of Notre Dame de Lorette, Ablain St. Nazaire, Carency, Souchez and Neuville St. Vaast. In April, 1915, his temporary rank was made permanent. In the following June he was given the command of the 2nd army. In September and October he greatly distinguished himself in the great French offensive in Champagne, at Vimy ridge and Tahure, and in the

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

capture of the hand-shaped down of Massiges. It was at Massiges that General Pétain first claimed special attention by his effective use of heavy artillery, and so gave a direct challenge to the massed-gun tactics of the foe. The great captures of German guns and men were due chiefly to the precision of his arrangements. In February, 1916, he was placed in command of the defences of Verdun, where he showed brilliant generalship. Given command in December of all the armies of the centre, he later became chief of staff, and in May, 1917, succeeded Nivelle as commander of the armies of the north and north-east. In March, 1918, when Foch was made generalissimo, Pétain became commander-in-chief. He was made a marshal of France, November 19, 1918, and he was inspector general of the French army, 1922-31. He has published "Verdun," 1930.

General Berthelot

HENRI MATHIAS BERTHELOT was born at Fours, Loire, December 7, 1861, and was educated at the Lycée at Lyons, and afterwards at St. Cyr. He entered the French army as a lieutenant of Zouaves in 1883, and saw service in the operations in Tongking, 1885-7. In 1910 he was colonel of the 94th infantry regiment, and three years later was promoted general, becoming sub-chief of the general staff.

On the outbreak of the Great War he was major general at French General Headquarters, and later was commander of the 53rd division, taking part in the operations around Soissons in January, 1915, and in the conquest of the Labyrinth, May-June, 1915. Placed in command of the 32nd army corps, he participated in the Champagne offensive, September-October, 1915, and in the defence of the Mort Homme, March-June, 1916. Subsequently he was head of the French military missions in Rumania and in the U.S.A. On his return he commanded the French 5th army, July-October, 1918, and took part in the operations around Reims and elsewhere, including the forcing of the Vesle, September 30, 1918. In October he was put in command of the Army of the Danube, which forced the passage of that river November 9, 1918.

General Anthoine

FRANCOIS PAUL ANTHOINE was born on February 28, 1860, in that part of Lorraine which was annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian War. Educated at the Ecole Polytechnique and at the Ecole d'Application at Fontainebleau, he entered the French army as a lieutenant in the artillery. He saw service in Tongking and China in 1884, and returning to France in 1893, attended the Ecole de la Guerre. In 1901 he

FRENCH

was in command of the artillery of the 4th cavalry division, and in 1907, promoted colonel, commanded the artillery of the 15th cavalry division. Four years later he became a member of the general staff, and on the outbreak of the Great War was chief of staff to General Castelnau. On October 8, 1914, he was put in command of the 20th division under Maud'huy, then engaged at Arras. In June, 1915, Anthoine was given command of the 10th army corps, which was operating in the Argonne. In March, 1916, he was placed in command of the French 4th army, part of the group of armies under Pétain around Moronvilliers. Three months later, at the head of the French 1st army he cooperated with the British in Flanders, taking part in the 3rd battle of Ypres.

General Sarraill

MAURICE PAUL EMMANUEL SARRAIL was born at Carcassonne, April 6, 1856. He joined the French army as a lieutenant of the 4th battalion of the Chasseurs-à-Pied. On active service in Algeria, 1877-78, he became a lieutenant in the Foreign Legion in 1882, and took part in operations in Tunis and Algeria. He was made commandant of the infantry school at St. Maixent, 1901.

A colonel in command of the 39th infantry regiment in 1905, he was director of infantry under the minister of war in 1907, brigadier general in 1908, general of division commanding the 12th infantry division, 1911, and successively head of the 8th army corps, 1913, and of the 6th army corps, 1914. Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War he was given command of the 3rd army, and he took part in the first battle of the Marne, September, 1914. In August, 1915, he was appointed commander of the French army of the Orient at Salonica, which he reached in October following, and in January, 1916, was made commander-in-chief of the whole Salonica expedition. Recalled in 1917, he was placed on the reserve in April, 1918. In 1923 he was appointed high commissioner in Syria, but in 1925 he was recalled. He died March 23, 1929.

General Balfourier

MAURICE BALFOURIER was born at Paris, April 27, 1852. He entered St. Cyr, November 15, 1870. He first saw active service in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1908 he was made a brigadier general, and in 1911 governor of Toul. General of division in June, 1912, he commanded the 20th army corps on the outbreak of the Great War, and took part in many operations, especially distinguishing himself at Verdun in 1916,

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

in which year he received the rank of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. In March, 1917, he was placed at the head of the 36th army corps, and fought up to April 11, when he joined the reserve. He died June 24, 1933.

General Micheler

JOSEPH ALFRED MICHELER was born at Phalsbourg, September 23, 1861, and educated at St. Cyr. He entered the French army as a lieutenant of infantry, October, 1882. He served in Algeria, 1890-98, 1903-5, and 1909-11, and in December, 1912, was colonel of the 29th infantry regiment. After the outbreak of the Great War he was promoted brigadier general, and in October, 1914, was chief of the staff of the 6th army corps. Early in 1915 he became chief of the staff of the 1st army, and in August commanded the 53rd infantry division. As temporary general of division, he was placed at the head of the 38th army corps in March, 1916, and in April commanded the 10th army. Full general of division in June, 1916, he took part in the battle of the Somme. In December, 1916, he was appointed assistant to the commander-in-chief, and in 1917 successively commanded the 1st and 5th armies. He retired in May, 1919.

Aristide Briand

ARISTIDE BRIAND was born at Nantes, March 28, 1862, and was educated at the college of St. Nazaire. He became a barrister, political editor of the socialist paper, "La Lanterne," and a contributor to many other journals. Elected to the Chamber in 1902 by the industrial constituency of St. Etienne, he first took office as minister of public instruction, March 12, 1903. This led to his expulsion from the socialist party in March, 1906, and from that time his most bitter opponents were his former socialistic supporters. In October of the same year he was appointed minister of public instruction and worship in the first government formed by Clemenceau.

Briand succeeded Clemenceau as prime minister in July, 1909, and with a reconstructed Cabinet remained in office until June, 1911. Again premier for 56 days, January-February, 1913, he re-entered official life August 27, 1914, as minister of justice in the Viviani Cabinet, and, becoming premier again, October 29, 1915, retained this position until his resignation, March 17, 1917. Of Breton descent, tenacious, persuasive, conciliatory, he carried through the separation of church and state, included working men in the jury lists, and, making a determined stand against syndicalism, successfully fought the great railway strike of October, 1910. The strike had lasted a week, and no trains had been run; the whole industrial life of France was threatened,

FRENCH—ITALIAN

when Briand decided to call up the railwaymen, as reservists, to the colours, and to place them on duty on the railways. By this move he turned the strikers into breakers of their own strike, and the return to work was immediate.* Reproached in the Chamber by Jean Jaurès, Briand replied that his hands were free of blood, for the strike had been crushed without bloodshed.

During the critical period of the Great War Briand rallied his countrymen with the phrase, "united action on a united front." In 1926 Briand became foreign minister under Poincaré, and he retained that post when in July, 1929, he became premier for the twelfth time. In October his government was defeated, and he resigned, but he returned as foreign minister under Tardieu. During these years Briand worked steadily in the interests of peace; he had a share in drawing up the Kellogg Pact of 1929 and other international agreements. He resigned office in January, 1932, and died March 7, 1932.

Rene Viviani

RENE VIVIANI was born at Sidi-bel-Abbès, Algeria, in 1862. He became a barrister, entered politics as a socialist, and was elected to the chamber in 1893. In 1906 he first accepted office as minister of labour, and later held other official positions, including minister of labour, 1909-10, and minister of instruction, 1913. Prime minister, June, 1914, he reorganized his Cabinet after the outbreak of the Great War as a war ministry. Until his resignation in 1915 he was one of France's most powerful forces, and did much to unite his country in the whole-hearted prosecution of the war. He accepted office under Briand, and was minister of justice, 1915-17. In 1920 he was one of France's representatives at the first assembly of the League of Nations, and later became her permanent representative. He died September 7, 1925.

ITALIAN

Duke of Aosta

EMMANUEL PHILIBERT, duke of Aosta, was the eldest son of Amadeus, king of Spain, 1870-73, a grandson of Victor Emmanuel II, king of Italy, and, therefore, a cousin of King Victor Emmanuel III. He was born at Genoa, January 13, 1869. He was married in 1895 in England to a Bourbon princess, and, entering the Italian army, rose to a high command. In the Great War the duke led the 3rd army. He was largely responsible for the capture of Gorizia from the Austrians in August, 1916, and distinguished himself in the Caporetto campaign by his retreat across the Tagliamento. In June, 1926, he was created a marshal. He died July 4, 1931.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

Gabriele d'Annunzio

GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO was born at Pescara, of Dalmatian extraction, his patronymic being Rapagnetta. His mother was Duchess Maria Galesa di Roma. His first volume of poems, "Primo Vere," published when he was about fifteen, was followed in 1882 by the prose "Terra Vergine"; then came "Canto Novo," 1882, and "Intermezzo di Rime," 1883. For a time he was on the staff of the Rome "Tribuna," for which he wrote under the name Duca Minimus.

Poems and novels, brilliant in quality but frequently marked by sensuousness, followed rapidly; his more notable volumes including "San Pantaleone," (short stories), 1886; "La Chimera," 1888; "Poema Paradisiaco," 1891; "Odi Navali," 1893; "Il Trionfo del Morte," 1894, translated into English as "The Triumph of Death" by G. Harding, 1898; "Le Vergini delle Rocce," 1897, translated into English as "The Virgins of the Rocks" by A. Hughes, 1899; "La Città Morta," 1898, translated into English as "The Dead City" by A. Symons, 1900; and an epic, "La Canzone di Garibaldi," 1901. One of the greatest of modern Italian authors, d'Annunzio shows in his poetry that natural magic which is one of the rarest endowments of genius, and in his prose is almost as successful.

In May, 1915, d'Annunzio returned to Rome from France, where he had become fired with hatred against German vandalism, and his eloquence in speech and print had a great influence in determining Italy's choice. He soon became a daring airman and flew over enemy towns bombing Austrian troops, losing the sight of an eye as the result of an accident. In August, 1918, he led a flight of eight Italian aeroplanes over Vienna, dropping thousands of leaflets. He also fought on land. In 1919 d'Annunzio appeared as a new Garibaldi. Dissatisfied with the delay of the Peace Conference in deciding the future of Fiume, he led a raid thither in September, 1919, and occupied the port, which he declared annexed to Italy. He administered its affairs and issued flamboyant manifestoes. In November it was announced that he had occupied Zara, where he acted in a similar manner. In 1924 he was made prince of Montenevoso.

RUSSIAN

General Sakharoff

VLADIMIR VICTOROVITCH SAKHAROFF was born May 20, 1853, and educated at the Staff Academy, St. Petersburg. He entered the army in 1869, and saw active service in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78. Colonel in 1881, and general in 1897, he took part in the operations in China in 1900, and in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. He first came into prominence

RUSSIAN

during the Great War in 1916, owing to his brilliant participation as commander-in-chief of the Russian 11th army in the offensive of that year, capturing Brody on July 28. Later in 1916-17 he commanded the Russo-Rumanian forces in the Dobruja and in Moldavia; and in 1919 commanded an army under Kolchak against the Soviet government.

General Baratoff

NICOLAS NICOLAEVITCH BARATOFF came of a Tersky Cossack (Terek, Caucasia) family. He was born February 1, 1865. Educated at the Staff Academy, St. Petersburg, he entered the Russian army as a lieutenant of the Tersky Cossacks, September 1, 1882. He served in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, and in 1915 commanded the Russian forces operating in Persia. Early in 1916 he advanced from Hamadan to Kermanshah, which he captured, but the fall of Kut to the Turks forced him to retreat. The British recovery of Kut in February, 1917, enabled him to advance again, and on April 2 his troops effected a junction with the British.

General Evert

ALEXIS ERMOLAEVITCH EVERT was born February 20, 1857. He entered the army in 1874, saw active service in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, and took part in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. After the outbreak of the Great War he commanded one of the Russian armies in South-east Poland, which defeated the Austrians under Dankl in August-September, 1914. In 1915-16 he was commander-in-chief of the Russian central armies, and skilfully conducted the retreat from the Niemen. He resigned his command in March, 1917.

General Yudenitch

NICHOLAS NICOLAEVITCH YUDENITCH was born July 18, 1862. He entered the Russian army, 1879, and saw active service in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. At the outbreak of the Great War he was chief of staff and virtually commander-in-chief of the army of the Caucasus, and early in 1915 he defeated the Turkish offensive in the Caucasus under Enver Pasha. In 1916, with the Grand Duke Nicholas as his titular chief, he captured Erzerum, Erzincan, and Trebizond, conquering all Turkish Armenia. In 1919 he appeared in Finland, and commanded the Russian forces in an advance against the Bolsheviks, but, defeated, went into retirement. He died October 6, 1933.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

General Ivanoff

NICHOLAS YUDOVITCH IVANOFF was born July 22, 1851, and was educated at the Artillery College, St. Petersburg. He entered the army in 1866. He took part in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, became a colonel in 1884 and a general in 1894, holding a high command in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. After the outbreak of the Great War he was commander-in-chief of the Russian central armies in South-east Poland, August-September, 1914, and later in chief command of the Russian armies in Galicia, receiving the surrender of Przemyśl, March, 1915. He was in general command during the retreat after the Dunajetz battles, May, 1915, to the San and into South-east Poland. In 1916 he was appointed military adviser to Nicholas II at Mohilev headquarters. In the beginning of the revolution of March, 1917, he made an ineffectual attempt to support the tsar. He was killed while leading a Ukrainian contingent against the Bolsheviks in February, 1918.

RUMANIAN

Ferdinand, King of Rumania

FERDINAND, king of Rumania, was born at Sigmaringen, August 24, 1865. He was a son of Leopold, a member of the non-reigning and Roman Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family. In 1866 his uncle Charles had been chosen king of Rumania, and, as his heir, Ferdinand became king in October, 1914. The Great War was then in progress, but it was not until 1916 that Rumania joined in on the side of the Allies. The land was soon overrun by Austro-Germans, and during the difficult period that followed there were rumours of the king's abdication; but these did not materialize, and the end of the war saw him again in possession of his country. Ferdinand married in 1893 Marie, daughter of the duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and, therefore, a cousin of King George V. Of their six children the eldest was a son, Carol. He died July 20, 1927.

General Averescu

ALEXANDER AVERESCU was born March 9, 1859. He is of Bessarabian origin. He served as a trooper in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. He afterwards studied at the military academy at Turin, became brigadier general in 1906, and general of division six years later. In 1913 he directed the expedition against Bulgaria which brought the second Balkan War to a close. He distinguished himself during Rumania's struggles with the Central Powers in 1916-17, particularly in

RUMANIAN—MONTENEGRIN

July-August, 1917, when he had a large share in defeating the Austro-German offensive. Early in 1918, when Rumania was concluding peace with Germany, he acted for a short time as foreign minister. He became minister of the interior in December, 1919.

General Presan.

GENERAL PRESAN was born in Wallachia, January 27, 1861. He was educated at the military academy, Bukarest, and entered the army as a lieutenant in the artillery in July, 1880, becoming a general in May, 1907. On the entry of Rumania into the Great War in 1916, he was in command of the Rumanian 4th army, and in November was commander-in-chief of the Rumanian 3rd and 4th armies, taking part in the battle of the Argesul, especially in that portion of it which was fought southwest of Bukarest and is known as the battle of the Neajlovu. Later, when Averescu was appointed generalissimo under King Ferdinand, Presan became chief of staff.

Ion Bratiano

ION BRATIANO OR BRATIANU, son of Ion Bratiano, a distinguished political leader, was born at Florica, the family seat in Wallachia, on August 20, 1864. Educated at the university of Paris, he succeeded his father as Liberal leader, and became prime minister in 1907. On the fall of Maiorescu's Conservative government in January, 1914, he was again prime minister, and occupied that position when the Great War broke out. In August, 1916, assured of Russian armed support, he brought his country into the war on the side of the entente. After the peace of Bukarest the pro-German elements in the Rumanian Parliament accused him of treason, and for some time he was kept under preventive arrest. After the signing of the armistice by Germany, one provision of which abrogated the treaty of Bukarest, he again became premier and was chosen as first delegate of Rumania at the Paris Conference. He resigned the premiership, September, 1919. He was again premier in 1922, and died November 23, 1927.

MONTENEGRIN

Nicholas, King of Montenegro.

NICHOLAS, king of Montenegro, was born September 25, 1841. He was the son of Mirko Petrovich, and the nephew of Danilo, prince of Montenegro, then part of the Turkish empire. Educated mainly in Paris, in August, 1860,

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

he succeeded the murdered Danilo as prince, and he was still reigning when the Great War broke out in 1914. The independence of his country was recognized in 1878, and in 1910 he took the title of king. In 1916, having joined the Great War on the side of Serbia, he was driven out of his country, which was overrun, and took refuge in France. He resigned his rights to Montenegro, and died at Antibes, March 1, 1921.

SERBIAN

General Bojovitch

PETER BOJOVITCH was born at Mishevitch, July 4, 1858. He entered the Military Academy, Belgrade, in 1875, and joined the Serbian army as lieutenant of artillery, 1876, but later was transferred to the cavalry. He saw active service in the Serbo-Turkish Wars, 1876-8, and took part in the war against Bulgaria, 1885-6. A colonel in 1901, he was a general in 1912, and commanded the Serbian 1st army in the Balkan Wars, 1912-13. During the Great War he continued in command of this army, and, though wounded at Shabatz, played a leading part in the defeat of the Austrian invasions, 1914-15. In 1916 he commanded the resuscitated Serbian 1st army in the operations that led to the capture of Monastir by the Allies. He was made a field marshal (voivode), September 13, 1918, and shortly afterwards was one of the commanders in the great offensive that resulted in the overthrow of Bulgaria.

General Mishich

ZIVOYIN MISHICH who was the son of Radovan Mishich, a peasant, was born at Struganik, near Valievo, July 7, 1855. He entered the Military Academy, Belgrade, in 1874, joined the Serbian army as lieutenant of infantry, 1876, and fought in the Serbo-Turkish Wars of 1876 and 1877-78, taking part also in the war against Bulgaria, 1885-86. Later he became professor of strategy at the superior military college, Belgrade. He was a general in 1912, and was chief of the general staff, under Putnik, during the Balkan wars, 1912-13.

At the outset of the Great War Mishich was in command of the Serbian 2nd army, and played a distinguished part in the defeat of the Austrian invasions, 1914-15, being made a field marshal (voivode) in 1914. He commanded the Serbian 2nd army during the great retreat, 1915, and in 1916 he was at the head of the resuscitated Serbian 2nd army, when the success of his operations in the Cherna Bend, by which Monastir was outflanked from the east, led to the capture of that city by the

SERBIAN—GERMAN

Allies. In September, 1918, he was one of the Serbian commanders in the great offensive that resulted in the overthrow of Bulgaria. He died January 20, 1921.

GERMAN

Admiral Scheer*

R EINHOLD VON SCHEER served in the cruiser *Bismarck*, 1884-86, was navigator of the *Prinz Wilhelm*, 1895-96, and in 1909-11 was chief of the staff to Holtzendorf when the latter commanded the High Sea Fleet. Regarded as one of the most energetic and able officers in the German navy, he was commanding a battle squadron at Kiel when the Great War broke out, and continued to hold that position until the end of 1915, when he became commander-in-chief of the High Sea Fleet. He commanded the German naval forces at Jutland with Hipper as second in command. On August 11, 1918, the latter took over the chief command, when Scheer was appointed to succeed Holtzendorf as chief of the Admiralty staff. He resigned in January, 1919. Scheer's conduct of the operations at Jutland has been the subject of much debate, the German view being that he was superior to the British commander in tactics and seamanship. He gave his own account of the battle in "Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War," published 1920. He died November 26, 1928.

Field Marshal Mackensen

A UGUST VON MACKENSEN, the son of Ludwig von Mackensen, was born at Haus Leipnitz, Saxony, December 6, 1849. Educated at the Torgau Gymnasium and the university of Halle, he entered the army in 1869, and in 1908 was general of cavalry and commander of the 17th army corps, with headquarters at Danzig. He was occupying this position when the Great War broke out. Becoming one of Hindenburg's lieutenants, he was first prominent in the second attack on Warsaw, and met with considerable success until held up on the Bzura, in November-December, 1914.

In reality generalissimo of all the Austro-German forces in the south, Mackensen carried out the great drive in 1915 against the Russians in Galicia and the Carpathians which began with the Dunajetz battles and ended in the reconquest of nearly all Galicia. He then advanced into South-east Poland, and co-operated in the campaign that compelled the evacuation of Warsaw by the Russians. He was made a field marshal, and in October-November of the same year was in command of the armies that overran Serbia.

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

After Rumania's entry into the war Mackensen commanded the composite army which invaded the Dobruja in August-September, 1916. Having subdued that area, in combination with Falkenhayn, moving from the Transylvanian Alps, he subjugated Rumania up to the line Sereth—Putna—Moldavian mountains by the middle of January, 1917. His offensive against the Russo-Rumanians in the summer of that year was not successful, but as, owing to Bolshevist defection and the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Rumania had to accept a disastrous peace, he remained in that country until the armistice of November 11, 1918, and till then was in effect dictator of Rumania. After the armistice he retired into Hungary, where he was interned, but early in 1919 he was permitted to return to Germany.

Prince Rupert of Bavaria

RUPERT OR RUPPRECHT, prince of Bavaria and German general, was the eldest son of Louis III, king of Bavaria, and the archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria-Este. He was born at Munich, May 18, 1869, and entered the German army as a subaltern in a Bavarian regiment in 1886. In 1906 he was head of the 1st Bavarian army corps, and in 1913 was made an inspector general.

Rupert commanded the German 6th army in Lorraine in August-September, 1914. In October he was put at the head of the German forces operating on the Lys; in October-November, 1914, he came into prominence in connexion with the first battle of Ypres. Later he held the German line from Ypres to Arras, and took part in many battles, chiefly against the British, in that area. In 1917 he held the front from the Oise to the sea. In 1918 he commanded a group of armies and in November, 1918, on the declaration of a republic in Bavaria, shared the fate of the royal house. By the death of his father, King Louis III, October 18, 1921, he became the head of his family. His first wife having died, he married in 1921 Princess Antonia of Luxembourg. He wrote several books dealing with his life and war experiences. To the British, Rupert is interesting as a descendant of Charles I, and, according to legitimist ideas, the rightful British sovereign as head of the house of Stewart.

Count Bothmer

FELIX VON BOTHMER, the son of Count Maximilian von Bothmer, at one time quartermaster general of the German army, was born at Munich, December 10, 1852. He entered the German infantry as a lieutenant in 1871, and became a general in 1910. He became prominent during the Great War as commander of a Prussian corps, which opposed

GERMAN—AUSTRIAN

with some success Brusiloff's offensive in Galicia in 1916. Previously he had been in the Carpathians and in Galicia, in 1915. He was reported shot by communists in Munich, April, 1919.

General Lettow-Vorbeck

PAUL EMIL VON LETTOW-VORBECK was born at Saarlouis, March 20, 1870. He entered the German army as a lieutenant of artillery. Shortly before the outbreak of the Great War he was in command of a battery in Cameroons, but he first came into prominence in connexion with the German operations in East Africa, 1914-15, then being a colonel and commander-in-chief of the German forces in that region. After the British under Smuts took the offensive, he made a skilful retreat, and escaped into Portuguese East Africa in 1917, in which year William II advanced him to the rank of general. In March, 1918, he became division commander in the Reichswehr, and he quelled the communist rising in Hamburg in June, 1919. In 1932 he visited London, and attended a reconciliation dinner at which he met his former opponent in East Africa, General Smuts. He published "My Reminiscences of East Africa," 1920.

General Eichhorn

HERMANN VON EICHHORN was born at Breslau, February 12, 1848. He entered the Prussian army as a lieutenant of the Guard in 1866, served in the Franco-German War, 1870-71, and reached the rank of general in 1912. On the outbreak of the Great War he was one of the commanders under Hindenburg on the east front, and operated in East Prussia and towards the Niemen. In command of the German 10th army, he took Kovno in August, 1915, and Vilna a month later, being made a field marshal for these successes. In 1918 he led the German forces in the Ukraine, and for some time was military dictator of that country. His arbitrary rule made him unpopular, and he was murdered at Kiev, July 31, 1918.

AUSTRIAN

General Boehm-Ermolli

GENERAL VON BOEHM-ERMOLLI first came into prominence during the Great War as commander of the cavalry in the Austrian armies operating against the Russians in western Galicia in October-November, 1914. In 1914-15 he was in command of the Austrian 2nd army that formed part of Mackensen's forces in Galicia in the German offensive which began with the Dunajetz battles in May, 1915, and later he fought on the line of the Bug. In 1916 he commanded the

PERSONALIA OF THE WAR

same army in the region of the Strypa, and in 1917 again in the region of the Bug.

General Borovic von Bojna

BOROVIC VON BOJNA during the Great War was commander of the Austrian 3rd army operating in the region of the Central Carpathians in April, 1915. He took part in Mackensen's offensive in Galicia, beginning with the Dunajetz battles in May, 1915, but was soon transferred to the Italian front. In 1917 he was in chief command of the Austrian forces on the line of the Isonzo, and later on the Lower Piave. In January, 1918, he succeeded the archduke Eugen in supreme command of the Austrian armies, and became field marshal in February. He died at Klagenfurt, May, 1920.

General Kovesshaza

KOVESS VON KOVESHHAZA came into prominence in 1915, when he held command on the Russian front under the archduke Ferdinand Joseph and captured Ivangorod. In the autumn of that year he went to Serbia, where he commanded one of the two armies under Mackensen. His army, composed of Germans and Austrians, was chiefly responsible for the over-running of Serbia, and this led to his appointment to command the expeditionary force sent to conquer Montenegro early in 1916. Later in that year Kovesshaza had command of an army in the Austrian offensive in the Trentino. He was created a marshal in August, 1917. In July, 1918, he was appointed successor to Conrad von Hötzenndorf. He died September 22, 1924.

TURKISH

Djemal Pasha

DJEMAL PASHA, noted Turkish politician and soldier, came of an obscure origin. He was born at Constantinople on May 1, 1861. He entered the army and later became one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was appointed military governor of Adana, 1908, governor-general of Bagdad, 1911, and commanded a division during the Balkan wars. In 1913 he commanded the 1st army corps, and was made minister of public works and then minister of marine. In 1915-17 he commanded the Turkish forces in Sinai and Palestine. On the collapse of Turkey in October, 1918, Djemal Pasha fled from Constantinople. Accused of misappropriation of state funds and of crimes against international law, he was condemned to death in his absence in July, 1919. Turkish peace delegate at Paris, May, 1920, he was assassinated at Tiflis in July, 1922.

DIARY OF EVENTS
1916

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Fall of Lovtchen.

German defeat in Champagne. Enemy launches strong attack on French positions with three divisions. All its results nullified by French counter-attacks.

Report from Sir Charles Monro describes the final evacuation of Gallipoli.

Further news to hand of General Aylmer's Kut relief force. After battle on 7th near Sheikh Saad, Turks retreated, pursued by British. Owing to weather conditions and necessity of removing wounded by river, British force was still halting on the 10th.

JAN. 12.—French land at Corfu, and prepare island for the Serbian army.

JAN. 13.—Announced that Allies have cut Greco-Bulgarian railway line, and railway bridge at Demirhissar, about 45 miles north-east of Salonica, blown up.

Fall of Cetinje.

JAN. 14.—British artillery heavily bombards enemy's trenches about Givenchy.

British force under General Aylmer advancing to relief of Kut-el-Amara attack and repulse Turks on north bank of the Tigris at and about Wadi.

JAN. 15.—Reciprocal bombardments about Maricourt, Givenchy, Hill 63, and Hollebeke.

JAN. 16.—Lille shelled by British.

Announced that in Persia there has been conflict between Russian and Turkish troops at Kangavar. Latter occupied by Russians, and prisoners taken.

JAN. 17.—Unconditional surrender of Montenegro announced.

Announced that south of Pinsk the Russians have made considerable inroads on the enemy's lines.

JAN. 18.—French batteries wreck German trenches in the region of Moulin-Sans-Touvent, between Oise and Aisne.

JAN. 19.—Russians report a considerable success by their troops in the Caucasus.

JAN. 20.—Announced that the first South African infantry brigade has arrived in Egypt.

North-east of Czernowitz, in the region of Rarancze, Russians capture sector of enemy's position.

Admiralty announce that British submarine grounded off the Dutch coast. Part of her officers and crew taken off by British destroyer, and remainder rescued by Dutch warship.

Allied warships bombard Dedeagach, destroying a train and several buildings.

A Montenegrin official statement says that that country has refused the onerous Austrian terms.

JAN. 21.—British submarine operating in the Adriatic torpedoes and sinks Austrian torpedo-boat destroyer, after capturing



British troops holding an outpost formed of wire entanglements thrown across a roadway. Barbed wire was also extensively used to consolidate



To counteract the effects of phosgene gas British troops were supplied with improved gas helmets impregnated with sodium thiosulphate and sodium phenate. This photograph was taken 13 July, 1916, near Ovillers. Imperial War Museum

MECHANICAL AIDS TO VICTORY



WOMEN ON THE HOME FRONT. To relieve men for military service women were employed as bus conductors and (above) as ticket collectors at the railway stations.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

two of the enemy's airmen from a derelict aeroplane.

General Aylmer attacks the enemy opposing his march to relieve Kut-el-Amara at Essin.

JAN. 22.—Russian army in Caucasus pursues defeated Turks towards Erzerum and shells the forts.

JAN. 23.—Air raids in Kent; at one o'clock in bright moonlight a hostile aeroplane visits the east coast of Kent, dropping nine bombs. One man killed; two men, one woman, and three children slightly injured. At noon two hostile seaplanes make a second attack in the same locality, but are chased away by naval and military machines; no damage and no casualties reported.

Twenty-four French aeroplanes bomb the railway station and barracks at Metz.

Near Neuville the Germans gain about 270 yards of French advanced trench, but this almost wholly regained.

General Wallace's column operating in western Egypt attacks the camp of the Senussi, burning it and dispersing the enemy's forces. Our losses 28 killed, 274 wounded.

JAN. 24.—German seaplane passes over Dover. It is engaged by anti-aircraft guns, and pursued by two British machines.

Success in East Africa; British troops advancing from Mbuyuni occupy enemy's camp at Serengeti.

Russians again shell the forts of Erzerum.

JAN. 25.—After a series of mine explosions, accompanied by a violent bombardment, the Germans attack on a front of over 1,600 yards in the angle formed by the Arras-Lens road and the Neuville St. Vaast-Thelus road. At two points the enemy occupies the craters caused by his explosions, but is generally driven back.

German aeroplanes bomb Dunkirk.

Austrians occupy San Giovanni di Medua.

JAN. 26.—Announced that Austrians pursuing a plan of absorbing Albania have captured Scutari.

JAN. 27.—Report from General Townshend states that enemy have evacuated their trenches on the land side of Kut defences, and retired about a mile.

Military Service Bill receives the royal assent.

JAN. 28.—British beat back infantry attack near Loos. Further fighting on the French front at Neuville St. Vaast.

Total British casualties reported are 549,467 up to January 9, and include all fields of operations.

To the south of the Somme, after a violent bombardment, the Germans attack entrenched positions, capturing the village of Frise. The first counter-attacks enable the French to re-occupy some of the trenches.

Allied force occupies Kara Burun, commanding Gulf of Salonica.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- JAN. 29.**—French continue to re-occupy the portions of trenches captured by enemy in Artois, west of Hill 140.
Press bureau announces General Sir Percy Lake has joined General Aylmer's force at Wadi.
Zeppelin raid on Paris; over 53 killed and injured.
- JAN. 30.**—A second Zeppelin raid on Paris. No casualties reported.
- JAN. 31.**—Great Zeppelin raid on England; six or seven hostile airships raid the eastern and north-eastern and midland counties.
- FEB. 1.**—General Smith-Dorrien, commanding in East Africa, reports good progress being made with branch railway from Voi. It has been pushed on to the site of an enemy camp west of Mbuyuni.
- FEB. 2.**—Announced that British liner Appam captured by German armed liner Moewe, and taken, with prize crew aboard, to the American port of Norfolk.
- FEB. 3.**—Heavy shelling of British trenches around Loos.
- FEB. 4.**—Loss of a Zeppelin; Germans admit that one of the Zeppelins that took part in raid on midland counties, January 31, has been wrecked in the North Sea.
Allied columns in the Cameroons closing in on remnant of German force.
- FEB. 5.**—Reported from British headquarters in France that there have been 28 combats in the air. In five cases the German machines were driven down to their lines, and a sixth forced to descend with a stopped engine.
- FEB. 6.**—Minor naval action in the Adriatic; a British cruiser and a French torpedo-boat, covering the retirement of the Serbian army, meet four enemy destroyers and fire upon them. Latter flee towards Cattaro.
- FEB. 7.**—Renewed fighting on Bukovina frontier.
A communiqué regarding operations in Mesopotamia states that General Townshend is holding Kut-el-Amara as a point of strategical value.
- FEB. 8.**—German long-range gun fires three shells into Belfort.
French armoured cruiser Admiral Charner torpedoed by enemy submarine and sinks. Most of crew of 375 lost.
- FEB. 9.**—Two German seaplanes bomb Margate and Ramsgate in the afternoon, causing few casualties and slight damage.
- FEB. 10.**—Announced that General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien has resigned owing to ill-health, and General Smuts has succeeded him.
Germany sends a note to the United States as to the arming of merchantmen of the Allies.
- FEB. 11.**—Announced that hostile Arabs attacked British reconnaissance force on its return to Nasiriyeh from an upper branch of the Tigris named Shat-el-Hai. Our total casualties

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

373. A small punitive column was later dispatched from Nasiriyeh, surprised the Arabs, and destroyed four of their villages.
- FEB. 12.—Announced that French troops have crossed the Vardar and installed themselves on the right bank of the river in the region of Yenitso (Janitza) and at Verria.
- FEB. 13.—In Artois the Germans launch a series of attacks from Hill 140 to the road from Neuville to La Folie.
Russians capture one of forts before Erzerum.
- FEB. 14.—Admiralty announces H.M.S. Arethusa struck a mine off the east coast, and it is feared she will become a total wreck. About 10 men lose their lives.
In Champagne, near Tahure, the Germans capture a trench. South of the Somme the French recover portions of captured trenches.
Between the Ypres-Comines canal and the Ypres-Comines railway Germans capture 600 yards of the "International trench."
- FEB. 15.—Russians storm and carry another of the Erzerum forts.
- FEB. 16.—Fall of Erzerum.
Reported that the Austrians and Bulgarians are advancing on Durazzo.
- FEB. 17.—Conquest of the Cameroons. War Office announces that operations now practically ended, and conquest of the Cameroons complete, with the exception of the isolated position of Mora Hill (in the extreme north). Later announced that General Dobell, commander of British forces, reports that the Germans have ceased their resistance.
- FEB. 18.—General Smuts reports that an enemy force attacked the post of Kachumbe, on the Uganda border, but driven off.
Russian troops take Mush, 81 miles south of Erzerum, and Akhlut, on Lake Van.
- FEB. 19.—Colonial Office announces that German garrison at Mora has capitulated.
- FEB. 20.—Four German seaplanes drop 17 bombs on Lowestoft, and six on Walmer. Two men and a boy killed in latter town.
- FEB. 21.—Opening of great Verdun battle. Front from Brabant-sur-Meuse to Herbebois. Haumont Wood and the Beaumont salient captured by Germans. Attacks against Brabant and Herbebois repulsed.
- FEB. 22.—Haumont village evacuated. Part of the Beaumont salient recaptured. Strong enemy attack on Herbebois stopped. Artillery bombardment on a 25-mile front from Malancourt (west of the Meuse) to near Etain.
- FEB. 23.—French evacuate Brabant, and repulse attack against Samogneux. Part of the recaptured Beaumont salient again

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- lost. French withdraw from Samogneux and Ornes. French air raid on Metz-Sablon railway, one of the lines of communication for present operations.
- FEB. 24.—French established on the line of heights stretching from the east of Champneuville, to the south of Ornes. Germans claim capture of Champneuville, Beaumont, Ornes, and the French positions up to the ridge of Lauvemont, as well as over 10,000 prisoners.
- FEB. 25.—Several German attacks against the new French positions repulsed.
- Announced that Lord Derby is to be chairman of a joint naval and military air defence committee.
- Russians reported to have taken Kermanshah, 170 miles east of Bagdad.
- FEB. 26.—Verdun battle. Germans claim capture of Fort Douaumont, a dismantled fort without guns or garrison in the outer line of defences to the north-east of Verdun, but French report its encirclement.
- Evacuation of Albania by Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian troops. Italian troops leave Durazzo.
- Erzerum captures—officially announced that Russians made prisoners 235 Turkish officers and 12,753 men, and captured 323 guns.
- FEB. 27.—French rally beyond Fort Douaumont.
- P. and O. liner Maloja sinks off Dover; said to have been torpedoed. One hundred and fifty-five persons missing.
- FEB. 28.—Announced that the South Africans and Territorials have routed the Arabs in western Egypt.
- To the north of Verdun sector the activity of the opposing artilleries is still very great. To the west of Fort Douaumont the French troops engage in hand-to-hand fighting.
- FEB. 29.—Reported that General Aylmer's column on the Tigris has moved up three miles nearer Kut.
- French transport Provence II reported sunk in Mediterranean, February 26.
- MAR. 1.—German seaplane raids the south-east coast.
- H.M.S. Primula, a mine-sweeper carrying out patrol duties, torpedoed and sunk in the East Mediterranean.
- MAR. 2.—To the north and in the Woevre district of Verdun sector the enemy's artillery fire increases on the whole front, and principally against Dead Man Hill, the Pepper ridge, and the Douaumont ridge.
- British explode five mines near the Hohenzollern redoubt. Russians take Bitlis.
- MAR. 3.—Fighting near village of Douaumont.
- MAR. 4.—Violent cannonade on left bank of the Meuse at Hill 304 and at Goose Hill. Germans succeed in gaining a footing in village of Douaumont.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Russian troops occupy Atina on the Black Sea coast.
MAR. 5.—In the wood to the east of Vacherauville, on the Meuse north-east of Verdun, an attack by the Germans against French advanced positions repulsed.

Zeppelin raid over eight eastern counties; 13 killed and 33 injured.

MAR. 6.—Germans enter the village of Forges, but are repulsed at Goose Hill.

MAR. 7.—Germans capture Hill 265 at the price of heavy loss.

Russians capture Rizeh, 40 miles east of Trebizond.

MAR. 8.—French repulse a great German infantry attack west of the Meuse in the region of Bethincourt.

French air squadrons, consisting of 18 machines, drop 124 bombs on the Metz-Sablons station.

MAR. 9.—French smash a German mass attack in the region of the village of Vaux, north-east of Verdun.

War Office announces that on March 6 General Aylmer reached Es-Sinn, seven miles east of Kut-el-Amara.

War Office announces that General Smuts' troops have advanced against German forces in the Kilimanjaro area.

British air raid by 31 machines against the Germans' rail-head and billets at Carvin.

MAR. 10.—Germans succeed in retaking the Crows' Wood.

Germany declares war on Portugal.

MAR. 11.—Italian artillery vigorously bombard enemy positions at the bridge-head of Gorizia.

MAR. 12.—Russia reports her troops have occupied Kirind, in Persia, on the way to Bagdad.

MAR. 13.—Russians report that they drove back the Turks in the region of the river Kalapotamos, 30 miles east of Trebizond, and captured eight guns in the operations near Kermanshah.

MAR. 14.—North-west of Verdun German heavy gun fire redoubled in intensity. Repulsed on the whole front, the enemy gain a footing only at two points of French trenches, between Bethincourt and Dead Man Hill.

Italians capture enemy positions in the San Martino zone.

War Office reports that the Senussi raid from Tripoli has crumpled up. The British re-occupy Sollum.

MAR. 15.—General Smuts reports another success by capturing Moshi, the most important town in the north-east of German East Africa.

MAR. 16.—Resignation of Grand Admiral Tirpitz officially announced from Berlin.

Dutch 14,000-ton liner Tubantia torpedoed off the North Hinder Light.

British spring mines on the Double Crassier, Locs.

General Galliéni, French minister of war, resigns through ill-health, and is succeeded by General Roques.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- MAR. 17.—To the north of the Aisne an enemy attack directed against a French post to the south-east of the Bois des Buffes repulsed after hand-grenade fighting.
- MAR. 18.—Germans, by exploding mines, recapture three craters at the Hohenzollern redoubt.
Dutch liner Palembang torpedoed and sunk off the Galloper lightship.
- MAR. 19.—Four German seaplanes drop bombs on Ramsgate, Margate, Deal and Dover—13 killed and 31 wounded.
- MAR. 20.—Announced that H.R.H. the Prince of Wales has arrived in Egypt on appointment as staff captain on the staff of the general officer commanding-in-chief the Mediterranean expeditionary force.
Sixty-five British, French, and Belgian machines bomb German air stations at Zeebrugge and Houthane.
The Germans, having failed at every other point, extend their attacks on Verdun farther to the west.
- MAR. 21.—Germans, after violent fighting and using jets of flaming liquid, make their way to the southern edge of Avocourt Wood.
Renewed Russian offensive in the north and south of their line.
Four British destroyers attack and chase three German destroyers off the Belgian coast.
- MAR. 22.—On the small knoll of Haucourt the Germans succeed in gaining a footing.
Activity along whole Russian front, especially at Jacobstadt, in the Tchermetz Lotra region, and on the south-western shore of Lake Narotch.
Russians occupy Ispahan.
General Cadorna arrives in London.
- MAR. 23.—Announced that Major General Sir George F. Goringe, K.C.B., appointed temporary lieutenant general in Mesopotamia.
British front extended. In official report from headquarters announced that there has been artillery activity about Fricourt, Gommécourt, Hohenzollern redoubt, and Souchez, the last-mentioned in new line taken over from the French.
- MAR. 24.—Cross-Channel steamship Sussex torpedoed off the French coast on her passage from Folkestone to Dieppe. Feared loss of 100 persons.
Liner Minneapolis torpedoed in the Mediterranean, with loss of 11 lives.
- MAR. 25.—Admiralty announces an engagement took place on February 29 in North Sea between the armed German raider Greif, disguised as a Norwegian merchant vessel, and H.M. armed merchant cruiser Alcantara (Captain T. E. Wardle,

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

R.N.). The engagement resulted in the loss of both vessels, the German raider being sunk by gun fire, and the *Alcantara* apparently being torpedoed. Five German officers and 115 men picked up and taken prisoners. British losses, five officers and 69 men.

British seaplanes attack German airship sheds in Schleswig-Holstein, east of the island of Sylt, escorted to their rendezvous, close to the German coast, by a force of light cruisers and destroyers under Commodore Tyrwhitt.

MAR. 26.—Russian offensive continues; trenches captured at Postavy.

MAR. 27.—After exploding mines, infantry of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Royal Fusiliers assault the German salient at St. Eloi, south of Ypres, successfully taking the front and second-line trenches on a front of some 600 yards.

Great Allied conference opens in Paris.

MAR. 28.—Russian troops dislodge Turks from their positions in the region of the Baltachi Darassi river, 30 miles east of the port of Trebizond.

MAR. 29.—French storm Avocourt redoubt, and advance 300 yards.

MAR. 30.—General Polivanoff, Russian war minister, resigns.

Germans attack French positions on skirts of Fort Douaumont with aid of liquid fire, but repulsed.

MAR. 31.—Crown Prince of Serbia arrives in London.

Zeppelin raid on eastern counties; 43 killed, 66 injured. Zeppelin L 15 disabled and crew captured.

APRIL 1.—Zeppelin raid on north-east coast; 16 persons killed and 100 injured.

APRIL 2.—Zeppelin raid on north and south-east England and south-east Scotland. In latter country 12 killed, 11 injured.

Germans make violent attacks on the Avocourt Wood redoubt, but are repulsed.

Allied airmen drop 83 bombs on enemy cantonments of Keyem, Eessen, Terrest, and Houthulst.

APRIL 3.—British attack the crater at St. Eloi, which had been held by Germans since March 30, capturing it and establishing the line beyond it.

APRIL 4.—Ministry of munitions reports serious fire broke out in a powder factory in Kent during the week-end, leading to a series of explosions.

War Office announces Zeppelin raid on East Anglian coast; no damage, and no casualties.

War budget introduced in House of Commons.

APRIL 5.—A Zeppelin attacking north-east coast driven off by anti-aircraft fire.

British bombard hostile works near Bois Grenier (south of Armentières) and north of Ypres-St. Julian road with good

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

effect. About St. Eloi artillery on both sides very active.

General Lake reports from Mesopotamia that Tigris corps attacked and carried the enemy's entrenched position at Umm-el-Hannah, 20 miles north-east of Kut.

APRIL 6.—General Sir John Nixon's dispatch on operations in Mesopotamia published.

Germans attack British at St. Eloi.

French gain near Fort Douaumont.

APRIL 7.—At St. Eloi enemy regains portion of trenches captured by British, March 27.

APRIL 8.—Further War Office report concerning operations in Mesopotamia issued. During night of April 6-7, operations on the north (left) bank of the river confined to close reconnaissance of the Sanna-i-Yat defences.

General Smuts reports that on April 3 troops under General van Deventer surprised a German force in the Arusha district, and received its surrender, April 6.

APRIL 9.—German attack on a six-mile front north-west of Verdun everywhere repulsed.

APRIL 10.—Officially reported British troops capture the mine-crater at St. Eloi.

APRIL 11.—Dispatch by General Sir C. C. Monro on the evacuation of Gallipoli published.

Enemy raids British trenches near La Boisselle, north-east of Albert, after heavy bombardment, in which he used "tear" shells, but was driven out.

APRIL 12.—Reported that Allies land forces in the Greek island of Cephalonia, 75 miles south of Corfu.

Enemy makes three successive attacks west of Pkém-Ypres road, north of Ypres.

APRIL 13.—Turks' camp at Jifjaffa, east of Suez canal, attacked and occupied by Australian troops. The Katia oasis also occupied.

APRIL 14.—Three naval aeroplanes drop bombs on the Zaitunlik powder factory and aeroplane sheds at Constantinople. Another naval aeroplane visits Adrianople and drops bombs on the railway station.

APRIL 15.—Turkish division routed by Russian troops in the region of Bitlis.

APRIL 16.—General Lake reports gradual, but steady, progress made on the right bank of the Tigris, and the enemy's advanced lines driven in and occupied.

APRIL 17.—On the right of the Meuse, from the river to Douaumont, the Germans launch an attack by two divisions.

APRIL 18.—Fall of Trebizond, officially reported from Petrograd.

War Office announces a check to the Kut relief army. Turks heavily counter-attacked on the right (south) bank of the Tigris, forcing back British lines.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- President Wilson's note to Berlin demanding that Germany abandon her piracy or the United States will sever relations with her regarded as practically an ultimatum.
- APRIL 19.—Germans' three successive attacks on French positions at Les Eparges, 13 miles south-east of Verdun, repulsed.
- APRIL 20.—Announced that a detachment of Russian troops has arrived at Marseilles.
- APRIL 21.—French gains in the region of Dead Man Hill.
King's Shropshire Light Infantry recapture the trench about the Ypres-Langemark road lost on April 19.
- APRIL 22.—War Office announces advance in German East Africa, British troops occupying Umbugwe and Salanga.
- APRIL 23.—Attack on the Sanna-i-Yat position on the left (north) bank of the Tigris fails owing to the floods.
- APRIL 24.—Zeppelin raid over Norfolk and Suffolk coast.
- APRIL 25.—Announced that on April 23 Turks' attack at Duweidar, near Suez beaten off. On same day enemy attacked Katia, held by small force of Yeomanry.
Announced that General van Deventer has occupied Kondona Irangi, in German East Africa.
Admiralty announce that on night of April 20-21 an attempt to land arms and ammunition in Ireland was made by a disguised German auxiliary, in conjunction with a German submarine. The auxiliary sank, and Roger Casement was made a prisoner.
Chief secretary for Ireland announces that at noon on April 24 grave disturbances broke out in Dublin. Rebels seized post office and parts of city.
At 4.30 a.m. enemy battle cruisers appear off Lowestoft and shell the town.
- APRIL 26.—Zeppelin raid over the east coast of Kent.
Liberty Hall, Dublin, the rebel base, destroyed and occupied. In recapture of St. Stephen's Green 11 insurgents killed.
- APRIL 27.—German wireless reports H.M. submarine E 22 sunk in North Sea.
Whole of Ireland under martial law. General Sir John Maxwell sent, with plenary powers over the whole country.
H.M.S. Russell strikes a mine in the Mediterranean and sinks.
- APRIL 28.—German submarine sunk off east coast. One officer and 17 men of the crew captured.
- APRIL 29.—Fall of Kut. General Townshend surrenders with 2,970 British troops and 6,000 Indian troops.
- APRIL 30.—Lord French reports that the back of the Irish rebellion has been broken.
- MAY 1.—All rebels in Dublin reported to have surrendered and city "quite safe."

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- Admiralty announces loss through mines of the armed yacht Aegusa and the mine-sweeper Nasturtium.
Russian push north-east of Bagdad.
- MAY 2.—French attack enemy's positions south-east of Fort Douaumont, and carry 500 yards of a first-line trench.
Five Zeppelins raid north-east coast of England and south-east coast of Scotland; nine killed, 29 injured.
- MAY 3.—Hostile aeroplane drops bombs on Deal.
French carry German positions to north-west of Dead Man Hill; 100 prisoners and four machine guns taken.
Mr. Birrell resigns Irish secretaryship.
P. H. Pearse, Thomas J. Clarke, and Thomas MacDonagh, signatories to Irish Republican Proclamation, shot.
Mr. Asquith introduces his bill for compulsory service of all men between 18 and 41.
Zeppelin L 20 destroyed off Stavanger (Norway), on way back from raid on British coast, May 2.
Belgian forces land on German shore of Lake Kivu, East Africa.
- MAY 4.—More Russian troops reach Marsilles.
British prisoners in enemy hands reported to be 37,047.
Zeppelin L 7 destroyed by British light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton, and a submarine, off Schleswig.
Four more Irish rebel leaders shot.
Austrian destroyer sunk by French submarine Bernouilli.
- MAY 5.—Zeppelin destroyed off Salonica; four officers, eight men made prisoners.
- MAY 6.—Germany's reply to the American note on submarine warfare published.
- MAY 7.—Strong German attack on French front between Hill 304 and Dead Man Hill.
General Pétain promoted commander-in-chief of the Central armies between Soissons and Verdun.
- MAY 8.—Anzacs in France. War Office announces that Australian and New Zealand troops have arrived in France. General Birdwood in command.
Italian troops land at Bardia, near Sollum.
White Star liner Cymric torpedoed and sunk in Atlantic.
- MAY 9.—Three violent German attacks in the region of Hill 304, with large forces, smashed by the French fire.
- MAY 10.—Petrograd reports that Russian troops have occupied Kasr-i-Shirin, about 100 miles from Bagdad.
President Wilson's reply to German note published.
Strong German attack west of Hill 304 completely repulsed by French.
- MAY 11.—Sir John Nixon's dispatch on the battle of Ctesiphon and retreat to Kut published.
Mr. Asquith leaves London for Dublin.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Total German losses to end of April officially stated at 2,822,079.

German attack west of the Vaux Pond, north-east of Verdun, repulsed.

Total casualties to date in Irish rebellion published—1,315 ; 13 rebels executed.

MAY 12.—Enemy captures 500 yards of our front trenches north-east of Vermelles. Portion of lost ground regained.

At Verdun the French extend their positions south-east of Haucourt.

MAY 13.—Germans, after very heavy bombardment, attack British lines about Ploegsteert Wood, but are repulsed.

MAY 14.—German East Africa. Reported that three days' attacks by enemy in direction of Kondoa Irangi have been defeated, and that Belgians have entered Kigali.

Austrians begin attack on Italian front, south-east and south of Trent, and advance slightly.

MAY 15.—Roger Casement charged at Bow Street with high treason.

Lancashire Fusiliers seize and occupy the enemy's forward line at Vimy ridge.

MAY 16.—Austrians launch attack against Italians on a narrow front between Zugna Torta and the Val Sugana.

Sir Douglas Haig reports 27 combats in the air ; an Albatross was attacked, driven down, and wrecked near Lille ; another driven down north of Vitry.

Lord Curzon president of new Air Board.

An encounter off the Belgian coast between British destroyers and monitors and German destroyers.

MAY 17.—Anzac column in Sinai Peninsula successfully attacks enemy troops at Bayoud and Mageibra.

Mr. Balfour's statement on "freedom of the seas" published.

MAY 18.—Big enemy attack on French positions in the Avocourt Wood and Hill 304 repulsed.

Mine crater on Vimy ridge captured by the enemy.

Royal Commission inquiry on Irish rising opens.

Successful bombardment of El Arish, important post on the Turkish line of communications from Syria to Egypt, by British ships, aeroplanes, and seaplanes.

MAY 19.—Italian retreat on Trentino front.

General Gorringe takes the Dujailar redoubt on the Tigris.

The loyal North Lancashire Regiment recapture crater on Vimy ridge.

Hostile seaplanes raid the Kent coast.

MAY 20.—Lieutenant General Sir Bryan Mahon assumes command in western Egypt, and is succeeded by Lieutenant General Milne at Salonica.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Detachment of Russian cavalry join General Gorringe's troops on the Tigris.

MAY 21.—French capture two German trenches between Avo-court Wood and the Meuse, and on the right bank of the river the Haudromont quarries.

MAY 22.—South bank of Tigris as far as the Shat-el-Hai reported clear of the enemy.

French troops re-enter part of Douaumont Fort.

MAY 23.—Forces of disaffected sultan of Darfur defeated by British column, and his capital, El Fasher, entered.

Italians withdraw between the Astico and the Brenta, north-east of Rovereto, and in the Sugana valley.

MAY 24.—The Germans, after heavy sacrifices, enter the village of Cumières, and re-occupy Fort Douaumont.

MAY 25.—Military Service Act receives royal assent.

British aeroplanes bomb Turkish posts at Rodh Salem, El Hamma, Bir Bayoud, Bir Salmana.

MAY 26.—War Office announces that General Smuts' advanced troops have occupied Rufu Lager on the Usambara railway, Lembeni, on the same railway, and Ngulu, eight miles south-east of Lembeni.

MAY 27.—In fierce counter-attack at Cumières the French win back eastern part, and make progress at Hill 304.

Death of General Galliéni.

MAY 28.—Reported that Bulgarian troops operating in the Struma valley advance and occupy the southern outlet of the Rupel pass, the adjacent heights, and the Demirhissar bridge.

MAY 29.—Continued Austrian attacks against the Italian positions between the Adige and the Arsa valley, south of Rovereto, repulsed.

A White Paper issued containing telegrams regarding the Bagdad expedition which passed between the viceroy of India, the India Office, Generals Nixon and Townshend.

MAY 30.—Sir Douglas Haig's first dispatch published.

In Verdun sector French report violent attack between Dead Man Hill and Cumières.

War Office reports that Brigadier General Northey has occupied New Langenburg, in south-west of German East Africa.

MAY 31.—With unprecedented artillery fire the Germans make repeated attacks east of Dead Man Hill and around Cumières village. The French repulse enemy, but have to evacuate their first-line trench south-west of Cumières.

Great naval fight off Jutland. Admiral Beatty engages German battle cruiser squadron and battle fleet off Danish coast, inflicting and sustaining heavy losses. On the advent of the British battle fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, the enemy

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

disperses and retreats. Result of action: 11 German ships sunk against British 14, among latter being the battle cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, *Invincible*, and the cruisers *Defence*, *Black Prince*, and *Warrior*.

JUNE 1.—In southern Tyrol the Austrians are held on the left and centre, but gain ground in the Asiago region.

The new Air Board issues details of many British air fights in France and Flanders during the month of May.

JUNE 2.—Germans pierce the French lines in southern part of the Caillette Wood, in the region south of the Vaux Pond, and at Damloup. On the slopes of Vaux Fort there is a struggle of "unprecedented violence."

JUNE 3.—Reported that General Smuts' troops carried German entrenched positions between the Pangani river and the Pare foothills on May 30.

Allied troops at Salonica occupy the government bureaux, and proclaim martial law throughout the occupied territory.

JUNE 4.—Russians conduct a violent offensive from the Pripet to the Rumanian frontier.

JUNE 5.—British infantry enter German trenches in five different places between Cuinchy and Fauquissart.

H.M.S. *Hampshire*, with Lord Kitchener and his staff on board, sunk at 8 p.m., to the west of the Orkneys, by a mine. The secretary of state for war was on his way to Russia.

JUNE 6.—Germans bombard British positions about Hooze and in neighbourhood of Ypres-Comines railway and canal.

Russians take Lutsk.

Allies blockade Greek coast.

JUNE 7.—Fort Vaux cut off. The French claim that at 3.50 a.m. the fort was still in their hands, but no communication with it has been possible. Great artillery activity about Hill 304, north-west of Verdun, is announced.

Announced from British front that enemy captured our front-line trenches running through the ruins of Hooze. Australian troops raid German trenches east of Bois Grenier, inflicting loss and bringing back prisoners.

Officially reported that in recent actions in Volhynia, Galicia, and the Bukovina the armies of General Brusiloff took over 40,000 prisoners and 77 guns.

Mr. Asquith takes over duties of secretary for war, pending appointment of Lord Kitchener's successor.

JUNE 8.—Russia reports vigorous pursuit of Austrians following on capture of Lutsk, and additional 11,000 prisoners.

Loss of Vaux Fort officially admitted by the French.

Admiral Jellicoe reports 12 survivors of H.M.S. *Hampshire* washed ashore on a raft.

A blockade of Greece by the Allies announced.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

JUNE 9.—Germans penetrate French lines between Thiaumont farm and the Caillette Wood.

Admiralty publishes news of a patrol action off Zeebrugge, British force chasing the enemy back to port.

Allied war council in London. Generals Joffre, Roques, and M. Briand, French premier, being present.

JUNE 10.—Violent artillery action by both sides in Verdun sector. General Smuts reports his troops have occupied Mombo and Mkaramo.

JUNE 11.—General Brusiloff's armies reported to have taken Dubno, and on the Bukovina border thrusting towards Czernowitz.

Germans launch a heavy bombardment at the southern part of the Ypres salient.

JUNE 12.—Russians reported pressing on the heels of the Austrians 24 miles south of Lutsk. In the extreme south they are nearing the suburbs of Czernowitz.

Successive German attacks against the Thiaumont work repulsed.

Heavy mutual bombardment on the front between Hill 60 and Hooge.

British column under General Sir Percy Sykes enters Kerman, South Persia.

JUNE 13.—The Canadians by a splendid attack regain lost ground south-east of Zillebeke. The Australians make a successful raid on enemy trenches south of Armentières.

Germans capture French advanced trenches east of Hill 321.

Continued Russian advance on Kovel.

JUNE 14.—Russian advance continues along the whole front, from the southern part of the Pripet marshes to the Rumanian frontier. Total prisoners to date, 1,720 officers, 120,000 men.

General Smuts' northern column reaches Makuyuni. He reports the occupation of Wilhelmstal.

JUNE 15.—French carry a trench on southern slopes of Dead Man Hill.

JUNE 16.—H.M. destroyer Eden in collision, sinks in the Channel; 31 saved.

JUNE 17.—Austro-German counter attack on the Styr repulsed. Fall of Czernowitz.

JUNE 18.—French repulse German attacks against Dead Man Hill and Thiaumont.

General Moltke, ex-chief of German general staff, dies suddenly of heart failure.

JUNE 19.—Russians reported 50 miles from Lemberg. They have taken 3,000 prisoners near Czernowitz, bringing total of 175,000 to date since their offensive opened.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

In Italy the Alpini carry a summit of Mount Lidro, taking 200 prisoners.

Successful raid by Royal Flying Corps against enemy aerodrome, five miles south of El Arish.

JUNE 20.—Three German attacks against French positions north-west of Hill 321 repulsed.

JUNE 21.—Full text of Allies' decisions at the economic conference in Paris published.

General Smuts reports occupation of Handeni, and enemy continuing his retreat towards the Central railway.

JUNE 22.—Russia reports capture of Radautz.

Greek government accedes to the demands of the Allies.

JUNE 23.—In the Bukovina the Austrians are retiring towards the Carpathians. Russians capture Kimpolung.

Germans reach the village of Fleury, south of Hill 320, but French counter-attack recovers part of the ground.

JUNE 24.—Allies' blockade of Greece raised.

JUNE 25.—British artillery active on the whole front.

The Italians in the Pasubio sector extend their lines of occupation as far as the Piazza valley.

JUNE 26.—Italian infantry advance from the Val Arsa to the Sette Comuni plateau.

JUNE 27.—Italians, rapidly advancing, re-occupy Arsiero and Asiago.

JUNE 28.—General Lechitsky defeats the Austrians on a front of 25 miles east of Kolomea.

JUNE 29.—Roger Casement sentenced to death.

JUNE 30.—Petrograd reports capture of Kolomea.

JULY 1.—Great Allied offensive launched. A Franco-British attack north and south of the Somme, on a front of 25 miles, begins at 7.30 a.m. Allied troops carry the German forward system of defences on a front of 16 miles, storming and occupying the strongly fortified villages of Montauban and Mametz.

JULY 2.—Sir Douglas Haig reports heavy fighting in the area between the Ancre and the Somme. British troops carry Pricourt. Total prisoners to date, 3,500. French engaged north of the Somme in the region of Hardecourt and Curlu. The village of Frise and Méréaucourt Wood captured. Prisoners exceed 6,000.

JULY 3.—Third day of Somme offensive. British take La Boisselle, but are checked north-east of Albert. The French capture five villages and advance to within three miles of Péronne. Prisoners taken by Allies total 12,300.

JULY 4.—Sir Douglas Haig reports that La Boisselle, part of which had been in enemy hands, is entirely in British possession. South of the Somme the French make good progress towards Péronne, capturing Estrées and Belloy-en-Santerre.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- JULY 5.—Continued gains by British and French. Latter advance north of the Somme to Hem and reach a point on the south bank two miles from Péronne. Prisoners in British sector total over 6,000; French 9,500.
- JULY 6.—British advance near Thiepval.
In Volhynia Russians take over 2,300 prisoners. West of Lower Strypa the enemy is overthrown and driven back.
- JULY 7.—Text of Admiral Jellicoe's dispatch on Jutland battle published.
Mr. Lloyd George new war minister.
British advance between the Ancre and the Somme.
Russians break the German line north of Lutsk salient.
- JULY 8.—Fighting takes place on the extreme British right flank. Our troops gain a lodgment in the Bois des Trônes. The French report their capture of Hardecourt.
- JULY 9.—East of Flaucourt French troops carry enemy positions on a depth of from 1,100 yards to a mile and a quarter. They capture the village of Biaches.
Russians north of the Lutsk salient force the Germans back six miles to the Stokhod.
Aeroplane raid on south-east coast of England.
- JULY 10.—Germans make slight gain in the Trônes Wood, where desperate battle raged.
General Smuts reports occupation of Tanga, on the coast of German East Africa, on July 7.
- JULY 11.—Dispatch from Sir Douglas Haig published, stating that after 10 days and nights of continuous fighting, British troops have completed the "methodical capture" of the enemy's first system of defence on a front of eight miles. Prisoners exceed 7,500, and 26 field guns captured.
U boat fires 30 rounds of shrapnel at Seaham Harbour.
- JULY 12.—Sir Douglas Haig reports recapture of all ground in Mametz Wood lost during the night, also some progress in the Trônes Wood.
- JULY 13.—British continue their pressure and advance their line.
Allied shell conference at War Office.
- JULY 14.—Sir Douglas Haig reports the capture of the enemy's second line on a front of four miles. As the result of the day's fighting British hold position from Bazentin-le-Petit village to Longueval village and the whole of Trônes Wood.
- JULY 15.—North of Bazentin-le-Grand British penetrate the German third line at the Bois des Foursaux.
- JULY 16.—In Volhynia Russians capture two batteries and 3,000 prisoners. They report having stormed Baiburt, half-way between Erzerum and Trebizond.
- JULY 17.—British troops, as the result of fresh successes, hold four miles 600 yards of the German second line north of the Somme. North of Longueval they are close to the third line.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- JULY 18.**—Germans attack positions near Longueval and Delville Wood.
- JULY 19.**—Enemy recaptures a portion of Delville Wood and obtains a footing in Longueval, but British regain most of the lost ground.
- JULY 20.**—British advance 1,000 yards north of the Bazentin-Longueval line. Heavy fighting continues in the northern outskirts of Longueval village and in Delville Wood.
General Sakharoff's troops inflict heavy defeat on the Austrians on the south-western face of the Lutsch salient.
- JULY 21.**—Reported that Russian army of the Caucasus has captured the town of Gumushkhane, 100 miles from Erzerum.
- JULY 22.**—Dispatches from Lord French and General Maxwell on the rising in Ireland published.
- JULY 23.**—Territorial and Australian troops carry the German outer works of Pozières, in the Somme area, by assault.
Resignation of M. Sazonoff, Russian foreign minister.
- JULY 24.**—All-day stubborn battle for Pozières, a large portion of which is in British hands.
- JULY 25.**—Russians take Austro-German positions in north-eastern Galicia, about 12 miles from Brody.
Fall of Erzindjan.
- JULY 26.**—The whole of Pozières captured.
- JULY 27.**—Announced that, north of the line Pozières-Bazentin-le-Petit, British capture 200 yards of an important trench. Enemy driven from east and north-east of Delville Wood.
Russians capture Brody.
Captain Fryatt, of the captured steamer Brussels, shot by Germans in Bruges.
- JULY 28.**—German efforts to recapture Delville Wood repulsed.
- JULY 29.**—Serbians gain a success east of Monastir.
Three Zeppelins raid the east coast, dropping 32 bombs in Lincolnshire and Norfolk.
- JULY 30.**—New Allied advance from the east of the Delville Wood to the Somme.
- JULY 31.**—General Smuts reports occupation of Dodoma.
Zeppelin raid on seven eastern and south-eastern counties.
- AUG. 1.**—The British hold their gains north of Bazentin-le-Petit.
A new German attack at Verdun, west and south of the Thiaumont work, repulsed.
- AUG. 2.**—North of the Somme the French capture a strongly-fortified enemy work between Hem and the Monacu farm. South of the Somme they occupy an enemy trench in the Estrées region.
- AUG. 3.**—Zeppelin raid on eastern and south-eastern counties; one airship hit.
French retake the village of Fleury.
Roger Casement hanged.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- AUG. 4.—After being driven from Fleury and the work of Thiaumont, the French regain possession of both positions.
An enemy force, 14,000 strong, attacks British positions near Romani, 23 miles east of the Suez Canal, but fails disastrously.
- AUG. 5.—North of Pozières an attack, in which the Australians and New Army troops take part, penetrates the German main second-line system on a front of over 2,000 yards.
Suez Canal victory. British forces start the pursuit of the Turks at dawn, and by the evening take more than 2,500 unwounded prisoners, four mountain guns, and a number of machine guns.
- AUG. 6.—Germans counter-attack north-west of Pozières.
- AUG. 7.—Italian success on Isonzo front; 4,000 prisoners announced to have been taken since August 4.
Announced that pursuit of Turks in Egypt pressed for 18 miles, and the Katia-Elm-Aisha basin cleared of invaders.
In German East Africa van Deventer's men reported now on the Central railway at three points.
- AUG. 8.—British right wing moves against Guillemont, their line having been advanced about 400 yards south-west of the town.
Portugal decides, on the invitation of the British government, to extend her cooperation to Europe.
- AUG. 9.—Fall of Gorizia.
Zeppelin raid on east coast.
French artillery bombards Doiran.
North-west of Pozières the Australians advance our line 200 yards on a frontage of 600 yards.
- AUG. 10.—Russians occupy Stanislaw.
British again advance north-west of Pozières, and the French north of Hem Wood.
- AUG. 11.—The French follow up their bombardment of Doiran by occupying Hill 227, south of the town.
British squadrons bomb airship sheds at Brussels and at Namur, and railway sidings and stations at Mons, Namur, and Busigny.
- AUG. 12.—French attack the third German position from east of Hardécourt as far as the Somme opposite Buscourt, carry all the trenches to a depth of 1,000 yards, and penetrate into the village of Maurepas.
Enemy retreat in Galicia.
Seaplane attack on Dover.
- AUG. 13.—British progress north-west of Pozières.
French progress on the slopes of Hill 109 to the south-east of Maurepas.
Destroyer, H.M.S. Lassoo, torpedoed or mined off the Dutch coast.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

AUG. 14.—South of the Somme the French extend their positions south-west of Estrées.

AUG. 15.—At Verdun the French force back the German lines close to Fleury.

Russians occupy Jablonica, two miles from the Carpathian crest.

AUG. 16.—Announced that King George has spent a week with his army in France.

Russians publish the total of their captures from June 4 to August 12: 7,757 officers, 350,845 men, 405 cannon.

AUG. 17.—British line pushed forward both west and south-west of Guillemont.

Reported that the Arab town and military coastal station of Bagamoyo, 36 miles north of Dar-es-Salaam, occupied by naval forces.

AUG. 18.—The British and French attack all along the front from Pozières to the Somme. Our troops carry strong positions and gain ground towards Ginchy and Guillemont. The French carry a further great part of Maurepas village.

AUG. 19.—German High Seas Fleet comes out, but retires in face of British forces in considerable strength. Two British light cruisers, the Nottingham and the Falmouth, were torpedoed. One enemy submarine destroyed, another rammed.

Submarine E 23 torpedoes and sinks German battleship of the Nassau class.

Thiepval ridge captured.

AUG. 20.—British gain more ground north of Bazentin-le-Petit. Bulgarians reported advancing on Kavalla.

AUG. 21.—Sir Charles Monro succeeds Sir Beauchamp Duff as commander-in-chief in India.

General Smuts, moving on Dar-es-Salaam, supported by warships operating at sea. Deventer defeats a German force near Kidete station.

AUG. 22.—Sir Douglas Haig reports progress near Pozières, in the Leipzig salient, and south of Guillemont.

Announced that troops of the Allies have landed at Salonica, the Russians arriving on July 30, the Italians on August 11.

Occupation of Kilossa, east Africa.

AUG. 23.—British troops gain another 200 yards of German trench south of Thiepval.

Zeppelin raid on east coast.

AUG. 24.—Several Zeppelins carry out raid on east and south-east coasts, one reaching outskirts of London.

French take Maurepas, and progress beyond the village.

British troops push forward 300 yards towards Thiepval. Russia reports her troops have retaken Mush.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

AUG. 25.—Admiralty announces H.M. armed yacht *Zaida* sunk; four officers and 19 men of her crew prisoners of the Turks.
H.M. armed boarding steamer *Duke of Albany* torpedoed and sunk in North Sea.

Naval aeroplanes bomb airship sheds at Namur.

In the Thiepval salient a determined attack by the Prussian Guard repulsed by Wiltshire and Worcestershire troops.

AUG. 26.—British gain 200 yards of German trench north of Bazentin-le-Petit, and make headway north-west of Ginchy.

Russian troops gain fresh ground on the frontier heights near Mount Kowerla.

AUG. 27.—Rumania declares war on Austria-Hungary.

British troops gain ground north-west of Ginchy.

AUG. 28.—Italy at war with Germany.

Bulgarians announced to have reached the Aegean coast at Kavalla.

British monitors bombard Bulgarian forces at the mouth of the Struma.

Zeppelin raid on Bukarest.

AUG. 29.—Rumanian army moves in the passes of the Transylvanian Alps. South of Kronstadt Austrian troops compelled to retire by "an encircling movement."

Officially announced that the total prisoners captured by British since July 1 are: 266 officers, and 15,203 other ranks, with 26 guns and 160 machine guns.

AUG. 30.—Lechitsky's troops, advancing in the Carpathians, capture Mount Pantyr.

General von Falkenhayn dismissed from post of chief of general staff; he is succeeded by von Hindenburg.

Turkey declares war on Rumania.

AUG. 31.—British launch discharge of gas "over a broad front" near Arras and near Armentières, with good results.

Rumanian army advances 20 miles into Hungary.

SEPT. 1.—Allied naval demonstration at Athens. Twenty-three warships, with seven transports, anchor four miles outside the port of Piræus.

A revolt of Greek troops in Salonica results in the surrender of the garrison to General Sarrail. Insurrection breaks out in various parts of Macedonia, and a "Committee of National Defence" is appointed.

General Sarrail announces enemy in full retreat both east and west of the Uluguru mountains, south of Mrogoro.

Rumanian victory at Orsova, on the Danube.

SEPT. 2.—Russians capture the Ploska height, just north of the Jablonica pass.

Allied warships enter port of Piræus and seize three German vessels. The Allied governments demand the control

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

of posts and telegraphs, the banishment of enemy agents, and punishment of Greek subjects in collusion with the Germans.

SEPT. 3.—British capture Guillemont and part of Ginchy. French capture the village of Forest and Cléry.

Hostile airship, one of 13 raiding eastern counties, attempting to approach the London area, is brought down by Lieutenant W. L. Robinson, R.F.C., at Cuffley, near Enfield.

SEPT. 4.—South of the Somme French attack over a front of 12 miles, from Barleux to the district south of Chaillnes.

Surrender of Dar-es-Salaam to British naval forces.

SEPT. 5.—Russians in touch with German-Bulgarian forces in the Dobruja.

British air raid on El Arish.

SEPT. 6.—British capture whole of Leuze Wood.

SEPT. 7.—Russians capture bridge-head of Halicz.

French gain at Verdun. Attacking the German line on the Vaux-Chapitre Wood-Le Chenois front, they carry it to a length of 1,600 yards.

Rumanians sustain a reverse at Tutrakau (Turtukai) on the south bank of the Danube.

British naval forces and Marines, with military landing-parties, occupy the ports of Kilwa Kivinje and Kilwa Kisiwani (German East Africa).

British naval aeroplanes raid enemy's aerodrome at St. Denis Westrem.

SEPT. 8.—Capture of Orsova by Rumanian troops officially announced.

SEPT. 9.—Sir Douglas Haig reports capture of whole of Ginchy village.

Bulgarian and German invaders of the Dobruja reported driven back.

On the Euphrates a mixed British force from Nasiriyeh drives Turkish irregulars northwards, killing 200.

SEPT. 10.—A British headquarters dispatch summarizes gains during the week September 2-9. British advanced on a front of 6,000 yards to a depth varying from 300 to 3,000 yards. The ground between Ginchy and Leuze Wood is also captured.

SEPT. 11.—The British operating on the Salonica front cross the Struma, and drive Bulgarians out of villages east of the river.

SEPT. 12.—French carry Hill 145, the village of Bouchavesnes, the woods of Marrières, and all the enemy trench system up to the Bapaume-Péronne road, capturing 1,500 prisoners.

Austrian air raid on Venice.

SEPT. 13.—French carry by assault the farm of L'Abbé Wood, 600 yards east of the Béthune road, and hold the German third line.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

SEPT. 14.—French increase their gains south-east of Comblès by storming Le Priez farm. South of the Somme they progress by the use of grenades to the east of Belloy-en-Santerre.

Serbian push forward towards Monastir, taking Garnichevo and most of the Malka Nidje ridge.

SEPT. 15.—British attack is made on a front that goes from a point north of the Albert-Bapaume road to Bouleaux Wood, a distance of six miles. Advance at various places some 3,000 yards, and take Flers, Martinpuich, and Courcellette, with most of Bouleaux Wood, and the whole of High Wood. Announced that for the first time a new type of heavy armoured car (tanks) was used in attack.

SEPT. 16.—Sir Douglas Haig reports continued progress, and estimates total number of prisoners captured at 4,000. British line now runs 500 yards to the north of High Wood. Russian victory north of Halicz.

Russo-Rumanian forces in the Dobruja retire to strong positions between Rasova and Tuzla.

The Allied forces in Macedonia drive the Bulgarians before them, and capture the heights overlooking Florina.

Italians capture the height of San Grado.

SEPT. 17.—Sir Douglas Haig reports improved position near Mouquet farm, and counter-attacks beaten off.

The French advance south of the Somme, capturing the villages of Vermandovillers and Berny.

In Macedonia French troops take Florina by storm.

A mobile column, comprised of Anzac mounted troops, camel corps, with artillery, surprises the Turks at Bir-el-Mazar, 65 miles from the canal, penetrates their trenches, inflicting considerable casualties.

SEPT. 18.—French troops carry the whole of the village of Deniécourt, and advance towards Ablaincourt.

SEPT. 19.—Reported heavy fighting in the defile of Merisov, in Transylvania. The Rumanians are moving towards Hatszeg.

SEPT. 20.—Great German attacks upon the French lines in the salient which cuts the Béthune-Péronne road between Le Priez farm and the farm of L'Abbé Wood repulsed with very heavy losses.

Allies declare a blockade of the Greek coast from the mouth of the Struma to the mouth of the Mesto.

SEPT. 21.—Enemy makes strong counter-attacks south of the Ancre against the New Zealand troops, all of which are beaten off with severe loss to the enemy.

East of Gorizia the Italians occupy a new position near Santa Caterina.

Bukarest officially announces that the battle of Dobruja, which began on September 3 (16th), ended on September 7 (20th) in the defeat of the enemy by Rumanians.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

SEPT. 22.—Seaplane attack on Dover; three bombs dropped, no damage caused.

SEPT. 23.—British, continuing their offensive on the Somme, advance to the east of Courcellette, where a strongly fortified system of enemy trenches is captured.

Great Zeppelin raid on London and the eastern, south-eastern, and east midland counties. Two Zeppelins brought down, one in south Essex, the crew being destroyed. The crew of the other set fire to their craft and surrender.

Italians take the summit of the Gardinal, south of the Avisio.

SEPT. 24.—Officially reported from Salonica that British troops cross the Struma in three places.

Two French airmen, Captain de Beauchamps and Lieutenant Daucourt, drop bombs on Krupps at Essen.

SEPT. 25.—The British and French, after a long and violent bombardment, resume their offensive. British troops take Morval and Lesbœufs on the Somme, and practically sever the enemy's communications with Combles.

M. Venizelos leaves Athens with a number of highly placed officers and many supporters.

Zeppelin raid on northern and north-eastern counties; 36 killed, 27 injured.

SEPT. 26.—The British take Thiepval, and, in conjunction with the French, Combles.

SEPT. 27.—North of Flers, on a 2,000 yards front, British advance to the eastern side of Eaucourt l'Abbaye. North-east of Thiepval they capture the Stuff redoubt.

SEPT. 28.—British line advanced north and north-east of Courcellette.

Text of the proclamation of the Greek provisional government published, signed by M. Venizelos and Admiral Conduroitis.

SEPT. 29.—British gains south-west of Le Sars, on the Bapaume road.

SEPT. 30.—Completion of three-months' battle of the Somme.

OCT. 1.—Attacking the German lines in the Somme area, British troops capture the whole of their objective on a front of 3,000 yards.

Zeppelin raid on east coast; one airship brought down in flames at Potter's Bar.

Rumanian diversion across the Danube between Ruschuk and Tutrakan.

OCT. 2.—Naval aeroplanes attack enemy airship sheds near Brussels.

OCT. 3.—Russians continue their offensive in Volhynia.

British recapture Eaucourt l'Abbaye.

French success near Rancourt.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- British Camel Corps detachments and armoured cars sweep the Dakhla and Baharia oases, in the western Libyan desert, taking 175 prisoners.
- OCT. 22.—Aeroplane raid on Sheerness.
- OCT. 23.—H.M.S. Genista, a mine-sweeper, torpedoed and sunk. All her officers and 73 men lost.
Hostile aeroplane raid on Margate.
British air raid on blast furnaces of Hagondange.
On the Transylvanian frontier the enemy take the village of Predeal.
- OCT. 24.—Enemy's line pierced at Verdun along a front of five miles to a depth of two. Douaumont village and fort, the farm of Thiaumont, and the quarries of Haudromont captured.
- OCT. 25.—Russo-Rumanian retreat in the Dobruja.
- OCT. 26.—Officially announced that the pressure of the enemy in the Dobruja has weakened. On the Transylvanian frontier the chief pressure of the enemy is being exercised in the passes south of Brasso, and mainly in the Toltzburg and the Predeal.
Ten German destroyers attempt a raid from Zeebrugge on cross-Channel transport service. One empty transport, the Queen, and several drifters sunk. H.M.S. Flirt sunk, and H.M.S. Nubian disabled by a torpedo and grounded.
- OCT. 27.—French closing round Fort Vaux.
Rumanians repulse enemy attacks in the valley of Pravatz, and advance in the Uzal valley, taking 900 prisoners.
- OCT. 28.—At Verdun French troops carry a quarry which had been organized by the enemy north-east of Fort Douaumont. British liner Marina sunk by submarine.
- OCT. 29.—British make further advance north-east of Lesbœufs. Rumanians continue their offensive in the Jiul valley, north-western front.
- OCT. 30.—French gains north and south of the Somme.
North of Veliselo the Serbians engage German-Bulgarian troops and score some successes.
- OCT. 31.—Rumanians surprise and overwhelm the enemy on Mount Rosca, and occupy it.
- NOV. 1.—British strengthen hold on the Seres-Demirhissar railway by the capture of Barakli Djuma.
Vaux Fort abandoned by the Germans.
An advance is made by Italians over a six-mile front, from east of Gorizia to beyond the Oppacchia-sella-Kostanjevica road; 4,731 prisoners taken.
Successful raid on Pola by Italian torpedo boats.
- NOV. 2.—Italians continue their advance from Gorizia to the sea, and take strong defences and 3,498 prisoners.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Nov. 3.—French carry their lines forward as far as the outskirts of Vaux village.

Nov. 4.—French take all the village of Vaux, and occupy Damloup.

Nov. 5.—French take most of Saillisel, and British in their centre progress on a front of about 1,000 yards, and take the high ground near the Butte de Warleancourt.

Nov. 6.—Lieutenant General Sir Bryan Mahon appointed commander-in-chief of the forces in Ireland in succession to Lieutenant General Sir John Maxwell, who takes the northern command.

P. and O. liner Arabia torpedoed in Mediterranean, all passengers saved.

British mounted troops round up the rebels at Darfur, capturing 200 prisoners. A'i Dinar, the ex-sultan, killed.

Nov. 7.—French take all the villages of Ablaincourt and Pressoir, push east of Ablaincourt, capture the strongly fortified cemetery, and advance as far as the approaches to Gommécourt.

Officially announced that from July 1 to November 1 Franco-British troops, in Somme fighting, take 72,000 prisoners.

Nov. 8.—Violent enemy artillery bombardment in the Prahova valley, where Rumanians repulse an infantry attack. In the Dobruja they advance towards the south.

Serbians repulse three Bulgarian attacks in the loop of the Cherrfa.

Nov. 9.—Rumanians report they have re-occupied Hirsova (Dobruja), with assistance of gunboats on the Danube.

Prime minister of Portugal announces Portuguese army ready to leave for the European battlefields.

Nov. 10.—British naval aeroplanes attack the harbour and submarine shelters at Ostend and Zeebrugge.

A pitched battle takes place between a British and a German air squadron on the west front, each of 30 machines or more. Enemy squadron broken up and dispersed, 15 of his machines fall out or driven down, seven British machines missing.

Reported that Allied force has driven enemy from Dumarea, at the Rumanian side of Danube bridge at Cernavoda.

Dutch mail steamer *Konigin Regentes* captured by enemy.

British storm and capture eastern portion of Regina trench on a front of 1,000 yards.

Serbians storm the Chuke heights and carry the village of Polog, taking 600 prisoners.

Nov. 11.—French recapture greater part of Saillisel.

British deliver gas attack south of Ypres.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Nov. 12.—French take whole of Saillisel.

Rumanians report they have advanced in the Dobruja as far as the Topalu (Danube), Iuan-Cisme, Carauasuff (Black Sea) front.

Nov. 13.—British attack on both sides of the Ancre, and penetrate the German defences on a front of nearly five miles, taking the strongly fortified village of St. Pierre Divion, Beaumont-Hamel, and over 3,300 prisoners.

Continuing their offensive towards Monastir, Serbians drive the Bulgarians out of Iven, 15 miles east of Monastir.

Rumanians admit yielding ground in the region of Saracinești, to the south of the Roter Turm pass.

Nov. 14.—Sir Douglas Haig reports continued success, the troops capturing Beaumont-Hamel, and advancing east of the Butte de Warlencourt. Prisoners to date number over 5,000.

Nov. 15.—Sir Douglas Haig reports British troops establish positions gained north and south of the Ancre.

Rumanian retreat in the western valleys south of the Roter Turm and Vulkan passes.

British air raid on Ostend and Zeebrugge.

Bulgarians abandon Kenali line.

Nov. 16.—French drive Germans out of Pressoir.

Rumanians admit retirements in the valley of the Aluta and in the region of the Jiul.

Nov. 17.—Flight Captain de Beauchamps bombs Munich, then flies across the Alps, landing north of Venice, making a non-stop flight of 437½ miles.

British naval aeroplanes make another raid on Ostend and Zeebrugge.

Nov. 18.—British advance north and south of the Ancre, and reach the outskirts of Grandcourt.

Germans claim to have broken the Rumanian front in the western valley of the Jiul.

Nov. 19.—Sir Douglas Haig reports a total of 6,962 prisoners taken since November 13.

Capture of Monastir by Allied troops.

Ultimatum to ministers of the enemy Powers at Athens to leave the capital by November 22.

Nov. 20.—Allies pursuing enemy from Monastir; advance on Prilep.

Officially reported that in the valley of the Jiul the Rumanians continue to retire towards the south.

Nov. 21.—Death of Emperor Francis Joseph.

German troops occupy Craiova.

British hospital ship Britannic sunk by mine or torpedo in the Zee Channel, in the Aegean Sea; 1,106 survivors, over 100 lost.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Nov. 22.—On the western shore of Lake Prespa, west of Monastir, French troops occupy Leskovetz, about 10 miles south-east of Ochrida, and continue their advance towards the north.

Zeebrugge raided by British naval aeroplanes, an enemy destroyer hit.

Nov. 23.—Naval raid on south-east coast. Six German destroyers, during the night attempt to approach the north end of the Downs, fire about 12 rounds, and steam off at once. One shell hits a drifter without injuring any of her crew. It is denied that shells hit Ramsgate, as the enemy's communiqué reports.

Nov. 24.—British hospital ship Braemar Castle announced mined or torpedoed in Aegean Sea; all on board saved.

Mackensen reported to have forced the Danube. Rumanians give up Orsova and Turnu Severin, and continue retreat.

Nov. 25.—Bukarest admits her troops retire on the left bank of the Alt, in the direction of Dragasani and Slatina.

Nov. 26.—Falkenhayn's army has come into touch with Mackensen's, which has crossed the Danube at Zimnicea. German advance continued in south-western part of Wallachia.

Zouaves carry by storm Hill 1,050, north-east of Monastir.

German sea raid near Lowestoft; armed trawler Narval sunk.

Nov. 27.—Rumanians abandon the line of the Olt (Aluta), and fall back. Alexandria, on the Vedeia river, reported in German hands. On the Rumanian right, Rymmk, on the Olt river, has fallen to the enemy.

Zeppelin raid on northern counties. One airship brought down in flames into the sea off the coast of Durham.

Serbians carry a height north-west of Grunisht. Zouaves storm a crest east of Hill 1,050.

Nov. 28.—Another Zeppelin which took part in the raid on the night of November 27 brought down in flames nine miles out at sea off the Norfolk coast.

Enemy aeroplane drops six bombs on London in midday raid. Later in day the same machine brought down by the French off Dunkirk.

Germans holding Giurgevo, on the Danube, almost due south of Bukarest, and Curtea de Arges in the north.

Nov. 29.—Sir John Jellicoe becomes first sea lord; Sir David Beatty is appointed to command the Grand Fleet.

Nov. 30.—Mackensen reported attacking 12 miles from inner forts of Bukarest. Rumanian government removed to Jassy.

Greek government refuses Admiral du Fourmet's demand for the surrender of arms.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- DEC. 1.—Allied troops land at Athens, and are attacked by Greek troops.
 War Office issues statement recording the defeat and dispersal of enemy force in German East Africa, which, driven out of Tabara by the Belgians in September, attempted to join the German troops in the south-central region of the territory. The force has been divided into two parts, one of which surrendered.
- DEC. 2.—Rumanian troops turn in their retreat and oppose the enemy's advance. Latter driven back on the road from Bukarest to Alexandria. Rumanians recapture Comana and Gostinar.
- DEC. 3.—Announced that government is to be reconstructed. Rumanians defeated at battle of the Arges.
- DEC. 4.—Petrograd announces, Rumanians under uninterrupted enemy pressure retiring in the Pitesti-Targoviste area. Serbians carry by assault the village of Staravina.
- DEC. 5.—Mr. Asquith resigns premiership, and Mr. Lloyd George resigns as secretary for war. Continued Rumanian retreat towards the east; enemy advancing towards Ploesti.
- DEC. 6.—Mr. Lloyd George to form a National government. Fall of Bukarest. Russians lose again the commanding height of the Jablonica pass. Germans attacking at Verdun win slight gains on Hill 304.
- DEC. 7.—Mr. Lloyd George, premier. He accepts the king's offer of the post of prime minister and first lord of the Treasury. Germans announce Rumanian rearguard at Orsova forced into engagement on River Olt, and obliged to capitulate with 8,000 men.
- DEC. 8.—Russians attack three miles south of Jawornik, in the south-east corner of Galicia. Allied blockade of Greece.
- DEC. 9.—British raid enemy trenches at Neuville St. Vaast and Souchez. French make successful coup de main against a German salient in the region of the Butte de Mesnil.
- DEC. 10.—British bombard heavily various points behind the enemy's line. Russians report that in Wallachia the Rumanian troops, under unceasing hostile pressure, continue to retire eastward.
- DEC. 11.—Names of the new "War Cabinet" announced. Allied air raid on Zeebrugge. Russians reported to have advanced in the Carpathians in the region of Kirlibaba and in the valley of the Trotus river.
- DEC. 12.—French troops carry five small Bulgarian posts south of the Lumnitza river, south-west of Ghevveli.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

Germany's peace move. At a specially summoned meeting of the Reichstag, the chancellor makes a speech outlining Germany's willingness to open peace negotiations. Overtures for such negotiations to be made through neutral governments by the four Central Powers.

Rumanian retreat continued; enemy in possession of Urziceni and Mizil.

DEC. 13.—Changes in French higher command. General Nivelle to command in the field on the western front. General Joffre becomes "technical military adviser" to the new French war committee. Vice Admiral Guchet to command Allied fleet in the Mediterranean in place of Admiral Fournet.

British troops advance on Kut from the south on the Hai river. Crossing to the west bank of the river, they clear the Turkish trenches and a position $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Kut.

DEC. 14.—Near the Jablonica pass, Russian artillery bombards Kövösmezo.

French report enemy's artillery bombards the whole of the Serbian front and the town of Monastir.

DEC. 15.—Attacking the Germans on the east bank of the Meuse, to the north of Douaumont, French break their front over a depth of two miles, taking Vatherauville and Louvemont, and the works of Harcourt and Bézouvaux. French announce German prisoners amount to 7,500.

Allies' ultimatum to Greece results in compliance of latter.

British outposts pushed on to within three-quarters of a mile of the Tigris, south of Kut.

DEC. 16.—French victory at Verdun extended. The village of Bézouvaux carried, and prisoners now total 10,000.

British troops near Kut extend their hold over the Hai.

DEC. 17.—Successful British trench raids near Ransart, and south-west of Wytschaete.

DEC. 18.—German counter-attack at Verdun gains a footing in the farm of Chambrettes, but driven out. The French report they have taken 11,387 prisoners since December 15.

DEC. 19.—French report lively artillery fighting on both sides of the right bank of the Meuse.

Reported that German advance in Rumania has been checked before Braila, at the village of Botogu, 30 miles away from the town.

DEC. 20.—Russians report that an enemy attack south-west of Brody, near Bonikowica, breaks down.

DEC. 21.—British troops occupy the Egyptian town of El Arish, which had been for two years in the hands of the Turks.

DEC. 22.—British air raid on Turkish base near Bargela, Magdhaba, Beersheba, Auja, and railway bridge at Tel-el-Sharia.

Rumanians abandon Isaccea and Tulcha in the Dobruja.

DIARY OF EVENTS, 1916

- Text of President Wilson's note on peace to all the belligerents published.
- New Allied note delivered to Greece.
- DEC. 23.—Mounted troops in Egypt carry strong enemy position at Magdhaba.
- Austrian naval raid in strait of Otranto; successfully driven off by Allied units.
- DEC. 24.—Officially announced that on the Struma front British troops carry out a successful raid on Kavakli, and the Royal Navy effectively bombards enemy entrenchments in neighbourhood of Teochari.
- DEC. 25.—British artillery active north of the Somme.
- On the Doiran front our troops successfully raid enemy's main-line trenches between Lake Doiran and Doldzeli.
- DEC. 26.—Announced that Bulgarians have evacuated Filipesti.
- Great artillery activity on both sides in the sectors Belloy-en-Santerre and Focquescourt.
- British naval raid on Galata (Gallipoli).
- British airmen bomb Dillingen, and French airmen bomb Neunkirchen and Hagondangoy.
- DEC. 27.—Announced that an invitation has been sent to the Dominion prime ministers to attend "a special war conference of the empire."
- General Joffre nominated marshal of France.
- Announced that more of the Allied line in France has been taken over by the British army.
- Germans claim success in Rumania in a battle lasting five days, and announce they have taken Rimnic-Sarat.
- DEC. 28.—Germans claim further successes at Rimnic-Sarat, and 10,000 prisoners.
- DEC. 29.—New German offensive on Moldavian border.
- DEC. 30.—Allies reply to German peace proposals with a direct negative; the proposals are characterized as sham, lacking all substance and precision, less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre.
- DEC. 31.—British effectively bombard the enemy's defences south-east of Le Transloy. An enemy ammunition dump is blown up as the result of their fire.

END OF VOLUME THREE

